obvious

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property.

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: A widow who lived two or three months without asking for sustenance, loses the sustenance of these three months. That is, if she did not take a loan. But if she took out a loan, she collects. If there is no pledge in her hand. But if she has a pledge in her hand, she collects even if she did not take a loan. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That is what they said, at the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. If at the end of thirty days they say, we gave, but she says, I did not receive, it would be similar to what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one took a loan of 12’000 for a year in order to repay one gold denar per month. It is obvious that he gave for the first month and did not give for the last. About the days in between they said, not at the start.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there: “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access.

HALAKHAH: “If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.

“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, earlier generations were asking, may a man ask about his confirmation? How is that? If his wife made a vow, her husband heard it and did not dissolve for her. It is obvious that he cannot dissolve as a husband. May he dissolve as an Elder? What are we talking about? If it is about vows between him and her, these are vows of himself. But we must talk about vows between her and others. [Is that not a Mishnah? “Not his wife’s vows between her and others!”] Is that not Rebbi Jehudah’s? It was stated in the name of Rebbi Judah; Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of the Sages.

HALAKHAH: “Earlier they said,” etc. That is, if she cannot bring proof for her assertion, it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. Rebbi Hila said, would it not be reasonable that a fellow should be apprehensive, and if he was a Cohen that she should be forbidden to eat heave? There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina, the colleague of the rabbis, and he permitted her to eat heave. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, my father knew the first and the last case. Soldiers entered the town. A woman came and said, a soldier embraced me and ejaculated semen between my knees. He permitted her to eat heave. There came a case before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele of a woman who said, my cowhand seduced me. He said to her, is the cowhand not forbidden? And he forbade her. Here, you say that he forbade her. There, you say that he permitted her. There, she came to forbid herself and he permitted her. But here, she came to permit herself and he forbade her.

HALAKHAH: ““I shall be a nazir if a son is born to me,” etc. It is obvious that the end of a day is counted as a full [day]. Is the start of a day counted as a full day? Is that not the Mishnah: “after 70 [days], he reduces to 70,” not even a part? This implies that the start of a day is counted as a full day.

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers.

It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.

It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

HALAKHAH: Is it counted for him and his shaving? If you would say that it is not counted for him and his shaving, then his sacrifices count for nothing. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Following Rebbi Simeon, may he shave for his holiday well-being offerings? Is that not the Mishnah? “Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him.” When he slaughtered them are they not like voluntary well-being offerings? This means that he may shave for voluntary well-being offerings following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rebbi Joḥanan. For Rav Ada bar Aḥawa it is problematic, but for Rebbi Joḥanan it is obvious.

HALAKHAH: The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There, he says: “he has to repeat only for 30,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan says, he has to repeat all his sacrifices. It is obvious, if it would have been valid without him becoming impure, then why is it not valid if later he becomes impure? Rebbi Ḥinena said, is that not Rebbi Eliezer’s? And Rebbi Eliezer follows the Shammaites, as it was stated: Concerning a nazir who lost all his hair, the House of Shammai say, he has to move a shaving knife over his head; the House of Hillel say, he does not need to move a shaving knife over his head.

HALAKHAH: “The nazir shaves for the following impurities,” etc. An old man asked Rebbi Joḥanan: If the volume of an olive from a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth which did not reach the volume of an olive. He continued to ask: If a limb of a corpse makes impure, then certainly all of it also? He said to him, to include the stillbirth whose limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Yose said, was that old man wise? His questions were not wise since after he asked the first question, it was not necessary to ask the second. If he wanted to ask both, he should have asked the second and after that the first. The students of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta asked the second but did not ask the first because it was obvious for them that if he did not reach the volume of an olive it is certain that his limbs did not yet jell. Rebbi Mana bar Ḥizqiah said, do you remember when Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa was here, were not both questions by that old man [asked] about Ahilut that the nazir shaves for them? In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan said, I thought that the stillbirths were not Torah. But since he makes his mother sit days of purity, it is implied that [the rules of] stillbirths are Torah.

What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted

The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.

MISHNAH: If somebody finds a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings. If he finds two, he takes them and their surroundings. If he finds three and between one and the next is a distance of between four and eight cubits, enough for the bier and the people who bury, that is a cemetery. He has to check on both sides for another 20 cubits. If he finds a grave at the end of 20 cubits, he has to check another 20 cubits since it is obvious that if this were a new burial ground, one would have taken him and his surroundings there.

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

This is obvious: A loan that is disputed is not remitted. A loan that was disputed but is now a [confirmed] loan, is remitted. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is this also true for judgments? A loan that was disputed can be collected. A disputed loan turned into a [confirmed] loan is collected from property of average quality.

Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.

Ulla bar Ismael: By law, it should not atone even if it was [not] known in public. Why did they say that it atones? Not to let the altar be deserted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, by law, it should atone even if it was known in public. Why did they say that it does not atone? Not to let the altar accept robberies. How many are “public”? Rebbi Gorion in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Three people. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You brought robbed goods with the lame and the sick.” Since lame and sick are obvious, so everything must be obvious.

Rebbi Mana said, not only a neck-iron of mortal danger but also a neck-iron of money. For every neck-iron is a mortal danger. Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jacob the Armenian: That which is a problem for Rebbi Simeon is obvious for Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina, as we have stated there: “One may have use for the hair of a woman who was executed but an animal which was executed is forbidden for all use.” Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if she said, my bonnet should be given to my daughter.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.

Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”

Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”

Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: How can a ḥăruphah slave girl acquire her autonomy in such a way that she would be freed from flogging, and [free] the one who had intercourse with her from a reparation sacrifice? It is obvious that she cannot leave by a bill of divorce since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least since (Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce. It is obvious that she can leave by a bill of divorce at least). Rebbi Yose said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: Aquila the proselyte translated before Rebbi Aqiba “and she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “she spread morsels on it.” Rebbi Ḥiyya said in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: So Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon explained it before the Sages. “And she is a slave girl נֶחֱרֶפֶת to a man”, by “one who was pounded before a man”, as you say, “in morsels by a pestle.”

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.

HALAKHAH: “One man should not be alone with two women,” etc. Rebbi Abun said, when has this been said? With decent men. But with profligates she should not be alone even with a hundred men. It was stated: A one day old child who died is for his father, his mother, and all his relatives like one fully grown. Not only if he died when one day old but even if he was alive when his head and most of his body were born. He is carried out at the bosom and buried by one woman and two men; Abba Shaul says even one man and two women. It is obvious that Rebbi Simeon will agree with Abba Shaul but Abba Shaul does not need to agree with Rebbi Simeon since there is no sexual desire in the cemetery.

Rebbi Hoshaia the Elder and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal came to them and asked: If it wagged its tail as those mules do, what are the rules? They did not tell him. Later, Rebbi Hoshaia the Elder told him, for if it were not so, what would we say? Does he have to grab its tail? That is, if it does not usually do it. But if it usually does it, he has to grab its tail. What is obvious to us? The problem of full damages. What is problematic for us? Half damages.

Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

There, they said: Admon and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La said, they disagree when nothing was specified. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included, everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was specified. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he does have to buy access.

MISHNAH: He who sells a ship sold the mast, and the sail, and the anchors, and all steering gear, but he neither sold the slaves, nor the storage bags, nor the load. If he said, “it and all that is in it,” all is sold. He who sold a truck did not sell the mules; he who sold the mules did not sell the truck. He who sold the yoke did not sell the cattle; he who sold the cattle did not sell the yoke. Rebbi Jehudah says, the price is an indicator. How is that? If he said to him, sell me your yoke and harness for 200 denars, it is obvious that yoke and harness are not worth 200 denars. But the Sages say, the price is no indicator. He who sells a donkey did not sell its gear. Nahum the Mede says, he sold the gear. Rebbi Jehudah says, sometimes it is sold, sometimes it is not sold. How is this? If a donkey was standing there with his gear on it and he said, sell me this donkey, his gear is sold; your donkey, for this one the gear is not sold. He who sells a donkey sold the foal; he who sold a cow did not sell its young. He who sold a dungheap sold the manure; he who sold a cistern sold its water. He who sold a beehive sold the bees; he who sold the dovecote sold the pigeons. He who bought the yield of a dovecote leaves the first brood to fledge, of a beehive takes three swarms and then intermittently, honeycombs leaves two honeycombs, olive trees to cut down leaves two handbreadths.

There, we have stated: “If somebody find a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings.” Rav Ḥisda said, this implies that it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation, since we have stated: “he takes him and his surroundings.” And how much? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Up to three finger-breadths, the place where fluid penetrates. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, this is not reasonable; it is forbidden to remove a corpse of obligation. If you would say, it is permitted to remove him, since you are going to ruin the whole field, would it be permitted to remove him? Since it is obvious for the Tanna that it is forbidden to remove a corpse of obligation, therefore, one needs the Mishnah. Rav Ḥisda said, it follows him who said, it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation; I am saying that he was buried on a permitted path. But whould one not have to worry that maybe he was a corpse of obligation? Corpses of obligation are infrequent.

There is no lengthening of the month, but sanctification of the month. Samuel says, sanctification of the month needs no less than ten [participants]120. Should Fellows be able to enter for the sanctification of the month? Rebbi Hoshaia said, I was a Fellow and Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac took me to the sanctification of the month, but I do not know whether I was counted or not. It is obvious that he was not counted, but why? Was it because he was his son-in-law, or because Fellows are nor able to enter for the sanctification of the month? Rebbi Cahana said, I was a Fellow when Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya took me to the sanctification of the month and I was counted. This implies that Fellows enter for the sanctification of the month.

It is written: David turned. Who are the “empty ones”? Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the most empty one, that is the dancer. She told him, today the honor of my father’s house became obvious. One said about the family of Saul that one never saw a heel or a thumb of them. That is what is written: He came to the sheep fences. Rebbi Abun ben Rebbi Eleazar: That was a fence inside a fence. Saul came to spread his feet. He saw him how he lifted a little and covered a little. He said, one who would touch such modesty would be cursed. That is what he told him, behold, what your eyes saw today, etc. Is it not written “I had mercy on you” but it had mercy on you, your modesty had mercy on you. David told Michal, etc. With the servant girls you mentioned, with them I shall be honored, for they are not servant girls but mothers. How was she punished? Michal, Saul’s daughter, had no child, But is it not written: The sixth Yitreˋam, of his wife Calf. She mood like a calf and died.

He was with David at Efes Dammim. Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the red field. But Rebbi Samuel said, from there the money stopped. The Philistines assembled, etc. Rebbi Jacob from Kefar Ḥanan said, they were lentils but a kernel was as good as a barley grain. Rebbi Levi said, this describes the Philistines who came straight as barley and went away low as lentils, as one verse says, there was a field full of barley, and one said, full of lentils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, it was one year but concerning two fields, one of barley and one of lentils. It was obvious to him that he might destroy it and pay for the damage. Perhaps it was obvious to him that he might destroy it and not pay for the damage? Which one might he destroy and for which one would he have to pay? For the one of lentils or the one of barley? For the one of lentils grows human food, the one of barley animal feed. The one of lentils will not be obligated for ḥallah, barley will be obligated for ḥallah. The ˋomer comes from barley; ˋomer cannot be brought from lentils. But the rabbis said, it was one field and two years. Does one infer from last year, or does one not infer from one year to the next? They stood up in the property and saved it. One verse says, they saved it, and one says, he saved it. This shows that he returned it to its owner and it was dear to him as if it had been a field of saffron.

He was with David at Efes Dammim. Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the red field. But Rebbi Samuel said, from there the money stopped. The Philistines assembled, etc. Rebbi Jacob from Kefar Ḥanan said, they were lentils but a kernel was as good as a barley grain. Rebbi Levi said, this describes the Philistines who came straight as barley and went away low as lentils, as one verse says, there was a field full of barley, and one said, full of lentils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, it was one year but concerning two fields, one of barley and one of lentils. It was obvious to him that he might destroy it and pay for the damage. Perhaps it was obvious to him that he might destroy it and not pay for the damage? Which one might he destroy and for which one would he have to pay? For the one of lentils or the one of barley? For the one of lentils grows human food, the one of barley animal feed. The one of lentils will not be obligated for ḥallah, barley will be obligated for ḥallah. The ˋomer comes from barley; ˋomer cannot be brought from lentils. But the rabbis said, it was one field and two years. Does one infer from last year, or does one not infer from one year to the next? They stood up in the property and saved it. One verse says, they saved it, and one says, he saved it. This shows that he returned it to its owner and it was dear to him as if it had been a field of saffron.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.

The following is obvious: A murderer who broke vessels or otherwise caused damage is liable to pay. If he continued to break until he came to the town, Rebbi Zeˋira and Rebbi Hoshaia: One said, he pays, the other said, he does not pay. If the pursuer becomes the pursued, may one save the pursuer through the person of the pursued? An adult (who became) a minor, may one save the adult through the person of the minor? Rebbi Jeremiah objected, did we not state: “If his head and most of his body were born, one does not touch him, for one does not push aside one life for another.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is different there since you do not know who is killing whom.

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained) in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.

HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them, to exclude the heir. Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.

It is obvious: If the householder dies, the journeyman swears to his heirs. Even if the journeyman dies, do his heirs swear to the householder’s heirs? They made this ordinance only for the journeyman. Maybe for his heirs? Rebbi Eleazar said, if he claimed before witnesses. [But if he claimed without witnesses, he can tell him,] I paid your wages. Rebbi Joḥanan said, does one not in money matters argue “because?” Because he can say to him, I did not hire you, he can tell him, I hired you and paid your wages. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “When was this said? If he said, I gave, but the other said, I did not take; I gave you your wages, but he says, I did not take. You hired me, but he says, I did not hire you. The burden of proof is on the claimant.” It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar, if he hired him before witnesses, how can this one say, I did not hire you?

Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked: “You worked for me one day and I paid you.” But the other says, “I worked for you for two days and you did not give anything to me.” It is obvious that he takes for the first day without oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar. “I hired you for a tetradrachma and gave it to you.” But the other says, “you hired me for two tetradrachmas and did not give me anything.” It is obvious that he takes the first tetradrachma without an oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar.

Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked: “You worked for me one day and I paid you.” But the other says, “I worked for you for two days and you did not give anything to me.” It is obvious that he takes for the first day without oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar. “I hired you for a tetradrachma and gave it to you.” But the other says, “you hired me for two tetradrachmas and did not give me anything.” It is obvious that he takes the first tetradrachma without an oath. The second is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously? One explains it, that he was not present. Does this invalidate? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

If she checked herself and found it a doubtful case. It is obvious that it is not counted as a check to diminish from 24 hours. Itself, would it be impure because of doubt? Let us hear from the following: “A sexless or a hermaphrodite who had a discharge follow their exact timing.” What do you infer from this? Rebbi Yose said, a sexless or a hermaphrodite represent a doubt, 24 hours represent a doubt, and a doubt is not superimposed on a doubt. So here, whether she had a discharge represents a doubt, 24 hours represent a doubt, and a doubt is not superimposed on a doubt.

Rebbi Yudan asked: She checked her garment in the morning and found it pure, in the afternoon and found a stain on it. It is obvious that her garment is retroactively impure only after the time of her checking. Is her body impure for retroactive 24 hours? Does one not declare her body to be impure only because of her garment? Her garment is retroactively impure only after the time of her checking; her body should retroactively be impure for 24 hours?

For whom does he mention this ? If it is supposed for the Rabbis, it is surely obvious ; since if a man with a running issue who experiences emission and originally was not under the necessity of bathing is compelled by the Rabbis to have immersion, how much more so a woman who experiences the menstrual flow during intercourse and originally was under the necessity of bathing ! Must it not be for R. Judah ? But the statement is intended to apply to this case exclusively, viz. :

Rab Pappa said : A pig's snout is to be regarded as passing manure [for the purpose of reading the Shema']. That is obvious! No; it is necessary [to mention it], because even if it just came up out of the river [it is to be so considered].

Rab Judah said : It is forbidden to read the Shema' in the presence of a naked gentile. Why is a gentile specified ? Even by a naked Israelite it is likewise [forbidden] ! [That it is forbidden with an Israelite is obvious] ; but it was necessary to specify the case of a gentile. For thou mightest have said : Since it is written with reference to the gentiles, "Whose flesh is as the flesh of asses" (Ezek. xxiii. 20), argue that [in this matter the naked gentile is to be considered] only like an ass ; therefore he informs us that to them also [when exposed] is "nakedness" attributed ; for it is written, "And they saw not their father's nakedness" (Gen. ix. 23).

But Aha b. Raba said to Rab Ashe : But we say : "[We will bless] the One Who has performed for our fathers and for us all these miracles" ! He replied : Here it is obvious that it is the Holy One, blessed be He, Who performed the miracles.

The Halakah is in agreement with Bet Hillel." All this is obvious, for a Bat Kol had issued forth!

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: We are here dealing with a point of time near to the setting of the sun; so if it were an adult, it is obvious that he must certainly be a gentile. But in the case of a child, one might say it is an Israelite and it is by chance that he is holding [the torch].

This is obvious, because the Mishnah states "and forgot"!

R. Johanan can reply to thee : It is obvious that according to R. Judah, if a man made a purchase and then a fresh purchase, he also must say a benediction [for the latter]; but the point of variance [between R. Judah and R. Meir] is where the man already possessed the article and made a fresh purchase, to show the extreme view taken by R. Meir; for even if he made a purchase, already possessing a similar article, there is no necessity for a benediction, how much more unnecessary is it if he purchased and then made a fresh purchase.

There was no need to mention this, [since it is obvious that] if we apply [the rule of ‘since’] from the less stringent to the more stringent, all the more so apply it from the more stringent to the less stringent

This is obvious! The statement: "the lower one is valid and the upper one is invalid" was necessary. For what might you have said: we should invalidate [the lower sukkah] as a preventive measure lest one also joins invalid skhakh with valid skhakh, therefore it teaches us [that it is valid].

Gemara. R. Hisda stated: [Our mishnah] speaks only [of a sheet spread] because of falling [leaves], but if [it was spread] in order to beautify [the sukkah], it is valid But is not this obvious! For did we not learn in the mishnah, "because of falling [leaves]? One might have said that the law is the same even [where the sheet was intended] to beautify [the sukkah] and that the reason why it was stated, because of falling [leaves], is that he mentions what is the common practice, therefore he [R. Hisda] teaches us this.

When he came before R. Hiyya b. Ashi the latter said to him: Thus said Rav, [In such a case the threads] may be cut and they are valid. Thus it is obvious that their cutting is considered their making, so too here, their cutting is considered their making.

‘With male arrow-shafts it is valid’; but is not this obvious? I might have said that these should be forbidden on account of female ones, therefore he teaches us [that they are not forbidden].

‘With female shafts, it is invalid’, is not this obvious? — I might have said that a receptacle which is made to be [permanently] filled up is not regarded as a receptacle, therefore he informs us [that it is].

It was also taught in a baraita: Reeds and forked reeds may be used as skhakh. As to reeds, this is obvious? — Say: Forked reeds may be used as a Sukkah-covering.

But is not this obvious? — One might have said that we apply the law of lavud once, but we do not apply lavud twice [to the same wall], therefore he informed us of this.

R. Abba b. Zavda also said in the name of Rav, A mourner is obligated in the Sukkah Is not this obvious? What might I have said? Since R. Abba b. Zavda said in the name of Rav that he who is in discomfort is exempt from the obligation of Sukkah, this [one] is also in discomfort, therefore he informs us that this applies only to discomfort that comes on its own, but [the mourner] since it is he himself who is the cause of his discomfort, he must settle his mind

But is not this obvious? But is not this obvious? This is [considered to be] another [Sukkah] and is not one for seven days, therefore he teaches us [that this is not so].

But is not this obvious? But is not this obvious? This is [considered to be] another [Sukkah] and is not one for seven days, therefore he teaches us [that this is not so].

This is obvious! How is it different than [normal] wood? You might have said, "Wood is commonly found, but these [i.e. beams] are not common, I would say not [a valid argument], and we can learn from this [i.e. Ravina's statement].

A Master said, "Just like we do not take away from the [four species], so too we do not add to them." This is obvious [seeing as we are not allowed to add to commandments]! You might have said, Seeing as Rabbi Yehudah said that a Lulav [bundle] needs binding, if you bring another species [outside of the bundle], than [you might think that] this [i.e. the Lulav bundle] is one group, and this [i.e. the new species] is one group. We learn from the [above statement that you cannot add to the four species].

A Master said, "If he did not find an Etrog, he should not bring: not a pomegranate, not a quince, and not any other thing." This is obvious[! Why would any other fruit be acceptable?]! You might have said, "We should bring it so that the instruction regarding the Etrog will not be forgotten." We learn from the [above statement], that sometimes destruction comes from this [as people will forget the Etrog and bring this new fruit instead].

But is not this obvious? I might have said that since it has an accompanying name, it is not valid, therefore he teaches us [that it is valid]. But perhaps it is indeed so? The Torah says, "branches of a thick tree," of any kind.

If he reduced their number, it is valid. When did he reduce them? If you say, before he bound them, this is obvious? Rather after he bound them? This then is a case of "set aside" from the very outset! Deduce from here that if something is "set aside" from the outset it is not [permanently] "set aside"?

Abaye said: deduce from here that a rounded aravah is valid for the hoshanna But is this not obvious? What might you have said? Since it has an accompanying name it would not be valid, therefore he informs us [that it is not so].

If it was grown in a cast, so that it has the appearance of another species, it is invalid Rava said: They taught this only in the case where it has the appearance of another species but if it has its natural shape it is valid. But is this not obvious, seeing that it was taught: the appearance of another species! It was necessary only in a case where it was cast in the shape of planks joined together.

GEMARA. Is not this obvious? I might have said that, since a woman does not come under the obligation [of lulab] she may not take it, therefore he informs us [that she may].

R. Ami said: The aravah must have a minimum size, it must be taken separately only, and one does not fulfill his obligation with the aravah in the lulav. Since the Master said: It must be taken separately only is it not obvious that one cannot fulfill his obligation with the aravah in the lulav?

Our Rabbis taught: Since it is said, “And their faces toward the east,” (Ezekiel 8:16) is it not obvious that “their backs were toward the Temple of the Lord”?

And the rabbis? — It was indeed a signal, but the Torah made it into a commandment. Whose view does the following statement by R. Kahana go according to: There must be no interval between the tekiah and the teruah? In agreement with whose view [you ask]? In agreement with that of R. Judah. But is not this obvious?

And similarly a woman keeping day for day should not immerse until the sun has risen. This is obvious! Why should a woman keeping day for day be different from all others who are obligated to immerse?