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The Writings of Origen
When Celsus here or elsewhere finds himself unable to dispute the truth of what we say, but avers that the same things were said by the Greeks, our answer is, that if the doctrine be sound, and the effect of it good, whether it was made known to the Greeks by Plato or any of the wise men of Greece, or whether it was delivered to the Jews by Moses or any of the prophets, or whether it was given to the Christians in the recorded teaching of Jesus Christ, or in the instructions of His apostles, that does not affect the value of the truth communicated. It is no objection to the principles of Jews or Christians, that the same things were also said by the Greeks, especially if it be proved that the writings of the Jews are older than those of the Greeks. And further, we are not to imagine that a truth adorned with the graces of Grecian speech is necessarily better than the same when expressed in the more humble and unpretending language used by Jews and Christians, although indeed the language of the Jews, in which the prophets wrote the books which have come down to us, has a grace of expression peculiar to the genius of the Hebrew tongue. And even if we were required to show that the same doctrines have been better expressed among the Jewish prophets or in Christian writings, however paradoxical it may seem, we are prepared to prove this by an illustration taken from different kinds of food, and from the different modes of preparing them. Suppose that a kind of food which is wholesome and nutritious has been prepared and seasoned in such a way as to be fit, not for the simple tastes of peasants and poor labourers, but for those only who are rich and dainty in their tastes. Suppose, again, that that same food is prepared not to suit the tastes of the more delicate, but for the peasants, the poor labourers, and the common people generally, in short, so that myriads of persons might eat of it. Now if, according to the supposition, the food prepared in the one way promotes the health of those only who are styled the better classes, while none of the others could taste it, whereas when prepared in the other way it promoted the health of great multitudes of men, which shall we esteem as most contributing to the public welfare,—those who prepare food for persons of mark, or those who prepare it for the multitudes?—taking for granted that in both cases the food is equally wholesome and nourishing; while it is evident that the welfare of mankind and the common good are promoted better by that physician who attends to the health of the many, than by one who confines his attention to a few.
And the charge of folly applies not only to those who offer prayers to images, but also to such as pretend to do so in compliance with the example of the multitude: and to this class belong the Peripatetic philosophers and the followers of Epicurus and Democritus. For there is no falsehood or pretence in the soul which is possessed with true piety towards God. Another reason also why we abstain from doing honour to images, is that we may give no support to the notion that the images are gods. It is on this ground that we condemn Celsus, and all others who, while admitting that they are not gods, yet, with the reputation of being wise men, render to them what passes for homage. In this way they lead into sin the multitude who follow their example, and who worship these images not simply out of deference to custom, but from a belief into which they have fallen that they are true gods, and that those are not to be listened to who hold that the objects of their worship are not true gods. Celsus, indeed, says that “they do not take them for gods, but only as offerings dedicated to the gods.” But he does not prove that they are not rather dedicated to men than, as he says, to the honour of the gods themselves; for it is clear that they are the offerings of men who were in error in their views of the Divine Being. Moreover, we do not imagine that these images are representations of God, for they cannot represent a being who is invisible and incorporeal. But as Celsus supposes that we fall into a contradiction, whilst on the one hand we say that God has not a human form, and on the other we profess to believe that God made man the image of Himself, and created man the image of God; our answer is the same as has been given already, that we hold the resemblance to God to be preserved in the reasonable soul, which is formed to virtue, although Celsus, who does not see the difference between “being the image of God,” and “being created after the image of God,” pretends that we said, “God made man His own image, and gave him a form like to His own.” But this also has been examined before.
And observe the recklessness of that expression, “For if thou worship any other of the things in the universe,” as though he would have us believe that we are led by our service of God to the worship of any other things which belong to God, without any injury to ourselves. But, as if feeling his error, he corrects the words, “If thou worship any other of the things in the universe,” by adding, “We may honour none, however, except those to whom that right has been given by God.” And we would put to Celsus this question in regard to those who are honoured as gods, as demons, or as heroes: “Now, sir, can you prove that the right to be honoured has been given to these by God, and that it has not arisen from the ignorance and folly of men who in their wanderings have fallen away from Him to whom alone worship and service are properly due? You said a little ago, O Celsus, that Antinous, the favourite of Adrian, is honoured; but surely you will not say that the right to be worshipped as a god was given to him by the God of the universe? And so of the others, we ask proof that the right to be worshipped was given to them by the Most High God.” But if the same question is put to us in regard to the worship of Jesus, we will show that the right to be honoured was given to Him by God, “that all may honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.” For all the prophecies which preceded His birth were preparations for His worship. And the wonders which He wrought—through no magical art, as Celsus supposes, but by a divine power, which was foretold by the prophets—have served as a testimony from God in behalf of the worship of Christ. He who honours the Son, who is the Word and Reason, acts in nowise contrary to reason, and gains for himself great good; he who honours Him, who is the Truth, becomes better by honouring truth: and this we may say of honouring wisdom, righteousness, and all the other names by which the sacred Scriptures are wont to designate the Son of God.
He adds, “And indeed he who, when speaking of God, asserts that there is only one who may be called Lord, speaks impiously, for he divides the kingdom of God, and raises a sedition therein, implying that there are separate factions in the divine kingdom, and that there exists one who is His enemy.” He might speak after this fashion, if he could prove by conclusive arguments that those who are worshipped as gods by the heathens are truly gods, and not merely evil spirits, which are supposed to haunt statues and temples and altars. But we desire not only to understand the nature of that divine kingdom of which we are continually speaking and writing, but also ourselves to be of those who are under the rule of God alone, so that the kingdom of God may be ours. Celsus, however, who teaches us to worship many gods, ought in consistency not to speak of “the kingdom of God,” but of “the kingdom of the gods.” There are therefore no factions in the kingdom of God, nor is there any god who is an adversary to Him, although there are some who, like the giants and Titans, in their wickedness wish to contend with God in company with Celsus, and those who declare war against Him who has by innumerable proofs established the claims of Jesus, and against Him who, as the Word, did, for the salvation of our race, show Himself before all the world in such a form as each was able to receive Him.
And if, further, temples are to be compared with temples, that we may prove to those who accept the opinions of Celsus that we do not object to the erection of temples suited to the images and altars of which we have spoken, but that we do refuse to build lifeless temples to the Giver of all life, let any one who chooses learn how we are taught, that our bodies are the temple of God, and that if any one by lust or sin defiles the temple of God, he will himself be destroyed, as acting impiously towards the true temple. Of all the temples spoken of in this sense, the best and most excellent was the pure and holy body of our Saviour Jesus Christ. When He knew that wicked men might aim at the destruction of the temple of God in Him, but that their purposes of destruction would not prevail against the divine power which had built that temple, He says to them, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it again.... This He said of the temple of His body.” And in other parts of holy Scripture where it speaks of the mystery of the resurrection to those whose ears are divinely opened, it says that the temple which has been destroyed shall be built up again of living and most precious stones, thereby giving us to understand that each of those who are led by the word of God to strive together in the duties of piety, will be a precious stone in the one great temple of God. Accordingly, Peter says, “Ye also, as lively stones, are built up a spiritual house, an holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ;” and Paul also says, “Being built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ our Lord being the chief corner-stone.” And there is a similar hidden allusion in this passage in Isaiah, which is addressed to Jerusalem: “Behold, I will lay thy stones with carbuncles, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy battlements of jasper, and thy gates of crystal, and all thy borders of pleasant stones. And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord; and great shall be the peace of thy children. In righteousness shalt thou be established.”
From this it is evident that we have already met the next statement of Celsus, which is as follows: “We must either not live, and indeed not come into this life at all, or we must do so on condition that we give thanks and first-fruits and prayers to demons, who have been set over the things of this world: and that we must do as long as we live, that they may prove good and kind.” We must surely live, and we must live according to the word of God, as far as we are enabled to do so. And we are thus enabled to live, when, “whether we eat or drink, we do all to the glory of God;” and we are not to refuse to enjoy those things which have been created for our use, but must receive them with thanksgiving to the Creator. And it is under these conditions, and not such as have been imagined by Celsus, that we have been brought into life by God; and we are not placed under demons, but we are under the government of the Most High God, through Him who hath brought us to God—Jesus Christ. It is not according to the law of God that any demon has had a share in worldly affairs, but it was by their own lawlessness that they perhaps sought out for themselves places destitute of the knowledge of God and of the divine life, or places where there are many enemies of God. Perhaps also, as being fit to rule over and punish them, they have been set by the Word, who governs all things, to rule over those who subjected themselves to evil and not to God. For this reason, then, let Celsus, as one who knows not God, give thank-offerings to demons. But we give thanks to the Creator of all, and, along with thanksgiving and prayer for the blessings we have received, we also eat the bread presented to us; and this bread becomes by prayer a sacred body, which sanctifies those who sincerely partake of it.
Celsus would also have us to offer first-fruits to demons. But we would offer them to Him who said, “Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth.” And to Him to whom we offer first-fruits we also send up our prayers, “having a great high priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God,” and “we hold fast this profession” as long as we live; for we find God and His only-begotten Son, manifested to us in Jesus, to be gracious and kind to us. And if we would wish to have besides a great number of beings who shall ever prove friendly to us, we are taught that “thousand thousands stood before Him, and ten thousand times ten thousand ministered unto Him.” And these, regarding all as their relations and friends who imitate their piety towards God, and in prayer call upon Him with sincerity, work along with them for their salvation, appear unto them, deem it their office and duty to attend to them, and as if by common agreement they visit with all manner of kindness and deliverance those who pray to God, to whom they themselves also pray: “For they are all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for those who shall be heirs of salvation.” Let the learned Greeks say that the human soul at its birth is placed under the charge of demons: Jesus has taught us not to despise even the little ones in His church, saying, “Their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven.” And the prophet says, “The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear Him, and delivereth them.” We do not, then, deny that there are many demons upon earth, but we maintain that they exist and exercise power among the wicked, as a punishment of their wickedness. But they have no power over those who “have put on the whole armour of God,” who have received strength to “withstand the wiles of the devil,” and who are ever engaged in contests with them, knowing that “we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.”
In the next place, he expresses his approval of those who “hope that eternal life shall be enjoyed with God by the soul or mind, or, as it is variously called, the spiritual nature, the reasonable soul, intelligent, holy, and blessed;” and he allows the soundness of the doctrine, that “those who had a good life shall be happy, and the unrighteous shall suffer eternal punishments.” And yet I wonder at what follows, more than at anything that Celsus has ever said; for he adds, “And from this doctrine let not them or any one ever swerve.” For certainly in writing against Christians, the very essence of whose faith is God, and the promises made by Christ to the righteous, and His warnings of punishment awaiting the wicked, he must see that, if a Christian were brought to renounce Christianity by his arguments against it, it is beyond doubt that, along with his Christian faith, he would cast off the very doctrine from which he says that no Christian and no man should ever swerve. But I think Celsus has been far surpassed in consideration for his fellow-men by Chrysippus in his treatise, On the Subjugation of the Passions. For when he sought to apply remedies to the affections and passions which oppress and distract the human spirit, after employing such arguments as seemed to himself to be strong, he did not shrink from using in the second and third place others which he did not himself approve of. “For,” says he, “if it were held by any one that there are three kinds of good, we must seek to regulate the passions in accordance with that supposition; and we must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away.” And he adds, “Thus, supposing that pleasure were the highest good, or that he was of that opinion whose mind was under the dominion of passion, we should not the less give him help, and show that, even on the principle that pleasure is the highest and final good of man, all passion is disallowed.” And Celsus, in like manner, after having embraced the doctrine, “that the righteous shall be blessed, and the wicked shall suffer eternal punishments,” should have followed out his subject; and, after having advanced what seemed to him the chief argument, he should have proceeded to prove and enforce by further reasons the truth that the unjust shall surely suffer eternal punishment, and those who lead a good life shall be blessed.
Having said so much on this subject, let us proceed to another statement of Celsus: “Since men are born united to a body, whether to suit the order of the universe, or that they may in that way suffer the punishment of sin; or because the soul is oppressed by certain passions until it is purged from these at the appointed period of time,—for, according to Empedocles, all mankind must be banished from the abodes of the blessed for 30,000 periods of time,—we must therefore believe that they are entrusted to certain beings as keepers of this prison-house.” You will observe that Celsus, in these remarks, speaks of such weighty matters in the language of doubtful human conjecture. He adds also various opinions as to the origin of man, and shows considerable reluctance to set down any of these opinions as false. When he had once come to the conclusion neither indiscriminately to accept nor recklessly to reject the opinions held by the ancients, would it not have been in accordance with that same rule of judging, if, when he found himself not disposed to believe the doctrines taught by the Jewish prophets and by Jesus, at any rate to have held them as matters open to inquiry? And should he not have considered whether it is very probable that a people who faithfully served the Most High God, and who ofttimes encountered numberless dangers, and even death, rather than sacrifice the honour of God, and what they believed to be the revelations of His will, should have been wholly overlooked by God? Should it not rather be thought probable that people who despised the efforts of human art to represent the Divine Being, but strove rather to rise in thought to the knowledge of the Most High, should have been favoured with some revelation from Himself? Besides, he ought to have considered that the common Father and Creator of all, who sees and hears all things, and who duly esteems the intention of every man who seeks Him and desires to serve Him, will grant unto these also some of the benefits of His rule, and will give them an enlargement of that knowledge of Himself which He has once bestowed upon them. If this had been remembered by Celsus and the others who hate Moses and the Jewish prophets, and Jesus, and His faithful disciples, who endured so much for the sake of His word, they would not thus have reviled Moses, and the prophets, and Jesus, and His apostles; and they would not have singled out for their contempt the Jews beyond all the nations of the earth, and said they were worse even than the Egyptians,—a people who, either from superstition or some other form of delusion, went as far as they could in degrading the Divine Being to the level of brute beasts. And we invite inquiry, not as though we wished to lead any to doubt regarding the truths of Christianity, but in order to show that it would be better for those who in every way revile the doctrines of Christianity, at any rate to suspend their judgment, and not so rashly to state about Jesus and His apostles such things as they do not know, and as they cannot prove, either by what the Stoics call “apprehensive perception,” or by any other methods used by different sects of philosophers as criteria of truth.
Although, therefore, Celsus would, in his own words, “drive us with all haste out of life,” so that “such a race may become extinct from the earth;” yet we, along with those who worship the Creator, will live according to the laws of God, never consenting to obey the laws of sin. We will marry if we wish, and bring up the children given to us in marriage; and if need be, we will not only partake of the blessings of life, but bear its appointed sorrows as a trial to our souls. For in this way is divine Scripture accustomed to speak of human afflictions, by which, as gold is tried in the fire, so the spirit of man is tried, and is found to be worthy either of condemnation or of praise. For those things which Celsus calls evils we are therefore prepared, and are ready to say, “Try me, O Lord, and prove me; purge my reins and my heart.” For “no one will be crowned,” unless here upon earth, with this body of humiliation, “he strive lawfully.” Further, we do not pay honours supposed to be due to those whom Celsus speaks of as being set over the affairs of the world. For we worship the Lord our God, and Him only do we serve, and desire to be followers of Christ, who, when the devil said to Him, “All these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me,” answered him by the words, “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve.” Wherefore we do not render the honour supposed to be due to those who, according to Celsus, are set over the affairs of this world; for “no man can serve two masters,” and we “cannot serve God and mammon,” whether this name be applied to one or more. Moreover, if any one “by transgressing the law dishonours the lawgiver,” it seems clear to us that if the two laws, the law of God and the law of mammon, are completely opposed to each other, it is better for us by transgressing the law of mammon to dishonour mammon, that we may honour God by keeping His law, than by transgressing the law of God to dishonour God, that by obeying the law of mammon we may honour mammon.
Afterwards he says: “If it were possible,” implying at the same time that he thought it most desirable, “that all the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, Greeks and barbarians, all to the uttermost ends of the earth, were to come under one law;” but judging this quite impossible, he adds, “Any one who thinks this possible, knows nothing.” It would require careful consideration and lengthened argument to prove that it is not only possible, but that it will surely come to pass, that all who are endowed with reason shall come under one law. However, if we must refer to this subject, it will be with great brevity. The Stoics, indeed, hold that, when the strongest of the elements prevails, all things shall be turned into fire. But our belief is, that the Word shall prevail over the entire rational creation, and change every soul into His own perfection; in which state every one, by the mere exercise of his power, will choose what he desires, and obtain what he chooses. For although, in the diseases and wounds of the body, there are some which no medical skill can cure, yet we hold that in the mind there is no evil so strong that it may not be overcome by the Supreme Word and God. For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the healing power that dwells in Him; and this healing He applies, according to the will of God, to every man. The consummation of all things is the destruction of evil, although as to the question whether it shall be so destroyed that it can never anywhere arise again, it is beyond our present purpose to say. Many things are said obscurely in the prophecies on the total destruction of evil, and the restoration to righteousness of every soul; but it will be enough for our present purpose to quote the following passage from Zephaniah: “Prepare and rise early; all the gleanings of their vineyards are destroyed. Therefore wait ye upon me, saith the Lord, on the day that I rise up for a testimony; for my determination is to gather the nations, that I may assemble the kings, to pour upon them mine indignation, even all my fierce anger: for all the earth shall be devoured with the fire of my jealousy. For then will I turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent. From beyond the rivers of Ethiopia my suppliants, even the daughter of my dispersed, shall bring my offering. In that day shalt thou not be ashamed for all thy doings, wherein thou hast transgressed against me: for then I will take away out of the midst of thee them that rejoice in thy pride; and thou shalt no more be haughty because of my holy mountain. I will also leave in the midst of thee an afflicted and poor people, and they shall trust in the name of the Lord. The remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak lies; neither shall a deceitful tongue be found in their mouth: for they shall feed and lie down, and none shall make them afraid.” I leave it to those who are able, after a careful study of the whole subject, to unfold the meaning of this prophecy, and especially to inquire into the signification of the words, “When the whole earth is destroyed, there will be turned upon the peoples a language according to their race,” as things were before the confusion of tongues. Let them also carefully consider the promise, that all shall call upon the name of the Lord, and serve Him with one consent; also that all contemptuous reproach shall be taken away, and there shall be no longer any injustice, or vain speech, or a deceitful tongue. And thus much it seemed needful for me to say briefly, and without entering into elaborate details, in answer to the remark of Celsus, that he considered any agreement between the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, as well Greeks as barbarians, was impossible. And perhaps such a result would indeed be impossible to those who are still in the body, but not to those who are released from it.
The Zohar (selections)
David the king said at first, Ps. xxvi. 2: “Try me, O Tetragrammaton, and prove me!” For I shall not be destroyed by all the severities, not even by Tzedeq, Justice Herself, seeing that I am joined thereunto.
The Book of the Cave of Treasures
Now up to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem the Hebrew, Greek, and Syrian writers were in possession of the truth, and they were able to produce the registers of the genealogies of the tribes and the people. But from the destruction of Jerusalem and onwards there has been no truth in their writings, except as regards the heads of the tribes (i.e. the Patriarchs), and they are unable to prove whence the succession of the priests took its origin.
Pistis Sophia
When then the Saviour had said this, John continued again and said to the Saviour: "My Lord, suppose an exceedingly sinful brother who hath renounced the whole world and the whole matter therein and all its sins and all its cares, and we shall prove him and know that he is not in deceit and play-acting but that in uprightness and in truth he longeth [after God], and we know that he hath become worthy of the mysteries of the second space or of the third,--desirest thou that we give him of the mysteries of the second space and of the third, before he hath at all received mysteries of the Inheritance of the Light or not? Desirest thou that we give or not?"
"And moreover those receivers lead that soul to the Virgin of Light and that soul giveth the Virgin of Light the seals and the glory of the songs of praise. And the Virgin of Light and also the seven other virgins of the Light together prove that soul and find together their signs in it and their seals and their baptisms and their chrism. And the Virgin of Light sealeth that soul and the receivers of the Light baptize that soul and give it the spiritual chrism; and every one of the virgins of the Light sealeth it with her seals.
"And if that soul hath had its number of the circuits, then the Virgin of Light proveth it, and doth not have it chastized, because it hath had its number of circuits, but handeth it over to the seven virgins of the Light. And the seven virgins of the Light prove that soul, baptize it with their baptisms and give it the spiritual chrism and lead it into the Treasury of the Light and put it in the last order of the Light until the ascension of all the perfect souls. And when they prepare to draw apart the veils of the region of those of the Right, they cleanse that soul anew and purify it and put it in the orders of the first saviour who [is] in the Treasury of the Light."
The Mishnah
Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.
Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.
If the pesah was slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, he [the slaughterer] is liable to a sin-offering on its account. All other sacrifices which he slaughtered as a pesah: if they are not fit [to be a pesah] he is liable; if they are fit [to be a pesah]: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to a sin-offering, But Rabbi Joshua exempts him. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: if for the pesah, which it is permitted [to slaughter] for its own purpose, yet when he changes its purpose he is liable; then [other] sacrifices, which are forbidden [to slaughter even] for their own purpose, if he changes their purpose is it not logical that he should be liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the pesah, [he is liable] because he changed it to something that is forbidden; will you say [the same] of [other] sacrifices, where he changed them for something that is permitted? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: let the community sacrifices prove it, which are permitted for their own sake, yet he who slaughters [other sacrifices] in their name is liable. Rabbi Joshua said to him: not so. If you say [with regard to] the public sacrifices, [that is] because they have a limit; will you say [the same] of the pesah, which has no limit? Rabbi Meir says: he too who slaughters [other sacrifices] in the name of public sacrifice is not liable.
If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted?
If a woman miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day: Bet Shammai say: she is exempted from an offering. But Bet Hillel say: she is liable. Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: what is the difference between the eve of the eighty-first day and the eighty-first day itself? Since these are considered equal with regard to [blood] uncleanness, why should they not be considered equal also with reference to the offerings? Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you said this in the case where she miscarries on the eighty-first day where it occurred at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, can you say this where she miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, where it did not occur at a time when she was fit to bring an offering? Bet Hillel said to them: the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat shall prove it, where it did not take place at a time when she was fit to bring an offering and yet she is liable to bring a [new] offering. Bet Shammai said to them: No; if you says this of the eighty-first day which fell on a Shabbat for although it is not fit for offerings of an individual, it is at least fit for communal offerings, would you maintain this concerning a woman who miscarries on the eve of the eighty-first day, seeing that the night is fit neither for offerings of the individual nor for communal offerings? As to [your argument of the uncleanness of] the blood, it proves nothing, for if she aborted within the period of cleanness the blood is unclean, and yet she is exempted from an offering.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
Rabbi Akiba said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer: if one performed many acts of forbidden work of the same category on different Shabbats but in one spell of unawareness, what is the law? Is he liable only to one [offering] for all of them, or to a separate one for each of them? He replied to me: he is liable to a separate one for each of them. And this can be derived by through a kal vehomer. If with regard to relations with a menstruant, for which there are neither many categories nor many ways of sinning, one is still liable for each act, how much more must one be liable to separate offerings in the case of Shabbat, for which there are many categories [of work] and many ways of sinning! I said to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of the menstruant, since in that case there are two warnings: the man is warned with regard to the menstruant woman, and the menstruant woman is warned with a man; but can you hold the same in the case of the Shabbat where there is only one warning? He said to me: One who has relations with [menstruant] minors can prove the point, where there is but one warning, and yet one is liable for each act. I responded to him: No, you may hold this view in the case of minors because although no prohibition now applies, it will apply later; but can you hold the same view with regard to Shabbat where neither now nor later [is there more than one warning]? He said to me: Let the law concerning intercourse with an animal prove my point. I replied to him: the law concerning intercourse with an animal is indeed comparable to [that concerning] Shabbat.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
The Jerusalem Talmud
One may give two explanations: If he had little [manure] on his field, he may continuously add to it after the agricultural workers stopped; Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be manure and it will turn out that he fertilizes that place. One may give another explanation: If he had little [manure] in his house before the Sabbatical year and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the agricultural workers stopped; Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it will turn out that he fertilizes that place. Has it not been fertilized before the Sabbatical year? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamai: Because of the bad impression [it is forbidden] unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care for a bad impression? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap.
Should not their action be proof of their intentions? As we have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them up, they are not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he grabs it while full of dew. We also have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them down, even if he thought that [his animals’] feet should be doused, it is not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he rubs them with water. We should also say here, let their action be proof of their intentions! Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; Rebbi Zeïra in the name of the rabbis (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be credited to you.” When thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions; when thought is not mentioned in the verse, his action can prove his intentions. Since here thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions.
Should not their action be proof of their intentions? As we have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them up, they are not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he grabs it while full of dew. We also have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them down, even if he thought that [his animals’] feet should be doused, it is not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he rubs them with water. We should also say here, let their action be proof of their intentions! Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; Rebbi Zeïra in the name of the rabbis (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be credited to you.” When thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions; when thought is not mentioned in the verse, his action can prove his intentions. Since here thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions.
Should not their action be proof of their intentions? As we have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them up, they are not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he grabs it while full of dew. We also have stated there: “If a deaf-mute, insane, or minor person brought them down, even if he thought that [his animals’] feet should be doused, it is not under the category of ‘when given’ because they have action but no intention.” What is their action? Rebbi Ḥuna said, when he rubs them with water. We should also say here, let their action be proof of their intentions! Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; Rebbi Zeïra in the name of the rabbis (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be credited to you.” When thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions; when thought is not mentioned in the verse, his action can prove his intentions. Since here thought is mentioned in the verse, his action cannot prove his intentions.
Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.
Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”
Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”
Who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell heave which is forbidden to lay people, since Second Tithe is permitted to lay people, one should certainly be permitted to sell it. No, if you assert this for heave which does not need an enclosure, what can you imply for Second Tithe which needs an enclosure? First Fruits shall prove it which need an enclosure and one may sell them! No, if you assert this for First Fruits which do not implicate their monetary substitute, what can you imply for Second Heave which implicates its monetary substitute! The Sabbatical shall prove it which implicates its monetary substitute and it is permitted to sell it! Rebbi Yudan said, from this? The sale of Sabbatical produce is its redemption.
Who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell heave which is forbidden to lay people, since Second Tithe is permitted to lay people, one should certainly be permitted to sell it. No, if you assert this for heave which does not need an enclosure, what can you imply for Second Tithe which needs an enclosure? First Fruits shall prove it which need an enclosure and one may sell them! No, if you assert this for First Fruits which do not implicate their monetary substitute, what can you imply for Second Heave which implicates its monetary substitute! The Sabbatical shall prove it which implicates its monetary substitute and it is permitted to sell it! Rebbi Yudan said, from this? The sale of Sabbatical produce is its redemption.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.
But Rebbi Ismael himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? It should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? The verse speaks about males. His sister is mentioned to teach about all females. Does Rebbi Eleazar not accept this? He has it from do not come near, equally male or female. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? He explains it but it is not clear, so also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Zeˋira, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple regarding larceny, lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, so it is. They split but do not combine.
HALAKHAH: 3. Who taught “signs”? Rebbi Yose! What means “of any language”? Even אα. Should one not be concerned that maybe one will put them upside down or bottom up? They were made similar to reed pens. Should one not be concerned that maybe one will put them inside out or outside in? The rings did prove. Should one not be concerned that maybe one would exchange? Rebbi Aḥa said, it was written slanted. Why could they not be switched? Rebbi Immi said, You shall erect the Tabernacle according to its ruling. Does there exist a ruling for wood? But the log which merited to be put in the North should be put in the North, in the South should be put in the South.
It was stated: “Rebbi Eliezer says, just as slaughter pushes the Sabbath aside so the preparations of slaughter push the Sabbath aside. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, no. If you speak about slaughter which is impossible to be done on Friday, what can you infer about preparations of slaughter than can be done on Friday? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, the public parts shall prove which he could make on (Friday) which nevertheless push aside the Sabbath. What is the difference between preparations of slaughter before the slaughter and preparations of slaughter after slaughter? Rebbi Aqiba said to him, about preparations of slaughter after slaughter when the slaughter already had pushed away the Sabbath, what does this imply for preparations of slaughter before slaughter when the slaughter not yet had pushed away the Sabbath? Another explanation: Maybe the sacrifice would be found disqualified, then it turned out that the Sabbath was pushed aside without a slaughter.”
Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.
It was stated: “Rebbi Eliezer says, just as slaughter pushes the Sabbath aside so the preparations of slaughter push the Sabbath aside. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, no. If you speak about slaughter which is impossible to be done on Friday and pushes the Sabbath aside, what can you infer about preparations of slaughter than can be done on Friday, should they push the Sabbath aside? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, the public parts shall prove which he could do after the Sabbath and which nevertheless push aside the Sabbath. What is the difference between preparations of slaughter before the slaughter and preparations of slaughter after slaughter? Rebbi Aqiba said to him, about preparations of slaughter after slaughter which push aside the Sabbath when the slaughter already had pushed away the Sabbath, what does this imply for preparations of slaughter before slaughter when the slaughter had not yet pushed away the Sabbath? Another explanation: Maybe the sacrifice would be found disqualified, then it turned out that the Sabbath was pushed aside without a slaughter.”
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
We find that the Temple was destroyed the first time only because they were active idolators, and uncoverers of nakedness, and spillers of blood. And so the second time. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Torta said, we find that Shiloh was destroyed only because they slighted the holidays and desecrated the sancta. We find that the Temple was destroyed the first time only because they were active idolators, and uncoverers of nakedness, and spillers of blood. But of the second we know that they toiled in the Torah, were careful about the commandments and tithes, and every good custom was in them; only they loved money and hated one another without reason. Hate without reason is hard for it is the equivalent if idolatry, and uncovering nakedness, and spilling of blood. An example. Rebbi Zeˋira, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, and Rebbi Abuna, were sitting and saying, it is worse since the first time it was rebuilt but the second time it was not rebuilt. Rebbi Zeˋira said, the first ones repented, the second ones did not repent. Rebbi Eleazar said, the first time their sin was brought into the open and so was their end; the second time their sin was brought into the open but their end was not brought into the open. They asked Rebbi Eliezer, are the later generations more qualified than the first? He told them, your witness, the Temple, shall prove it. Our forefathers removed the ceiling, the curtain of Jehudah was lifted, but we blew out the walls, who are saying, make bare, make bare, up to its foundations. They said, any generation in which it is not rebuilt is debited as if it had destroyed it.
HALAKHAH: It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about wood in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which in the morning is written only once. Then even before its blood? Rebbi Hila said, you shall do, preceded action for it. It is written about the daily sacrifice in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning. Something about which is written in the morning, in the morning, shall precede something about which only [one] in the morning is written. Where do we hold? If about limbs, are they not like wood? But we are holding, even for its blood. It is written about wood in the morning, in the morning, and it is written about incense in the morning, in the morning, and I do not know which of the two is preceding. Which one is enabling what? Wood enables the incense; the wood shall precede the incense. Come and see, wood precedes the blood and blood precedes incense, and you are saying so? Rebbi Hila said, no. Since I could not prove by a logical argument that wood enables the incense, you needed that baraita. They wanted to say, what enables the incense? Charcoal. Rebbi Eleazar said, smoke-creating herb.
Rebbi Shammai said, a baraita implies that the remainders are obstructive, as we have stated: “The lower ones, if given on the upper did not placate since nothing of them is brought on the upper, should you not say about the upper ones, if given on the lower they placate since something of them is brought below? The inner ones shall prove, since some of them is given outside, but if he gave them outside it did not placate, since the altar did not cleanse them, what should you say about the upper ones, if given on the lower they should placate since the horns cleanse them. Since the horns cleanse them, if he gave them below it should be qualified. The verse says it, that he give the blood on the upper, but not that he give in the lower.” What does it mean, “the altar did not cleanse them”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it does not cleanse them to turn them into remainders; only through the beams and the gobelins they become remainders.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The Holy One, praise to Him, associated His great Name with Israel. {A parable} of a king who had the small key of a jewelry box. The king said, if I leave it as it is, it is apt to be lost. Therefore I shall put in on a chain. Then if it were lost the key would prove where it is. So the Holy One, praise to Him, said, if I leave Israel as they are, they would be absorbed by the nations. Therefore I shall associate My great Name with them and they will survive. What is the reason? The Canaanites and all inhabitants of the Land will hear, and encircle us, and eradicate our Name from the Land; then what would You do for Your great Name?[Immediately], the Eternal said to Joshua, get up. Rise for what You mentioned.
The House of Shammai are saying, heaven was created first and afterwards earth. But the House of Hillel are saying, earth was created first and afterwards heaven. These are bringing proof for their assertion, and those are bringing proof for their assertion. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? In the Beginning God created heaven and earth. {A parable} of a king who made a chair. After he had made it he made its footstool: the Heavens are My throne and the Earth My footstool. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? On the day of the Eternal’s, God’s, making of earth and heaven {A parable} of a king who made a palace. After he built the foundations he built the upper structure: also My left hand founded the Earth and My right hand tended the Heavens. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, also the following supports the House of Hillel: in earlier times You founded the Earth, and the Heavens are the work of Your hands. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the place from where the House of Shammai prove their assertion, from there the House of Hillel remove them. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? In the Beginning God created heaven and earth. From there the House of Hillel remove them: and the earth was, it already was. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of the Sages: As for creation, the heaven preceded. As for perfecting, the earth preceded. As for creation, the heaven preceded, in the Beginning God created. As for perfecting, the earth preceded, on the day of the Eternal’s, God’s, making of earth and heaven. According to the House of Shammai, the heaven after the First waited three days, First, Second, Third, to have offspring. On the Fourth, there shall be lights. According to the House of Shammai, the sea after the Second waited three days, Second, Third, Fourth, to have offspring. On the Fifth, the waters shall teem. According to the House of Shammai, the earth after the Third waited three days, Third, Fourth, Fifth, to have offspring. On the Sixth, the earth shall produce. According to the House of Hillel, the earth after the First waited two days, First and Second, to have offspring. On the Third, the earth shall be covered with grass. According to the House of Hillel, the sea after the Third waited two days, Third and Fourth, to have offspring. On the Fifth, the waters shall teem. Rebbi Simeon ben Yohai said, I am wondering how the fathers of the world could disagree about the creation of the world. Heaven and earth were only created like a pan and its cover. What is the reason? Also My left hand founded the Earth and My right hand tended the Heavens. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, following this, my father’s opinion, sometimes heaven precedes earth, sometimes earth precedes heaven, which teaches that they are equivalent one to another.
HALAKHAH: There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids unless he raises or lowers by three {hand-breadths} or puts it on a rock.” One may give two explanations. If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah parallels Rebbi Yose. Just as Rebbi Yose says, manure is not easily found, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, manure is not easily found. One may give another explanation: If he had a small amount{of manure} in his house from before the Sabbatical and he wants to transport it to his field during the Sabbatical, he may continuously add to it after the sinning sinners stopped. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah forbids it. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah? Maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place. Is it not already fertilized from before the Sabbatical? Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression, unless he transports ten boxes together. Do the rabbis not care about bad impressions? Rebbi Idi said his stick, his basket, and his shovel prove that he intends to make a dungheap. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun applied these traditions from here, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, one does not make new water canals on the holiday or in the Sabbatical year.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, because he would prepare its banks to be sown. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: because of the bad impression. They wanted to say, the one who says there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says there “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, what would you have here? The only answer would be, “maybe there will be no more manure and it turns out that he fertilizes that place.” What is the difference between them? If he dug a water canal for a building. They wanted to say that the one who said there “because of the bad impression” also here “because of the bad impression”. The one who says here “because he would prepare its banks to be sown”, clearly here its banks will not be prepared to be sown. Everybody agrees that if he assembled there stones, pebbles, lime, or cement it is permitted.
How can one prove secondary prohibitions? Rebbi Ḥuna said: “These”, the strong ones. This implies that there are weaker ones. The following are the secondary prohibitions: His paternal grandmother and his maternal grandmother, his paternal grandfather’s wife and his maternal grandfathers wife, his grandson’s wife whether from son or daughter, the wife of his mother’s brother and the wife of his father’s maternal brother.
Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted, he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.
HALAKHAH: : “He does not write on a wooden plank,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, “Amen” for an oath, “Amen”, may the words be confirmed. “Amen” [is said] for acceptance, from the suspected wife. “Amen” for an oath: “To keep the oath I had sworn to your forefathers”, etc. “Amen”, may the words be confirmed: “Benaiah ben Yehoyada (the priest) answered the king and said Amen”, etc. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that does not prove that Amen means an oath, it implies nothing. But the following says: “that you pass by the covenant of your God and His curse,” because oath means curse, as you say: “The Cohen has to administer to the woman the oath of the curse.”
“The teaching about jealousies”. This is a teaching of the Temple. A woman does not drink and repeat. Rebbi Jehudah said, Neḥemiah the ditch-digger testified before Rebbi Aqiba that a woman drinks and repeats. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain. From one husband a woman does not drink and repeat, from two husbands a woman drinks and repeats. But the Sages say she drinks and repeats whether from one husband or from two husbands. Korkemit shall prove it, who drank and repeated and did it a third time from one husband before Shemaia and Abtalyon.
“I came to her and did not find her a virgin.” Should we not worry that he found and made disappear? The husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery while in her father’s house. “This is proof of my daughters virginity.” Should we not worry that this is bird’s blood? The father brought witnesses to prove perjury by the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in this paragraph there are witnesses, witnesses of perjury, and witnesses of perjury of the witnesses of perjury: The husband says, these are witnesses that she whored in her father’s house. The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. And the husband brought witnesses to prove perjury of the father’s witnesses. Some Tannaïm state: “If this was true,” that the father found witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses.
“I came to her and did not find her a virgin.” Should we not worry that he found and made disappear? The husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery while in her father’s house. “This is proof of my daughters virginity.” Should we not worry that this is bird’s blood? The father brought witnesses to prove perjury by the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in this paragraph there are witnesses, witnesses of perjury, and witnesses of perjury of the witnesses of perjury: The husband says, these are witnesses that she whored in her father’s house. The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. And the husband brought witnesses to prove perjury of the father’s witnesses. Some Tannaïm state: “If this was true,” that the father found witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses.
“I came to her and did not find her a virgin.” Should we not worry that he found and made disappear? The husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery while in her father’s house. “This is proof of my daughters virginity.” Should we not worry that this is bird’s blood? The father brought witnesses to prove perjury by the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in this paragraph there are witnesses, witnesses of perjury, and witnesses of perjury of the witnesses of perjury: The husband says, these are witnesses that she whored in her father’s house. The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. And the husband brought witnesses to prove perjury of the father’s witnesses. Some Tannaïm state: “If this was true,” that the father found witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses.
“I came to her and did not find her a virgin.” Should we not worry that he found and made disappear? The husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery while in her father’s house. “This is proof of my daughters virginity.” Should we not worry that this is bird’s blood? The father brought witnesses to prove perjury by the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in this paragraph there are witnesses, witnesses of perjury, and witnesses of perjury of the witnesses of perjury: The husband says, these are witnesses that she whored in her father’s house. The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. And the husband brought witnesses to prove perjury of the father’s witnesses. Some Tannaïm state: “If this was true,” that the father found witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses.
“I came to her and did not find her a virgin.” Should we not worry that he found and made disappear? The husband brought witnesses that she committed adultery while in her father’s house. “This is proof of my daughters virginity.” Should we not worry that this is bird’s blood? The father brought witnesses to prove perjury by the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in this paragraph there are witnesses, witnesses of perjury, and witnesses of perjury of the witnesses of perjury: The husband says, these are witnesses that she whored in her father’s house. The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: The father brought witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses. And the husband brought witnesses to prove perjury of the father’s witnesses. Some Tannaïm state: “If this was true,” that the father found witnesses to prove perjury of the husband’s witnesses.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the father brought witnesses to prove the perjury of the husband’s witnesses; but the father’s witnesses were proven perjurers, is he flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? He said to him, if the father’s witnesses are not proven perjurers, is not the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? Rebbi Ze‘ira is of the opinion that there are two different proceedings. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is only one proceeding. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abbahu: “To the town’s Elders”, that is a court of three members; “to the gate”, that is a court of 23. He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says that he is flogged and pays. There, we have stated: “The seducer, the rapist, and the calumniator [are judged] by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, the calumniator by 23 since it is a potential capital case.” Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned by a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But by the case of the preliminarily married adolescent, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. [It turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Mana [follows] Rebbi Abbahu].
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rav: At a place where one writes ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on her to prove that he did not write. But at a place where one does not write ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he wrote.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rav: At a place where one writes ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on her to prove that he did not write. But at a place where one does not write ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he wrote.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and a person came towards them when one said, “I am a nazir unless he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if it is not he”; “I am a nazir unless one of you is a nazir”, “unless both of you are nezirim”, “unless all of you are nezirim”. The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim, but the House of Hillel say, only those whose assertions prove wrong are nezirim. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, none of them is a nazir. If he suddenly returned, no one is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, one should say: If it was as I said, I am a nazir by obligation, otherwise I am a nazir voluntarily. If one saw a koy and said, “I am a nazir if this is a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is not a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a not a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a wild and domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is neither a wild nor a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if one of you is not a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, then all of them are nezirim.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.
If the appointed time has arrived and he says, I gave, but she says, I did not receive: Rebbi Abun said, since he tries to wrest the contract from the woman’s hand, the burden of proof is on him. Think of it, maybe there was no contract? Rebbi Yose said, since he tries to forbid her to anybody, he has to prove that they entered into the contract. A case came before Rebbi Abbahu; he said to him, go and deliver. He answered, Rabbi, I did not acquire a wife and you say to me, go and deliver! Rebbi Abbahu said, it never happened to me that one got the better of me except this one. He rephrased and said: If he changed his mind, he shall deliver. If she changed her mind, she shall deliver. Is that not his former judgment? He rephrased to give it the status of a court document.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One had a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had a fracture, the donkey’s owner had to bring proof that his donkey was well at the moment he took the cow. Anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree, I do not know anything about civil law. There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she was in her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yose to sharpen wits. They quoted the statement and he told them, look at the next statement: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove? But you are saying that the husband has to prove; here also, the owner has to prove.
MISHNAH: If a bedridden person distributed all his properties to others but reserved any real estate his gift is permanent; if he did not reserve any real estate his gift is not permanent. If [in the document] it was not written “bedridden”; he says, I was bedridden, but they are saying, he was healthy, he must prove that he was bedridden, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, the burden of proof is on the claimants.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: Three Amoraïm. One said, any time he brings proof he can demand a new trial. The other said, if he brought within 30 days, he can demand a new trial, after 30 days he cannot demand a new trial. The other said, he never can demand a new trial unless he prove that he absolutely had no knowledge of it. But did we not state: “Rabban Gamliel said, what should he do who did not know that he had witnesses but found witnesses; that he had no proof, but found proof?” Rebbi La and Rebbi Zeˋira: One said, unless he voided his proofs; the other said, until he disclaimed his proofs.
But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?
MISHNAH: By the words of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a death sentence be imposed. If testimony is confirmed by two, why did the verse mention three? Only to compare three to two. Since three may prove that two are plotters, two also may prove that three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Simeon says, since two are executed only if both are plotters, so three are executed only if all three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Aqiba says, the third is only mentioned to punish him harshly and to identify his judgment with that of the others. If the verse in this way punished the accessory of criminals like criminals, so much more it will reward the accessory to one who keeps the commandments as one who keeps the commandments. Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? In criminal trials, but in civil trials the testimony should be upheld by the remaining [witnesses]. Rebbi says, both in criminal and in civil trials, if they warned them. But if they did not warn them, what should two brothers do who were eye-witnesses to a murder?
MISHNAH: By the words of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a death sentence be imposed. If testimony is confirmed by two, why did the verse mention three? Only to compare three to two. Since three may prove that two are plotters, two also may prove that three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Simeon says, since two are executed only if both are plotters, so three are executed only if all three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Aqiba says, the third is only mentioned to punish him harshly and to identify his judgment with that of the others. If the verse in this way punished the accessory of criminals like criminals, so much more it will reward the accessory to one who keeps the commandments as one who keeps the commandments. Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? In criminal trials, but in civil trials the testimony should be upheld by the remaining [witnesses]. Rebbi says, both in criminal and in civil trials, if they warned them. But if they did not warn them, what should two brothers do who were eye-witnesses to a murder?
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said?” It should have been said for civil trials and would not have been needed for criminal trials. If it had been said for civil trials, not for criminal trials, I would have said that in the relaxed standards of civil trials three [witnesses] may prove two [witnesses] to be plotting but two may not prove three to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Or if it had been said for criminal trials, not for civil trials, I would have said that according to the stringent standards of criminal trials two [witnesses] may prove three [witnesses] to be plotting; three may not prove two to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said?” It should have been said for civil trials and would not have been needed for criminal trials. If it had been said for civil trials, not for criminal trials, I would have said that in the relaxed standards of civil trials three [witnesses] may prove two [witnesses] to be plotting but two may not prove three to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Or if it had been said for criminal trials, not for civil trials, I would have said that according to the stringent standards of criminal trials two [witnesses] may prove three [witnesses] to be plotting; three may not prove two to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said?” It should have been said for civil trials and would not have been needed for criminal trials. If it had been said for civil trials, not for criminal trials, I would have said that in the relaxed standards of civil trials three [witnesses] may prove two [witnesses] to be plotting but two may not prove three to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Or if it had been said for criminal trials, not for civil trials, I would have said that according to the stringent standards of criminal trials two [witnesses] may prove three [witnesses] to be plotting; three may not prove two to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said?” It should have been said for civil trials and would not have been needed for criminal trials. If it had been said for civil trials, not for criminal trials, I would have said that in the relaxed standards of civil trials three [witnesses] may prove two [witnesses] to be plotting but two may not prove three to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Or if it had been said for criminal trials, not for civil trials, I would have said that according to the stringent standards of criminal trials two [witnesses] may prove three [witnesses] to be plotting; three may not prove two to be plotting. From where even a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.
The Babylonian Talmud
Whence is it that worldly occupation [requires effort]? As it is said, "Be of good courage, and let us prove strong for our people" etc. (II Sam. 10:12).
R. Nehorai said to him : By Heaven it is so. Thou canst prove it ; for behold the common soldiers go down to open the fight but the veterans go down to win the victory.
R. 'Ami further said: What is the meaning of the verse (Eccl., 10.10): "If the iron be blunt and one do not whet the edge"? If thou seest a generation over which the heavens are as tough as iron, sending neither dew nor rain, it is due to the people's corrupt deeds, as it is said, "and one do not whet the edge." What is the remedy? They should pray much, as it is said (ibid.): "Then must he put to more strength, but wisdom is profitable to direct," the latter part of which means to say that the additional praying will prove more profitable if the people's deeds are still good. Resh Laḳish explains it thus: When thou seest a scholar
to whom his studies are as tough as iron, it is because his lesson is not properly ordered in his mind, as it is said, "and one do not whet the edge." What is his remedy? He should attend more diligently the sessions of the scholars, as it is said, "then must he put to more strength, but wisdom is profitable to direct," the latter part of which means to say that increased diligence will prove still more profitable if the scholar's studies have always been well ordered. Resh Laḳish used to arrange his studies in proper order forty times, corresponding to the forty days during which the Torah was given to Israel, before he appeared before R. Johanan. R. 'Adda b. 'Ahabah used to arrange his lessons in proper order twenty-four times, corresponding to the number of the books of the Pentateuch, Prophets, and Hagiographa, before he appeared before Raba.
Raba explained the above verse as follows: If thou seest a disciple to whom his studies are as tough as iron, it is due to his master's lack of kindness toward him, as it is said, "and one do not whet the edge." What is his remedy? He should send many friends to the master, as it is said, "then must he put to more strength, but wisdom is profitable to direct," which means to say that the intercession of the friends will prove the more profitable when prior to that the pupil's ways had been improved before his master.
R. Huna had wine in a ruinous house and wanted to remove it. He therefore engaged R. Adda b. 'Ahabah in a learned discussion until the wine was removed. As soon as they left the house, it fell in. When R. Adda b. 'Ahabah noticed that he was used for such a purpose, he became angry, saying, "Is not this an instance with regard to which R. Jannai said, one should never stay in a place of danger and say, I shall be saved by a miracle, for it might be that no miracle will be performed for him, and even if one should be performed, such performance would be charged against his merits?" Said R. Hanan, where is the biblical verse to prove it? "I am not worthy of all the mercies, and of all the truth" (Gen., 32. 11).
And both the midrash of R. Simai and the midrash on “from his issue” are necessary [to prove this point]. For if I had only R. Simai, I might have raised the above objection, and therefore it teaches us “from his issue.” And if I had only “from his issue,” I would not have known how many issues [obligate for a sacrifice]; therefore I have R. Simai.
How do we know that this “passing” means “before”? R. Nahman b. Isaac said: Scripture says, “Then Ahimaaz ran by way of the plain and overran [wa-ya’avor] the Cushite” (II Samuel 18:23). Abaye said: We prove it from here: “And he himself passed over before them” (Genesis 33:3). Or, if you want, I can say: “And their king passed on before them and the Lord at the head of them” (Micah 2:13).
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
But what comparison can be made to a Bechor which needs the blood and sacrificial parts placed on the alter? Bikorim will then prove it. But what comparison can be made to Bikorim which need placement before the alter?
The Roman Missal
Secret. May our offerings, we beseech thee, O Lord, prove suitable to the mysteries of this day's nativity, and ever infuse into us peace; that as the man born to us gloriously shone as our God, so this earthly substance may confer upon us what is divine. Through the same, &c.
For St Anastasia. Graciously accept our offerings, we beseech thee, O Lord; and grant that the merits of blessed Anastasia thy martyr pleading for us, may prove a help to our salvation. Through our Lord, &c.