outset
46 occurrences across the corpus
The Writings of Origen
Celsus now sets himself to combat the views of those who say that the Jewish prophets foretold events which happened in the life of Christ Jesus. At the outset let us refer to a notion he has, that those who assume the existence of another God besides the God of the Jews have no ground on which to answer his objections; while we who recognise the same God rely for our defence on the prophecies which were delivered concerning Jesus Christ. His words are: “Let us see how they can raise a defence. To those who admit another God, no defence is possible; and they who recognise the same God will always fall back upon the same reason, ‘This and that must have happened.’ And why? ‘Because it had been predicted long before.’” To this we answer, that the arguments recently raised by Celsus against Jesus and Christians were so utterly feeble, that they might easily be overthrown even by those who are impious enough to bring in another God. Indeed, were it not dangerous to give to the weak any excuse for embracing false notions, we could furnish the answer ourselves, and show Celsus how unfounded is his opinion, that those who admit another God are not in a position to meet his arguments. However, let us for the present confine ourselves to a defence of the prophets, in continuation of what we have said on the subject before.
Now let us hear what it is that he invites us to learn, that we may ascertain from him how we are to know God, although he thinks that his words are beyond the capacity of all Christians. “Let them hear,” says he, “if they are able to do so.” We have then to consider what the philosopher wishes us to hear from him. But instead of instructing us as he ought, he abuses us; and while he should have shown his goodwill to those whom he addresses at the outset of his discourse, he stigmatizes as “a cowardly race” men who would rather die than abjure Christianity even by a word, and who are ready to suffer every form of torture, or any kind of death. He also applies to us the epithet “carnal” or “flesh-indulging,” “although,” as we are wont to say, “we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth we know Him no more,” and although we are so ready to lay down our lives for the cause of religion, that no philosopher could lay aside his robes more readily. He then addresses to us these words: “If, instead of exercising your senses, you look upwards with the soul; if, turning away the eye of the body, you open the eye of the mind, thus and thus only you will be able to see God.” He is not aware that this reference to the two eyes, the eye of the body and the eye of the mind, which he has borrowed from the Greeks, was in use among our own writers; for Moses, in his account of the creation of the world, introduces man before his transgression as both seeing and not seeing: seeing, when it is said of the woman, “The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise;” and again not seeing, as when he introduces the serpent saying to the woman, as if she and her husband had been blind, “God knows that on the day that ye eat thereof your eyes shall be opened;” and also when it is said, “They did eat, and the eyes of both of them were opened.” The eyes of sense were then opened, which they had done well to keep shut, that they might not be distracted, and hindered from seeing with the eyes of the mind; and it was those eyes of the mind which in consequence of sin, as I imagine, were then closed, with which they had up to that time enjoyed the delight of beholding God and His paradise. This twofold kind of vision in us was familiar to our Saviour, who says, “For judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind,”—meaning by the eyes that see not the eyes of the mind, which are enlightened by His teaching; and the eyes which see are the eyes of sense, which His words do render blind, in order that the soul may look without distraction upon proper objects. All true Christians therefore have the eye of the mind sharpened, and the eye of sense closed; so that each one, according to the degree in which his better eye is quickened, and the eye of sense darkened, sees and knows the Supreme God, and His Son, who is the Word, Wisdom, and so forth.
To this our answer is, that if the Scythians, the nomadic tribes of Libya, the Seres, who according to Celsus have no god, if those other most barbarous and impious nations in the world, and if the Persians even cannot bear the sight of temples, altars, and images, it does not follow because we cannot suffer them any more than they, that the grounds on which we object to them are the same as theirs. We must inquire into the principles on which the objection to temples and images is founded, in order that we may approve of those who object on sound principles, and condemn those whose principles are false. For one and the same thing may be done for different reasons. For example, the philosophers who follow Zeno of Citium abstain from committing adultery, the followers of Epicurus do so too, as well as others again who do so on no philosophical principles; but observe what different reasons determine the conduct of these different classes. The first consider the interests of society, and hold it to be forbidden by nature that a man who is a reasonable being should corrupt a woman whom the laws have already given to another, and should thus break up the household of another man. The Epicureans do not reason in this way; but if they abstain from adultery, it is because, regarding pleasure as the chief end of man, they perceive that one who gives himself up to adultery, encounters for the sake of this one pleasure a multitude of obstacles to pleasure, such as imprisonment, exile, and death itself. They often, indeed, run considerable risk at the outset, while watching for the departure from the house of the master and those in his interest. So that, supposing it possible for a man to commit adultery, and escape the knowledge of the husband, of his servants, and of others whose esteem he would forfeit, then the Epicurean would yield to the commission of the crime for the sake of pleasure. The man of no philosophical system, again, who abstains from adultery when the opportunity comes to him, does so generally from dread of the law and its penalties, and not for the sake of enjoying a greater number of other pleasures. You see, then, that an act which passes for being one and the same—namely, abstinence from adultery—is not the same, but differs in different men according to the motives which actuate it: one man refraining for sound reasons, another for such bad and impious ones as those of the Epicurean, and the common person of whom we have spoken.
The Mishnah
If one finds produce on the road and picks it up in order to eat it, and then decides to hide it, he may not hide it unless he has [first] tithed it. But if from the outset he picked it up only in order to guard it against being destroyed, he is exempt [from tithing it]. Any produce which one may not sell [in the condition of] demai, he may not send it [as a gift] to his friend [in the condition of] demai. Rabbi Yose permits [one to send as a gift produce] that is certainly untithed, on condition that he makes the matter known to the recipient.
One who has planted two rows [of vines] if there are not eight cubits between them, he may not bring seed there [in the space between the two rows]. If there are three [rows] if there are not between one row and its companion sixteen cubits he may not bring seed there. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said in the name of Hananya ben Hakinai: even if the middle row was laid waste and there is not between one row and its companion row sixteen cubits, he may not bring seed there, but if he had planted them [two rows] at the outset, it is permitted [to sow between them] if they are eight cubits [apart].
They may not give terumah from impure [produce] for that which is pure. If he did give: If unwittingly, the terumah is valid; If intentionally he has done nothing. So too, if a Levite had [unclean] tithe [from which terumah] had not been given, and he gave terumah from this, if unwittingly, the terumah is valid, if intentionally he has done nothing. Rabbi Judah says: if he knew of it at the outset, even if done in error, he has done nothing.
One may replace a plaster bandage on a wound in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. A harp string may be tied up in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. One may remove a wart in the Temple but not in the country. If [the operation must be performed] with an instrument it is forbidden in both.
One may replace a plaster bandage on a wound in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. A harp string may be tied up in the Temple but not in the country. At the outset, it is prohibited in both. One may remove a wart in the Temple but not in the country. If [the operation must be performed] with an instrument it is forbidden in both.
They may not be counted as having a share in an animal at the outset on Yom Tov, but they may be counted [as having a share in an animal] on the eve of Yom Tov, and they may then slaughter it and divide it between them [on Yom Tov]. Rabbi Judah says: a man may weigh meat [on Yom Tov] against a utensil or against a butcher's chopper. But the sages say: one may not pay attention to the scales at all.
One may not chop up wood, neither from beams nor from a beam which was broken on Yom Tov. And one may not chop with an axe or with a saw or with a sickle but only with a [butcher's] chopper. A [closed] room full of produce which was burst open [on Yom Tov] he may take [produce] out through the breach. Rabbi Meir says: he may make a hole at the outset and bring out [the produce].
Rabbi Meir says: [Priests] may inspect leprous symptoms at the outset [during the festival] for [the priest to make] a lenient assessment, but not to make a strict one. But the sages say: neither for a lenient nor for a severe assessment. Furthermore Rabbi Meir said: a man may gather his father’s and mother’s bones, since this is a joy for him. Rabbi Yose says: it is mourning for him. A man should not stir up wailing for his dead, nor hold a lamentation for him thirty days before the festival.
A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah.
A boy of the age of nine years and one day disqualifies [his sister-in-law for marriage] with his brothers, and his brothers disqualify her for him, but while he disqualifies her from the outset only, the brothers disqualify her from the outset and at the end. How is this so? A boy of the age of nine years and one day who had intercourse with his sister-in-law disqualifies her [for marriage] with his brothers; The brothers disqualify her [for marriage with him] whether they had intercourse with her, did ma’amar, gave her a get or submitted to her halitzah.
[A minor] who refused her husband, a secondary incest prohibition, or an aylonit is not entitled to a ketubah or to the usufruct [of her dowry] or to maintenance, or to the worn-out articles [of her dowry]. If from the outset he had married on the understanding that she is an aylonit she is entitled to a ketubah. A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah who was married to a regular priest, a mamzereth or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a Natin or a mamzer is entitled to a ketubah.
If a man finds a corpse for the first time lying in a typical position, he may remove it together with the soil that it occupies. [If he finds] two, he may remove them together with the ground they occupy. If he finds three, then if the distance between the first and the last is from four to eight cubits, this is a graveyard site. He [must] check from that point twenty cubits in all directions. If he finds one twenty cubits away, he must check from it another twenty cubits, for there are grounds [that it is a graveyard]. For if he had found it at the outset he would have removed it and the soil that it occupies.
Any matter of doubt regarding [leprous affliction] at the outset is clean before a decision is made [to declare it] unclean. Once a decision has been made [to declare it] unclean, any matter of doubt is regarded as unclean. A person suffering from gonorrhea (a is examined regarding seven things, before it has been decided that it is gonorrhea: With regard to food, drink, carrying things, jumping, sickness, something seen, or an impure thought. Once gonorrhea is established, he is no longer examined. [Any flux resulting] from an accident to him, doubtful [flux] and his semen are unclean, for there are grounds for this assumption. If a one strikes his fellow, and they expected him to die and he partially recovered and then grew worse and died [the other] is liable [for murder]. Rabbi Nehemiah exempts him, for there are grounds for this assumption.
If the murderer was discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it goes free and grazes with the herd; But if after the heifer’s neck was broken, it is buried in that place because it came there from the outset in connection with a matter of doubt, and atoned for the doubt which is now gone. If the heifer’s neck was broken and afterwards the murderer is discovered, behold he is executed.
If one leased a field from his fellow and the custom of the place was to cut the crops, he must cut them; If the custom was to uproot them, he must uproot them; If the custom was to plough after reaping, he must plough. Everything should follow local custom. Just as they share the grain, so too they share the chopped straw and the stubble. Just as they share the wine, so too they share the [dead] branches and the reeds [used to prop the vines]. And both parties must [at the outset] provide [their share of] the reeds.
The law is different with a certain asham: If before the animal was slaughtered, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was slaughtered, it shall be buried; If after the blood was tossed, the flesh must be removed to the place of burning. The law is also different regarding an ox to be stoned: If before it was stoned, it may go out to pasture among the flock; If after it was stoned, it is permitted for use. The law is also different regarding the heifer whose neck is to be broken: If before its neck was broken, it may go out to pasture among the flock. If after its neck was broken, it shall be buried on the spot, for it was from the outset brought in a matter of doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose.
Some materials raise the mikveh up [to the required quantity] and do not make it invalid. Some make it invalid and do not raise it up [to the required quantity]; And some neither raise it up [to the required quantity] nor make it invalid. These raise it up to the required quantity and do not make the mikveh invalid. Snow, hail, frosted dew, ice, salt, and thin mud. Rabbi Akiva said: Rabbi Ishmael once argued against me saying; snow does not raise up the mikveh [to its required quantity]. But the men of Madeba testified in his name that he had once told them: go and bring snow and with it prepare a mikveh from the outset. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: hailstones are like drawn water. How do they raise it up [to the required quantity] and not render it invalid? If the mikveh contained forty seahs less one, and a se'ah of them fell in and made up [the required quantity], they thus make up [the required quantity] but do not render it invalid.
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: A person may not pierce an eggshell, fill it with oil, and put it over a light so it should drip even if it is made from clay; Rebbi Jehudah permits it. But if the potter combined it from the outset it is permitted. A person may not fill a bowl with oil, put it next to a light and dip the end of the wick into it so it should draw; Rebbi Jehudah permits it.
“If the potter combined it from the outset it is permitted since it is one vessel.” There is a difference because all is one, if he combined it by lime or gypsum. Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion since Rebbi Jehudah says moist liquid is a connection. It was stated: One wick in two cups, in two pots, in two trays is forbidden; Rebbi Jehudah permits. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion since Rebbi Jehudah says moist liquid is a connection.
The Babylonian Talmud
It was necessary to have the statements of Rab and Samuel. For from that [quotation from the Mishnah] I might have said that [only when the Shattit] is intended as a food and becomes a remedy of itself [is a benediction required] ; but here, since it was from the outset intended as a remedy, no benediction is at all required. Therefore [from Rab and Samuel's statement] we are informed that since one derives enjoyment therefrom, it is necessary to say a benediction.
because it is proper for them to be placed under the obligation of Zimmun from the outset of the meal.
It is different there, because from the outset [by being three] they placed upon themselves the obligation of Zimmun.
This only refers to the case where the original parties did not at the outset include these [three men] in their own place for Zimmun ; but if they had done so, then the necessity for Zimmun has passed from these men.
But the two cases are not parallel; for there [in the instance of immersion], the man was not at the outset fit [to pronounce a benediction] ; but here [in the instance of the benediction] the man was fit at the outset [to say it], and since it was deferred it must remain so.
But the two cases are not parallel; for there [in the instance of immersion], the man was not at the outset fit [to pronounce a benediction] ; but here [in the instance of the benediction] the man was fit at the outset [to say it], and since it was deferred it must remain so.
And R. Yohanan could say to you that here where it states, "One may not use them as skhakh" it means that only at the outset it is invalid,
Now we should assume that since its remnants [are valid] with two, at the outset also two are valid, and that the reason he teaches three is to indicate what is the most proper observance of the commandment And since R. Yose requires three only for the most proper observance of the commandment according to the rabbis three are indispensable.
But has it not been taught: R. Yose says: If at the outset a bunch of hyssop has only two stalks or if its remnants consist of one, it is invalid, since a bunch is not valid unless at the outset it contains three and its remnants are no less than two? Reverse [the assumption]: According to R. Yose three are indispensable, according to the rabbis three are required only for the proper observance of the commandment.
But has it not been taught: R. Yose says: If at the outset a bunch of hyssop has only two stalks or if its remnants consist of one, it is invalid, since a bunch is not valid unless at the outset it contains three and its remnants are no less than two? Reverse [the assumption]: According to R. Yose three are indispensable, according to the rabbis three are required only for the proper observance of the commandment.
So it has also been taught: If a bunch of hyssop contains two stalks at the outset or if its remnant consists of one it is valid; it is not invalid unless at the outset or when it is a remnant it consists of one.
So it has also been taught: If a bunch of hyssop contains two stalks at the outset or if its remnant consists of one it is valid; it is not invalid unless at the outset or when it is a remnant it consists of one.
Say rather: Unless at the outset, [it contains] no more than the number permitted for its remnant, one.
If he reduced their number, it is valid. When did he reduce them? If you say, before he bound them, this is obvious? Rather after he bound them? This then is a case of "set aside" from the very outset! Deduce from here that if something is "set aside" from the outset it is not [permanently] "set aside"?
If he reduced their number, it is valid. When did he reduce them? If you say, before he bound them, this is obvious? Rather after he bound them? This then is a case of "set aside" from the very outset! Deduce from here that if something is "set aside" from the outset it is not [permanently] "set aside"?
But one may not reduce them [the berries] on Yom Tov. But if he transgressed and did pluck them it is valid. But then, when did it become black? If you will say that it became black from the previous day, then it is a case of "set aside" from the very outset. Deduce from here that something that is "set aside" from the very outset is not [permanently] set aside?
But one may not reduce them [the berries] on Yom Tov. But if he transgressed and did pluck them it is valid. But then, when did it become black? If you will say that it became black from the previous day, then it is a case of "set aside" from the very outset. Deduce from here that something that is "set aside" from the very outset is not [permanently] set aside?
No! Indeed it refers to a case where it became black from the outset; and you can deduce from here that something "set aside" from the outset is not permanently "set aside"; But a case in which it was fit and then was "set aside" you cannot deduce from here.
No! Indeed it refers to a case where it became black from the outset; and you can deduce from here that something "set aside" from the outset is not permanently "set aside"; But a case in which it was fit and then was "set aside" you cannot deduce from here.
From where is this derived? — As R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak taught in front of R. Huna: “Then the priest shall pronounce him clean; it is a scab; and he shall wash his clothes and be clean” (Leviticus 13:6); he is clean at the outset from having been liable to rend garments and loosen the hair.
Rava said to him. If that is so, then in regard to a zav of whom it is written, “And he shall wash his garments and be clean”, how is it possible to say that he shall have been clean from the outset?
Is that to say that “found” [means that the person] was already there from the outset? And pit them against each other [this baraita and the baraita that follows]: “And he found” (Leviticus 25:26) [This verse describes a case in which someone has a third party redeem a field because they do not have funds. If that person is trying to subvert the system and already has the money to redeem, he is not permitted to go through this process of including a third party] excludes [what was already] found, because he may not sell a far [field] and redeem it with [a field that is] close, [nor a field that is] bad and redeem it for a good [quality field].
Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.
Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.