constitutes

And thus she rises. And her first phase in the east comes forth on the thirtieth morning: and on that day she becomes visible, and constitutes for you the first phase of the moon on the thirtieth day together with the sun in the portal where the sun rises.

And I have not yet spoken of the other evils which prevail amongst men, from which even those who have the appearance of philosophers are not speedily freed, for in philosophy there are many pretenders. Nor do I say anything on the point that many such evils are found to exist among those who are neither Jews nor Christians. Of a truth, such evil practices do not at all prevail among Christians, if you properly examine what constitutes a Christian. Or, if any persons of that kind should be discovered, they are at least not to be found among those who frequent the assemblies, and come to the public prayers, without their being excluded from them, unless it should happen, and that rarely, that some one individual of such a character escapes notice in the crowd. We, then, are not worms who assemble together; who take our stand against the Jews on those Scriptures which they believe to be divine, and who show that He who was spoken of in prophecy has come, and that they have been abandoned on account of the greatness of their sins, and that we who have accepted the Word have the highest hopes in God, both because of our faith in Him, and of His ability to receive us into His communion pure from all evil and wickedness of life. If a man, then, should call himself a Jew or a Christian, he would not say without qualification that God had made the whole world, and the vault of heaven for us in particular. But if a man is, as Jesus taught, pure in heart, and meek, and peaceful, and cheerfully submits to dangers for the sake of his religion, such an one might reasonably have confidence in God, and with a full apprehension of the word contained in the prophecies, might say this also: “All these things has God shown beforehand, and announced to us who believe.”

Now if this is a true account of what constitutes the right and the wrong use of personification, have we not grounds for holding Celsus up to ridicule for thus ascribing to Christians words which they never uttered? For if those whom he represents as speaking are the unlearned, how is it possible that such persons could distinguish between “sense” and “reason,” between “objects of sense” and “objects of the reason?” To argue in this way, they would require to have studied under the Stoics, who deny all intellectual existences, and maintain that all that we apprehend is apprehended through the senses, and that all knowledge comes through the senses. But if, on the other hand, he puts these words into the mouth of philosophers who search carefully into the meaning of Christian doctrines, the statements in question do not agree with their character and principles. For no one who has learnt that God is invisible, and that certain of His works are invisible, that is to say, apprehended by the reason, can say, as if to justify his faith in a resurrection, “How can they know God, except by the perception of the senses?” or, “How otherwise than through the senses can they gain any knowledge?” For it is not in any secret writings, perused only by a few wise men, but in such as are most widely diffused and most commonly known among the people, that these words are written: “The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” From whence it is to be inferred, that though men who live upon the earth have to begin with the use of the senses upon sensible objects, in order to go on from them to a knowledge of the nature of things intellectual, yet their knowledge must not stop short with the objects of sense. And thus, while Christians would not say that it is impossible to have a knowledge of intellectual objects without the senses, but rather that the senses supply the first means of obtaining knowledge, they might well ask the question, “Who can gain any knowledge without the senses?” without deserving the abuse of Celsus, when he adds, “This is not the language of a man; it comes not from the soul, but from the flesh.”

What constitutes a defective cluster (olelet) of grapes? Any [cluster] which has neither a shoulder [a wide upper part] nor a pendant [a cone-shaped lower part]. If it has a shoulder or a pendant, it belongs to the owner. If there is a doubt, it belongs to the poor. A defective cluster on the joint of a vine [where a normal cluster hangs from the vine], if it can be cut off with the cluster, it belongs to the owner; but if it can not, it belongs to the poor. A single grape: Rabbi Judah says: It is deemed a whole cluster, But the sages say: It is deemed a defective cluster.

A vineyard that has been [partly] ruined: if it is still possible to harvest ten vines within a bet seah, and they are planted according to halakhah, behold this is called a “poor vineyard.” A vineyard planted in a mixed-up manner, if there remains an alignment of [one line of] two parallel [vines] opposite [a line of] three [vines], it constitutes a vineyard, but if not it is not a vineyard. Rabbi Meir says: since it is in appearance like a vineyard [in general], it is a vineyard.

Weaver’s mark’s or launderer’s marks [can be] prohibited because of kilayim. One who sticks one thread [through material], this does not constitute a connection, nor does [the prohibition of] kilayim apply and one who unties [such a connection] on Shabbat is exempt. If one made its two ends come out on the same side [of the material], this constitutes a connection, and it comes under the prohibition of kilayim, and one who unties such a connection on Shabbat is liable. Rabbi Judah said: [the prohibition does not apply] until one has made three stitches. A sack and a basket [one having a strip of woolen material attached to it, and the other a strip of linen] combine to form kilayim.

What constitutes an orchard? Any field in which there are at least three trees for every bet seah. If each tree is capable of yielding a cake of pressed figs, the size of sixty in the Italian maneh, then the entire bet seah may be plowed for their sake. If less than this amount, they may only plow the area that is occupied by the gatherer when his basket is placed behind him.

They may not give terumah according to measure, or weight, or number, but one may give it from that which has already been measured, weighed or counted. They may not give terumah in a basket or a hamper of a measured capacity, but one may give in it when it is a half or a third filled. He may not give a half of seah in a seah measuring vessel, for this half constitutes a known measure.

And so too a city which has a plague or [its buildings] collapse that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. What constitutes a plague? If in a city that can supply five hundred foot-soldiers and three deaths occurred on three consecutive days, behold this constitutes a plague, less than this is not a plague.

And so too a city which has a plague or [its buildings] collapse that city fasts and they sound a blast, but those [in the places] around it fast but do not sound the alarm. Rabbi Akiva says: they sound the alarm but do not fast. What constitutes a plague? If in a city that can supply five hundred foot-soldiers and three deaths occurred on three consecutive days, behold this constitutes a plague, less than this is not a plague.

A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.

A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.

Scalp baldness (karahat) or forehead baldness (gabahat) may become unclean in two weeks and by two signs: by quick flesh or by spreading. What constitutes baldness? If one ate neshem or smeared himself with neshem or had a wound from which hair can no longer grow. What is the extent of scalp baldness? From the crown sloping backwards to the protruding cartilage of the neck. What is the extent of forehead baldness? From the crown sloping forwards to the region facing the hair above. Scalp baldness and forehead baldness cannot be combined, nor is spreading from one to the other effective. Rabbi Judah says: if there is hair between them they cannot be combined, but if there is none they must be combined.

Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that the statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is like that of the House of Shammai. Just as the House of Shammai say that one row constitutes a vineyard, so Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that one row constitutes a vineyard. What do you want to say? A large vineyard is forbidden by eight, a small vineyard is forbidden by eight! Rebbi Judan did not say so but taught that eight cubits is forbidden, eight cubits plus any length is permitted. Some want to state: “But if someone newly planted sixteen by sixteen, it would be permitted with eight cubits.” Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that the statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is like that of the House of Shammai. Just as the House of Shammai are more restrictive when it is dried up than when it is planted, so Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is more restrictive when it is dried up than when it is planted.

Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that the statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is like that of the House of Shammai. Just as the House of Shammai say that one row constitutes a vineyard, so Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says that one row constitutes a vineyard. What do you want to say? A large vineyard is forbidden by eight, a small vineyard is forbidden by eight! Rebbi Judan did not say so but taught that eight cubits is forbidden, eight cubits plus any length is permitted. Some want to state: “But if someone newly planted sixteen by sixteen, it would be permitted with eight cubits.” Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It turns out that the statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is like that of the House of Shammai. Just as the House of Shammai are more restrictive when it is dried up than when it is planted, so Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob is more restrictive when it is dried up than when it is planted.

Rabina found Mar b. Rab Ashe throwing away the berries and eating the caper-buds. He said to him : What is thy opinion — like R. 'Akiba's who takes the lenient view? Then let the master act in accord with Bet Shammai who take a still more lenient view. For there is a Mishnaic teaching : In the case of the caper-bush. Bet Shammai say : It constitutes Kila'im in a vineyard ; but Bet Hillel say : It does not. Both, however, admit that it is subject to 'Orlah.

This is self-contradictory ! Thou declarest, "In the case of the caper-bush, Bet Shammai say : It constitutes Kila'im in a vineyard" — hence it is a kind of vegetable ! It then goes on to state, "Both, however, admit that it is subject to 'Orlah" — hence it is a kind of tree!

Thou mayest, however, derive [a conclusion] from the fact that [the bud] constitutes a protection of the fruit, and the All-merciful declared, "Ye shall deem it an uncircumcision with its fruit" (Lev. xix. 23) — the word "with" meaning to include what is attached to the fruit ; and what is that ? The protection of the fruit.

But, said Raba : When do we declare that a thing constitutes the protection of the fruit ? When it is there at the time the fruit has ripened ; but the caper-bud is not there at the time the fruit has ripened.

"Vine" — it requires a fourth [of a Log] of wine for a Nazirite. "Fig-tree" — to carry as much as a dried fig [from a private to a public court or vice versa] constitutes a breach of the Sabbath. "Pomegranate" — as we have the Mishnaic teaching : The vessels of house-owners

but [as regards] R. Huna and R. Chanan b. Rabbah,can we say that they differ on [what minimum of extent constitutes] the kashrus of the Sukkah the former, holding the opinion that the kashrus of the Sukkah [depends upon its being a minimum of] four amos [square] while the latter holds that The kashrus of the Sukkah [depends, upon its capacity of] containing his head, the greater part of his body, and his table?

The traditional law comes [to teach] concerning one's hair, in agreement with a statement of Rabbah b. Bar Hana, or Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated: One knotted hair constitutes an interposition, three hairs do not, but I do not know [the law in the case of] two.

But as to a house, even though it is not ten [handbreadths] high, since it is permanent it constitutes a valid tent, for it is no worse than the frame of a four-post bed.

But as to what constitutes an intermediate stage, I do not know whether if it has been pounded and not combed it is regarded as in an intermediate stage, but if it has been soaked and not pounded it is regarded as being in its natural state, or perhaps, even if it has been soaked but not pounded, it is also regarded as being in an intermediate stage.

but he should not hold the box, the words of R. Yaakov. The sages say: one may sleep casual sleep in his tefillin but not a regular sleep. And what constitutes a casual sleep? The time it takes to walk one hundred cubits.

What constitutes "avot"? Rav Judah said: When three leaves grow out of one spot. R. Kahana said: Even two and then one. R. Aha the son of Raba tried to find one [whose leaves grew] two and then one, since that was what R. Kahana said. Mar b. Amemar said to R. Ashi: "My father used to call that a wayward hadas."

Why does it need mention that he returned it? It teaches us something incidentally-- -a gift made on condition that it be returned constitutes a valid gift;

Fasts should not be decreed so as to begin on a Thursday, etc. No fasts should be enjoined upon the community on the days of New Moon, Hanukkah and Purim, but if the fasts began, etc. What constitutes a beginning? R. Aḥa said, three fasts, R. Jose said, even one fast. R. Judah said in the name of Rab, this view (that one should not fast to the end of the day) is the view of R. Meir, who offered it in the name of Rabban Gamaliel, but the other Sages say, one must fast to the end of the day. Mar Zuṭra lectured in the name of R. Huna that the law is, one must fast to the end of the day.

What is considered an epidemic? When in a city capable of furnishing five hundred foot-soldiers etc. The Rabbis taught: If in a small town capable of furnishing five hundred foot-soldiers as, for instance, Kefar 'Imḳi, three men died within three successive days, it is to be considered an epidemic, but if the three men died in one day or in four days, it does not constitute an epidemic; if in a larger city, capable of furnishing fifteen hundred men as, for instance, Kefar 'Akko, nine men died successively within three days, it constitutes an epidemic,

With regard to the houses of a walled town he was not in doubt; where he was in doubt was with regard to reading the Megillah. [He asked]: What constitutes the difference between villages (perazim) and walled towns which are mentioned in connection with the reading of the Megillah? Is it that the former are exposed and the latter are not exposed, [in which case] Tiberias [belongs to the former] being also exposed, or is it that the latter are protected and the former are not protected, [in which case] Tiberias [belongs to the latter], being protected? That was why he was in doubt.

It was taught there: What constitutes a vow? When one says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.” And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: “Behold, this shall be an olah.” What is the [practical] difference between vows (neder) and freewill offerings (nedavah)? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. Whence is this rule derived? —

It was taught there: What constitutes a vow? When one says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.” And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: “Behold, this shall be an olah.” What is the [practical] difference between vows (neder) and freewill offerings (nedavah)? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. Whence is this rule derived? —

Mar Zutra said: The covers of scrolls which have worn out may be used for making shrouds for a met mitzvah; and this constitutes their “storing away.”

And, if you like, I will fully grant you what they have said from the beginning. But you will say, Rabena's saying constitutes a difficulty. There is no difficulty. One opinion is according to the older Mishnah, the other according to the later Mishnah.

And they both derive their views from [the same statement] of Rebbi Yehudah. For It was taught in a barasia, (Exodus 12, 10) "And do not leave anything over until morning. And anything leftover until morning [must be burned in fire] etc." the Torah comes to give a positive commandment following a negative commandment to teach that he is not liable to malkus. These are the words of Rebbi Yehudah. Rebbi Yochanon expounds thus, the reason [Rebbi Yehudah says that he isn't flogged] is because the Torah comes [with a remedial positive commandment], but if the Torah would not have came then he would be flogged. We therefore see that a questionable warning constitutes as a valid warning.

Rather there was only one warning. But then would he be liable [five times]? Bit it was taught in a mishna, A Nazir who was drinking wine all day is only liable once. If they said to him, "Don't drink. Don't drink.", and he drank, than he would be liable for each individual time. Rather [the ruling] was necessary where one dipped his five fingers into a cream and placed them [on his beard] simultaneously, that it constitutes as a warning for each one.