111 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

Against Celsus, Book VII 37:1

Now if this is a true account of what constitutes the right and the wrong use of personification, have we not grounds for holding Celsus up to ridicule for thus ascribing to Christians words which they never uttered? For if those whom he represents as speaking are the unlearned, how is it possible that such persons could distinguish between “sense” and “reason,” between “objects of sense” and “objects of the reason?” To argue in this way, they would require to have studied under the Stoics, who deny all intellectual existences, and maintain that all that we apprehend is apprehended through the senses, and that all knowledge comes through the senses. But if, on the other hand, he puts these words into the mouth of philosophers who search carefully into the meaning of Christian doctrines, the statements in question do not agree with their character and principles. For no one who has learnt that God is invisible, and that certain of His works are invisible, that is to say, apprehended by the reason, can say, as if to justify his faith in a resurrection, “How can they know God, except by the perception of the senses?” or, “How otherwise than through the senses can they gain any knowledge?” For it is not in any secret writings, perused only by a few wise men, but in such as are most widely diffused and most commonly known among the people, that these words are written: “The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” From whence it is to be inferred, that though men who live upon the earth have to begin with the use of the senses upon sensible objects, in order to go on from them to a knowledge of the nature of things intellectual, yet their knowledge must not stop short with the objects of sense. And thus, while Christians would not say that it is impossible to have a knowledge of intellectual objects without the senses, but rather that the senses supply the first means of obtaining knowledge, they might well ask the question, “Who can gain any knowledge without the senses?” without deserving the abuse of Celsus, when he adds, “This is not the language of a man; it comes not from the soul, but from the flesh.”

The Mishnah

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:5

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:5

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:5

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].

Mishnah Bava Kamma 2:5

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].

Pirkei Avot (Mishnah Avot) 3:8

Rabbi Dostai ben Rabbi Yannai said in the name of Rabbi Meir: whoever forgets one word of his study, scripture accounts it to him as if he were mortally guilty, as it is said, “But take utmost care and watch yourselves scrupulously, so that you do not forget the things that you saw with your own eyes” (Deuteronomy 4:9). One could [have inferred that this is the case] even when his study proved [too] hard for him, therefore scripture says, “that they do not fade from your mind as long as you live” (ibid.). Thus, he is not mortally guilty unless he deliberately removes them from his heart.

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

Mishnah Niddah 4:6

If a woman was in hard labor during the eighty days prescribed for the birth of a female, all kinds of blood that she may observe are clean, until the fetus is born. But Rabbi Eliezer holds them to be unclean. They said to Rabbi Eliezer: if in a case where the law was stringent in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain, it was nevertheless lenient in regard to blood discharged during hard labor, in a case where it was lenient in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain is there not even more reason to be lenient in regard to blood discharged during hard labor? He replied: it is enough for the case inferred to be treated in the same manner as the one from which it is inferred. For in what way were you lenient upon her? From the uncleanness of a zivah, but she does have the uncleanness of a niddah.

Mishnah Niddah 4:6

If a woman was in hard labor during the eighty days prescribed for the birth of a female, all kinds of blood that she may observe are clean, until the fetus is born. But Rabbi Eliezer holds them to be unclean. They said to Rabbi Eliezer: if in a case where the law was stringent in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain, it was nevertheless lenient in regard to blood discharged during hard labor, in a case where it was lenient in regard to blood discharged in the absence of pain is there not even more reason to be lenient in regard to blood discharged during hard labor? He replied: it is enough for the case inferred to be treated in the same manner as the one from which it is inferred. For in what way were you lenient upon her? From the uncleanness of a zivah, but she does have the uncleanness of a niddah.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 4:9

The rabbis said, they inferred prayers from daily sacrifices. The morning prayer from the perpetual sacrifice of the morning (Num. 28:4): “The first lamb you should present in the morning.” Minḥah prayer from the perpetual sacrifice of the evening: “And the second lamb you should present in the evening.” They did not find anything to peg evening prayers onto it and simply stated it; that is what we have stated: Evening prayers have no fixed time. Musaph prayers are all day. Rebbi Tanḥuma said: In fact, they fixed it corresponding to the consumption of limbs and fat which were consumed on the altar during the entire night.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 7:45

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth year after planting only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the vineyard of the fourth year only from the Second Tithe, since you say that the Second Tithe started only after 14 years, similarly there was no fourth year after planting until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 7:45

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth year after planting only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the vineyard of the fourth year only from the Second Tithe, since you say that the Second Tithe started only after 14 years, similarly there was no fourth year after planting until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 1:28

Birds are not mentioned in the Mishnah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is inferred from [the statement of] Bar Dalaiah: “Chicken with pheasant, chicken with peacock, even though they look similar, are kilaim one with the other.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said that Rebbi stated for us a complete Mishnah: “The same applies to wild animals and birds.” Rebbi Jonah said, we need that of Rebbi Joḥanan, we state here “wild animal” and explain it there. We state here “domesticated animal” and explain it there. Birds, we stated there and explain it here. Rebbi Jose said, is that correct? It comes to tell you that birds are forbidden in kilaim!

Jerusalem Talmud Sheviit 5:11

Rebbi Ammi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does our Mishnah go back to the time before they decreed about spontaneous growth? He said to him, where you there on the upper floor? Rebbi Ammi inferred that the prohibition of spontaneous growth is from the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 5:28

It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that there is no Second Tithe in Syria, so there is no fourth-year orchard in Syria. Similarly, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that they did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years,, similarly there was no fourth-year orchard until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Maaser Sheni 5:28

It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, Israel did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years, seven during which they conquered and seven during which they divided up the land. Rav Ḥisda said, it turns out that the argument of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah is identical with that of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that there is no Second Tithe in Syria, so there is no fourth-year orchard in Syria. Similarly, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said that they learned the rules of the fourth-year orchard only from Second Tithe, since you say that they did become obligated for the fourth-year orchard only after 14 years,, similarly there was no fourth-year orchard until after 14 years. Rebbi Yose said, he follows his son’s argument; Syria was inferred from “after 14 years;” “after 14 years” was not inferred from Syria.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:44

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. Rebbi Zeïra said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted are not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Zeïra: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from seeds to grape skins he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? That means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; is it not logical that for all prohibitions of the Torah, whose prohibition is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition cannot be lifted, that we treat taste like the thing itself? From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Zeïra who says everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here he says, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:29

Rebbi Yose said, it was necessary that his aunt be mentioned separately, to exclude his maternal brother’s wife. It is said here his aunt, and it is said there, either his uncle or his uncle’s son shall free him. Since by his uncle mentioned there, the verse understands his father’s paternal brother, also by his aunt mentioned here, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal sister. Also his brother’s wife can be inferred from his aunt. Since by his aunt mentioned there, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal brother’s wife, also by his brother’s wife mentioned here, the verse speaks of his paternal brother’s wife. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael stated: It is said here his brother’s wife and it is said there, a man who would take his brother’s wife, she is niddah. Since a menstruating woman will be permitted after being forbidden, also his paternal brother’s wife may be permitted after being forbidden. This excludes his maternal brother’s wife, who cannot be permitted after being forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 7:31

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. Sowing and pruning were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since sowing and pruning are particular in that they perform work on the soil or on a tree, I have only what is work on the soil or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion do they not divide? He holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, are they not for making inferences? There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. Rebbi Eleazar said, a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical at all. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Why is it written that the Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the roof as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they do not compare. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed stakes are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine or squash.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shadow it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rav Oshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the roof as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they do not compare. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed stakes are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine or squash.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shadow it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rav Oshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:43

“Round, one considers it as if square.” Again this is Rebbi Jehudah’s. They inferred it from the sea. He made the sea cast, ten cubits. It is impossible to say “circular” since already it was said “square”. It is impossible to say “square” since already it was said “circular”. If you said circular, it would turn out to contain 160 times the measure of purity. If you said square, it would turn out to contain 122 times the measure of purity. Therefore you have to say that the upper two cubits were circular, the lower three cubits were square and it turns out that it contained 150 times the measure of purity. One verse says, it contained 2’000 bat, but another verse says, it contained a volume of 3’000 bat. It is impossible to say 2’000 since already it says 3’000 and it is impossible to say 3’000 since already it says 2’000. Therefore you have 2’000 in fluid measure which are 3’000 in dry measure. From here the Sages learned that 40 seah in fluid measure are two kor in dry measure.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 2:21

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “In addition, Rebbi Jehudah ben Bava said,” etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan, they inferred it from the courtyard of the Tabernacle: the length of the courtyard 100 cubits wide 50 by 50. 50 times 100 are 5’000. 70 by 70 are 5’000 minus 100, and we have stated “seventy cubits and a remainder.” And Samuel stated, they stated cubits and two thirds of a cubit. Seventy times two thirds and seventy times two thirds make 140 thirds each; 140 thirds and 140 thirds are 93⅓. There is missing from there 4/9 for the corner, there remain nineteen thirds minus one ninth. As we have stated, there is a slight difference which the Sages could not compute.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 5:14

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:24

There are Tannaim who state that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ. There are Tannaim who state that each of them is inferred from its place. He who said that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ, since at its fixed time which is said (here) [about Pesaḥ pushes impurity aside, also at its fixed time which is written about all of them] pushes impurity aside. He who said that each of them is inferred from its place, from where does he have it? It comes as it is stated: “Rebbi says, why does the verse say, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal. Since we learned only about Pesaḥ and the daily sacrifices that they push the Sabbath aside, since it is said about them at its fixed time, from where the rest of public offerings? The verse says, these you shall offer to the Eternal at your fixed times. For the Omer and what is brought with it, and for the Two Breads and what is brought with them, we have no information. But since it is said, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel, this fixed it as obligation that all of them have to be offered in impurity.” Just as they are brought in impurity, should they not be eaten in impurity? It is a decision of the verse: Any meat that touched anything impure may not be eaten. One would say that the same is valid for the Pesaḥ. This is different since from the start this is what it is for.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:24

There are Tannaim who state that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ. There are Tannaim who state that each of them is inferred from its place. He who said that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ, since at its fixed time which is said (here) [about Pesaḥ pushes impurity aside, also at its fixed time which is written about all of them] pushes impurity aside. He who said that each of them is inferred from its place, from where does he have it? It comes as it is stated: “Rebbi says, why does the verse say, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal. Since we learned only about Pesaḥ and the daily sacrifices that they push the Sabbath aside, since it is said about them at its fixed time, from where the rest of public offerings? The verse says, these you shall offer to the Eternal at your fixed times. For the Omer and what is brought with it, and for the Two Breads and what is brought with them, we have no information. But since it is said, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel, this fixed it as obligation that all of them have to be offered in impurity.” Just as they are brought in impurity, should they not be eaten in impurity? It is a decision of the verse: Any meat that touched anything impure may not be eaten. One would say that the same is valid for the Pesaḥ. This is different since from the start this is what it is for.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:24

There are Tannaim who state that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ. There are Tannaim who state that each of them is inferred from its place. He who said that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ, since at its fixed time which is said (here) [about Pesaḥ pushes impurity aside, also at its fixed time which is written about all of them] pushes impurity aside. He who said that each of them is inferred from its place, from where does he have it? It comes as it is stated: “Rebbi says, why does the verse say, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal. Since we learned only about Pesaḥ and the daily sacrifices that they push the Sabbath aside, since it is said about them at its fixed time, from where the rest of public offerings? The verse says, these you shall offer to the Eternal at your fixed times. For the Omer and what is brought with it, and for the Two Breads and what is brought with them, we have no information. But since it is said, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel, this fixed it as obligation that all of them have to be offered in impurity.” Just as they are brought in impurity, should they not be eaten in impurity? It is a decision of the verse: Any meat that touched anything impure may not be eaten. One would say that the same is valid for the Pesaḥ. This is different since from the start this is what it is for.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:24

There are Tannaim who state that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ. There are Tannaim who state that each of them is inferred from its place. He who said that all of them are inferred from the Pesaḥ, since at its fixed time which is said (here) [about Pesaḥ pushes impurity aside, also at its fixed time which is written about all of them] pushes impurity aside. He who said that each of them is inferred from its place, from where does he have it? It comes as it is stated: “Rebbi says, why does the verse say, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal. Since we learned only about Pesaḥ and the daily sacrifices that they push the Sabbath aside, since it is said about them at its fixed time, from where the rest of public offerings? The verse says, these you shall offer to the Eternal at your fixed times. For the Omer and what is brought with it, and for the Two Breads and what is brought with them, we have no information. But since it is said, Moses told the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel, this fixed it as obligation that all of them have to be offered in impurity.” Just as they are brought in impurity, should they not be eaten in impurity? It is a decision of the verse: Any meat that touched anything impure may not be eaten. One would say that the same is valid for the Pesaḥ. This is different since from the start this is what it is for.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: But since the he-goat of initiation obstructs, does the he-goat of the Day of Atonement also obstruct? And he accepted it from him. [On that Rebbi Mana said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish ask before Rebbi Joḥanan and he accepted it from him?] Should he not have objected to him that we do not find that anything obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, nor can anything not obstructing be inferred from anything obstructing? “He breaks the neck”, “to burn in smoke”. Since (breaking the neck) is done on top of the altar, so (breaking the neck) [burning in smoke] is done on the top of the altar. Breaking the neck obstructs, burning in smoke does not obstruct. “Permanently,” [“permanently].” “Permanently” is mentioned for the pan-baked breads and “permanently” is mentioned for the shew-bread.] The shew-breads are obstructive, the pan-baked breads are not obstructive. Since [“permanently” mentioned for the pan-baked breads refers to twelve,] so “permanently” mentioned [for the shew-bread refers to twelve. “Taking”, “taking”. “Taking” mentioned in Egypt, “taking” is mentioned for lulav. [Since “taking” mentioned in Egypt implies a bundle, so also “taking” mentioned for lulav implies a bundle.] For the lulav it obstructs, in Egypt it did not obstruct. Therefore we found things obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, and things not obstructing can be inferred from anything obstructing.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: But since the he-goat of initiation obstructs, does the he-goat of the Day of Atonement also obstruct? And he accepted it from him. [On that Rebbi Mana said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish ask before Rebbi Joḥanan and he accepted it from him?] Should he not have objected to him that we do not find that anything obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, nor can anything not obstructing be inferred from anything obstructing? “He breaks the neck”, “to burn in smoke”. Since (breaking the neck) is done on top of the altar, so (breaking the neck) [burning in smoke] is done on the top of the altar. Breaking the neck obstructs, burning in smoke does not obstruct. “Permanently,” [“permanently].” “Permanently” is mentioned for the pan-baked breads and “permanently” is mentioned for the shew-bread.] The shew-breads are obstructive, the pan-baked breads are not obstructive. Since [“permanently” mentioned for the pan-baked breads refers to twelve,] so “permanently” mentioned [for the shew-bread refers to twelve. “Taking”, “taking”. “Taking” mentioned in Egypt, “taking” is mentioned for lulav. [Since “taking” mentioned in Egypt implies a bundle, so also “taking” mentioned for lulav implies a bundle.] For the lulav it obstructs, in Egypt it did not obstruct. Therefore we found things obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, and things not obstructing can be inferred from anything obstructing.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: But since the he-goat of initiation obstructs, does the he-goat of the Day of Atonement also obstruct? And he accepted it from him. [On that Rebbi Mana said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish ask before Rebbi Joḥanan and he accepted it from him?] Should he not have objected to him that we do not find that anything obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, nor can anything not obstructing be inferred from anything obstructing? “He breaks the neck”, “to burn in smoke”. Since (breaking the neck) is done on top of the altar, so (breaking the neck) [burning in smoke] is done on the top of the altar. Breaking the neck obstructs, burning in smoke does not obstruct. “Permanently,” [“permanently].” “Permanently” is mentioned for the pan-baked breads and “permanently” is mentioned for the shew-bread.] The shew-breads are obstructive, the pan-baked breads are not obstructive. Since [“permanently” mentioned for the pan-baked breads refers to twelve,] so “permanently” mentioned [for the shew-bread refers to twelve. “Taking”, “taking”. “Taking” mentioned in Egypt, “taking” is mentioned for lulav. [Since “taking” mentioned in Egypt implies a bundle, so also “taking” mentioned for lulav implies a bundle.] For the lulav it obstructs, in Egypt it did not obstruct. Therefore we found things obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, and things not obstructing can be inferred from anything obstructing.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:5

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: But since the he-goat of initiation obstructs, does the he-goat of the Day of Atonement also obstruct? And he accepted it from him. [On that Rebbi Mana said, I am wondering how could Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish ask before Rebbi Joḥanan and he accepted it from him?] Should he not have objected to him that we do not find that anything obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, nor can anything not obstructing be inferred from anything obstructing? “He breaks the neck”, “to burn in smoke”. Since (breaking the neck) is done on top of the altar, so (breaking the neck) [burning in smoke] is done on the top of the altar. Breaking the neck obstructs, burning in smoke does not obstruct. “Permanently,” [“permanently].” “Permanently” is mentioned for the pan-baked breads and “permanently” is mentioned for the shew-bread.] The shew-breads are obstructive, the pan-baked breads are not obstructive. Since [“permanently” mentioned for the pan-baked breads refers to twelve,] so “permanently” mentioned [for the shew-bread refers to twelve. “Taking”, “taking”. “Taking” mentioned in Egypt, “taking” is mentioned for lulav. [Since “taking” mentioned in Egypt implies a bundle, so also “taking” mentioned for lulav implies a bundle.] For the lulav it obstructs, in Egypt it did not obstruct. Therefore we found things obstructing can be inferred from anything not obstructing, and things not obstructing can be inferred from anything obstructing.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:13

There, we have stated: “These take away and those put down. And the hand of one is close to the hand of the other, for it is said, before Me always.” The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s. But according to Rebbi Joḥanan does Rebbi Meïr agree that if they removed the old set in the morning and arranged the new set in the evening this is also “always”. “Rebbi Yose says, also these may remove and those put down; for this also is ‘always’.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Yose inferred this from the sitting of Aaron and his sons. As you are saying, at the sitting of Aaron and his sons it was necessary that the day deliver to the night and the night deliver to the day, so here it was necessary that the day deliver to the night and the night deliver to the day. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Yose said, it was sufficient that the day deliver to the night. What does Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph say about the sitting of Aaron and his sons?, Since if there, where it is written “always”, you are saying that it was sufficient that the day deliver to the night, here where it is not written “always” not so much more? You have to say that in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion there were seven erections and six dismantlings. In Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph’s opinion here were fourteen erections and thirteen dismantlings. It was stated: “All seven days of initiation did Moses anoint the Tabernacle, erected and dismantled it, and performed in it the services. On the eighth day, he erected it and did not dismantle. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, on the eighth day also he erected, anointed, and dismantled.” Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that erection in the night is invalid for service during the day. You have to say that in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah there were fourteen erections and thirteen dismantlings. In Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph’s opinion following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah there were 21 erections and 20 dismantlings.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 1:33

Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis asked: May one infer law of obligations from issaron? It was found stated, “he inferred law of obligations from issaron.” Rebbi Abun said, only he should not bring them in three vessels. Rebbi Abba Mamal said, even in many vessels.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:23

It is written, he shall sprinkle it on the cover. I could think on its top, the verse says, in front of the cover. I could think on its front, the verse says, on, in front of. Rebbi Zeˋira said, it needs to touch; Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, it does not need to touch. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the reason of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: he shall sprinkle it on the cover and in front of the cover. Since “the cover” mentioned there means in front of but not on its top and it does not need to touch, also “the cover” mentioned here means in front of but not on its top and it does not need to touch. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya thinks that the upwards sprinkling of the he-goat is inferred from the upwards sprinkling of the bull, but it is not so, but the upwards sprinkling of the he-goat is inferred from the downwards sprinkling of the bull:

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:23

It is written, he shall sprinkle it on the cover. I could think on its top, the verse says, in front of the cover. I could think on its front, the verse says, on, in front of. Rebbi Zeˋira said, it needs to touch; Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, it does not need to touch. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the reason of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: he shall sprinkle it on the cover and in front of the cover. Since “the cover” mentioned there means in front of but not on its top and it does not need to touch, also “the cover” mentioned here means in front of but not on its top and it does not need to touch. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya thinks that the upwards sprinkling of the he-goat is inferred from the upwards sprinkling of the bull, but it is not so, but the upwards sprinkling of the he-goat is inferred from the downwards sprinkling of the bull:

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:41

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat. The coals of every day and the Western light are inferred from the Day of Atonement. And the two censers are inferred from the remainder blood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 5:41

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat. The coals of every day and the Western light are inferred from the Day of Atonement. And the two censers are inferred from the remainder blood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:27

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, what could He have said instead of will not be deprived? “Shall not eat”? All eating in the Torah is by the volume of an olive, but here by the volume of a date. Rav Hoshaia said, “watch yourself, lest, not be deprived,” would be three warnings. Rebbi Ḥuna said, watch yourself regarding the saying which I said to you, watch yourself in matters of skin disease to be very careful and act, etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Punishment could [not] have been said about work since it is unnecessary. I could have inferred it from deprivation. [Since for deprivation] which is minor one is liable to extirpation, for work which is major it should be logical that one should be liable for extirpation. Therefore punishment was spelled out for work only to imply a warning preceding it. Since the punishment indicated for work is preceded by a warning, also the punishment indicated for deprivation is preceded by a warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one may infer about an “equal cut” even if it is free only on one side. Rebbi Yudan said, Is that not Rebbi Aqiba’s? And Rebbi Aqiba said, one infers about an “equal cut” even if it is not free.

Jerusalem Talmud Shekalim 6:31

“Incense”, he may not give less than for a fistful. It is said here “remembrance” and it is said there, “remembrance”. Since “remembrance” there means a full fistful, so “remembrance” here must mean a full fistful. Since “remembrance” there means two fistfuls, does “remembrance” here mean two fistfuls? Rebbi La said, they inferred fistfuls only from the shew bread. Since there a deficient fistful is disqualified, also here a deficient fistful is disqualified. Rebbi Yose said, the word of Rebbi Ila implies that one who volunteers a flour offering brings it according to the High Priest’s fistful. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: even according to the owner’s fistful.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the roof as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they are not comparable. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed poles are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine, or squash, or ivy, and used it as roofing it is disqualified.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shade it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:2

HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the roof as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they are not comparable. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed poles are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine, or squash, or ivy, and used it as roofing it is disqualified.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shade it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 2:33

HALAKHAH: To whom did he send? Since it was stated, Rebbi Joshua said, it would have been better for me would I be sick in bed and Rabban Gamliel had not sent this, it implies that he sent to Rebbi Joshua. Through whom did he send? Since it was stated, in the following expression he said to him, Aqiba, you consoled me, it implies that he sent through Rebbi Aqiba. What should he have inferred? Rebbi Yose said, we know that if they sanctified it without witnesses it is sanctified. For what does he testify? “For if they sanctified it and then the witnesses were found perjured, it is sanctified.” But did we not state, “it happened that more than 40 couples passed by and Rebbi Aqiba held them back in Lydda”? Because they are 40 couples. But if it had been a single couple he would not have held them back.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:3

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Why did the verse join the chapter of the nazir to the chapter of lifting the hands? To teach you that just as the nazir is forbidden wine so lifting the hands is forbidden wine. Then since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. Rebbi Jonah said, Joshua the son of the Circumciser and Rebbi Ze`ira disagreed. One infers it from the nazir, the other infers it from Temple service. But we do not know who inferred it from the nazir and who inferred it from Temple service. For him who inferred it from the nazir, since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. For him who inferred it from Temple service, since the service is forbidden to bodily defective persons, so lifting the hands has to be forbidden to bodily defective persons.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:3

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Why did the verse join the chapter of the nazir to the chapter of lifting the hands? To teach you that just as the nazir is forbidden wine so lifting the hands is forbidden wine. Then since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. Rebbi Jonah said, Joshua the son of the Circumciser and Rebbi Ze`ira disagreed. One infers it from the nazir, the other infers it from Temple service. But we do not know who inferred it from the nazir and who inferred it from Temple service. For him who inferred it from the nazir, since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. For him who inferred it from Temple service, since the service is forbidden to bodily defective persons, so lifting the hands has to be forbidden to bodily defective persons.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:3

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Why did the verse join the chapter of the nazir to the chapter of lifting the hands? To teach you that just as the nazir is forbidden wine so lifting the hands is forbidden wine. Then since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. Rebbi Jonah said, Joshua the son of the Circumciser and Rebbi Ze`ira disagreed. One infers it from the nazir, the other infers it from Temple service. But we do not know who inferred it from the nazir and who inferred it from Temple service. For him who inferred it from the nazir, since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. For him who inferred it from Temple service, since the service is forbidden to bodily defective persons, so lifting the hands has to be forbidden to bodily defective persons.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:3

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Why did the verse join the chapter of the nazir to the chapter of lifting the hands? To teach you that just as the nazir is forbidden wine so lifting the hands is forbidden wine. Then since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. Rebbi Jonah said, Joshua the son of the Circumciser and Rebbi Ze`ira disagreed. One infers it from the nazir, the other infers it from Temple service. But we do not know who inferred it from the nazir and who inferred it from Temple service. For him who inferred it from the nazir, since the nazir is forbidden skins and kernels, also lifting the hands has to be forbidden skins and kernels. For him who inferred it from Temple service, since the service is forbidden to bodily defective persons, so lifting the hands has to be forbidden to bodily defective persons.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:9

“The sexless.” Everybody agrees that a sexless who was torn open and turned out to be a male on the first day of a holiday is liable. Where do they disagree? On the remaining days. Ḥizqiah said, he shall be seen, he shall be seen, he who is liable on the first {day} is liable on the second; he who is not liable on the first {day} is not liable on the second. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Ila said, Rebbi Joḥanan inferred this from the Second Pesaḥ. As Rebbi Joḥanan said there, the Second Pesaḥ is make-up for the first, so he says here, all seven {days} are make-up for the first. Rebbi Hoshaia said, all seven {days} are obligatory. What results between them? A proselyte who converted on one of the other days. In Ḥizqiah’s opinion he is not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions he is liable. Is it the same for the impure one? In Ḥizqiah’s opinion is he not liable; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s and Rebbi Hoshaia’s opinions is he liable? Rebbi Yose said, there he is suitable; the tearing caused it. But here the impure person himself is not suitable.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:2

HALAKHAH: “The uncircumcised and any impure persons,” etc. “Every man”, to include the uncircumcised. Or “every man” to include the mourner? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is written, “no outsider shall eat sanctified [food]”. I forbade to you because of outside status, I did not forbid because of prepuce. The reddish Rebbi Tiufa asked before Rebbi Yose: may we not say, I did not forbid because of prepuce and because of mourning? He said to him, since one verse includes and the other excludes, I am including the uncircumcised who is missing some procedure performed on his body and excluding the mourner who is not missing some procedure performed on his body. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It said “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover and “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave. Since “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover implies disabling the uncircumcised, so “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave must imply disabling the uncircumcised. Rebbi Ḥaggai questioned: If “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover is in a group of laws disabling the mourner, also “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave should imply disabling the mourner. Rebbi Hila answered: They inferred from “under, under” only items mentioned in the paragraph. The sexless and the hermaphrodite came under another category. The mourner comes from second tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:40

There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:40

There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:7

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:32

Rebbi Eliezer inferred from the gift which Jacob had sent to his brother Esaw, for he sent him according to copulations. “200 she-goats and 20 he-goats,” one for ten; “200 ewes and 20 rams,” one for ten. “Nursing camels and their sons 30.” Rebbi Berekhiah said, because it is decent in his sexual behavior did the verse not publicize. “40 cows and ten bulls,” one for four since they are tired; “20 she-donkeys and ten he-donkeys,” one for two since they are tired.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:27

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:8

Rebbi Simai preached: “And the man,” that is the agent of the court. For if the creditor enters, he removes the best. If the borrower enters, he removes the worst. How is this? The agent of the court enters and removes from average quality. Rebbi Ismael says, it is a word from the Torah that the creditor should enter, for it is written: “The man whose creditor you are should bring the pledge out for you.” That is, his pledge. His real estate was inferred from his pledge. Since his pledge [is taken] from average quality, also his real estate [is taken] from average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:14

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:6

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This shall be an elevation sacrifice for thirty days,” it is an elevation sacrifice for thirty days; after thirty days it automatically becomes profane. What is its status regarding larceny? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the larceny is clear. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Hila both say, the larceny is in doubt. “You are preliminarily married to me for thirty days,” she is preliminarily married. What is the difference between dedication and woman? We find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption but we do not find that a woman could leave without a divorce document. Where do we find that a dedication can be eliminated without redemption? Following Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “they enter without paying.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it according to everybody regarding a bought field. “This is your bill of divorce for thirty days”: it is no bill of divorce. Rebbi Isaac ben R. Eleazar said, when do you say that she is preliminarily married? If he effectuated the preliminary marriage by money. But if he effectuated the preliminary marriage by a document, since marriage documents were inferred from divorce documents and in the case of a divorce she is not divorced, so in the case of a preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 9:29

HALAKHAH: It is written about torts that the collection be from the best quality, as it is said: “his best field, etc.” And it is written about a loan that the collection be from average quality, as it is said: “and the man to whom you are creditor, etc.” They inferred real estate from pledges. Similarly, should not pledges be inferred from real estate? Rebbi Simai explained: It is a word of the Torah that the court’s bailiff enter and collect from average quality. For if the creditor enter, he would bring out the best. And if the debtor enter, he would bring out the worst. But the court’s bailiff enters and collects from average quality. Rebbi Ismael stated: It is a word of the Torah that the debtor enter, as it is said: “and the man to whom you are creditor etc.” Rebbi La said, it was stated there: “to seize as pledge”, by the court. Outside the court, from where? The verse says, “if to seize as pledge you seize as pledge.” If he took the pledge without authorization, he transgresses all these verses. Rebbi La said, he caused himself to transgress all these verses.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 9:29

HALAKHAH: It is written about torts that the collection be from the best quality, as it is said: “his best field, etc.” And it is written about a loan that the collection be from average quality, as it is said: “and the man to whom you are creditor, etc.” They inferred real estate from pledges. Similarly, should not pledges be inferred from real estate? Rebbi Simai explained: It is a word of the Torah that the court’s bailiff enter and collect from average quality. For if the creditor enter, he would bring out the best. And if the debtor enter, he would bring out the worst. But the court’s bailiff enters and collects from average quality. Rebbi Ismael stated: It is a word of the Torah that the debtor enter, as it is said: “and the man to whom you are creditor etc.” Rebbi La said, it was stated there: “to seize as pledge”, by the court. Outside the court, from where? The verse says, “if to seize as pledge you seize as pledge.” If he took the pledge without authorization, he transgresses all these verses. Rebbi La said, he caused himself to transgress all these verses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:28

Rebbi Yose said, one understands from here: If three sat in judgment and one of them died, two sign and note: Even though we are two who sign, we were three in judging. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah implies this: “The judges sign at the bottom or the witnesses.” Does one learn court documents from prozbol? It was found stated: This about court documents he inferred from the rules of prozbol.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:21

Rebbi Yose said, it was necessary that his aunt be mentioned separately, to exclude his mother’s brother’s wife. What is the reason? It is said here his aunt, and it is said there, either his uncle or his uncle’s son shall freehim. Since by his uncle mentioned there, the verse understands his father’s paternal brother, also by his aunt mentioned here, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal brother’s wife. Also his brother’s wife can be inferred from his aunt. Since by his aunt mentioned there, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal brother’s wife, also by his brother’s wife mentioned here, the verse speaks of his paternal brother’s wife. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It is said here his brother’s wife and it is said there, a man who would take his brother’s wife, she is niddah. Since a menstruating woman will be permitted after being forbidden, also his [paternal] brother’s wife may be permitted [after being forbidden.] This excludes his maternal brother’s wife, who cannot be permitted after being forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:44

Rebbi Ḥiyya said that Rebbi Yasa asked: We have stated: “The herald goes before him: ‘X ben Y is led to be stoned because he committed crime Z; U and V testified against him. Anybody who knows of his innocence shall come and argue.’ ” We inferred that he who hears from one who heard has to rend. Does he who hears from one who heard from one who heard have to rend?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:13

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 3:12

MISHNAH: All those subject to extirpation are no longer liable to extirpation once they were flogged, as it is said, your brother would be despicable in your eyes. After he was flogged, he is your brother, the words of Rebbi Ḥanania ben Gamliel. And since one who commits a transgression may lose his soul because of it, if one fulfills a commandment certainly his soul shall be given to him. Rebbi Simeon says, from its place it can be inferred as it is written, the souls of the perpetrators will be extirpated, and it says, that a human shall do and live in them. Therefore, to anybody who quietly does not transgress a prohibition is given reward like somebody keeping the Commandments. Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi says, does it not say, only be strong not to eat blood, for blood is the life? Since one who desists from blood, from which a person recoils, receives reward, if one desists of robbery and sexual offenses, which a person desires and cherishes, certainly he should acquire the merit for himself, his descendants, and his descendants’ descendants to the end of all generations.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:123

How is it to be inferred that "one of the Seraphim" means Michael ?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:131

R. Isaac said : Whoever reads the Shema' upon his bed is as though he holds a two-edged sword in his hand; as it is said, "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand" (Ps. cxlix. 6). How is this inferred ? Mar Zotra (another version : Rab Ashe) said : From what precedes ; for it is written, "Let the saints exult in glory, let them sing for joy upon their beds" (ibid. v. 5), and this is followed by "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:360

When Rab Isaac b. Joseph came [from Palestine], he said : The statement of Rab Aha b. R. Hannina in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi was not explicitly said but was inferred.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:539

But R. Zerika stated that R. Ammi said in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish : It is "Who formest light." When Rab Isaac b. Joseph came [from Palestine], he said : The statement of R. Zerika was not explicitly made but was inferred ; for what R. Zerika stated that R. Ammi said in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish was : This teaches that the benedictions do not invalidate one another.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:543

It might have been inferred that it was certainly "With abounding love" that [the priests] recited, and when the proper time for reciting "Who formest light" arrived, they said it; and what means "The benedictions do not invalidate one another"? The order of the benedictions.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:127

Still thou canst not possibly maintain that it is in accord with R. Judah ; because from what is stated in the sequel, "R. Judah allows a minor to read [the Megillah]" it is to be inferred that the first part is not R. Judah's view !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:163

Rab Mari, the son of Samuel's daughter, asked Raba : Our Mishnah states : Workmen may read [the Shema'] on the top of a tree or on the top of scaffolding ; hence it is to be inferred that it does not require Kawwanah. I quote in refutation: Who reads the Shema' must direct his heart; as it is said, "Hear, O Israel" (Deut. vi. 4) and elsewhere, "Attend and hear, O Israel " (ibid, xxvii. 9) ; as here "attention" is required so also there !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:225

It is to be inferred that Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel is concerned lest a charge of presumption [be brought against a bridegroom who reads the Shema' on the first night of his marriage and therefore forbids it], whereas the Rabbis have no such concern [and permit it]. But we understood just the opposite of them ! For there is a Mishnaic teaching : In a place where they are accustomed to work on the ninth of Ab, we may work ; but in a place where they are not accustomed to work, we may not. Disciples of the wise must cease work in every place. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says : Everyone should regard himself as a disciple of the wise.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:5

GEMARA When the body is lying before him, he is exempt; [it is consequently to be inferred that] when it is not lying before him, he is not exempt !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:10

He whose dead [is lying before him] is exempt, but [so it may The be inferred,] not the watcher. But lo, there is a teaching :

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:11

Who watches the body, although it is not his dead, is exempt from reading the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah ! "Who watches the body, although it is not his dead" [so stated the Baraita ; therefore it is to be inferred] if it is his dead, although he does not watch the body, [he is exempt].

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:12

If it be his dead or if he watches it, he is exempt ; but [so it may be inferred] one who walks in a cemetery is not ! But lo, there is a teaching : A man must not walk in a cemetery with his Tefillin on his head or holding a scroll of the Torah and reading therein ; should he do so, he commits a transgression because of the injunction : "Whoso mocketh the poor blasphemeth his Maker" (Prov. xvii. 5) !

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:44

"Count not thy handmaid for a wicked woman" (I Sam. i. 16) — R. Eleazar said : Hence it is inferred that if a drunken person prays, it is as though he practised idolatry; for it is written here "a wicked woman," and elsewhere it is written, "Certain base fellows are gone out from the midst of thee" (Deut. xiii. 14) — as the reference in this latter passage is to idolatry, so also in the other passage idolatry is intended.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:172

"The Halakah being so, is it to be inferred that there are some who differ from him?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:3

Surely it is required [to teach as follows :] First, that the All-merciful declares [the owner] must redeem it and then eat it ; and second, only those things which require "a song of praise" require redemption, but if they do not require "a song of praise," redemption is unnecessary ! This is according to the statement of R. Samuel b. Nahmani in the name of R. Jonathan who said : [not translated] Whence is it that we say "a song of praise" only over wine ? As it is said, "And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine which cheereth God and man?" (Judges ix. 13). If it cheereth man, how does it cheer God ? Hence it is to be inferred that we have "a song of praise" only over wine.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:266

The same one says the benediction over the perfume, etc. Since he teaches, The same one says the benediction over the perfume, it is to be inferred that there may be somebody more worthy than he ; why, then, [is it his privilege] ?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:10

Come and hear : Three who ate together are under the obligation of Zimmun and are not permitted to divide themselves up. [Hence it is to be inferred that] three can and two cannot make Zimmun !