ruled
274 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and all the public or a majority acted on their instruction, they bring a bull; or in a matter of idolatry a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and in a matter of idolatry the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and twelve goats. Rebbi Simeon says, thirteen oxen, and in a matter of idolatry thirteen bulls and thirteen goats; a bull and a goat for each tribe; a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and all the public acted,” etc. Who stated “a majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. And Rebbi Simeon follows Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said, each single tribe is called “public”, so Rebbi Simeon says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Simeon says, one tribe does not drag all tribes. [Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes,] he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Bejamin ben Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written: A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity, as we have stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Passover] and impure the second. Rebbi Jehudah said, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in impurity or all celebrate in purity. Who is “they told him”? Following Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated: “If one of the loaves or one of the (leftovers) [orders] became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, who is “they told him”? The Sages who argue like Rebbi Jehudah.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and seven tribes or a majority acted on their saying they bring a bull and for idolatry they bring a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the seven tribes who sinned bring seven bulls, and the remaining tribes who did not sin bring because of them a bull each, for also those who did not sin each bring a bull because of the sinners. Rebbi Simeon says eight bulls, and for idolatry eight oxen and eight goats, a bull and a goat for each tribe and a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable. Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a baraita said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?
MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.
HALAKHAH: "If the Court of one of the tribes ruled," etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is the Court's obligation. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the public's obligation. Rebbi Simeon said, it is an obligation of the Court and an obligation of the public. What is Rebbi Meïr's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, here it also refers to the Court. What is Rebbi Jehudah's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. What is Rebbi Simeon's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, also from the eyes here refers to the Court. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to bring. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who brings? As we have stated, "one imposes and collects, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, they are brought from the Temple tax". For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to lay their hands on. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who lays their hands on? As we have stated, three from every tribe, led by the president of the Court, lay their hands on the head of the bull. "Their hands, the hands of each single one. Their hands on the head of the bull; the bull needs laying on of hands but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon said, the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders; for Rebbi Simeon says, every public purification offering whose blood is brought inside needs laying on of hands. " One objected to Rebbi Jehudah, is it not written, they presented the goats of the purification offering? Rebbi Hiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated: “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known, not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it, if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.
MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.
MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.
MISHNAH: If he ruled for himself and acted for himself, it is atoned for himself. If he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public. As the Court is not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part, so is the Anointed. Also for idolatry they are not liable unless they instruct to void part and confirm part.
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”
HALAKHAH: “They are liable only for forgetting,” etc. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Jeremiah. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s or has inferences like Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr who said, it is an obligation of the Court. Rebbi Mana said, following Rebbi Meïr. There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted. If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others of their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
The Babylonian Talmud
Before Raba was appointed Principal [of the Seminary], the daughter of Rab Hisda used to rattle a nut in a flask for him; but afterwards when he ruled [over the Seminary] she made an aperture for him [in the wall] and placed her hand upon his head.
Rabbah ruled two and twenty years[13], and then Rab Joseph two and a half;
but all the years that Rabbah ruled he never called a cupper to his house[14].
Say rather, The law of division does not apply to it, as [it does in the case of] a courtyard. For R' Huna ruled, ‘A courtyard is divided according to the number of its doors.’ (and) R' Chisda said, ‘Four amos are given for each door and the remainder is divided equally’.
R. Simon (or, as some say, R. Joshua b. Levi) ruled: One makes [the additional wall of the width of] a loose handbreadth and places it within three handbreadths of the wall, since whatever is less than three handbreadths from the wall is regarded as joined to the wall.
Rava ruled: It is only permitted if it has the form of a doorway.
for it is you who ruled that if one placed skhakh over an alleyway which has a side-post it is valid?
Rav Judah ruled: One may use fern or wormwood as skhakh. Abaye ruled: One may use fern as skhakh, but not wormwood. What is the reason?
Rav Judah ruled: One may use fern or wormwood as skhakh. Abaye ruled: One may use fern as skhakh, but not wormwood. What is the reason?
If so, read the concluding [part:] R. Meir ruled, he should remove one from between two, but not loosen. Is not R. Meir's view thus identical with that of Beth Shammai?
Abaye ruled: An air space of three handbreadths in a large sukkah which is diminished with either sticks or spits is a [valid] diminution; in a small Sukkah, with sticks it is a [valid] diminution, with spits an invalid one.
They only differ with regard to the opinion of Rav. Abaye agrees with Rav, while Rava can say that Rav ruled then only in that case, since the partitions are made for the exedra, but in the case here, since they are not made for this purpose [he would] not [rule thus].
R. Ishmael son of R. Yose said in the name of his father: Both the one and the other, are valid for skhakh; and R. Dosa also ruled according to his view.
a) Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel ruled,
If it is peeled. Raba ruled: An etrog which was peeled so as to resemble a red date is valid. But have we not learned, if it is peeled . . . It is invalid? There is no difficulty:
There are those who say: Rav ruled that "goodly" since R. Hanina tasted a part [of an etrog] and fulfilled his obligation [with the remainder]. But is not our Mishnah a difficulty against R. Hanina? There is no contradiction since the former refers to the first day of the Festival, while the latter refers to the second day.
The minimum size of an etrog: Rafram b. Papa said: As is the dispute here, so is the dispute with regard to rounded pebbles. For it has been taught, It is permitted on Shabbat to carry three rounded smooth pebbles into [a field] lavatory. And what must be their size? R. Meir ruled, The size of a nut, R. Judah ruled, That of an egg.
The minimum size of an etrog: Rafram b. Papa said: As is the dispute here, so is the dispute with regard to rounded pebbles. For it has been taught, It is permitted on Shabbat to carry three rounded smooth pebbles into [a field] lavatory. And what must be their size? R. Meir ruled, The size of a nut, R. Judah ruled, That of an egg.
2) Since he says: "Praise Him, servants of the Lord" (Psalms 113:1) and they respond Halleluyah, it may be deduced that if an adult recites [the Hallel] for one the latter responds Halleluyah. 3) Since he says: "Give thanks to the Lord" (Psalms 118), and they respond, "Give thanks unto the Lord," it may be inferred that it is a mitzvah to respond with the beginning of sections. (So it was also stated; R. Hanan b. Raba ruled: It is a mitzvah to respond with the beginning of the sections.)
in that its tithing is determined by the time of its picking, the words of Rabban Gamaliel. R. Eliezer ruled: The etrog is like a tree in all respects.
But Levi said: The etrog is forbidden even on the eighth day; And the father of Shmuel said The etrog is forbidden on the seventh day, but permitted on the eighth. The father of Shmuel subsequently adopted the view of Levi. R. Zera adopted the [earlier] view of the father of Samuel, for R. Zera ruled:... It is forbidden to eat an etrog [even one] that has become invalid, all the seven days.
There are those who say that all agree that one does not recite the blessing [on the Sukkah], and that they only disagree over whether one must sit [in the Sukkah] according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the Sukkah, we must indeed sit in it, while according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we do not even sit in it. R. Yoseph said:... Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yohanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Shmuel b. Shilath, and he himself sat outside the Sukkah on the eighth day which might be the seventh. And the law is that we must indeed sit in the Sukkah but may not recite the blessing.
There are those who say that all agree that one does not recite the blessing [on the Sukkah], and that they only disagree over whether one must sit [in the Sukkah] according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the Sukkah, we must indeed sit in it, while according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we do not even sit in it. R. Yoseph said:... Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yohanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Shmuel b. Shilath, and he himself sat outside the Sukkah on the eighth day which might be the seventh. And the law is that we must indeed sit in the Sukkah but may not recite the blessing.
GEMARA. Our Mishnah does not agree with R. Judah, for it has been taught: R. Judah ruled, The minimum number of blasts is seven, and the maximum sixteen. What is the basis of their dispute? R. Judah holds that tekiah, teruah and tekia are counted as one, whereas the Rabbis hold that the tekiah and the teruah are separate and distinct notes.
On the eve of Shabbat during the intermediate days of the festival etc. But [the sounding of the shofar] on the tenth step is not mentioned. Who is in agreement with our Mishnah? It is in agreement with that of R. Eliezer b. Jacob, for it has been taught: Three blasts on the tenth step. R. Eliezer b. Jacob ruled, Three at the altar.
And we who keep two days [of the Festival], how do we proceed? Abaye ruled: The [paragraph for the] second day is to be omitted. Raba ruled,
And we who keep two days [of the Festival], how do we proceed? Abaye ruled: The [paragraph for the] second day is to be omitted. Raba ruled,
Rav ruled, [The blessing of] the Sukkah [comes first] and then that of the season, since the obligation of the day is more important. Rabbah b. Bar Hannah said: [The blessing of] the season [is first], since that which is frequent precedes that which is infrequent.
“From Hodu to Cush”: Rav and Shmuel: One said that Hodu is at one end of the world and Cush at the other, and the other said that Hodu and Cush are right next to each other, and that just as he ruled over Hodu and Cush, so he ruled from one end of the world to the other.
“From Hodu to Cush”: Rav and Shmuel: One said that Hodu is at one end of the world and Cush at the other, and the other said that Hodu and Cush are right next to each other, and that just as he ruled over Hodu and Cush, so he ruled from one end of the world to the other.
Similarly you say, “For he had dominion over all the region on this side of the River, from Tiphsah until Gaza” (I Kings 5:4). Rav and Shmuel: One said that Tiphsah is at one end of the world and Gaza at the other, and the other said that Tiphsah and Gaza are near one another [and that what is meant is that] just as he [Solomon] ruled over Tiphsah and over Gaza, so he ruled over the whole world.
Similarly you say, “For he had dominion over all the region on this side of the River, from Tiphsah until Gaza” (I Kings 5:4). Rav and Shmuel: One said that Tiphsah is at one end of the world and Gaza at the other, and the other said that Tiphsah and Gaza are near one another [and that what is meant is that] just as he [Solomon] ruled over Tiphsah and over Gaza, so he ruled over the whole world.
“Seven and twenty and a hundred provinces”. R. Hisda said: At first he ruled over seven, then over twenty [more], and finally over a hundred [more]. But if so, [what did you do with the verse], “And the years of the life of Amram were seven and thirty and a hundred years?” (Exodus 6:20). How do you expound this? It is different here, because the whole text is superfluous, since it is written, “From Hodu to Cush,” what would I then do with, “seven and twenty and a hundred provinces”? You must conclude that it is for a special lesson.
Our Rabbis taught: There were three who ruled over the whole globe: Ahab, Ahashverosh and Nebuchadnezzar. Ahab, as it is written, “As the Lord your God lives, there is no nation or kingdom which my Lord has not sent to seek you” (I Kings 18:10) etc. Now if he was not king over them, how could he make them take an oath?
This goes well for the one who holds that he was first a king and then an ordinary person. But for the one who holds that he was first a king, then a subject, and then a king again, what can we say? Solomon was in a different category, because he ruled over those in the upper world and those in the lower world, as it says, “And Solomon sat upon the throne of the Lord” (I Chronicles 29:23).
R. Yohanan said Jeremiah was not there, as he had gone to bring back the ten tribes. From where do we know that they returned? Because it is written, “For the seller shall not return to that which is sold” (Ezekiel 7:13). Now is it possible that after the Jubilee had already ceased the prophet should prophesy that it will cease? The fact is that it teaches that Jeremiah brought them back. Josiah the son of Amon ruled over them,
“Words of peace and truth”: R. Tanhum said: [or, according to some, R. Assi]: This shows that the Megillah must be written on ruled lines, like the true essence of the Torah.
R. Hisda found R. Hananel writing scrolls without a written copy. He said to him: The whole Torah could be written by you by heart, but the Sages have ruled: It is forbidden to write one letter except from a copy. Since he said: The whole Torah could be written by you by heart, we may conclude that he could produce them correctly. But we see that R. Meir actually did write? In case of emergency it is different.
Abaye allowed the members of the household of Bar Habu to write tefillin and mezuzot without a copy. Whose authority did he follow? The following Tanna, as it has been taught: R. Jeremiah says in the name of our Teacher: Tefillin and mezuzot may be written out without a copy, and do not require to be written upon ruled lines.