66 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

De Principiis, Book III 7:7

I know not, indeed, how the heretics, not understanding the meaning of the apostle in these words, consider the term “subjection” degrading as applied to the Son; for if the propriety of the title be called in question, it may easily be ascertained from making a contrary supposition. Because if it be not good to be in subjection, it follows that the opposite will be good, viz. not to be in subjection. Now the language of the apostle, according to their view, appears to indicate by these words, “And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him,” that He, who is not now in subjection to the Father, will become subject to Him when the Father shall have first subdued all things unto Him. But I am astonished how it can be conceived to be the meaning, that He who, while all things are not yet subdued to Him, is not Himself in subjection, should—at a time when all things have been subdued to Him, and when He has become King of all men, and holds sway over all things—be supposed then to be made subject, seeing He was not formerly in subjection; for such do not understand that the subjection of Christ to the Father indicates that our happiness has attained to perfection, and that the work undertaken by Him has been brought to a victorious termination, seeing He has not only purified the power of supreme government over the whole of creation, but presents to the Father the principles of the obedience and subjection of the human race in a corrected and improved condition. If, then, that subjection be held to be good and salutary by which the Son is said to be subject to the Father, it is an extremely rational and logical inference to deduce that the subjection also of enemies, which is said to be made to the Son of God, should be understood as being also salutary and useful; as if, when the Son is said to be subject to the Father, the perfect restoration of the whole of creation is signified, so also, when enemies are said to be subjected to the Son of God, the salvation of the conquered and the restoration of the lost is in that understood to consist.

De Principiis, Book IV 2:11

The way, then, as it appears to us, in which we ought to deal with the Scriptures, and extract from them their meaning, is the following, which has been ascertained from the Scriptures themselves. By Solomon in the Proverbs we find some such rule as this enjoined respecting the divine doctrines of Scripture: “And do thou portray them in a threefold manner, in counsel and knowledge, to answer words of truth to them who propose them to thee.” The individual ought, then, to portray the ideas of holy Scripture in a threefold manner upon his own soul; in order that the simple man may be edified by the “flesh,” as it were, of the Scripture, for so we name the obvious sense; while he who has ascended a certain way [may be edified] by the “soul,” as it were. The perfect man, again, and he who resembles those spoken of by the apostle, when he says, “We speak wisdom among them that are perfect, but not the wisdom of the world, nor of the rulers of this world, who come to nought; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, the hidden wisdom, which God hath ordained before the ages, unto our glory,” [may receive edification] from the spiritual law, which has a shadow of good things to come. For as man consists of body, and soul, and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture, which has been arranged to be given by God for the salvation of men. And therefore we deduce this also from a book which is despised by some—The Shepherd—in respect of the command given to Hermas to write two books, and after so doing to announce to the presbyters of the church what he had learned from the Spirit. The words are as follow: “You will write two books, and give one to Clement, and one to Grapte. And Grapte shall admonish the widows and the orphans, and Clement will send to the cities abroad, while you will announce to the presbyters of the church.” Now Grapte, who admonishes the widows and the orphans, is the mere letter [of Scripture], which admonishes those who are yet children in soul, and not able to call God their Father, and who are on that account styled orphans,—admonishing, moreover, those who no longer have an unlawful bridegroom, but who remain widows, because they have not yet become worthy of the [heavenly] Bridegroom; while Clement, who is already beyond the letter, is said to send what is written to the cities abroad, as if we were to call these the “souls,” who are above [the influence of] bodily [affections] and degraded ideas,—the disciple of the Spirit himself being enjoined to make known, no longer by letters, but by living words, to the presbyters of the whole church of God, who have become grey through wisdom.

Against Celsus, Book IV 35:1

And let any one who peruses the treatise of Celsus observe whether it does not convey some such insinuation as the above, when he says: “And they attempted to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words, whose meaning was veiled in obscurity.” For these names are indeed obscure, and not within the comprehension and knowledge of many, though not in our opinion of doubtful meaning, even although assumed by those who are aliens to our religion; but as, according to Celsus, they do not convey any ambiguity, I am at a loss to know why he has rejected them. And yet, if he had wished honestly to overturn the genealogy which he deemed the Jews to have so shamelessly arrogated, in boasting of Abraham and his descendants [as their progenitors], he ought to have quoted all the passages bearing on the subject; and, in the first place, to have advocated his cause with such arguments as he thought likely to be convincing, and in the next to have bravely refuted, by means of what appeared to him to be the true meaning, and by arguments in its favour, the errors existing on the subject. But neither Celsus nor any one else will be able, by their discussions regarding the nature of names employed for miraculous purposes, to lay down the correct doctrine regarding them, and to demonstrate that those men were to be lightly esteemed whose names merely, not among their countrymen alone, but also amongst foreigners, could accomplish [such results]. He ought to have shown, moreover, how we, in misinterpreting the passages in which these names are found, deceive our hearers, as he imagines, while he himself, who boasts that he is not ignorant or unintelligent, gives the true interpretation of them. And he hazarded the assertion, in speaking of those names, from which the Jews deduce their genealogies, that “never, during the long antecedent period, has there been any dispute about these names, but that at the present time the Jews dispute about them with certain others,” whom he does not mention. Now, let him who chooses show who these are that dispute with the Jews, and who adduce even probable arguments to show that Jews and Christians do not decide correctly on the points relating to these names, but that there are others who have discussed these questions with the greatest learning and accuracy. But we are well assured that none can establish anything of the sort, it being manifest that these names are derived from the Hebrew language, which is found only among the Jews.

Against Celsus, Book V 59:1

Celsus then continues: “The Jews accordingly, and these (clearly meaning the Christians), have the same God;” and as if advancing a proposition which would not be conceded, he proceeds to make the following assertion: “It is certain, indeed, that the members of the great church admit this, and adopt as true the accounts regarding the creation of the world which are current among the Jews, viz. concerning the six days and the seventh;” on which day, as the Scripture says, God “ceased” from His works, retiring into the contemplation of Himself, but on which, as Celsus says (who does not abide by the letter of the history, and who does not understand its meaning), God “rested,”—a term which is not found in the record. With respect, however, to the creation of the world, and the “rest which is reserved after it for the people of God,” the subject is extensive, and mystical, and profound, and difficult of explanation. In the next place, as it appears to me, from a desire to fill up his book, and to give it an appearance of importance, he recklessly adds certain statements, such as the following, relating to the first man, of whom he says: “We give the same account as do the Jews, and deduce the same genealogy from him as they do.” However, as regards “the conspiracies of brothers against one another,” we know of none such, save that Cain conspired against Abel, and Esau against Jacob; but not Abel against Cain, nor Jacob against Esau: for if this had been the case, Celsus would have been correct in saying that we give the same accounts as do the Jews of “the conspiracies of brothers against one another.” Let it be granted, however, that we speak of the same descent into Egypt as they, and of their return thence, which was not a “flight,” as Celsus considers it to have been, what does that avail towards founding an accusation against us or against the Jews? Here, indeed, he thought to cast ridicule upon us, when, in speaking of the Hebrew people, he termed their exodus a “flight;” but when it was his business to investigate the account of the punishments inflicted by God upon Egypt, that topic he purposely passed by in silence.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Yadayim 4:7

The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 7:21

From where that “congregation” means ten people? Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: It is said here “congregation” and it says there “congregation”. Since “congregation” mentioned there means ten, so also “congregation” mentioned here must mean ten. Rebbi Simon said, it is said here “in the midst” and it is said there “in the midst” (Gen. 42:5): “The sons of Israel came to buy grain in the midst of those who came.” Since “in the midst” said there means ten, so also here it must mean ten. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, if you deduce from “in the midst”, there are too many of them. But it is said here “the children of Israel” and it is said there “the children of Israel.” Since “children of Israel” said there means ten, so here it also must mean ten.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 1:42

Does Rebbi Judah say that in this case it is not kilaim? Rebbi Zeïra said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, since Rebbi Jehudah said, in the case of a vegetable field one hand-breadth. Rebbi Yose said, he who wants to question this statement of Rebbi Zeïra might deduce the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah from that of the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, in the case of the prohibition of bet rova‘ one needs six-by-six to whip, so Rebbi Judah said in the case of the prohibition of six-by-six that one needs a hand-breadth to whip. But did we not state, Rebbi Judah permits it? Then it is difficult: what is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since he threw it out from his hand as seed, he is guilty. But did we not state that “Rebbi Jehudah says, it is not kilaim?” Explain it, until the moment that it comes to rest. But was it not stated that Rebbi Judah permits it? Even if it came to rest, Rebbi Jehudah permits it. Rebbi Illaï said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Ḥizqiah: A vertex from a dry spot is permitted. Then it also should be thus in the case of two wheat grains and one of barley? That is correct. But did we not state, “unless there are two wheat kernels and one barley kernel, or one wheat kernel and two barley kernels, or one each of wheat, barley, and spelt?” Explain it if there is a grain of wheat on each side, a fence on each side, and the grain of barley caught in the middle. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is only if there is no dry spot, but if there is a dry spot there, it is permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 2:33

It is written (Deut. 23:25): “If you come into your neighbor’s vineyard.” I could think that this means everybody; the verse says: “Do not put into your own vessel,” but you may put into somebody else’s vessel. Who is this? This is the laborer. “You may eat grapes.” Do we not know that in a vineyard there is nothing to eat but grapes? Why does the verse say, you may eat grapes? From here [it follows] that if he works fig trees he cannot eat grapes, vines he cannot eat figs. “All your soul’s desire,” all that your inclination may be. “All your soul’s desire,” anything that is free from tithes. What you eat without obligation also the laborer may eat without obligation. “All your soul’s desire,” from here that the laborer should not eat more than the value of his wages. From here did Rebbi Eleazar Ḥisma deduce that the laborer should not eat more than the value of his wages, but the Sages permit it. From where that his wages are called his soul? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina, it says here “his soul” and it says at another place “his soul” as it is written (Deut. 24:15): “For that he carries his soul.” Just as “his soul” there means his wages, so here “his soul” means his wages. “Until you are satiated,” that he should not eat and vomit. “Until you are satiated,” that he should not peel figs or suck out grapes.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 5:26

Rebbi Yose said, from that of Rebbi Eleazar one may deduce two [conclusions]. Since Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah if he slaughtered it for those who eat it, but it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. But it is disqualified if from the start he slaughtered for those who eat it and it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. Then its disqualification is of others and you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified, and you are saying so? But it must be the following, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Abin said, there are others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all services; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to slaughtering.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:16

Instead of inferring from his wife’s sister that all women under incest prohibitions remain prohibited, deduce from his brother’s wife that all women under incest prohibitions become permitted! Rebbi Mana said,one infers two prohibitions from two prohibitions but one does not infer two prohibitions from one prohibition. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun: For anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for anything not induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. What is that? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, e. g., those fifteen categories of women. That you should not say that his daughter is forbidden to him before she is married to his brother; once she is married to his brother she is permitted to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:4

Are sacrifices forbidden for the uncircumcised? One cannot deduce the answer from Passover since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] breaking a bone, neither from heave since that would be inference after inference. At the end, you have to say “from it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover implies that the uncircumcised is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of sacrifices must imply that the uncircumcised is disqualified. Are sacrifices forbidden for the mourner? “From it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of tithe states that the mourner is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover must imply that the mourner is disqualified.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:13

Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their words [we can deduce] whether he may feed his slaves or may not feed his slave. They wanted to say that he who says “the pure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his,” and this one, because her body and soul is Heaven’s, he may feed his slave. And he who says, since he could sell it to Gentiles or feed it to the dogs, since this one’s body is his but he cannot sell her to Gentiles nor feed her to the dogs, he may feed his slave. It was found stated: He may feed his slave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:39

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 6:8

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells wine for a year, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who only harvest after Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That is what was said, “old from the preceding year, aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? May one check one amphora on which all others depend [or] does he have to check every single one whether they would not turn into vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel at the top and know what is inside.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:176

In that case, the All-merciful should have written "when walking." What means "when thou walkest"? Deduce from this, [it means] when walking for thine own purpose thou art under the obligation [to read the Shema'] ; but when it is the performance of a religious duty, thou art exempt.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:13

One might deduce from this teaching that since he did not add the paragraph of "Division" in the first Tefillah, he is as though he had not prayed at all and we make him repeat it.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 9:187

There is no contradiction ; the former refers to one suffering thus from his mother's womb, the other to one suffering thus after birth. This is also proved from the fact that he teaches that [the man afflicted with leprous eruption] is like the person with an amputated limb. Deduce from this [that the leper referred to in the Baraita is one who became diseased after birth].

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:98

Go and deduce it from the smallest of the vessels, concerning which it is said, ... "And you shall make for it a border of a handbreadth around" (Exodus 25:25) Just as there the height was a handbreadth so was it here also a handbreadth But why should our deduction not be made from the vessels themselves? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:100

We deduce [the measurements of a] vessel from another vessel, but we do not deduce [the measurements of a] vessel from an ornament.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:100

We deduce [the measurements of a] vessel from another vessel, but we do not deduce [the measurements of a] vessel from an ornament.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:101

Why then should we not deduce from the crown, of which a master stated: The crown was on the smallest possible size? We deduce the size of a vessel from that of another vessel, but not from an accessory to a vessel. If so, [it may be objected] was not the border also an appurtenance of a vessel? The border was below [the top of] the table.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:101

Why then should we not deduce from the crown, of which a master stated: The crown was on the smallest possible size? We deduce the size of a vessel from that of another vessel, but not from an accessory to a vessel. If so, [it may be objected] was not the border also an appurtenance of a vessel? The border was below [the top of] the table.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:287

They thought that everyone agrees that a lulav must be tied together, and that we deduce [the law of] lulav from that of Sukkah, for it is written concerning the sukkah "You shall make" -- but not from what which is already made.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:289

No! Everyone agrees that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that their cutting is their making, but here they differ on the principle whether we deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. The one who declares it valid is of the opinion that we do not deduce lulav from Sukkah, while the one who declares it invalid says that we do deduce lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:289

No! Everyone agrees that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that their cutting is their making, but here they differ on the principle whether we deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. The one who declares it valid is of the opinion that we do not deduce lulav from Sukkah, while the one who declares it invalid says that we do deduce lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:289

No! Everyone agrees that with regard to the Sukkah we do not say that their cutting is their making, but here they differ on the principle whether we deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. The one who declares it valid is of the opinion that we do not deduce lulav from Sukkah, while the one who declares it invalid says that we do deduce lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:290

And if you wish you may say hat if we were of the opinion that the [components of the] lulav must be tied together, [we must admit that] all agree that we do deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. But here they dispute on the following: One Master holds the opinion that it must be tied together while the other holds that it need not be tied together; and their dispute is the same as that of the following tannaim as it has been taught: A lulav, whether [its components] be tied together or not, is valid. R. Judah says: If tied together it is valid, if not, it is invalid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:291

What is the reason of R. Judah? He deduces the word ‘take’ from the word ‘take’ mentioned in connection with the bundle of hyssop. It is written there, "And you shall take a bundle of hyssop," (Exodus 12:22) and it is written here, "And you shall take you on the first day" (Leviticus 23:40). Just as there it was taken in a ‘bundle, so here also it must be taken in a bundle. And the rabbis? They do not deduce ‘take’ from ‘take’.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:400

It has also been taught in a baraita: If he hollows out a haystack to make for himself a Sukkah, it is a [valid] Sukkah. But have we not learned, it is not a sukkah? Deduce, from it [that the explanation is] according to R. Huna. Deduce from it.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:400

It has also been taught in a baraita: If he hollows out a haystack to make for himself a Sukkah, it is a [valid] Sukkah. But have we not learned, it is not a sukkah? Deduce, from it [that the explanation is] according to R. Huna. Deduce from it.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:161

But could he not deduce [the answer] from his own statement, for we have learned: A window-shutter: R. Eliezer says if it is fastened or hung [on the window-frame] one may shut a window with it [on Shabbat], but if not, one may not shut a window with it; but the Sages say: in either case one may shut the window with it?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:64

It was also taught: The thorny palms of the Iron Mountain are invalid. But have we not learned that they are valid? Rather deduce from this like the teaching of Abaye. Deduce from this.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:64

It was also taught: The thorny palms of the Iron Mountain are invalid. But have we not learned that they are valid? Rather deduce from this like the teaching of Abaye. Deduce from this.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:87

with the Egyptian hadas which has seven [leaves] in each nest, and [therefore] when four fall off, there are still three left Abaye said: [From this] we can deduce that the Egyptian myrtle is valid for the hoshanna.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:96

Can we say that these are according to the following tannaim? If he transgressed and picked them off, it is invalid, the words of R. Elazar b. Zadok. But the sages declare it valid. They thought to explain his in the following way: According to all the lulav does not need binding, and even if you find to say that it does need binding, we do not deduce [the laws of] lulav from those of Sukkah of which it is written, "You shall make’ [which implies] but not from that which is already made.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:98

No! All agree that we do not apply the law of "set aside" to commandments, but they disagree here in whether we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah. One Master holds that we do so deduce them, while the other Master holds that we do not deduce the laws of lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:98

No! All agree that we do not apply the law of "set aside" to commandments, but they disagree here in whether we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah. One Master holds that we do so deduce them, while the other Master holds that we do not deduce the laws of lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:98

No! All agree that we do not apply the law of "set aside" to commandments, but they disagree here in whether we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah. One Master holds that we do so deduce them, while the other Master holds that we do not deduce the laws of lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:99

And if you want you can say: If we held that the lulav needs binding all would have agreed that we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah; But they disagree here on whether the lulav needs binding, and concerning the dispute of the following tannaim: Our Rabbis have taught: A lulav, whether [the other prescribed species were] bound with it or not, is valid. R. Judah says: If it is bound [with the others] it is valid; if it is unbound, it is invalid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:100

What is the reason of R. Judah? He deduces it from the word "take" [which occurs here (Leviticus 23:40) and with] the "taking" with regard to the bundle of hyssop (Exodus 12:22). It is written here, "And you shall take on the first day" and there it is written, "And you shall take a bundle of hyssop." Just as there [it must be] a bundle, so here also [it must be] a bundle. And the Rabbis? They do not deduce from the mention of the word "take" in the two passages.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:107

If he reduced their number, it is valid. When did he reduce them? If you say, before he bound them, this is obvious? Rather after he bound them? This then is a case of "set aside" from the very outset! Deduce from here that if something is "set aside" from the outset it is not [permanently] "set aside"?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:109

But one may not reduce them [the berries] on Yom Tov. But if he transgressed and did pluck them it is valid. But then, when did it become black? If you will say that it became black from the previous day, then it is a case of "set aside" from the very outset. Deduce from here that something that is "set aside" from the very outset is not [permanently] set aside?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:110

Rather it became black on the Festival. It is thus a case of being fit and then "set aside". Deduce from here that if something was fit and then was "set aside" it may become fit again?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:111

No! Indeed it refers to a case where it became black from the outset; and you can deduce from here that something "set aside" from the outset is not permanently "set aside"; But a case in which it was fit and then was "set aside" you cannot deduce from here.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:111

No! Indeed it refers to a case where it became black from the outset; and you can deduce from here that something "set aside" from the outset is not permanently "set aside"; But a case in which it was fit and then was "set aside" you cannot deduce from here.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:127

Abaye said: deduce from here that a rounded aravah is valid for the hoshanna But is this not obvious? What might you have said? Since it has an accompanying name it would not be valid, therefore he informs us [that it is not so].

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:201

But why? Perhaps that case is different; since [the thread or reed] was joined on [to the hyssop], it is regarded as part of it? Rather [deduce] from here: [If the ashes of the red heifer] fell from their tube into the trough they are invalid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:222

One can deduce important halakhot from the custom of [reciting the] Hallel. 1) Since he says Halleluyah and they respond Halleluyah it may be inferred that it is a mitzvah to answer Halleluyah

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:251

But according to R. Yose, is it not written “for food”? He needs that phrase to deduce, “for food”, but not for a salve, as it has been taught, “for food”, but not for a salve. You say “for food” but not for a salve; why not say, “[for food”] but not for washing? When it says, “for you” washing is included. So how then do I understand, “for food”? “For food”, but not for a salve. But what reason did you see for including washing and excluding a salve?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:11

This is indeed so; for in our Mishnah we have learned: If the first day of the festival, fell on Shabbat, all the people brought their lulavim to the Temple Mount, while in another Mishnah we have learned [that they brought them] to the Synagogue, consequently you may deduce from these that the former refers to the time when the Temple was in existence while the latter refers to the time when the Temple was no longer in existence. This is conclusive.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:15

Scripture says: "On the day," implying, even on Shabbat. But what do the rabbis do with the words "on the day"? They need it to infer from it that on the day, [the lulav is taken] but not at night. And R. Eliezer, from where does he deduce that [the lulav is to be taken] by day, and not at night? He deduces it from the conclusion of the verse, "And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God for seven days" "days" but not nights. And the Rabbis? If I learned it from that verse, I might have said that we ought to compare ‘days’ [mentioned here] with ‘days’ mentioned with regard to the Sukkah so that just as there [the expression of] ‘days’ includes nights, so here also [the expression of] ‘days’ includes nights.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:18

Let us then see to what it is more comparable. We should deduce a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day from a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day, and let no proof be adduced from something whose performance is only for one moment. Or take it another way: We might deduce a thing which is a mitzvah for future generations from something whose mitzvah is for future generations, but we will not deduce a proof from the preparations which were not for future generations.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:18

Let us then see to what it is more comparable. We should deduce a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day from a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day, and let no proof be adduced from something whose performance is only for one moment. Or take it another way: We might deduce a thing which is a mitzvah for future generations from something whose mitzvah is for future generations, but we will not deduce a proof from the preparations which were not for future generations.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:18

Let us then see to what it is more comparable. We should deduce a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day from a thing whose performance is a matter of the whole day, and let no proof be adduced from something whose performance is only for one moment. Or take it another way: We might deduce a thing which is a mitzvah for future generations from something whose mitzvah is for future generations, but we will not deduce a proof from the preparations which were not for future generations.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:61

Maremar said in the name of Mar Zutra: Deduce from this that they were laid upon the base [of the altar]. or if you were to assume that they were placed on the ground [then you have the following problem]: It (the altar) rose up one cubit and drew in one cubit, and this formed the base. It then rose up five cubits and drew in one cubit, and this formed the circuit; it [then] rose up three cubits, and this was the place of the horns. Now how could they bend over the altar? Consequently learn from this that they were placed on the base. This is conclusive.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:5

No; both of them may agree that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is with an instrument, but in this case they differ over whether we may deduce what it is possible [to manufacture from another material] from that which it is impossible [to manufacture from another material]. He who declares them valid is of the opinion that we do deduce that which it is possible [to manufacture from another material], from that which is impossible [to manufacture from another material], whereas he who holds them to be invalid is of the opinion that we do not deduce the possible from the impossible.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:5

No; both of them may agree that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is with an instrument, but in this case they differ over whether we may deduce what it is possible [to manufacture from another material] from that which it is impossible [to manufacture from another material]. He who declares them valid is of the opinion that we do deduce that which it is possible [to manufacture from another material], from that which is impossible [to manufacture from another material], whereas he who holds them to be invalid is of the opinion that we do not deduce the possible from the impossible.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:5

No; both of them may agree that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is with an instrument, but in this case they differ over whether we may deduce what it is possible [to manufacture from another material] from that which it is impossible [to manufacture from another material]. He who declares them valid is of the opinion that we do deduce that which it is possible [to manufacture from another material], from that which is impossible [to manufacture from another material], whereas he who holds them to be invalid is of the opinion that we do not deduce the possible from the impossible.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:6

And if you want you may say that all are in agreement that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is the vocal singing, and that we do not deduce the possible from the impossible, but in this case they differ on the question whether, in making the deduction concerning the candlestick, we apply the principle of “the general and the particular” or the rule of “inclusion and exclusion.” Rabbi applies the principle of “the general and the particular” while R. Yose b. Judah applies the principle of “exclusion and inclusion.”

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:93

What is the reason of R. Judah? — Scripture says, “And you shall sound (utekatem) a teruah,” (Numbers 10:5) showing that the How is this so? tekiah and the teruah are regarded as one. What then is the reason of the Rabbis? — That verse is required to teach that the Teru'ah must be preceded and followed by a sustained blast. (From Where does R. Judah deduce the necessity for a sustained blast preceding and following the Teru'ah? — He deduces it from the expression, a second time (Numbers 6:6).

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:147

Scripture says, "They shall receive equal portions to eat," (Deuteronomy 18:8) meaning, as the division of the service [is equal for all], so is the division of the food. Now what food [could this mean]? If you will say that it means the sacrifices, do we not deduce that from a different verse, "It shall be the priest's that offers it?" (Leviticus 7:9). Rather this must refer to the showbread.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:238

Gemara . [We can deduce] that in the matter of preliminaries for preparing food they are the same.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:244

Gemara. [We can deduce] from this that in respect of compensation they are the same.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:251

GEMARA. We can deduce from this that in the matter of utensils which are used for preparing food they are on the same footing.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:259

GEMARA. Behold we can deduce that in the matter of [defiling] a bed or a seat and counting seven days they are on the same footing.