27 occurrences across the corpus

The Writings of Origen

Against Celsus, Book II 22:1

He adds to this, as if he had brought together an argument with conclusive demonstrations and consequences, the following: “And, which is still more absurd, God himself conspired against those who sat at his table, by converting them into traitors and impious men.” But how Jesus could either conspire or convert His disciples into traitors or impious men, it would be impossible for him to prove, save by means of such a deduction as any one could refute with the greatest ease.

Against Celsus, Book IV 58:1

But we have something more to say to Celsus, when he declares that “the soul is the work of God, and that the nature of body is different,” and puts forward such an opinion not only without proof, but even without clearly defining his meaning; for he did not make it evident, whether he meant that every soul is the work of God, or only the rational soul. This, then, is what we have to say: If every soul is the work of God, it is manifest that those of the meanest irrational animals are God’s work, so that the nature of all bodies is different from that of the soul. He appears, however, in what follows, where he says that “irrational animals are more beloved by God than we, and have a purer knowledge of divinity,” to maintain that not only is the soul of man, but in a much greater degree that of irrational animals, the work of God; for this follows from their being said to be more beloved by God than we. Now if the rational soul alone be the work of God, then, in the first place, he did not clearly indicate that such was his opinion; and in the second place, this deduction follows from his indefinite language regarding the soul—viz. whether not every one, but only the rational, is the work of God—that neither is the nature of all bodies different [from the soul]. But if the nature of all bodies be not different, although the body of each animal correspond to its soul, it is evident that the body of that animal whose soul was the work of God, would differ from the body of that animal in which dwells a soul which was not the work of God. And so the assertion will be false, that there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man.

The Mishnah

Mishnah Kiddushin 1:2

A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document; And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price. A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’. He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.

Mishnah Keritot 3:9

Rabbi Akiba asked again: If a man slaughtered five sacrifices outside [the Temple] in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable to a separate offering for each act or only to one for them all? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiba did not ask this, but rather concerning one who ate of notar (remnant) from five sacrifices in one spell of unawareness what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or is he liable to one for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing about this. Rabbi Joshua: I have heard that if one eats an offering from five different dishes in one spell of unawareness, he is guilty of sacrilege for each of them; and it seems to me that the case in question may be inferred from this by a kal vehomer. Rabbi Akiba replied: if this is a received tradition we accept it; but if it is only a logical deduction, there is a rebuttal. He [Rabbi Joshua] said: rebut it. He replied: It is not so. For if you hold the view with regard to sacrilege, for in this case one who gives food to another is as guilty as the one who eats it himself, and the person who causes others to derive a benefit from them is as guilty as the person who himself made use of them; furthermore, [small quantities are] reckoned together in the case of sacrilege even after the lapse of a long period, can you say it in connection with notar (remnant) where not one of these laws applies.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 9:79

There are seven kinds of religious people: Religious on the shoulder, religious on credit, religious balancing, religious “what is the deduction,” religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” religious from fear, religious from love. Religious on the shoulder, he carries his deeds onhis shoulder. Religious on credit, “give me credit that I can perform commandments.” Religious balancing, he commits one sin and observes one commandment and balances one against the other. Religious “what is the deduction,” what I have that is what I am using to deduct for doing a commandment. Religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” I committed that sin and therefore I shall do this good deed to counteract it. Religious from fear, like Job. Religious from love, like Abraham. No one is beloved as much as the religious from love, like Abraham.

Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 9:79

There are seven kinds of religious people: Religious on the shoulder, religious on credit, religious balancing, religious “what is the deduction,” religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” religious from fear, religious from love. Religious on the shoulder, he carries his deeds onhis shoulder. Religious on credit, “give me credit that I can perform commandments.” Religious balancing, he commits one sin and observes one commandment and balances one against the other. Religious “what is the deduction,” what I have that is what I am using to deduct for doing a commandment. Religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” I committed that sin and therefore I shall do this good deed to counteract it. Religious from fear, like Job. Religious from love, like Abraham. No one is beloved as much as the religious from love, like Abraham.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:27

There are seven kinds of religious people: Religious on the shoulder, religious on credit, religious balancing, religious “what is the deduction,” religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” religious from fear, religious from love. Religious on the shoulder, he carries his deeds on his shoulder. Religious on credit, “give me credit that I can perform commandments.” Religious balancing, he commits one sin and observes one commandment and balances one against the other. Religious “what is the deduction,” what I have that is what I am using to deduct for doing a commandment. Religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” I committed that sin and therefore I shall do this good deed to counteract it. Religious from fear, like Job. Religious from love, like Abraham. No one is beloved as much as the religious from love, like Abraham.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:27

There are seven kinds of religious people: Religious on the shoulder, religious on credit, religious balancing, religious “what is the deduction,” religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” religious from fear, religious from love. Religious on the shoulder, he carries his deeds on his shoulder. Religious on credit, “give me credit that I can perform commandments.” Religious balancing, he commits one sin and observes one commandment and balances one against the other. Religious “what is the deduction,” what I have that is what I am using to deduct for doing a commandment. Religious “I shall do it when I realize my guilt,” I committed that sin and therefore I shall do this good deed to counteract it. Religious from fear, like Job. Religious from love, like Abraham. No one is beloved as much as the religious from love, like Abraham.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:18

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:144

But what does the phrase "and teachest him out of Thy law" (Ps. xciv, 12) intend to convey to us ? Read not telammedennu "and teachest him" but telammedennu "and teachest us"; i.e., Thou teachest us this matter out of Thy law as a deduction from the ordinance

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:141

They said : Yes, in the Book of Deuteronomy R. Judah does use this method of deduction; but the consecutive verses [quoted above] are required for another teaching of R. Joshua b. Levi who says : Whoever teaches his son Torah, the Scriptures ascribe it to him as though he had received it from Mount Horeb ; as it is said, "Thou shalt make them known unto thy children and thy children's children" (Deut. iv. 9) and it continues, "The day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb" (ibid. v. 10).

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:223

But this is what he means to say : This question [of carrying Tefillin in a regular privy but not a chance one] thou mayest argue with a reason; but thou must not argue it by means of a fortiori deduction, for if thou usest this method of argument, it is an argument which cannot be refuted.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:302

But against thine own argument, I quote the first clause [of the Baraita brought in objection, viz. :] "With urine, so long as the ground is wet enough to moisten it is prohibited" ; hence if the trace of it be recognisable, it is permitted! No such deduction can be drawn. It is possible to say that [the question under consideration]

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:62

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab : As for the caper-bush which is still in a state of 'Orlah outside the [Holy] Land, one throws away the berries but eats the buds ; that is to say, the berries are fruit but not the buds. Against this [deduction] I quote : ln the case of the various kinds of capers, over the leaves and their young shoots one says "...Who createst the fruit of the ground," but over the berries and buds "...Who createst the fruit of the tree!"

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 9:359

R. Jose b. Judah says : [This reasoning] is unnecessary ; for it is stated, "For none might enter within the king's gate clothed with sackcloth" (Esther iv. 2) — and is there not here an a fortiori deduction : If it is thus with sackcloth which is not a disgusting thing in the presence of human beings, must not expectoration, which is disgusting in the presence of the supreme King of kings, be all the more prohibited !

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:98

Go and deduce it from the smallest of the vessels, concerning which it is said, ... "And you shall make for it a border of a handbreadth around" (Exodus 25:25) Just as there the height was a handbreadth so was it here also a handbreadth But why should our deduction not be made from the vessels themselves? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:103

to a vessel! Rather one adduces the size of a thing some of whose measurements are given by the Torah from another thing whose measurements are given by the Torah, but no deduction can be made from the headplate or the crown of which the Torah gave no measurements at all

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:109

R. Aha b. Jacob answered: We have a tradition that the face of the cherubim were not less than a handbreadth and R. Huna too made his deduction from this verse.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:214

And Beth Shammai also, do not they need the verse for this deduction? Yes, indeed.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:158

And this is what R. Elazar said: What is the implication of the text, “It has been told to you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires of you: Only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?” (Micah 6:8): ‘To do justly’ means [to act in accordance with] justice; ‘to love mercy’ refers to acts of loving kindness’, ‘and to walk humbly with your God’ refers to attending to funerals and providing a bride with a dowry for her wedding. Now can we not make an a fortiori deduction: If in matters which are normally performed publicly the Torah says ‘to walk humbly’, how much more so in matters that are normally done privately?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:6

And if you want you may say that all are in agreement that the essential feature of the [Temple] music is the vocal singing, and that we do not deduce the possible from the impossible, but in this case they differ on the question whether, in making the deduction concerning the candlestick, we apply the principle of “the general and the particular” or the rule of “inclusion and exclusion.” Rabbi applies the principle of “the general and the particular” while R. Yose b. Judah applies the principle of “exclusion and inclusion.”

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 4:14

It is at all events generally admitted that a drunken priest is not allowed to raise his hands. Whence is this view derived? Said R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi, who reported it in the name of Bar Ḳappara, Why is the portion dealing with the blessing priest placed (in the Bible) immediately after the portion dealing with the Nazir? In order to convey the lesson that as the Nazir is forbidden to drink wine, so is the priest who is to pronounce a blessing. An objection was raised against this statement by 'Ahabah, son of R. Zera, or, as some say, by Joshua b. Gizora: If this deduction is correct, we ought also to say that as the Nazir is forbidden to eat the kernel (Num 6.4), so is the blessing priest! Said R. Isaac, Scripture says (Deut., 10.8): "To minister unto Him, and to bless in His name," which indicates that as the ministering priest is allowed to eat the kernel, so is the priest who is to pronounce a blessing.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:271

He replied: If you would think that that text is for the purpose of excluding, then the text could simply omit the word. And should you say, we could then derive the rule [that he is to count seven days] by a logical deduction, such a deduction could be confuted by the case of the woman who counts day for day.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:271

He replied: If you would think that that text is for the purpose of excluding, then the text could simply omit the word. And should you say, we could then derive the rule [that he is to count seven days] by a logical deduction, such a deduction could be confuted by the case of the woman who counts day for day.