action
397 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.
HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.
HALAKHAH: “On condition that I possess a bet kor of arable land,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel asked: If somebody said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take. Or maybe it is a difference since it is written: “To give to Nine and a half tribes.” It is as if he said, my son A should perform action X and receive property Y, and the rest of my sons shall inherit my properties; if he performs, he takes, but if he does not perform, he does not take from here or from there.
[“The dedicated ones”]. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, because of: “At that moment Joshua dedicated them as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation.” One understands “for the congregation.” But “for the Eternal’s altar”? But Joshua kept them in limbo. He said, I shall not include nor exclude them. But he who sometime in the future will build the Temple, if he wants to include them he may include, exclude them he may exclude. David came and excluded them as it is said: “But the Gibeonites are not part of the Children of Israel.” Why did he exclude them? Because “ there was a famine in David’s time, three years year after year.” David said, for four sins the rains are locked away. For the sins of foreign worship, incest and adultery, murder, and the sins of those who publicly promise money for welfare but do not pay. From where for the sin of foreign worship? “ Beware, lest you be seduced” etc. What is written afterwards? “The Eternal’s rage will be inflamed against you and he locks the sky, etc.” From where for the sins of the incestuous and adulterers? “ You distorted the Land by your immorality and your evil deeds.” What is the punishment? “Rainshowers were withheld, there was no late rain,” etc. From where because of the murderers? “ Because blood will distort the Land.” From where for the sins of those who publicly promise money for welfare but do not pay? “ Clouds and wind but no rain means the man who prides himself by lying gifts.” David checked his entire generation and did not find one of these. He turned to ask the urim and tummim. That is what is written: “ David asked before the Eternal” by urim and tummim. Rebbi Eleazar said, “Ask the Eternal, all the meek of the Land, who execute His Law.” What means “Whose Law is Work”? He enforces His Law and this is His Action. “ The Eternal said, because of Saul and the House of blood guilt.” “Because of Saul,” whom you did not grant the last favor, “and because of the House of blood guilt, for he had killed the Gibeonites.” David sent and called them, what is between you and the house of Saul? They told him, because he killed seven of our men, two hewers of wood, two drawers of water, a religious leader, a scribe, and a beadle. He asked them, what do you want now? They said to him: “ May there be given to us seven men of his sons and we shall hang them before the Eternal on the hill of Saul, the elected of the Eternal.” He said to them, what use is it for you that they be killed? Take silver and gold for yourselves! But they answered, “there is no money for us from Saul and his house.” He said, maybe they are afraid; he separated them and spoke to each one separately, trying to mollify him by himself, and asked him: What use is it for you that they be killed? Take gold and silver! But he said, “there is no money for us from Saul and his house.” It is written “for me”. At this moment, David said that the Holy One gave three good gifts to Israel: They are merciful, decent, and charitable. From where that they are merciful? “He gave you mercy.” From where that they are decent? “That His fear should be on your faces.” This is a sign, for a decent person does not sin. About anybody indecent it is clear that his ancestors did not stand on Mount Sinai. From where that they are charitable? “The Eternal, your God, kept for you covenant and charity.” But these, nothing of this in found in them. Immediately he went to exclude them as it is said: “But the Gibeonites are not of the Children of Israel.” And Ezra also excluded them, as it is said: “And the dedicated ones dwelt in the Ophel.” Also in the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will exclude them as it is written: “One crossing the city they cause to be lost.”
It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”
MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.
MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.
MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.
MISHNAH: A person may be liable for the action of his bull but not liable for his own action, not liable for the action of his bull but liable for his own action: If his bull puts to shame, he is not liable; but if he put to shame, he is liable. If his bull blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is not liable; but if he himself blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is liable. If his bull injured his father or his mother, he is liable; but if he himself injured his father or his mother, he is not liable. If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable since he will be tried for a capital crime.
HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.
MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.
Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: It is forbidden to judge money matters on Friday. Does not a Mishnah object: “Therefore one does not judge [criminal matters] on Sabbath eve or holiday eve”? Hence, one judges money matters! Also, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: One judges money matters on Friday but not criminal matters. One is for practice, the other for action.
The king said, I shall give. The king took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah. Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child, and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. The king gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal. All seven is written defective of one letter. That refers to Mephiboshet, for whom David prayed and whom the altar received. He told them, I let them pass by the altar and anyone whom the altar receives will be his, because of Mephiboshet who was great in Torah. He let him pass by the altar, which received him. Rebbi Avin said, I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision over me. For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. They were killed on the day of harvest …at the start of the barley harvest. Riṣpah bat Ayah took a garment and laid it out on the rock. What means on the rock? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: The rock, perfect is His action. Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: Do not leave his corpse overnight. But referring to desecration of the Name it is written that they were left hanging until water was poured on them. This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked cursed proselytes. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? Since even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: Solomon counted all proselytes … and appointed from them 70’000 carriers, etc.
A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Be on guard, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition. And it is written: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition, so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action.
Do not worship them. Should I say, not unless he worshipped every single strange worship in the world? The verse says, do not prostrate yourself before them. Prostration was included; why is it mentioned separately? To tie to it: Prostration is special in that it is the act of a single person and is punishable separately, so I am adding any single act that one is liable for separately. Even though Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: Do not worship them, a principle. Do not prostrate yourself before them, a detail. For you shall not prostrate yourself before another god; He again stated the principle. Principle, detail, and principle: is nothing covered but the detail? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana asked before Rebbi Hila: Do not do such, a principle. One who sacrifices to gods shall be banned, a detail. Only for the Eternal alone, He again stated the principle. Principle, detail, and principle; is not everything included? Does it not add one who embraces and one who kisses? He told him, why is prostrating mentioned? Not to infer from it that it is an action? He who embraces and he who (prostrates himself) do not exemplify actions.
Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If one says to it, you are my god, there is disagreement between Rebbi and the Sages. If he (prostrated himself), what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees that if he lowered his body, he is guilty. What is the difference between raising and lowering his body, and raising and lowering his lips? Rebbi Joḥanan said, following disagreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, following the distinction. Rebbi Zeˋira said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One rule should be for you, for the one acting in error. This only refers to what represents an action. The one who embraces (and who prostrates himself), which are not action, from where?
Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If one says to it, you are my god, there is disagreement between Rebbi and the Sages. If he (prostrated himself), what is the rule? Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees that if he lowered his body, he is guilty. What is the difference between raising and lowering his body, and raising and lowering his lips? Rebbi Joḥanan said, following disagreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, following the distinction. Rebbi Zeˋira said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One rule should be for you, for the one acting in error. This only refers to what represents an action. The one who embraces (and who prostrates himself), which are not action, from where?
Rebbi Tanḥum ben Yudan said, even though Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical to the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. From where that if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action? As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.
Rebbi Tanḥum ben Yudan said, even though Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical to the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action. From where that if one sacrificed, and burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting he is liable only for one; he agrees that if one worshipped it in its proper worship which is identical with the worship of Heaven like prostrating, he is liable for each single action? As Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: They should not continue to offer their sacrifices to spirits. They said to him, turn and refer it to sacrifices.
Rebbi Ḥinena ben Ḥanania said: I was promenading at Gufta of Sepphoris when I saw a Minean taking a skull, throwing it into the air, after which it came down transforming itself into a calf. I went and told it to my father. He said, if you ate from it, it was an action; otherwise it was an illusion.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?
“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?
HALAKHAH: “The following Gentile properties are forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Bitter, sweet, and hot are not under the rules of being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simon explains: The hot, spice wine. The bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the custudy of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi (Joshua) [Hoshaia], Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥanianiah the colleague of the rabbis, went to visit him. They saw Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal sitting there. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening, let us ask him. He said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. One said to him, maybe that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told them, it is for action and you can rely on it. When (they got up) [returned], Rebbi Ila was standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana and told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is this not a baraita? As Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “wine and vinegar which originally was wine.”
What is the rule for their parboiled [food]? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Immi went with Rebbi Jehudah to the hot springs of Gadara and permitted their parboiled [food]. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked, what is the difference between parboiled and lupines? Rebbi Yose said, parboiled is missing action by fire; lupines are not missing action by fire.
What is the rule for their parboiled [food]? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Immi went with Rebbi Jehudah to the hot springs of Gadara and permitted their parboiled [food]. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked, what is the difference between parboiled and lupines? Rebbi Yose said, parboiled is missing action by fire; lupines are not missing action by fire.
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left. What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable.
MISHNAH: They are liable only for forgetting a topic with action in error; the same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for forgetting a topic with action in error.
MISHNAH: They are liable only for forgetting a topic with action in error; the same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for forgetting a topic with action in error.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: Maybe following Rebbi? If the Anointed, error in action it is. But if the rabbis, oblivion of a topic it is. Rebbi Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. That you should not say, the Anointed and idolatry: Rebbi said, in acting in error; the rabbis said, in forgetting a topic. He said [ ], because we did not state about the Anointed. But in the former, we did not state about the Anointed but the Anointed is included, and here, even though we did not state about the Anointed, the Anointed is included.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
The Babylonian Talmud
GEMARA. It is well according to Bet Hillel; their reason is that ‘You shall make’, but not from that which is [already] made. If he loosens [the planks] he performs an action, and if he removes one from between two he performs an action. But what is the reason of Beth Shammai? If it is ‘You shall make’ but not from that which is [already] made, one act only should be sufficient; if it is because of a decree lest one use ordinary roofing, it should suffice if he removes one from between two?
GEMARA. It is well according to Bet Hillel; their reason is that ‘You shall make’, but not from that which is [already] made. If he loosens [the planks] he performs an action, and if he removes one from between two he performs an action. But what is the reason of Beth Shammai? If it is ‘You shall make’ but not from that which is [already] made, one act only should be sufficient; if it is because of a decree lest one use ordinary roofing, it should suffice if he removes one from between two?
After all, if the merchants cut it, there would be the despair of owners in their hands, and the change of ownership in the buyer's (lit. our ) hands [and therefore it seems that], We do not need [this solution]! [Rather, Rav Huna was trying to validate] the Hadasim of the merchants themselves. [But are they not able] to acquire it through a change [which takes place through] action [by tying it in the Lulav bundle]?
R. Judah said in the name of Rab, R. Meir's view is law; R. Huna said, it is established usage; R. Johanan said, the people adopted it as a usage. [The opinion of him who says that a view is law, carries with it that we must teach it in the school sessions; if one says that a view is established usage, it means that we do not teach it in the school sessions, but, if asked, decide accordingly; if one says that the people have adopted a view as usage, it means that we do not even decide according to it, but that when someone has already acted in accordance with it, we do not nullify his action.] R. Naḥman said, R. Jose's view is law and, indeed, R. Jose's view has been recognized as law. Why then do the priests nowadays spread their hands during the Minḥah service of public fasts? Inasmuch as they do it close to sunset, it is as if it were done during the Ne'ilah service.
In a baraita it was stated If nothing is known about the character of a man or of his ancestors, and the Scripture mentions any one of them in connection with a praiseworthy action, as for instance, “The word of the Lord which came to Zephaniah son of Cushi son of Gedaliah” (Zephaniah 1:1) we may know that he was a righteous man son of a righteous man; and wherever the Scripture mentions any one of them in connection with a reprehensible action, as for instance, “And it came to pass in the seventh month that Ishmael the son [of Netanel] son of Elishama came” (Jeremiah 41:1) we may know that he was a wicked man son of a wicked man.
In a baraita it was stated If nothing is known about the character of a man or of his ancestors, and the Scripture mentions any one of them in connection with a praiseworthy action, as for instance, “The word of the Lord which came to Zephaniah son of Cushi son of Gedaliah” (Zephaniah 1:1) we may know that he was a righteous man son of a righteous man; and wherever the Scripture mentions any one of them in connection with a reprehensible action, as for instance, “And it came to pass in the seventh month that Ishmael the son [of Netanel] son of Elishama came” (Jeremiah 41:1) we may know that he was a wicked man son of a wicked man.
Then that which was taught by R. Judah the son of R. Shimon b. Pazzi: One who can speak but not hear may set aside terumah ab initio. Whose view is this? If you say, R. Judah, he holds that this is only ex post facto, but not ab initio. If you say R. Yose, he invalidates the action even ex post facto.
But it [already] says 'do not bear false witness'. However it is a sin that is not an action, and for a sin that is not an action there is no lashes.
But it [already] says 'do not bear false witness'. However it is a sin that is not an action, and for a sin that is not an action there is no lashes.
They said in the name of R'Akiva etc. What is the reasoning of R' Akiva? He holds that it is a fine, and you do not pay a fine under self-confession. Rava said, there was no action [and they are killed] and they are fined. R' Nachmun said, the accused still has the money [he was accused of owing], and they [the witnesses] pay.
What does it mean there was no action? This is Rava! Let's say Yes, and also R' Nachmun.
There are those that learn that what Ulah taught from what has been taught, 'And ye shall let nothing of it remain until the morning; but that which remaineth of it until the morning' etc. Scripture came to give an action after the forbidden sin, meaning there aren't lashes. These are the words of R' Yehudah.
R' Akiva says, No. This isn't the source, rather it's from the fact that there is no forbidden action, and a sin without an action has no lashes [as a punishment]. It seems from what R' Yehudah explained that a sin without action, there are lashes. From where is this?
R' Akiva says, No. This isn't the source, rather it's from the fact that there is no forbidden action, and a sin without an action has no lashes [as a punishment]. It seems from what R' Yehudah explained that a sin without action, there are lashes. From where is this?
R' Akiva says, No. This isn't the source, rather it's from the fact that there is no forbidden action, and a sin without an action has no lashes [as a punishment]. It seems from what R' Yehudah explained that a sin without action, there are lashes. From where is this?
Ulah said, ... It is derived from the defaming husband; just as the defaming husband is a sin without action, so too here all sins without action are liable to lashes. [This cannot be correct.] What do we find regarding the defaming husband? He receives lashes and still pays.
Ulah said, ... It is derived from the defaming husband; just as the defaming husband is a sin without action, so too here all sins without action are liable to lashes. [This cannot be correct.] What do we find regarding the defaming husband? He receives lashes and still pays.
Rather Reish Lakish said, is is derived from false witnesses. Just as false witnesses is a sin without action, so too here a sin without action is liable to lashes. What [is the connection] to false witnesses, that does not require a warning?
Rather Reish Lakish said, is is derived from false witnesses. Just as false witnesses is a sin without action, so too here a sin without action is liable to lashes. What [is the connection] to false witnesses, that does not require a warning?
The sin of a defaming husband does require a warning. And the argument will resume, neither sin is similar to the other. The common characteristic of them is that they are both sins without action and liable to lashes. So too all sins without action are liable to lashes.
The sin of a defaming husband does require a warning. And the argument will resume, neither sin is similar to the other. The common characteristic of them is that they are both sins without action and liable to lashes. So too all sins without action are liable to lashes.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action? He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent.
Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
"Rabbi Yose says: The hater is killed." etc. But they didn't warn him? [In order to be executed in Jewish law, one has to be warned that their action is punishable by death by two witnesses]. Our mishnah is Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah, as it is taught [in a baraita]: Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: "A colleague does not need warning because warning was only given to distinguish between accidental and intentional." [And we assume that colleagues know the law and are thus, if sinning, sinning intentionally].
If so then a prohibition not involving an action should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "to perform" is written.
Ullah said [a possible resolution] [The Torah] need not have said "she should be to him for a wife" by Oneis, and it could have been derived from Motzei Shem Rah. And if by the case of Motzei Shem Rah where no action was performed, the Torah says (Deuteronomy 22,19) "She should be to him for a wife", then by Oneis [which does involve an action] is it not even more so?
Ullah said [a possible resolution] [The Torah] need not have said "she should be to him for a wife" by Oneis, and it could have been derived from Motzei Shem Rah. And if by the case of Motzei Shem Rah where no action was performed, the Torah says (Deuteronomy 22,19) "She should be to him for a wife", then by Oneis [which does involve an action] is it not even more so?
But Motzei Shem Rah from Oneis also can not be learned out, because you can ask what comparison can be made to Oneis which [is more stringent] as it involves an action?
Yes this is indeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previously asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?
because he had done a lav sh'ein bo maiseh [no action] and any lav sh'ein bo maiseh is not punishable with flogging. Reish Lakash says he is not flogged because it involved only a questionable warning, and a questionable warning does not constitute a valid warning.
But according to Rebbi Yochanon, this certainly is also a case of a prohibition without an action. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Reish Lakash made?]
He holds like that which Rav Idei bar Avin said from Rav Amram from Rebbi Yitzchok from Rebbi Yochanon. Rebbi Yehuda says in the name of Rebbi Yossi Haggilli Any prohibition in the Torah, if it involves an action one receives malkus on it. If it does not involve an action, one does not receive malkus on it, except in the cases of a Nishbah, a Meimer, and one who curses his friend with the name [of God].
He holds like that which Rav Idei bar Avin said from Rav Amram from Rebbi Yitzchok from Rebbi Yochanon. Rebbi Yehuda says in the name of Rebbi Yossi Haggilli Any prohibition in the Torah, if it involves an action one receives malkus on it. If it does not involve an action, one does not receive malkus on it, except in the cases of a Nishbah, a Meimer, and one who curses his friend with the name [of God].
A tanna taught in the presence of Rav Chisdah, Both the barber and the one who's hair gets cut incur malkus. [Rav Chisdah] asked him, Is one who eats dates from a sieve liable? That he would say to you, who is this Tanna? It's Rebbi Yehudah, who says that a lav sh'ein bo maaseh [a prohibition without tangible action] incurs malkus.
Chananya ben Chachinai said also one who is wearing shatnez. They responded that is not from [the same action]. He said back also a Nazir is not from [the same action].
Chananya ben Chachinai said also one who is wearing shatnez. They responded that is not from [the same action]. He said back also a Nazir is not from [the same action].
The Roman Missal
Within the action.
[Within the Action, or more solemn part of the Sacrifice.]
[Within the Action.]
[Within the Action.]
[Within the Action.]
[Within the Action.]
Prayer. Deus qui conspicis. O God, who seest that we confide in no action of our own: grant in thy mercy, that we may be defended from all evils by the protection of the Doctor of the Gentiles. Through our Lord, &c.
Secret. May this sacrifice, O God, both remain in us in action, and be strengthened by effect. Through, &c.
Within the Action. Communicantes. Communicating, and celebrating the most sacred day, on which our Lord Jesus Christ was delivered up for us. As also venerating the memory, in the first place, of the glorious and ever virgin Mary, Mother of the same God and our Lord Jesus Christ: as also of the blessed Apostles, &c.
Prayer. Deus qui diversitatem. O God, who hast united the various nations in the confession of thy name, grant us both to will and to be able to accomplish what thou commandest; that thy people being called to an eternal inheritance, may have one faith and one dutiful action. Through our Lord, &c.
[Within the Action.]
Prayer. Deus qui diversitatem. O God who hast united the various nations in the confession of thy name, grant, that being born again in the font of baptism, we may have one faith, and one dutiful action. Through our Lord, &c.
Prayer. Deus in te. O God, the strength of them that hope in thee, favourably give ear to our supplications, and since without thee mortal infirmity can do nothing, grant the help of thy grace, that in fulfilling thy commandments, we may please thee both in will and action. Through our Lord, &c.