54 occurrences across the corpus

Kebra Nagast

Kebra Nagast 72:41

And they went and argued their case before him.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Ketubot 8:1

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

Mishnah Ketubot 8:1

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

Mishnah Nazir 7:4

Rabbi Eliezer said in the name of Rabbi Joshua: for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite must shave, people are liable for entering the sanctuary, and for every defilement [conveyed] by a corpse on account of which a nazirite does not shave, people are not liable for one entering the sanctuary. Rabbi Meir said: such [defilement] should not be less serious than [defilement through] a dead creeping thing. Rabbi Akiba said: I argued in the presence of Rabbi Eliezer: Now if on account of a barley-corn’s bulk of bone which does not defile a man by overshadowing, a nazirite shaves should he touch it or carry it, then surely a quarter-log of blood which defiles a man by overshadowing, should cause a nazirite to shave should he touch it or carry it? He replied: What is this Akiva! We do not make here an ‘all the more so’ (a kal vehomer) argument. When I afterwards went and recounted these words to Rabbi Joshua, he said to me, “You spoke well, but thus they have ruled the halakhah.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1

Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:5

If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.

Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:5

If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.

Mishnah Chullin 4:4

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

Mishnah Chullin 10:1

The [law of] the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. For it might have been argued thus: if unconsecrated animals, which are not subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, are subject to these dues, how much more are consecrated animals, with are subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, subject also to these dues! Scripture states, “And I have given them to Aaron the priest and his sons as a due for ever” (Leviticus 7:34) only what is mentioned in this passage shall be his.

Mishnah Kelim 25:4

If [in a measure consisting of] a quarter [of a log] and half a quarter [of a log] the quarter measure contracted uncleanness, the half-quarter measure does not become unclean, and if the half-quarter contracted uncleanness the quarter does not become unclean. They argued before Rabbi Akiva: since the half quarter measure is the outer part of the quarter measure, should not the outer side of the vessel whose inner side contracted uncleanness become unclean? He answered them: Are you sure that it belongs to the category [of vessels] that have inner [and outer] parts? Perhaps the quarter is to be regarded as the outer side of the half quarter and, surely, the inner side of a vessel does not become unclean if the outer side contracted uncleanness.

Mishnah Mikvaot 7:1

Some materials raise the mikveh up [to the required quantity] and do not make it invalid. Some make it invalid and do not raise it up [to the required quantity]; And some neither raise it up [to the required quantity] nor make it invalid. These raise it up to the required quantity and do not make the mikveh invalid. Snow, hail, frosted dew, ice, salt, and thin mud. Rabbi Akiva said: Rabbi Ishmael once argued against me saying; snow does not raise up the mikveh [to its required quantity]. But the men of Madeba testified in his name that he had once told them: go and bring snow and with it prepare a mikveh from the outset. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: hailstones are like drawn water. How do they raise it up [to the required quantity] and not render it invalid? If the mikveh contained forty seahs less one, and a se'ah of them fell in and made up [the required quantity], they thus make up [the required quantity] but do not render it invalid.

Mishnah Yadayim 3:2

Anything which disqualifies terumah defiles hands with a second degree of uncleanness. One [unwashed] hand defiles the other hand, the words of Rabbi Joshua. But the sages say: that which has second degree of uncleanness cannot convey second degree of uncleanness. He said to them: But do not the Holy Scriptures which have second degree of uncleanness defile the hands? They said to him: the laws of the Torah may not be argued from the laws of the scribes, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from the laws of the Torah, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from [other] laws of the scribes.

Mishnah Yadayim 3:2

Anything which disqualifies terumah defiles hands with a second degree of uncleanness. One [unwashed] hand defiles the other hand, the words of Rabbi Joshua. But the sages say: that which has second degree of uncleanness cannot convey second degree of uncleanness. He said to them: But do not the Holy Scriptures which have second degree of uncleanness defile the hands? They said to him: the laws of the Torah may not be argued from the laws of the scribes, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from the laws of the Torah, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from [other] laws of the scribes.

Mishnah Yadayim 3:2

Anything which disqualifies terumah defiles hands with a second degree of uncleanness. One [unwashed] hand defiles the other hand, the words of Rabbi Joshua. But the sages say: that which has second degree of uncleanness cannot convey second degree of uncleanness. He said to them: But do not the Holy Scriptures which have second degree of uncleanness defile the hands? They said to him: the laws of the Torah may not be argued from the laws of the scribes, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from the laws of the Torah, nor may the laws of the scribes be argued from [other] laws of the scribes.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

Mishnah Yadayim 4:3

On that day they said: what is the law applying to Ammon and Moab in the seventh year? Rabbi Tarfon decreed tithe for the poor. And Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah decreed second tithe. Rabbi Ishmael said: Elazar ben Azariah, you must produce your proof because you are expressing the stricter view and whoever expresses a stricter view has the burden to produce the proof. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Ishmael, my brother, I have not deviated from the sequence of years, Tarfon, my brother, has deviated from it and the burden is upon him to produce the proof. Rabbi Tarfon answered: Egypt is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Egypt must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah answered: Babylon is outside the land of Israel, Ammon and Moab are outside the land of Israel: just as Babylon must give second tithe in the seventh year, so must Ammon and Moab give second tithe in the seventh year. Rabbi Tarfon said: on Egypt which is near, they imposed tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel might be supported by it during the seventh year; so on Ammon and Moab which are near, we should impose tithe for the poor so that the poor of Israel may be supported by it during the seventh year. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said to him: Behold, you are like one who would benefit them with gain, yet you are really as one who causes them to perish. Would you rob the heavens so that dew or rain should not descend? As it is said, "Will a man rob God? Yet you rob me. But you: How have we robbed You? In tithes and heave-offerings" (Malakhi 3:8). Rabbi Joshua said: Behold, I shall be as one who replies on behalf of Tarfon, my brother, but not in accordance with the substance of his arguments. The law regarding Egypt is a new act and the law regarding Babylon is an old act, and the law which is being argued before us is a new act. A new act should be argued from [another] new act, but a new act should not be argued from an old act. The law regarding Egypt is the act of the elders and the law regarding Babylon is the act of the prophets, and the law which is being argued before us is the act of the elders. Let one act of the elders be argued from [another] act of the elders, but let not an act of the elders be argued from an act of the prophets. The votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab should give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. And when Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit visited Rabbi Eliezer in Lod he said to him: what new thing did you have in the house of study today? He said to him: their votes were counted and they decided that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year. Rabbi Eliezer wept and said: "The counsel of the Lord is with them that fear him: and his covenant, to make them know it" (Psalms 25:14). Go and tell them: Don't worry about your voting. I received a tradition from Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, and so back to a halachah given to Moses from Sinai, that Ammon and Moab must give tithe for the poor in the seventh year.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 6:14

Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because betrothed she is his wife and married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll old ones over us! The new ones, after nissuïn, the old ones before nissuïn, when she was married in the second ceremony.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 5:8

Rebbi Simon says, Rebbi Eliezer stays with his opinion. Just as he says there, all that is defective was in his hand, so he says here all that is impure is in his hand. Rebbi Zeїra asked, may we not say that Rebbi Eliezer said it only because of a fence? Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that for a seah lifted from ṭevel he must give a name to its tithes? If you say the seah which fell is the seah which came up, it would not be necessary to give a name to its tithes! Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Zeїra is correct since we have stated after this: “A seah of pure heave which fell into a hundred of impure profane produce,” and Rebbi Eliezer does not disagree! The colleagues argued before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simon is correct, because otherwise would one burn heave because of a “fence”? He said to them, are the six doubts which we have stated not because of their “fences”? Do we not also burn here because of its “fence”? The colleagues said, we asked before Rebbi Yose: In any case, if it is impure heave, it should be burned, if it is profane, why could it not become impure? He said to us, is it not eaten as heave? Heave cannot be eaten except if it is pure, maybe impure? Do you not agree that if a doubt of impurity arose in its place that he cannot burn it? What is the difference whether a doubt of impurity arose at another place or at its place? But if you want to question, then question what Rebbi Hoshaiah stated, since Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “A seah of pure heave that fell into 100 seah of impure heave.”

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 1:35

“Second Tithe and dedicated [grain] that were redeemed”. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Assi, Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba, Rebbi Hillel ben Vales argued in the name of Rebbi Jehudah from the following: “First tithe given early, from ears, is free from [the obligation of] great heave”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:38

“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:4

Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because preliminarily married she is his wife and definitively married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll the new on over the old ones! The new ones, after the definitive marriage; the old ones before the definitive marriage, when she was married in the second ceremony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:34

Because Moses was lazy for circumcision, the angel tried to kill kim. That is what is written: “The Eternal met him and wanted to kill him.” Rebbi Yose said, far be the thought that Moses was lazy for circumcision but he argued on his own: To perform circumcision and leave would be dangerous. To wait, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him: “Go, return to Egypt.” But because he was lazy in preparing for the overnight stay before circumcision; that is what is written: “It was on the way, at the overnight stay.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, far be the thought that the angel wanted to kill Moses; it was the baby. Come and see, who is called ḥātān? Moses or the baby? There are Tannaïm who state that Moses is called ḥātān. There are Tannaïm who state that the baby is called ḥātān. He who said that Moses is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, blood is required from you. And he said that the baby is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, in blood you are preserved for me. “Ṣippora took a flintstone and cut her son’s prepuce and touched his feet.” Rebbi Jehudah, Rebbi Neḥemiah, and the rabbis. One said, Moses’s feet. Another said, the angel’s feet. Another said, the baby’s feet. He who said Moses’s feet: Here I cut your obligation for you. He who said, the angel’s feet: Here your mission was accomplished. He who said the baby’s feet, she touched the baby’s body. “He left off from him; then she said, a blood ḥātān for circumcisions.” From here that there are two circumcisions; one for baring the gland and one for the fibers.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:40

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:12

MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:12

MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:12

MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:12

MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:13

HALAKHAH: “In civil suits, one who argued for credit,” etc. Rebbi said, if they only miss saying, Mr. X, you are acquitted, or you are convicted; it does not apply to the discussion. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it also applies to the discussion.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:27

MISHNAH: The Synhedrion was like a semicircular threshing floor, so that they could see one another. Two court reporters were standing before them, one to the right and one to the left, and they wrote down the arguments of those who argued for acquittal and those who argued for conviction. Rebbi Jehudah says, there were three. One wrote the arguments for conviction, one wrote the arguments for acquittal, and one wrote the arguments for acquittal and for conviction. Three rows of students of the Sages were sitting before them; each one of them knew his place. If they needed to ordain, they ordained one from the first row. One of the second row came to sit in the first, and one of the third came to sit in the second. They chose a person from the general public and placed him in the third row; he did not sit in the place of the one promoted but in the place befitting him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 4:27

MISHNAH: The Synhedrion was like a semicircular threshing floor, so that they could see one another. Two court reporters were standing before them, one to the right and one to the left, and they wrote down the arguments of those who argued for acquittal and those who argued for conviction. Rebbi Jehudah says, there were three. One wrote the arguments for conviction, one wrote the arguments for acquittal, and one wrote the arguments for acquittal and for conviction. Three rows of students of the Sages were sitting before them; each one of them knew his place. If they needed to ordain, they ordained one from the first row. One of the second row came to sit in the first, and one of the third came to sit in the second. They chose a person from the general public and placed him in the third row; he did not sit in the place of the one promoted but in the place befitting him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:3

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first time one listens to him whether or not his arguments are substantial. After that, if his arguments are substantial one listens to him, otherwise one does not listen to him. They said, only if his later arguments are substantial. Ḥizqiah asked: If he was led out to be executed when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, this is a donkey’s question. But it must be: If he was led out to be executed and said, I have to argue for my acquittal: when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? He said, that is a statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:3

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first time one listens to him whether or not his arguments are substantial. After that, if his arguments are substantial one listens to him, otherwise one does not listen to him. They said, only if his later arguments are substantial. Ḥizqiah asked: If he was led out to be executed when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? Rebbi Joḥanan heard this and said, this is a donkey’s question. But it must be: If he was led out to be executed and said, I have to argue for my acquittal: when he became paralyzed, do we say that had he not become paralyzed, he would have argued for his acquittal? He said, that is a statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:126

It was necessary [to have both this and the former teaching of Rab Judah in the name of Samuel] ; for if he had given us only the first teaching, [we might have argued,] To whom does this apply ? To a person who said the Tefillah alone and is repeating it alone ;

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:143

Only in the case of a roan with a running issue who has experienced emission does R. Judah grant exemption, because he was not originally under the obligation to bathe ; but [it may be argued] a man who is merely a Ba'al Keri he does compel [to have immersion].

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:54

Then he should have specified wheaten-flour, and [we could have argued for ourselves] how much more so barley-flour!

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:427

And they answered me, If so, then even according to you, who says that invalid skhakh invalidates only if there are four cubits, how [would it be] if there was invalid skhakh of less than four cubits, and [next to it] an air space of less than three handbreadths? It would be valid. And if he filled in this space with metal spits? It would be invalid. Now [can it not similarly be argued] should not an air space which invalidates with three [handbreadths] be like the skhakh which invalidates [only] if there are four cubits?’

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:9

And Rabbi Yitzchak argued with him, For Rabbi Yitzchak quoted, "Shmuel said: 'They did not teach [that a stolen Lulav is invalid], except for on the first day of the holiday; but on the second day of the holiday, because he can fulfill his obligation with a borrowed [Lulav], he can fulfill his obligation also with a stolen [Lulav].

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:65

It has also been taught: Priests at their [Temple] service, Levites on their platform, Israelites at their station — all stop their service in order to come and hear the reading of the Megillah. From this the members of the house of Rabbi relied that they were to stop the study of Torah in order to come and hear the reading of the Megillah. They argued a fortiori from the case of the [Temple] service. If the Temple service, which is so important, may be abandoned, how much more the study of the Torah?

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:53

R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, opening the neck of a new garment on Shabbat is forbidden. R' Kahana argued, and what is the difference between this and opening a barrel? He replied to him, one is all connected, whereas one is not all connected.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:54

And R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, one kortob of wine fell in three logs of water, and it looks like wine, and this fell in a mikvah, it [the mikvah] is not impure. R' Kahana argued, and what is the difference between this and coloured water? As we learnt, R' Yosi says, coloured water makes a mikvah impure. Rava said to him, there it is called coloured water, here it is called diluted wine.