can
4701 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
R. Simeon asked, What of a child that is lame, according to the words of the house of Shammai, or one that is blind, according to the words of both of them? Explain this. If we are to speak of the case of a lame person, who cannot stretch out his limb, or a blind person, who cannot open his eye, see now, an adult is free, why should we ask about a child? It is not necessary to discuss such a case. But in the case of a lame person, who can stretch out his limb, or a blind person who can open his eye, what of this case? Abai said, Wherever the adult is bound according to the Law, we educate the child in it also according to our Rabbis, and wherever the adult is free according to the Law, the child also is free according to the Rabbis.
Abai said to him, Of course. For otherwise the question would arise, Which of them wilt thou cause to be sinners, and which of them wilt thou cause to be obedient? But wherefore then does the passage come? It is to correspond to the saying of others. For there is a Baraitha, viz., Others say, The cordwainer, and the smelter in bronze and the tanner, are exempt from the holocaust, for it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16), i.e., he who can go up with all thy males. These are excluded, for they cannot go up with all thy males.
They have only taught this, when it is not ended, but if it is ended, he may bring again. What is ended? If you say, It means that he has ended his offerings, how can he bring any more? But the teaching means, When the day is not ended, but if the day is ended, he may bring again.
I. (8) The rules concerning the dissolving of vows fly about in the air, and there is nothing upon which they can rest. The Halachoth concerning Sabbath, Chagigoth, and trespasses, behold, they are as mountains suspended by a hair, for lo! the Bible teaching is little and the Halachoth manifold. The legal decisions and the Temple services, the things clean and unclean, and cases of unlawful unions, have something on which they may rest, and these are the principal things of the Law.
R. Kattinah said, Even at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem there did not cease from them faithful men, as it is said, "When a man shall take hold of his brother in the house of his father, saying, Thou hast clothing, be thou our ruler" (Is. iii. 6). Let things which are hid from the children of men, as a garment hides, be under thy hand. "And this ruin." What is the meaning of the expression "and this ruin"? Words which the children of men cannot understand, but if one tries, he stumbles over them, they are under thy hand. "In that day shall he swear, saying, I am not an healer, for in my house is neither bread nor clothing. Ye shall not make me ruler of the people" (Is. iii. 7). "Shall he swear" is simply a term expressing an oath, as it is said, "Thou shalt not swear falsely by the name of the LORD thy God" (Exod. xx. 7). "I am not an healer," i.e., I have not been of those that heal a college. "For in my house is neither bread nor clothing," i.e., There is not in my hand either Torah or Mishnah or Gemara. And perhaps it is different here. For if he had said to them, I teach Gemara, they would have said to him, Tell us something. But no, he cannot have feared detection, for he might have said, that he had learned it but had now forgotten. What is the meaning of the words "I am not an healer"? They mean, I am not a healer at all. But, after all, behold Rabba said, Jerusalem was not laid waste till there ceased from it honest men, as it is said, "Run ye to and fro in the streets of Jerusalem, and see now, and know, and seek in the broad places thereof, if ye can find a man, if there be any that doeth justly, that seeketh truth, and I will pardon her" (Jer. v. 1). There is no difficulty.
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
And to shew that there are things which can disqualify without rendering unclean, here is a teaching. For there is a canonical Mishnah, All that disqualifies for a heave-offering, renders the hands unclean, so as to be of secondary impurity. And a hand renders its fellow unclean. These are the words of R. Joshua. And other wise men say, The hands themselves are only of secondary uncleanness, and that which is secondary does not produce a second in the case of ordinary things (Yadaim, iii. 2). Do you think that it cannot make a second? Nay, you say, it makes a third. Or perhaps it makes neither a second nor a third. But moreover we have a Baraitha to quote on our side. For there is a Baraitha, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to render unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rabbi. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, With that same hand he may disqualify, but not render unclean.
We have a canonical Mishnah, viz., vessels of wine and vessels of oil which are mixed, why should they not be mixed as regards heave-offering? Those of the house of R. Chia say, Mixed as regards hallowed things. But how can there be a mixture as regards hallowed things. Those of the house of R. El'ai say, Yes, in the case of one who is in the act of purifying his untouched produce, to take out of it the libations.
And so too the thieves, who have restored the vessels. But against this I adduce the following Baraitha, viz., In the case of the thieves who have gone into the midst of the house, only the place where the thieves' feet trode is unclean. R. Phinehas said in the name of Rab, They are to be believed only in case they have repented. You can even press it out from the language of the Mishnah, for the teaching is, Who have restored the vessels. Learn it thence.
There is a Baraitha, Be ye clean, lest ye touch the table or the lamp. And yet we have a Baraitha to this effect, viz., What is the reason that we are not taught this with reference to the lamp? It is because the table is called in Holy Writ perpetual, the lamp is not called in Holy Writ perpetual. And another says, Since Holy Writ says, "and the lamp over against the table" (Ex. xxvi. 35), it is as though it were called in Holy Writ perpetual. But another says, It was only to fix its place that it comes. But you may get it out for me in this way. For it is a vessel of wood which is made to rest; and every vessel of wood which is made to rest, is not liable to uncleanness. What is the reason then that it is liable to uncleanness? Because it is like a sack in this respect, and therefore can contract uncleanness. As a sack is moveable, whether empty or full, so also everything which is moveable whether empty or full is liable to cleansing. This also is moveable, whether empty or full. As is the teaching of Resh Lakish; for Resh Lakish said, What is the meaning of the passage, "upon the clean table?" (Lev. xxiv. 6) Undoubtedly it implies that it might be unclean. And why? It is a vessel of wood made to rest, and as such it does not receive uncleanness; but it informs us that they raise it up, and exhibit the shewbread on it to those who come up to the festival, and one says to them, Look at the love of God in giving you food. Its end was like its placing. For R. Joshua ben Levi said, A great miracle was wrought in the shewbread. As its placing was miraculous, so was its end; for it is said, "to put hot bread in the day that it was taken away" (1 Sam. xxi. 6). But you may get it out for me in this way. It is because it is overlaid. For lo, there is a canonical Mishnah, The table or the tripod table, which have had a piece broken off, or have been covered with marble, and there has been left on them a place to rest cups, may become unclean. R. Jehudah says, A place to rest cakes (Kelim, xxii. 1). And if thou sayest, It is a different matter with shittim wood, which is esteemed highly, and is not valueless, this is all right according to what Resh Lakish says. For he said, Their teaching only refers to tables made of woods that come from the province of the sea. But in the case of a vessel of Mismim it is not valueless. This is very good. But according to R. Jochanan who says, Even in the case of a vessel of Mismim also it is valueless, what is there to say? And if thou sayest, The one is the case of an overlaid article which stands, and the other, of an overlaid article which does not stand. Lo, Resh Lakish asks from R. Jochanan, Does the Mishnah treat of an overlaid article which stands, or of an overlaid article which does not stand? of one which has its extremities covered, or of one which has not its extremities covered? And he said to him, There is no difference in this respect between an overlaid article which stands and an overlaid article which does not stand. There is no difference in this respect between one which has its extremities covered, and one which has not its extremities covered. But it is the table itself which makes the difference.
R. Abohu said that R. Eliezer said, As to the disciples of the wise, the flame of Gehenna has no power over them. For this is shewn by an a fortiori argument drawn from the salamander. And what is the salamander? It is a creature of fire. He that anoints himself with its blood, flame has no power over him. How much more the disciples of the wise, whose whole body is fire, as it is written, "Is not my word like as fire, saith the LORD?" (Jer. xxiii. 29) Resh Lakish said, The flame of Gehenna has no power over the transgressors of Israel. How much less over the altar of gold! As in the case of the altar of gold, upon which is only about the thickness of a denarius of gold, for ever so many years the flame has had no power over it, how much less can it have power over the transgressors of Israel, who are full of the commandments as a pomegranate is full of seeds, as it is written, "Thy temples are like a piece of a pomegranate" (Cant. iv. 3). Read not, "thy temples" but, the vain fellows that are in thee.
GEMARA: Why does the Mishna ask 'How do witnesses become false witnesses?' [since this is not the topic of the Mishnah] and furthermore, later on we learn [the definition of a false witness] But they [different witnesses come and] say to them [the false witnesses]. 'How can you testify? On that day and in that place, you were with us [in a different place, and therefore lying].
Bar Pada said It stands to reason, a fortiori, since a priest who successfully takes away priesthood from his fellow keeps his priesthood, a priest who is unsuccessful remains a priest. Ravina argues, if so, false witnesses can never be punished
Even though you would not be able to collect the loan , in the end he can come to collect.
What [can be derived] from the common characteristic of the sins, that is a penalty. This isn't a question, because Rebbi Yehuda doesn't hold like Rebbi Akiva [who says that false witnesses is penalty].
Rather what [can be derived] from the common characteristic of the sins that possesses a stringency? Rebbi Yehuda doesn't consider a stringency to be a question.
GEMARA: From where is this known [that lashes can not be divided]? Abaye says, The word "rasha" (wicked person) is said by the laws of lashes (Deuteronomy 25, 2) and the word "rasha" is said by the laws of the death penalty (Numbers 35, 31). Just as there is no half of a death penalty, so too there is no half of lashes.
Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided]. Money combines, while lashes do not combine.
How is this? If they [the first set of witnesses] said, "We testify about this person, that he killed a man" [A second set of witnesses] said to them [the first set], "How can you testify, because the murderer or the victim was with us on that day in a different place?" They [the first set of witnesses] do not become zomemim. But if they [the second set of witnesses] said, "How can you testify, because you [the first set] were with us on that day in a different place?", then they [the first set] do become zomemim, and get executed on their [the second set's] words.
How is this? If they [the first set of witnesses] said, "We testify about this person, that he killed a man" [A second set of witnesses] said to them [the first set], "How can you testify, because the murderer or the victim was with us on that day in a different place?" They [the first set of witnesses] do not become zomemim. But if they [the second set of witnesses] said, "How can you testify, because you [the first set] were with us on that day in a different place?", then they [the first set] do become zomemim, and get executed on their [the second set's] words.
Rava says, If two [witnesses] come and say that they saw a person murder on the east east side of a building, and another two [witnesses] come and say that you [the first set] were with us on the west side of the building, then we see: If from standing at the west side of that building one can see to the east side of that building, they do not become zomemim, and if not then they do become zomemim.
And Rava also said, If two [witnesses] come and say, In we witnessed a murder in Sura [a town] on Sunday morning, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first set] was with us on Sunday evening in Neharda [a town], we see if from morning to evening one can travel from Sura to Neharda, then they do become zomemim, but if not then they do not become zomemim.
Reish Lakash would say to you, I can even say like the Rabbis, that the Rabbis only said [that we trust the witnesses] over there because there wasn't anyone seeking them out. But here there is one [the woman] seeking out the witnesses.
And Rebbi Yochanon would say to you, I can even say like Rebbi Yehudah that Rebbi Yehudah only said [that we don't believe the witnesses] over there, because we can't expect the whole world to have been by them [the same two witnesses]. But over here [by this woman], these [witnesses] knew their testimony, and these [witnesses] did not know their testimony.
He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".
We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three? Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
And just as by two [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed, so too by three [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed. And from where do we know that even [the testimony of] one hundred [witnesses can be dismissed if one is found to be relative or disqualified]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
GEMARA:Rava says, and this [that one can disqualify the whole group of witnesses] is only when they all testified בתוך כדי דיבור. Rav Acha mDifti said to Revina, let's see, how long is בתוך כדי דיבור? The amount of time that it takes for a student to greet his teacher. A hundred [witnesses] is too many [to all give testimony in this time slot]?!
Rava says, If they [the two witnesses] saw the warner or the warner saw them, they combine. Rava says, This warner that we mentions can even be himself, and can even be a demon.
Rava says, If they [the two witnesses] saw the warner or the warner saw them, they combine. Rava says, This warner that we mentions can even be himself, and can even be a demon.
However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.
Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
Across the Jordan—three [cities]; in the land of Israel—three?! [How can such diverse sized populations need the same number of cities?] Abaye said: In Gilead [more generally a term for the other side of the Jordan], there were a lot of murderers.
Rabbi Yitzhak said: "What is the [meaning of] the verse: 'And he will flee to one of these cities and live' (Deuteronomy 4:42)? We make him [the manslayer] something that can be his livelihood [in the city of refuge]."
It was taught [by a tanna]: "A student that is exiled—they exile his teacher with him." As it is said, "and live" (Deuteronomy 4:42)? We make him [the manslayer] something that can be his livelihood [in the city of refuge]. Rabbi Z'eira said: "From here [we learn] that one should not teach a student that is not discerning."
'Nor one who loves wealth (hamon) will have income (t'vu'ah)'—for whom it is fitting to teach in public (hamon)? One who all of the reward (t'vuah) is his." [This drash plays on ambiguity in the Masoretic text between lamed-aleph ("lo" as in "no") and lamed-vav ("lo" as in "his")]. And this is [similar to] what Rabbi Elazar said: "What is that which is written, 'Who can sing the mighty deeds of God, [who can] recount all His praises?' (Psalms 106:2)? For whom is it filling to sing the mighty deeds of God? To the one who is able to recount all His praises."
'Nor one who loves wealth (hamon) will have income (t'vu'ah)'—for whom it is fitting to teach in public (hamon)? One who all of the reward (t'vuah) is his." [This drash plays on ambiguity in the Masoretic text between lamed-aleph ("lo" as in "no") and lamed-vav ("lo" as in "his")]. And this is [similar to] what Rabbi Elazar said: "What is that which is written, 'Who can sing the mighty deeds of God, [who can] recount all His praises?' (Psalms 106:2)? For whom is it filling to sing the mighty deeds of God? To the one who is able to recount all His praises."
And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: "What is that which is written, 'A song of ascents. Of David. I am happy for they tell me: "We will go to the house of the Eternal"' (Psalms 122:1). David said before the Holy Blessed One: 'Master of the Universe, I heard people saying: "When will this elder [i.e. me] die, and Solomon his son will come and build the Temple, and then we can go up [there] on food and I will be happy?"' The Holy Blessed One replied: '"One day in your courtyards is better for me than a thousand [days]" (Psalms 84:11). One day when you are occupied with Torah before me is better for Me than a thousand burnt offerings that in the future your son Solomon will bring to the altar!'"
Rabbah bar Rav Huna said (and some say Rav Huna said that Rabbi Elazar said): "From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings [we can learn that] on the road the a person wants to travel on [to the cities of refuge], they permit him to go.
He [Rav Huna] said according to this tanna, as it is taught [in a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger the verse speaks. You say it's about the blood avenger or maybe the verse is actually speaking about the murderer? When it says, 'Since he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—this is speaking about the murderer, [but then] how can I uphold 'and for him there is no death penalty'? [This should have been obvious because it has already been established by the fact that he's a manslayer!]. [Therefore], the verse speaks about the blood avenger."
No! It is like as it is taught [in a baraita]: "And they speak to him words appropriate to him, saying to him: 'Do not do this practice of shedding blood! It was accidentally that the deed came to his hand!' Rabbi Meir says: 'He speaks for himself, as it is said: "And this is the word (davar) of the murderer" (Deuteronomy 19:4)' [lit. this is the matter (davar) of the murderer]. They [the rabbis] said to him: There is much that an agent can accomplish (that he alone would not be able to do).
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can make a ben sorer omorer [a rebellious son]. And one says, It can not make a ben sorer omorer. According to the opinion that it can not make a ben sorer omorer, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can make a ben sorer omorer, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can make a ben sorer omorer [a rebellious son]. And one says, It can not make a ben sorer omorer. According to the opinion that it can not make a ben sorer omorer, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can make a ben sorer omorer, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can make a ben sorer omorer [a rebellious son]. And one says, It can not make a ben sorer omorer. According to the opinion that it can not make a ben sorer omorer, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can make a ben sorer omorer, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can make a ben sorer omorer [a rebellious son]. And one says, It can not make a ben sorer omorer. According to the opinion that it can not make a ben sorer omorer, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can make a ben sorer omorer, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can bring an eglah arufah [a decapitated cow]. And one says, It can not bring an eglah arufah. According to the opinion that it can not bring an eglah arufah, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can bring an eglah arufah, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can bring an eglah arufah [a decapitated cow]. And one says, It can not bring an eglah arufah. According to the opinion that it can not bring an eglah arufah, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can bring an eglah arufah, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can bring an eglah arufah [a decapitated cow]. And one says, It can not bring an eglah arufah. According to the opinion that it can not bring an eglah arufah, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can bring an eglah arufah, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can bring an eglah arufah [a decapitated cow]. And one says, It can not bring an eglah arufah. According to the opinion that it can not bring an eglah arufah, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can bring an eglah arufah, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
And [a killer] can not go out [of the city of refuge], not to testify fro a mitzvah, not to testify for monetary cases, not to testify for capital cases. And even if Isreal needs him, and even if he is a great general of Isreal like Yoav ben Tzruyah, he can not ever go out, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "that he fled there". "There" shall be his dwelling. "There" shall be his death. "There" shall be his grave.
And [a killer] can not go out [of the city of refuge], not to testify fro a mitzvah, not to testify for monetary cases, not to testify for capital cases. And even if Isreal needs him, and even if he is a great general of Isreal like Yoav ben Tzruyah, he can not ever go out, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "that he fled there". "There" shall be his dwelling. "There" shall be his death. "There" shall be his grave.
If before his verdict was finalized, etc.: From where are these words derived [that he can go out with the new high priest's death]. Rav Kahana says, That the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "And he shall dwell there until the death of the high priest that he appointed with the holy oil". And did he [the murderer] appoint him? Rather, [the verse is referring to] this [high priest] that was annointed during his lifetime.
Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.
Just like the city protects... etc.: And a contradiction, (Numbers 35, 25) "And he shall dwell there" "there" implies not in the boundary [so how can we say that the boundary also protects]? Abaye says, It is not a difficulty. Here [by our Mishna] it's referring to [receiving] protection. Here [by the verse in Numbers] it's referring to [not being permitted to] dwell.
A murderer who exits the boundary etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,27) "And the goel hadam will kill the murderer" [we can derive that] it is a mitzvah in the hands of the goel hadam. If there is no goel hadam, it's permissible for anyone else. These are the words of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili. Rebbi Akiva says, It's permissible for the Goel Hadam, and anyone else is liable [for killing the murderer].
He says like the following Tanna, that we learned in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says, (Numbers 35, 12) "Untill he stands before a court for judgement" what is the Torah teaching us? Since it says (Numbers 35,27) "And the Goel Hadam will find the murderer" I might think that it means [he can kill him immediately] [therefore] the Torah teaches us "until he stand before a court for judgement"
The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently? The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].
The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently? The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].
One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.
One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.
Rather it's not a difficulty, [because] this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his son, and this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his grandson.
Are you asking a question on [cities of] refuge from maiser [shenei]!? Maiser [shenei] the Torah made dependent on the wall [of Jerusalem]; cities of refuge the Torah made dependent on dwelling, in the branches one can dwell, in the truck one cannot dwell.
Rabbi Akiva says liabilities of kares are subject to forty lashes for if he repents the heavenly court will forgive him. liabilities of court execution[, however,] are not subject to forty lashes for if he repents the earthly court can not forgive him.
And what is Rebbi Akiva's reason [for saying that kares liabilities are not subject to malkus]? [The Torah says] (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "according to his wickedness" which implies that according to one wickedness you can punish him but that you can not punish him according to two wickednesses.
And what is Rebbi Akiva's reason [for saying that kares liabilities are not subject to malkus]? [The Torah says] (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "according to his wickedness" which implies that according to one wickedness you can punish him but that you can not punish him according to two wickednesses.
Rebbi Abahu answers, the Torah explicitly compared liabilities of kares to malkus that we learn out [through a gezaria shava] (Leviticus 20,17) "לעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך". Rebbi Abba bar Mamal inquired, If so [that we can learn out to kares from a gezaria shava], then liabilities of court execution should also be [subject to malkus, as we should] learn out [through a gezaria shava] (Numbers 15,24) "מעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך"?
It was taught in a barasia of the house of Rebbi Yishmael, (Leviticus 14, 39) "And the priest left (שיבה)", (Leviticus 14, 44) "And the priest came (ביאה)". This is "שיבה" and this is also "ביאה". [A gezaria shava can be made because they have the same meaning dispute being different words.]
Rebbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak accepted [as an answer], "According to his wickedness" according to one wickedness you can punish him, according to two wickednesses you cannot punish him. This rule it's only referring to punishments given by court [i.e. not kares].
Rava[, who explains the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael differently,] says, If [the witnesses] warned him [the sinner that he would be liable] to court execution, then everyone would agree that he is not both flogged and executed. When do they disagree? When [the witnesses] warned him [that he would be liable] to malkus, for Rebbi Yishmael holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution can also be liable to malkus, and Rebbi Akiva holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution cannot also be liable to malkus.
[the dispute] is as we said previously, that [Rebbi Akiva's reason for giving malkus by liabilities of kares is that] if he repents the heavenly court will forgive him. What did you ask? That he hasn't yet repented? Kares is not definite. [He can still repent.]
This should be obvious!? They are separate bodies and they are separate prohibitions, [why do the Rabbis need a verse to teach us this?] Rather to make one liable [separate offerings for cohabiting with] his sister who is his father's sister, and who is [also] his mother's sister. And how can we find such a case, with a sinner the son of a sinner [re'shia bar re'shia. cf. Rashi].
And [the rabbis, who learn re'shia bar re'shia from kares b'achoso] would say that it is a flawed kal v'chomer, because what comparison can you make to niddah which involves separte bodies?
And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
Or if you prefer you can say, that he does not hold like Rebbi Elezar, [rather] he derives it from (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick".
It is understandable why Reish Lakash does not hold like Rebbi Yochanon, [as he can say that] he does not learn that gezaira shava. But what is the reason that Rebbi Yochanon does not say like Reish Lakash? [Rebbi Yochanon] would say to you, [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is giving a scriptual warning for [consuming] Terumah [while impure],
But still Oneis from Motzei Shem Rah can not be derived as you could ask on it, What comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which has [a more stringent punishment of] malkus and a monetary payment?
But still Oneis from Motzei Shem Rah can not be derived as you could ask on it, What comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which has [a more stringent punishment of] malkus and a monetary payment?
So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated by Motzei Shem Rah, and it could have been derived from Oneis. If by Oneis which doesn't have [the double punishment] of malkus and monetary payment, the Torah says, "she shall be to him for a wife", then is not Motzei Shem Rah even more so? Why then is it repeated [by Motzei Shem Rah, if it can just be derived from Oneis]? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
But Motzei Shem Rah from Oneis also can not be learned out, because you can ask what comparison can be made to Oneis which [is more stringent] as it involves an action?
But Motzei Shem Rah from Oneis also can not be learned out, because you can ask what comparison can be made to Oneis which [is more stringent] as it involves an action?
But Motzei Shem Rah from Oneis also can not be learned out, because you can ask what comparison can be made to Oneis which [is more stringent] as it involves an action?
But you can say, If it is not applicable before the Motzei Shem Rah [divorces his wife] apply it afterwards by itself [Motzei Shem Rah] that he does not recieve malkus for divorcing his wife [because he can remarry her].
But you can say, If it is not applicable before the Motzei Shem Rah [divorces his wife] apply it afterwards by itself [Motzei Shem Rah] that he does not recieve malkus for divorcing his wife [because he can remarry her].
Yes this is indeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previously asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?
Yes this is indeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previously asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?