someone

HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.

HALAKHAH: : “If a woman says, accept my bill of divorce,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. There, we have stated: “If someone tells a person who is not trustworthy, buy for me from somebody who is trustworthy, or from somebody who tithes, he is not trustworthy. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar (ben Rebbi Yose.) [Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar;] does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him.

MISHNAH: If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife, or to three persons, write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, they should write and deliver. If he said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court, the words of Rebbi Meïr. This instructions for practice did Ḥananiah from Ono send from jail: I know from tradition that if someone said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court. Rebbi Yose said, we told the messenger that we also know from tradition that even if he said to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall learn, write, and deliver. If he said to ten persons, write a bill of divorce for my wife, one writes and two sign. All of you shall write, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce would be void.

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz;” she is divorced and has to pay. “On condition that you give me within thirty days,” if she paid within thirty days she is divorced, otherwise she is not divorced. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, it happened in Sidon that someone said to his wife “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you return to me my stole” and it turned out that his stole was lost; then the Sages said, she shall pay him its value.

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.

HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.

If he said, I am paying, one may suspect that possibly he took it for himself. If he said, I am swearing, but then he saw that other oaths were added and he said, I am paying, one is suspicious. Rebbi Yose said, the Torah did not impose an oath on him to restrict him but to ease for him; for if he wants to pay, he shall pay, and if he wants to swear, he shall swear. If he had witnesses that it was forcibly stolen, to that case refers what Rebbi Eleazar said: If somebody sells his claims of fines to someone else, he did not do anything. If he had witnesses that it was stolen because of negligence, he comes under the category of “he shall pay”. If afterwards the stolen object was found, to whom does [the thief] pay? To the first, or to the second, or to both of them?

If someone said, field X I gave to Y, it is given to him, it should be his, Y should inherit my property, Y should take possession of my property, he did not say anything. It should be given to him as a gift, Rebbi says, he acquired, but the Sages say, he did not acquire; but one forces the heirs to fulfill the deceased’s words. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, also if one writes διέθεμεν in Greek it is a gift. Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: I turned to all linguists to know what is διέθεμεν and nobody told me anything.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

HALAKHAH: “A murderer who attacked someone,” etc. It is written: If he hit him with a lethal stone in his hand so that he died, (the hitter shall die, he is a murderer,)the murderer shall be put to death. Or he hit him with a lethal wooden implement in his hand so that he died, the murderer shall be put to death. When He comes to iron, He does not speak of lethal or not lethal, but even a small hook when applied to the esophagus could kill him; but a stone must be lethal, wood must be lethal. If he put him in front of a horse, in front of an arrow, in front of a spear, put him out in the cold, gave him bad water to drink, removed the ceiling over him and the rains came down and killed him, or he opened a water canal whose waters swept over him.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

HALAKHAH: “If one intended to hit someone on his hips,” etc. Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a deadly stone which killed one person and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other? Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a stone which was not deadly but which killed one person and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other?

MISHNAH: If one threw a stone into the public domain and it killed someone, he is exiled. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, if after the stone left his hand, the other one stuck out his head and received it, he is not liable.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “Deep sorrow” is only for the dead, for it is written: Its gates are in deep sorrow and mourning. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada objected: Is it not written: the fishermen are in deep sorrow,mourning are all who throw a fish-hook into the Nile? Rebbi Ḥanina said, so is the baraita: there is no deep sorrow in impurity except for the dead. It was stated: “What is deep sorrow? From the moment of death until the moment of burial, the word of Rebbi. But the Sages say, the entire day.” It turns out that one describes leniencies and stringencies following Rebbi, leniencies and stringencies following the rabbis. What is the difference between them? If someone died and was buried within the hour. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden only that hour. If the person died and was buried after three days. Following the rabbis, he is forbidden the entire day; following Rebbi he is forbidden up to three days. There came Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rav Ḥisda, both of whom said that Rebbi agrees with the Sages that he is forbidden only during the first day, as it was stated: Rebbi said, you know that deep mourning in the night is not biblical, since they said, “the deep mourner immerses himself and eats his Passover sacrifice in the evening.” But they said, deep mourning during daytime is biblical. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Explain it that the person was buried close to sundown and one cannot infer anything.

Let us, then, appoint R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah, for he is wise, rich, and he is of the tenth generation from Ezra. He is wise, so if anyone puts difficult questions to him, he will be able to reply to him ; and he is rich, so if it be necessary for someone to attend at the palace of the Emperor, he will be qualified to do so ; and he is of the tenth generation from Ezra, so he possesses ancestral merit and Rabban Gamaliel will not be able to worry him on that score." They attended upon R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah and asked him, "Would the master consent to become the head of the College?" He replied, "I will first go and take counsel with the members of my household." He went and consulted his wife, and she said to him,

[A sukkah where the shach] was taller than 20 amah, and [someone] came to lower it by putting pillows and blankets on the floor: It is not considered to have been lowered.

This ruling itself is only a rabbinic decree; we come and institute a decree lest someone transgress another thing which is only a decree?

Our rabbis taught [in a Baraita], [Regarding] a Sukkah that is stolen, or someone who covers his Sukkah [with Schach] from public property, Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid, and the Chachamim validate it.

Rav Nachman said, "The argument is about someone who takes his fellow and removes him from his sukkah, And Rabbi Eliezer [rules] according to his opinion, as he says, 'A person does not fulfill his obligation with his fellow's Sukkah. If land can be [truly] stolen, it is a stolen Sukkah; and if land cannot be stolen, it is a borrowed Sukkah [but either way, it is forbidden].'

And everyone present takes some of it and puts upon his own head. Why do not the Nasi and the Ab Bet Din take the ashes themselves and put them on their heads? Why is it that someone else has to take them and put them on their heads? Said R. 'Abba of Cæsarea: Because self-humiliation is not the same as

R. Judah said in the name of Rab, R. Meir's view is law; R. Huna said, it is established usage; R. Johanan said, the people adopted it as a usage. [The opinion of him who says that a view is law, carries with it that we must teach it in the school sessions; if one says that a view is established usage, it means that we do not teach it in the school sessions, but, if asked, decide accordingly; if one says that the people have adopted a view as usage, it means that we do not even decide according to it, but that when someone has already acted in accordance with it, we do not nullify his action.] R. Naḥman said, R. Jose's view is law and, indeed, R. Jose's view has been recognized as law. Why then do the priests nowadays spread their hands during the Minḥah service of public fasts? Inasmuch as they do it close to sunset, it is as if it were done during the Ne'ilah service.

But did not R. Yohanan said: Any talmid hakham in front of whom someone else blesses, even a high priest, who is all ignoramus, that talmid hakham is liable for the death penalty, as it says, “All that hate me [mesanai] love death” (Proverbs 8:36); read not mesanai [that hate me], but masni’ai [that cause me to be hated]?

R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, a barrel full of water that falls into the Mediterranean Sea and someone immerses, it is not considered valid because we are afraid three logs of water are in one place and this applies specifically to the Sea, which is stationary, but does not generally apply to rivers.

It is also taught, a barrel full of wine that falls into the Mediterranean Sea and someone immerses, it is not considered valid because we are afraid three logs (of wine) are in one place likewise if a holy loaf of bread fell there it is impure.

What is this [statement of Rava] coming to reach us? We [already] learned this in a mishna. "Therefore, if one of the [two groups that testified someone was liable for the death penalty] is found to be zomemim, he [the person they were testifying against] and they [the zomemim] are executed, and the second [group of witnesses, who haven't been found to be zomemim] is free.

There was a woman who had brought in witnesses who were find to be liars, [and she] had brought in [a second set] of witnesses who were [also] found to be liars. She went and brought in author set [of witnesses] who were not find to be liars. Reish Lakash said, She has been established [as someone who brings in false witnesses]. Rebbi Elazar responded, does the fact that she has been established [as bringing in false witnesses] cause all of Israel to be established [as being false witnesses]!?

At a different time they [Reish Lakash and Rebbi Elazar] were sitting before Rebbi Yochanon and this story came before them. Reish Lakash said, She has been established [as someone who brings in false witnesses]. Rebbi Yochanon responded, does the fact that she has been established [as bringing in false witnesses] cause all of Israel to be established [as being false witnesses]!? He [Reish Lakash] then proceeded to look at Rebbi Elazar crossly. He said [to Rebbi Elazar], You heard this from the blacksmith's son [Rebbi Yochanon], and you didn't say it over in his name?!

Rebbi Yosi says, etc.: Rav Papa asked Abaii, And does Rebbi Yosi indeed adhere to that logic? But we learned in a mishna, Rebbi Yosi says, An enemy is killed, because he is like someone who had purpose and was warned.

Mishnah: These are the exiles: One who kills someone accidentally. One was rolling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; one who was pulling up a barrel and it fell on him and killed him; one who was descending a ladder and it fell on him and killed him—[in all these cases] behold he is exiled. However, if he was pulling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; or he was lowering a barrel and the rope broke and it [the barrel] fell on him and killed him;

Gemara: From where is it derived [that downward motion that kills someone is punished by exile]? Shmuel said that the verse said: “And he cast it upon him, and he died” (Numbers 35:23) [meaning] until it falls in the way of falling.

Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: “If he came upon him suddenly” (Numbers 35:22) this excludes a [case when someone turns quickly] around a corner. “Without hatred” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who hates [their victim]. “He pushed him” (Numbers 35:22) [means] when he pushed his body. “Or hurled upon him” (Numbers 35:22) includes downward motion that is for a need of upward motion. “Without lying in wait (tz’diyah)” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who intends [to throw something] to one side (tzad) and it goes to the other side. “And if one does not lie in wait (tzadah)” (Exodus 21:13) excludes the one who intends to throw [something] two cubits and he threw [it] four cubits.

R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.

Mishnah: If the iron axe head slipped from its handle and it killed someone, Rebi says he isn't exiled, and the Sages say that he is exiled. If [a wood chip] from the tree broke off [and that wood chip killed someone], Rebi says he is exiled, and the Sages say that he isn't exiled.

Mishnah: If the iron axe head slipped from its handle and it killed someone, Rebi says he isn't exiled, and the Sages say that he is exiled. If [a wood chip] from the tree broke off [and that wood chip killed someone], Rebi says he is exiled, and the Sages say that he isn't exiled.

Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].

However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.

However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed.

Mishnah: The one who throws a stone into the public domain and killed [someone], behold, he is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If, from when the stone left his hand, another person stuck out their head and received [the stone and was killed], behold, he is exempt [from exile].

The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.

Abba Shaul says: Just as cutting wood is optional [for someone and therefore he should not be punished], so too, anything that is optional [should not receive punishment] except the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student [through beating], and the messenger of the court [who gives punishments through lashings].

Rav Papa said: This is only necessary to teach [a case of] a garbage heap that is regularly used [as a bathroom] at night, and not one that is regularly used during the day, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there, [therefore] he is not a [considered] a criminal. [In a case] that it is not regularly used during the day, it is also not [considered] totally unexpected, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there.

Rav Papa said: This is only necessary to teach [a case of] a garbage heap that is regularly used [as a bathroom] at night, and not one that is regularly used during the day, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there, [therefore] he is not a [considered] a criminal. [In a case] that it is not regularly used during the day, it is also not [considered] totally unexpected, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there.

Is that to say that “found” [means that the person] was already there from the outset? And pit them against each other [this baraita and the baraita that follows]: “And he found” (Leviticus 25:26) [This verse describes a case in which someone has a third party redeem a field because they do not have funds. If that person is trying to subvert the system and already has the money to redeem, he is not permitted to go through this process of including a third party] excludes [what was already] found, because he may not sell a far [field] and redeem it with [a field that is] close, [nor a field that is] bad and redeem it for a good [quality field].

Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.

Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish began a sermon on this section from here: "'If he didn't lie in wait, and God guided his hand' [and he ends up killing accidentally] (Exodus 21:13). 'As the ancient proverb says, "from the wicked comes wickedness"' (1 Samuel 24:14). What is this verse referring to? With two people that killed someone—one killed accidentally, and one killed intentionally—but for neither of them were there any witnesses,

GEMARA: What is the reason [that he doesn't go to exile if the high priest dies before he gets there]? Abaye says it's a fortiori, And just as someone who was already in exile goes out [with the death the high priest], then now, someone who never went to exile should certainly not be exiled. But maybe the one was exiled got an atonement, and the one who wasn't exiled didn't [get his atonement]? Is exile the thing that grants atonement? The death of the high priest is what grants atonement.

GEMARA: What is the reason [that he doesn't go to exile if the high priest dies before he gets there]? Abaye says it's a fortiori, And just as someone who was already in exile goes out [with the death the high priest], then now, someone who never went to exile should certainly not be exiled. But maybe the one was exiled got an atonement, and the one who wasn't exiled didn't [get his atonement]? Is exile the thing that grants atonement? The death of the high priest is what grants atonement.

[Continuing the list] someone who was impure and ate sacred food, or one who entered the Temple while impure, or one who ate chalev [forbidden fats], blood, noser [sacrifices left passed their allotted time], piggul [sacrifices offered with the wrong intentions], or impure foods.

Rebbi Zeira asked, but there still is [the case someone who unlawfully took] the pledge of a proselyte, and then the proselyte died?

And one who rounds the corners of his head. etc.: The rabbis taught in a baraisa, The corners of his head are the extremities of his head. And what are the extremities of his head? This refers to someone who smooths out his side from behind his ears to his forehead.