considered
561 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Excess sticks that exceed the sukkah are considered part of the sukkah. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the rabbis there: Only if it is on the entire front. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Even at a wall. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Even not at a wall. In the opinion of Rebbi Yasa it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, how could you be lenient in this if its sunshine is more than its shade?
How much rain should fall that it is considered fertilizing? If it fills a vessel of three handb̮readths, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yehudah says, the first rainfall one handb̮readth, the second one two hand breadths, and the third one three handb̮readths. It has been stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, there is no handb̮readths that falls from above that the earth does not raise two handb̮readths towards it. What is the reason? The deep calls to the deep by the sound of Your water spouts.
HALAKHAH: “How is the order of the fast days,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one move to the town plaza? To say, we are considered as if exiled before You. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because they prayed in privacy and were not answered; therefore they went public and were publicized. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one bring the Ark to the town plaza? To say that we had one precious vessel and our sins caused it to become debased. The Elder Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris said, our forefathers covered it with gold and we covered it with ashes. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said, why does one blow horns? To say, we are considered as if bellowing like animals before You. Rebbi Levi said, and why does one visit graves? To say, we are considered like dead before You. Rebbi Tanḥuma says, all of this is included. If we are guilty to die there are the dead, if exile there is exile, if hunger there is hunger.
HALAKHAH: “How is the order of the fast days,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one move to the town plaza? To say, we are considered as if exiled before You. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because they prayed in privacy and were not answered; therefore they went public and were publicized. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one bring the Ark to the town plaza? To say that we had one precious vessel and our sins caused it to become debased. The Elder Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris said, our forefathers covered it with gold and we covered it with ashes. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said, why does one blow horns? To say, we are considered as if bellowing like animals before You. Rebbi Levi said, and why does one visit graves? To say, we are considered like dead before You. Rebbi Tanḥuma says, all of this is included. If we are guilty to die there are the dead, if exile there is exile, if hunger there is hunger.
HALAKHAH: “How is the order of the fast days,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one move to the town plaza? To say, we are considered as if exiled before You. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because they prayed in privacy and were not answered; therefore they went public and were publicized. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, why does one bring the Ark to the town plaza? To say that we had one precious vessel and our sins caused it to become debased. The Elder Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris said, our forefathers covered it with gold and we covered it with ashes. Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said, why does one blow horns? To say, we are considered as if bellowing like animals before You. Rebbi Levi said, and why does one visit graves? To say, we are considered like dead before You. Rebbi Tanḥuma says, all of this is included. If we are guilty to die there are the dead, if exile there is exile, if hunger there is hunger.
Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: I wrote down for him most of My teaching. But was most of the Torah written down? Rather, more things are derived from what is written than what is derived from oral tradition. Is that so? But things derived from what is supported by a verse are preferred over those supported by oral tradition. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said: I wrote down for him most of My teaching, these are the admonitions. Nevertheless, is it not that they were considered foreign? Rebbi Abun said: If I had written down for you most of my teaching, would it not be considered Gentile? What would be the difference between us and the Gentiles? These produce their books and those produce their books. These produce their parchments and those produce their parchments.
Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: I wrote down for him most of My teaching. But was most of the Torah written down? Rather, more things are derived from what is written than what is derived from oral tradition. Is that so? But things derived from what is supported by a verse are preferred over those supported by oral tradition. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said: I wrote down for him most of My teaching, these are the admonitions. Nevertheless, is it not that they were considered foreign? Rebbi Abun said: If I had written down for you most of my teaching, would it not be considered Gentile? What would be the difference between us and the Gentiles? These produce their books and those produce their books. These produce their parchments and those produce their parchments.
May the body of a Pharisee be considered like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave? Rebbi Joḥanan asked, but did we not state, “somebody who let a vulgar watch his house, at times when he sees those who enter and those who leave, food, and drinks, and open clay vessels are impure. But couches and seats and clay vessels tightly wound closed are pure”? If you are saying, they considered the body of a Pharisee like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave then even those tightly [wound] closed should be impure. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, explain it concerning a vulgar at a Pharisee’s, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Mana said, so said my teacher Rebbi Yose, all that we are considering here refers to heave. You may know that this is so, since we have stated there, “even moved, even tied, everything is impure.” Did they not say they are impure, not because moving? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, concerning heave there is neither separations, nor movings, nor [private domain, nor] vulgar. May heave itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to sancta? Let us hear from the following. If one cuts a tube for sancta, he who cuts it and he who immerses it need immersion. One understands he who cuts. He who immerses? Could he not bind it with a (sit) [fiber] and immerse it? But explain it that he cut it in order to immerse it. May a sanctum itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to the ashes of the Red Cow? Let us hear from the following. Two pitchers, one pure for sancta and one pure for heave, who touched one another are both pure. But does not a baraita disagree? They made that the person pure for the ashes of the Cow who moved spittle or semen of one pure for heave that it became impure. The same is pure for heave and pure for sancta.
May the body of a Pharisee be considered like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave? Rebbi Joḥanan asked, but did we not state, “somebody who let a vulgar watch his house, at times when he sees those who enter and those who leave, food, and drinks, and open clay vessels are impure. But couches and seats and clay vessels tightly wound closed are pure”? If you are saying, they considered the body of a Pharisee like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave then even those tightly [wound] closed should be impure. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, explain it concerning a vulgar at a Pharisee’s, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Mana said, so said my teacher Rebbi Yose, all that we are considering here refers to heave. You may know that this is so, since we have stated there, “even moved, even tied, everything is impure.” Did they not say they are impure, not because moving? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, concerning heave there is neither separations, nor movings, nor [private domain, nor] vulgar. May heave itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to sancta? Let us hear from the following. If one cuts a tube for sancta, he who cuts it and he who immerses it need immersion. One understands he who cuts. He who immerses? Could he not bind it with a (sit) [fiber] and immerse it? But explain it that he cut it in order to immerse it. May a sanctum itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to the ashes of the Red Cow? Let us hear from the following. Two pitchers, one pure for sancta and one pure for heave, who touched one another are both pure. But does not a baraita disagree? They made that the person pure for the ashes of the Cow who moved spittle or semen of one pure for heave that it became impure. The same is pure for heave and pure for sancta.
May the body of a Pharisee be considered like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave? Rebbi Joḥanan asked, but did we not state, “somebody who let a vulgar watch his house, at times when he sees those who enter and those who leave, food, and drinks, and open clay vessels are impure. But couches and seats and clay vessels tightly wound closed are pure”? If you are saying, they considered the body of a Pharisee like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave then even those tightly [wound] closed should be impure. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, explain it concerning a vulgar at a Pharisee’s, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Mana said, so said my teacher Rebbi Yose, all that we are considering here refers to heave. You may know that this is so, since we have stated there, “even moved, even tied, everything is impure.” Did they not say they are impure, not because moving? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, concerning heave there is neither separations, nor movings, nor [private domain, nor] vulgar. May heave itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to sancta? Let us hear from the following. If one cuts a tube for sancta, he who cuts it and he who immerses it need immersion. One understands he who cuts. He who immerses? Could he not bind it with a (sit) [fiber] and immerse it? But explain it that he cut it in order to immerse it. May a sanctum itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to the ashes of the Red Cow? Let us hear from the following. Two pitchers, one pure for sancta and one pure for heave, who touched one another are both pure. But does not a baraita disagree? They made that the person pure for the ashes of the Cow who moved spittle or semen of one pure for heave that it became impure. The same is pure for heave and pure for sancta.
May the body of a Pharisee be considered like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave? Rebbi Joḥanan asked, but did we not state, “somebody who let a vulgar watch his house, at times when he sees those who enter and those who leave, food, and drinks, and open clay vessels are impure. But couches and seats and clay vessels tightly wound closed are pure”? If you are saying, they considered the body of a Pharisee like that of a sufferer from gonorrhea for heave then even those tightly [wound] closed should be impure. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, explain it concerning a vulgar at a Pharisee’s, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Mana said, so said my teacher Rebbi Yose, all that we are considering here refers to heave. You may know that this is so, since we have stated there, “even moved, even tied, everything is impure.” Did they not say they are impure, not because moving? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, concerning heave there is neither separations, nor movings, nor [private domain, nor] vulgar. May heave itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to sancta? Let us hear from the following. If one cuts a tube for sancta, he who cuts it and he who immerses it need immersion. One understands he who cuts. He who immerses? Could he not bind it with a (sit) [fiber] and immerse it? But explain it that he cut it in order to immerse it. May a sanctum itself be considered like a sufferer from gonorrhea in relation to the ashes of the Red Cow? Let us hear from the following. Two pitchers, one pure for sancta and one pure for heave, who touched one another are both pure. But does not a baraita disagree? They made that the person pure for the ashes of the Cow who moved spittle or semen of one pure for heave that it became impure. The same is pure for heave and pure for sancta.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked, what is the status of uninterrupted rest-water? Let us hear from the following: “What is rest-water? All the time that it rains and the mountains are muddy; after the rain stopped and the mountains still are muddy it is rest-water. When they are no longer muddy it is like cistern water.” How far? Ḥiyya bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Until the soft soil produces flowers. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum ben Rebbi Ḥiyya: Until they become like goose feet. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If the soft soil produced flowers before it stopped? Is it considered like a source retroactively or only for the future? In which respect? If he immersed in it needles and hooks. If you are saying that retroactively it is considered like a source they are pure, only for the the future they are impure. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked, how do you treat these waterfalls? Like pumped water or not like pumped water? May one irrigate from a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped? Let us hear from the following: “but one irrigates neither from rain water nor from pumped water.” Where do we hold? If in a time when it rains, is it not as if irrigating the ocean? But we must hold in the time when the rain stopped. If it is in the time when the rain stopped, is this not like a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped? Since you are saying that one does not irrigate from it this implies that one does not irrigate from a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped. May one irrigate from a pond which was filled with pumped water but one channelled well water into it? Let us hear from the following: One irrigates from an irrigated field which drips into another irrigated field. Rebbi Jeremiah said, as long as it drips. Is one able to irrigate because of the dripping, is it not rather because it is full? This implies that one irrigates from a pond which was filled with pumped water but one channelled well water into it. Samuel stated thus: One does not irrigate on a holiday from pools and ponds which were filled before the holiday. But one irrigates without hesitation if a water channel passes through them.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked, what is the status of uninterrupted rest-water? Let us hear from the following: “What is rest-water? All the time that it rains and the mountains are muddy; after the rain stopped and the mountains still are muddy it is rest-water. When they are no longer muddy it is like cistern water.” How far? Ḥiyya bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Until the soft soil produces flowers. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum ben Rebbi Ḥiyya: Until they become like goose feet. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If the soft soil produced flowers before it stopped? Is it considered like a source retroactively or only for the future? In which respect? If he immersed in it needles and hooks. If you are saying that retroactively it is considered like a source they are pure, only for the the future they are impure. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked, how do you treat these waterfalls? Like pumped water or not like pumped water? May one irrigate from a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped? Let us hear from the following: “but one irrigates neither from rain water nor from pumped water.” Where do we hold? If in a time when it rains, is it not as if irrigating the ocean? But we must hold in the time when the rain stopped. If it is in the time when the rain stopped, is this not like a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped? Since you are saying that one does not irrigate from it this implies that one does not irrigate from a pond which was filled from a well, but water supply from the well stopped. May one irrigate from a pond which was filled with pumped water but one channelled well water into it? Let us hear from the following: One irrigates from an irrigated field which drips into another irrigated field. Rebbi Jeremiah said, as long as it drips. Is one able to irrigate because of the dripping, is it not rather because it is full? This implies that one irrigates from a pond which was filled with pumped water but one channelled well water into it. Samuel stated thus: One does not irrigate on a holiday from pools and ponds which were filled before the holiday. But one irrigates without hesitation if a water channel passes through them.
It was stated: All these for whom they said that they shave on a holiday are permitted to shave during the thirty days of mourning. There are Tannaim who state, forbidden. [There are Tannaim who state, permitted.] Rav Ḥisda said, he who said permitted, if there happened to be a holiday; he who said forbidden, if there was no holiday. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda. If his mournings immediately followed one another he can lighten with a knife or coarse shears but not with scissors. But the second mourning relative to the first should be considered as an act of God and he should be permitted. Therefore it only was said for the honor of the holiday. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked, one understands the first Seven days. Within Thirty? Rebbi Ḥanania the colleague of the rabbis asked: Did we not state, these are the matters which are forbidden to the mourner during all Seven? If he would be forbidden during Thirty days, within Seven not so much more? It could not have been said except if mournings immediately followed one another. Does this imply that he is permitted? Rebbi Mattania said, he who said “forbidden”, as usual with scissors.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
HALAKHAH: “if she says ‘my husband died’,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that he died, and a woman says that he did not die; a woman said that he died and a witness said that he did not die.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.
“They asked Ben Zoma: Why is a doubt in a private domain considered impure? He said to them: Where is the suspected wife? In a private domain. He said to them, we find that she is forbidden for her house.” The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. But did we not state: “In any case where there is no mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure”? Therefore, if there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is impure. But here, even while there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure! “Why is a doubt in a public domain considered pure? He said to them: We find that the public prepare their Passah [as in] purity when most of them are impure. If known impurity was permitted in public, so much more for a case of doubtful impurity.”
“They asked Ben Zoma: Why is a doubt in a private domain considered impure? He said to them: Where is the suspected wife? In a private domain. He said to them, we find that she is forbidden for her house.” The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. But did we not state: “In any case where there is no mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure”? Therefore, if there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is impure. But here, even while there is a mind to be asked, the doubtful case is pure! “Why is a doubt in a public domain considered pure? He said to them: We find that the public prepare their Passah [as in] purity when most of them are impure. If known impurity was permitted in public, so much more for a case of doubtful impurity.”
HALAKHAH: “There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that she became impure, and a woman says that she did not become impure; a woman said that she became impure and a witness said that she did not become impure.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.
HALAKHAH: Gidul bar Benjamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. One should state: “A witness says that he saw the murderer, and a woman says that she did not see; a woman said that he saw and a witness said that he did not see,” as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property.
Rebbi Judah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If one of the brothers died, they all split evenly. Rebbi Mana said, that is necessary if they did not yet divide the estate. You should not say that he should be considered nonexistent and his house should inherit from him. If there was a (male) firstborn, you say the firstborn takes a double portion. What does he take? A double portion among his house or among all brothers? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: If there were two groups of daughters, they all split evenly. If there was a firstborn, you say the firstborn takes a double portion. What does he take? A double portion among his house or among all ketubot?
Rebbi Bar Qiria and Rebbi Eleazar were taking a walk on the road when they saw coffins being brought into the Land from abroad. Rebbi Bar Qiria said to Rebbi Eleazar: What good is that going to do them? I am reading for them (Jer. 2:7) “My inheritance your considered an abomination” during your lifetime, “you came and made My Land impure” in your death. He said to him, when they arrive in the Land, one takes a lump of earth and puts it on the coffin, as it is written (Deut. 32:43) “His earth atones for His people.”
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers.
After it was delivered to her, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent, make me two sheets, one to lie on and one for [a pattern], only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.
If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?
HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.
HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody left for overseas together with his wife,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They considered a man and his wife as two witnesses since it is general knowledge that a woman will not be silent about another woman’s children. Rebbi Abun referred this to the later statement: “I married a wife overseas, this is she and those are her children;” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They considered a man and his wife as two witnesses since it is general knowledge that a woman will not be silent about another woman’s children.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody left for overseas together with his wife,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They considered a man and his wife as two witnesses since it is general knowledge that a woman will not be silent about another woman’s children. Rebbi Abun referred this to the later statement: “I married a wife overseas, this is she and those are her children;” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They considered a man and his wife as two witnesses since it is general knowledge that a woman will not be silent about another woman’s children.
Rebbi Mana asked: Can the depth be considered like the height? How is that? If about him who comes from up high, he sees it. But for him who comes from below.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who lent to another by a document,” etc. Rav Huna said, predating is invalid but the document is valid. But did we not state: “A predated prozbol is valid, postdated it is invalid”? That means, Rav Huna, Rebbi Eleazar, and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim. Rav Huna, quoted here. “Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it if only he delivered it in the presence of witnesses; and she can use it to collect from encumbered property. For the witnesses sign on the bill of divorce only for the public good.” How? If about those who denied their testimony, the denied testimony is as if nonexistent, and the document should be valid? If about those who did not deny their testimony, did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? What about it: As one formulates, “I, X ben Y, am taking a loan from you, Z, and U is guarantor.”
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rebbi Meїr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”
Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If one said, “an oath wheat and wheat I am not holding;” what? Let us hear from the following: “Not from place X, not from place Y,” he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, they considered a multiplicity of places like a multiplicity of kinds. If he had said, not from this place, not from this place; it would have been useful.
Rebbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. [Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect;] similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rebbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night, therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. Rebbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday; one gives him one measure.
“But what leaves is forbidden.” Rebbi Abinna in the name of Rav Jeremiah: When he introduced it inside the lattice railing. But if he did not introduce it inside the lattice railing it is permitted. That is about a pagan Temple which has a lattice railing. But if a pagan Temple has no lattice railing, the entire building is considered lattice railing.
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. For instructions they considered the settlement of the Land of Israel. For impurity they considered the majority of those coming to the Temple precinct. How? Do they estimate every group or only the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, when they are still outside they estimate themselves. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: For appearance they consider from Levo- Ḥamat to the brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi is, at that time Solomon celebrated the holiday, and all of Israel, etc.
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. For instructions they considered the settlement of the Land of Israel. For impurity they considered the majority of those coming to the Temple precinct. How? Do they estimate every group or only the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, when they are still outside they estimate themselves. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: For appearance they consider from Levo- Ḥamat to the brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi is, at that time Solomon celebrated the holiday, and all of Israel, etc.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. It is written: If from the eyes of the congregation, from him who is appointed as eyes of the congregation. It is written, they shall stand there with you. Just as you are neither proselyte, nor Gibeonite, nor a bastard. Proselytes are reasonable, but bastards? does the court appoints bastards? Rav Ḥuna said, when they breached the rules and appointed. Rebbi Ḥanania, Rebbi Mana. One said, as part of the Seventy; the other said, apart from the Seventy. He who said, apart from the Seventy, is understandable. But he who said, as part of the Seventy, therefore not apart from the Seventy? Since he is not suitable for ordination, he is considered like a stone.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If she bled a first and a second time and then interrupted for three periods before she bled again. Is that like one long regular period and she would retroactively impart impurity for 24 hours or like an interruption so that her timing would be exact? Rebbi Yose said to him, if at a time you considered her as ready to bleed you said that her timing was exact, in this case when you do not consider her as ready to bleed, not so much more? He answered him: If that is so, even if she saw only once she should not retroactively impart impurity for 24 hours until she bled three times after that interruption! He agreed that it is like one long regular period.
The Babylonian Talmud
that the deliverance [from Egypt] began also at night, but the complete deliverance did not take place until the morning. R. Joshua b. Levi holds that since the deliverance did not take place until the morning, [what happened in the night] is not to be considered a proper deliverance.
" They answer: Since the Rabbis instituted the prayer "Cause us, etc.," it is to be considered part of the Ge'ullah. If thou dost not admit this, how is it possible to affect the same union in the morning service ; for lo, R. Johanan has said : Before the Tefillah one says, "O Lord, open Thou my lips" (Ps. li. 17), and at its conclusion, "Let the words of my mouth... be acceptable" (ibid. xix. 15) !
In this case, since the Rabbis instituted the saying of "O Lord, open Thou my lips," it is considered part of the Tefillah ; so likewise in the evening prayer, the Rabbis having instituted the saying of "Cause us, etc.," it is considered part of the Ge'ullah.
In this case, since the Rabbis instituted the saying of "O Lord, open Thou my lips," it is considered part of the Tefillah ; so likewise in the evening prayer, the Rabbis having instituted the saying of "Cause us, etc.," it is considered part of the Ge'ullah.
R. Jacob b. Iddi and Rab Aha b. Hannina [differ in opinion]. One of them says : Those are to be considered chastenings of love which do not involve neglect of Torah; as it is said, " Happy is the man whom Thou chastenest, O Lord, and teachest him out of Thy law " (Ps. xciv. 12).
The other declares : Those are to be considered chastenings of love which do not involve neglect of prayer; as it is written, "Blessed be God, Who hath not turned away my prayer, nor His mercy from me" (Ps. lxvi. 20)
R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya b. Abba said to them : Thus declared R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Johanan : Both of them are to be considered chastenings of love ; as it is said, "For whom the Lord loveth He correcteth" (Prov. iii. 12).
R. Johanan said : Plagues and childlessness are not to be considered chastenings of love.
Are not plagues to be so considered? Lo, there is a teaching : Whoever is afflicted with any of four plague-symptoms is to regard them as nothing but an altar of atonement !
Yes, they may be considered an altar of atonement, but not chastenings of love.
Or if thou wilt, I can say the latter teaching refers to when the plague affects a hidden part of the body and the other to the case where an exposed part is affected. Is not childlessness to be considered [chastenings of love] ?
Rab Ashe said : Thou mayest even suppose that it refers to all of them ; for, since the Rabbis instituted it in the Tefillah it is to be considered as part thereof. If thou dost not admit this, how could one unite them in the evening,
since one has to say the prayer "Cause us, O Lord our God, to lie down"! But since the Rabbis instituted that prayer, it is considered part of the Ge'ullah ; and so here also, since the Rabbis instituted "O Lord, open etc." in the Tefillah, it is to be considered part thereof.
since one has to say the prayer "Cause us, O Lord our God, to lie down"! But since the Rabbis instituted that prayer, it is considered part of the Ge'ullah ; and so here also, since the Rabbis instituted "O Lord, open etc." in the Tefillah, it is to be considered part thereof.
Abbai said to him : What is there excellent in this? Behold, Rab Kahana has said in the name of Rab : One need not commence [the third paragraph at all] ; but if he has commenced it, he must finish it ! Shouldest thou argue that [to say the words] "And thou shalt say unto them" is not commencing, behold Rab Samuel b. Isaac has declared in the name of Rab : "Speak unto the children of Israel" is not considered a commencement, but "And thou shalt say unto them" is to be so regarded !
Rab Pappa replied : In the West they hold that "And thou shalt say unto them" is likewise not considered a commencement, until one adds "And they shall make for themselves fringes."
Further, how could Rab be considered as holding the same opinion as R. Joshua b. Karhah ? For Rab Hiyya b. Ashe has said : On many occasions have I stood before Rab, who first washed his hands, uttered the benediction, taught us the chapters, laid Tefillin, and after that read the Shema' ! Shouldest thou argue that the time for reading the Shema' had not yet arrived, in that case what purpose is there in the testimony of Rab Hiyya b. Ashe?
It can be neither R. Jose's nor R. Judah's. For were it R. Judah's, if the man had said [Grace inaudibly] ab initio he would also have fulfilled his duty ; if R. Jose's, even post factum it cannot be considered that he has done so. How is it then?
Rab Pappa said : A pig's snout is to be regarded as passing manure [for the purpose of reading the Shema']. That is obvious! No; it is necessary [to mention it], because even if it just came up out of the river [it is to be so considered].
R. Eleazar (another version : R.Aha b. Abba b. Aha in the name of our master) said : The teaching here refers to turbid water which is to be considered like the solid earth, so that his heart does not see his nakedness.
Rab Judah said : It is forbidden to read the Shema' in the presence of a naked gentile. Why is a gentile specified ? Even by a naked Israelite it is likewise [forbidden] ! [That it is forbidden with an Israelite is obvious] ; but it was necessary to specify the case of a gentile. For thou mightest have said : Since it is written with reference to the gentiles, "Whose flesh is as the flesh of asses" (Ezek. xxiii. 20), argue that [in this matter the naked gentile is to be considered] only like an ass ; therefore he informs us that to them also [when exposed] is "nakedness" attributed ; for it is written, "And they saw not their father's nakedness" (Gen. ix. 23).
Whom hast thou heard say that a whole room is to be considered as four cubits? It was R. Simeon b. Eleazar.
Abbai said : This teaching applies only to a receptacle which is not used expressly for that purpose ; but if it is used for that purpose, even ten receptacles are only to be considered as one. Raba said : A cloth
And Rab Assi said : Boser and Garua' and the white bean are the same. [The same as] the white bean, dost thou imagine ? Nay, the meaning is : The size [of Boser and Garua'] is like that of the white bean. Whom hast thou heard declaring that the Boser is [to be considered fruit] but not the grape-bud? The Rabbis. It states : "All other trees when they produce fruit."
In the meantime Raba recalled it and he said to him : Thou must surely mean a brew of ground dates ; and thou remindest me of something that R. Assi said, viz. : It is permissible to make Trimma from dates brought as an offering, but one must not make strong drink of them. And the Halakah is : Over dates made into Trimma we say the benediction "...Who createst the fruit of the tree." On what ground ? Because [the dates are considered] as remaining in their original condition [as fruit].
[A sukkah where the shach] was taller than 20 amah, and [someone] came to lower it by putting pillows and blankets on the floor: It is not considered to have been lowered.
Straw, and he nullified it: it is considered to be lowered, and all the more so earth that he nullified.
Naklitin are different, since they are permanent. If they are permanent, why are they not [subject to the same law as] kinofoth? As compared to kinofot they are not [considered] permanent, but compared to the bridal-bed they are [considered] permanent.
Naklitin are different, since they are permanent. If they are permanent, why are they not [subject to the same law as] kinofoth? As compared to kinofot they are not [considered] permanent, but compared to the bridal-bed they are [considered] permanent.
When he came before R. Hiyya b. Ashi the latter said to him: Thus said Rav, [In such a case the threads] may be cut and they are valid. Thus it is obvious that their cutting is considered their making, so too here, their cutting is considered their making.
When he came before R. Hiyya b. Ashi the latter said to him: Thus said Rav, [In such a case the threads] may be cut and they are valid. Thus it is obvious that their cutting is considered their making, so too here, their cutting is considered their making.
R. Gidal said in the name of Rav: The forked portion of a palm tree may be used as skhakh, even though [the branches] are joined together, [since] a natural joining is not considered a joining; and even if one later joined them [the skhakh is valid, since] joining of one thing [to itself] is not considered a joining.