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560 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.
MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.
Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.
MISHNAH: For any commandment a father has to fulfill towards his son, men are obligated but women are free. For any commandment the son has to fulfill towards his father, men and women are equally obligated. For any positive commandment activated by time, men are obligated but women are free. For any positive commandment not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated. For any prohibition, whether or not activated by time, men and women are equally obligated except for “do not destroy”, “do not shear,” and “do not become impure for the dead.” Leanings and weavings, presentations, taking of fistfuls, burnings and neck breakings, sprinklings and receptions apply to men but not to women except for the flour offerings of the suspected wife and the nezirah; those do weave.
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment which does not refer to the Land,” etc. It is written (Deut. 12:1): “These are the statutes and the rules of law which you will be required to follow in the Land.” In the Land you are required to follow them but not outside the Land. Still we say obligations depending on the Land only apply in the Land, but we might think that obligations not depending on the Land also should only apply in the Land. The verse says (Deut. 11:16–18) “Be careful, lest your heart be seduced … and the Eternal’s rage be inflamed against you, etc. Put these words on your hearts,”. Even if you are exiled. (Deut. 11:18) “Put these words on your hearts and your persons.” You have to say, for example tefillin and the study of Torah. Just as tefillin and the study of Torah do not depend on the Land and apply both in the Land and outside the Land, so everything not depending on the Land applies both in the Land and outside the Land.
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment which does not refer to the Land,” etc. It is written (Deut. 12:1): “These are the statutes and the rules of law which you will be required to follow in the Land.” In the Land you are required to follow them but not outside the Land. Still we say obligations depending on the Land only apply in the Land, but we might think that obligations not depending on the Land also should only apply in the Land. The verse says (Deut. 11:16–18) “Be careful, lest your heart be seduced … and the Eternal’s rage be inflamed against you, etc. Put these words on your hearts,”. Even if you are exiled. (Deut. 11:18) “Put these words on your hearts and your persons.” You have to say, for example tefillin and the study of Torah. Just as tefillin and the study of Torah do not depend on the Land and apply both in the Land and outside the Land, so everything not depending on the Land applies both in the Land and outside the Land.
HALAKHAH: “Any commandment which does not refer to the Land,” etc. It is written (Deut. 12:1): “These are the statutes and the rules of law which you will be required to follow in the Land.” In the Land you are required to follow them but not outside the Land. Still we say obligations depending on the Land only apply in the Land, but we might think that obligations not depending on the Land also should only apply in the Land. The verse says (Deut. 11:16–18) “Be careful, lest your heart be seduced … and the Eternal’s rage be inflamed against you, etc. Put these words on your hearts,”. Even if you are exiled. (Deut. 11:18) “Put these words on your hearts and your persons.” You have to say, for example tefillin and the study of Torah. Just as tefillin and the study of Torah do not depend on the Land and apply both in the Land and outside the Land, so everything not depending on the Land applies both in the Land and outside the Land.
“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.
“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
HALAKHAH: “For a dog or a kid goat which jumped from a roof,” etc. There are Tannaïm who state: “jumped”. There are Tannaïm who state: “fell”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: “jumped”. But “fell” does not apply.
HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can one argue for him an argument which does not apply to him? Let us hear from the following: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. He said, does not everybody know that all Bar Ziza’s sharecrooper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza had adult and underage sons. He said, the adult one should take half and when the underage ones grow up, they should receive half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing [since there are people who do not flout their wealth]; it should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underaged ones is compared to one who gave a gift.
Rebbi Abbahu asked: Why did we not state that double restitution is due if a claim of theft is made in a partnership, where quadruple or quintuple restitution does not apply?
There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.
There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.
HALAKHAH: “Cheating is four obols,” etc. Rav said, this is the rate; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not the rate. Rav said, if somebody trades on condition that the rules of cheating not apply to him, the rules of cheating do apply to him. Rebbi Levi stated: Cheating applies to a peruṭah, cheating can be by a peruṭah. But what is the status of cheating? It was stated: The item was acquired, he returns the overcharge, the words of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince; Rebbi Joḥanan said, the sale is annulled.
HALAKHAH: “Cheating is four obols,” etc. Rav said, this is the rate; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not the rate. Rav said, if somebody trades on condition that the rules of cheating not apply to him, the rules of cheating do apply to him. Rebbi Levi stated: Cheating applies to a peruṭah, cheating can be by a peruṭah. But what is the status of cheating? It was stated: The item was acquired, he returns the overcharge, the words of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince; Rebbi Joḥanan said, the sale is annulled.
HALAKHAH: “Just as there is cheating in trade,” etc. “One may not put on make-up.” Rebbi Eudaimon the salt dealer was mollifying his spread. Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, did we not state: “one may not put on make up”? His word implies that there is make-up on food. Rebbi Ze‘ira was working with flax. He went to Rebbi Abbahu and asked him, may I make my work look good? He told him, go and apply all you know. Rebbi Abbahu was working on those shawls. He came to ask Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina, how am I with those shawls? He told him, go and apply all you know. Rebbi Abba painted a bathtub. Rebbi Jacob from Emmaus stated: What means: “one may not put on make up”? One may not say to him, paint yourself.
HALAKHAH: “Just as there is cheating in trade,” etc. “One may not put on make-up.” Rebbi Eudaimon the salt dealer was mollifying his spread. Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, did we not state: “one may not put on make up”? His word implies that there is make-up on food. Rebbi Ze‘ira was working with flax. He went to Rebbi Abbahu and asked him, may I make my work look good? He told him, go and apply all you know. Rebbi Abbahu was working on those shawls. He came to ask Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina, how am I with those shawls? He told him, go and apply all you know. Rebbi Abba painted a bathtub. Rebbi Jacob from Emmaus stated: What means: “one may not put on make up”? One may not say to him, paint yourself.
Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if it was collected from the start, this does not apply.
Rebbi Zachariah asked before Rebbi Immi: Does one act following that Tanna, as it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says, sometimes you are empowered to propose a compromise, sometimes you are not empowered to propose a compromise. How is this? Two come before a judge; before he heard their arguments, or after he heard their arguments but does not know how to correctly apply the law, he may tell them, go and work out a compromise. After you heard their arguments and know how to correctly apply the law, you may not propose a compromise, as it is said: One may remove the beginning of a quarrel like water; before it becomes manifest, the quarrel may be abandoned. Before the quarrel became manifest, you are permitted to abandon it; after the quarrel became manifest, you are not permitted to abandon it.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, even compromise needs intelligent decision.
Rebbi Zachariah asked before Rebbi Immi: Does one act following that Tanna, as it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Menassiah says, sometimes you are empowered to propose a compromise, sometimes you are not empowered to propose a compromise. How is this? Two come before a judge; before he heard their arguments, or after he heard their arguments but does not know how to correctly apply the law, he may tell them, go and work out a compromise. After you heard their arguments and know how to correctly apply the law, you may not propose a compromise, as it is said: One may remove the beginning of a quarrel like water; before it becomes manifest, the quarrel may be abandoned. Before the quarrel became manifest, you are permitted to abandon it; after the quarrel became manifest, you are not permitted to abandon it.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, even compromise needs intelligent decision.
HALAKHAH: “In civil suits, one who argued for credit,” etc. Rebbi said, if they only miss saying, Mr. X, you are acquitted, or you are convicted; it does not apply to the discussion. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it also applies to the discussion.
HALAKHAH: “Not only this,” etc. It was stated: If somebody transports a coffin from one place to the other, the rules of collecting bones do not apply. Rebbi Aḥa said, this means in a marble coffin. But in a wooden coffin, the rules of collecting bones do apply. Rebbi Yose said, even for a wooden coffin the rules of collecting bones do not apply. What is “collecting bones”?
HALAKHAH: “Not only this,” etc. It was stated: If somebody transports a coffin from one place to the other, the rules of collecting bones do not apply. Rebbi Aḥa said, this means in a marble coffin. But in a wooden coffin, the rules of collecting bones do apply. Rebbi Yose said, even for a wooden coffin the rules of collecting bones do not apply. What is “collecting bones”?
HALAKHAH: “Not only this,” etc. It was stated: If somebody transports a coffin from one place to the other, the rules of collecting bones do not apply. Rebbi Aḥa said, this means in a marble coffin. But in a wooden coffin, the rules of collecting bones do apply. Rebbi Yose said, even for a wooden coffin the rules of collecting bones do not apply. What is “collecting bones”?
There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.
There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, if his mother was not fit for his father, he is liable only for one [sacrifice]. Therefore, if his mother was fit for his father, he is liable for two. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference. Whether his mother was fit for his father or unfit for his father, he is liable only once. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your mother is she, you find him guilty because of his mother; this directs the entire chapter towards his mother. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: What caused Rebbi Joḥanan to concentrate on the mother and to leave the father’s wife aside? He told him, for he argues with Rebbi Ismael, as Rebbi Ismael explained: Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the male. Is not his father included in the category of the male? Only to make him liable twice, as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his father is doubly liable about him. Then should we not state “thirty-seven extirpations in the Torah”? Rebbi Mana said, all denotations of males are one. Your father’s wife’s nakedness; the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does Rebbi Aqiba not explain she is your father’s nakedness? There is no difference whether during lifetime or after death. Rebbi Aqiba explains: Your father’s wife’s nakedness, the verse refers to the father’s wife. Your mother’s nakedness, that is his mother who is his father’s wife. From where his mother who is not his father’s wife? Your mother is she; do not uncover her nakedness. How does Rebbi Ismael treat this? He explains it to apply after [the father’s] death. Does not Rebbi Aqiba treat your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness? Since your father refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to one’s mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Is it not reasonable to explain that verse except following Rebbi Jehudah who because he does not accept “his mother who is his father’s wife” must explain that your father’s nakedness, your mother’s nakedness refers to your father in any capacity both for punishment and warning, so also your mother refers to your mother in any capacity both for punishment and warning. Rebbi Zeˋira said, this implies that one infers from parallel language even if it is free only from one side. Rebbi Yudan said to him, this is obvious for Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba infers from parallel language even if it is not free.
Rebbi Huna said, a verse supports him who said, the necromancer is the one who raises by his masculinity. What is the reason? Please apply necromancer’s magic and raise for me whom I shall tell you. What do you understand from here? Rebbi Mana said, it implies that she was competent in many ways. What about it? Your voice will be from the earth like that of a necromancer.
The suspect wife, is that not a Mishnah, “one whose husband refuses to let her drink”? They wanted to say, before the scroll was written. He comes to tell, even after the scroll was written. But it does not apply to the case where the scroll had been erased.
The deviant son, is that not a Mishnah, “if his father was willing but not his mother, or his mother willing but his father unwilling”? They wanted to say, before he was tried. He comes to tell, even after he was tried. But it does not apply to the case where judgment had been passed.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, this means if he trades without account; it does not apply if there are accounts. Also the family member trades without accounts. Rebbi Ze`ira agrees with Rebbi Yose. A man came for judgment before Rebbi Ze`ira who required him to swear for two denars. He told him, do I not owe you two denars? Here they are thrown to you. He answered him, and cloth of fine wool X and Y. Rebbi Ze`ira said, either you give him everything he claims from you or you swear to him everything which he rolls over to you. How far does one roll over? Rebbi Joḥanan said, until he say to him, you are my slave. Think of it, could he be Cohen and Hebrew slave? Is there such a slave today?
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, a woman should not apply lime because it disfigures her.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration, so he says here, temporary pain is pain. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. Scurvy is dangerous. Rebbi Joḥanan had it; he was treated by the daughter of Domitianus of Tiberias. Friday evening he went down to her and asked her, will I need anything tomorrow? She said no, but if you need anything take date pits, some say of Nicolaus dates, split and heated, skin of barley grain, and dry excrement of a baby, grind it and apply it; do not tell this to anybody. The next day he went up and preached it in the House of Study. She heard it and strangled herself; but some say that she converted. You understand from this three things. You understand that scurvy is dangerous. You understand that anything inside of the lips one heals on the Sabbath. You understand what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was a professional healer it is permitted.
It is written, do not make idols for yourselves, statue and stele you shall not erect for yourselves. Is not making the same as erecting? Rebbi Hila said, making is from new; erecting, if it falls down one shall not re-erect it. It is written, you shall tear down their altars and break their steles. From where to apply one to the other? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, it was said to refer to both sides; either breaking, or cutting down, or tearing down for each of them.
HALAKHAH: “One may stamp with a Non-Jew in the wine press,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, that is, you say only if they walked over it crosswise. But if they did not walk over it crosswise, it does not apply. Rebbi Yose asked, if they walked over it crosswise, even following the earlier teaching? As it was stated: “Originally they were saying that one harvests grapes with the Non-Jew and stamps with a Jew who works in impurity. They changed and said, one does not harvest grapes with the Non-Jew nor stamp with a Jew who works in impurity, but one stamps with a Gentile and helps him as long as it did not disappear from sight. Once it disappeared from sight it became libation wine”.
HALAKHAH: “If two [witnesses] saw him,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look how we are stating here: “If two [witnesses] saw him from one window, two from another window, and a person in the middle gives the warning, if partially they can see one another then this is one testimony. Otherwise, these are two testimonies.” Therefore, if they were three each, this does not apply. Rebbi Yose said, we stated “three each not so.” We state here what was not stated in all of Sanhedrin: “he and they are executed; the second [group] is not prosecutable.”
MISHNAH: If somebody escaped after sentence was passed, if he is returned to the same court, his case is not reopened. Anywhere two [people] will come forward and say, we testify against this man that he was condemned in court X on the testimony of Y and Z, he shall be executed. Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land. A criminal court which hands out a death sentence once in a Sabbatical period is called terrorist. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said, once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarphon and Rebbi Aqiba say, if we had been members of a criminal court, nobody ever would have been condemned to death there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, they would have increased the number of murderers in Israel.
HALAKHAH: “Criminal courts apply in the Land,” etc. “Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land, as it is written: This shall be for you a law statute for your generations, in all your dwellings. And why does the verse say, judges and marshals you shall appoint for yourself in all your gates, in the towns of the Land of Israel. Only that in the Land of Israel one installs judges in every town and outside the Land one appoints them by circuits.” It was stated: “Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai says, there is an obligation for every tribe to judge his own tribe, as it is written: Judges and marshals you shall appoint for yourself in all your gates which the Eternal, your God, gives you for your tribes.”
HALAKHAH: “Criminal courts apply in the Land,” etc. “Criminal courts apply in the Land and outside the Land, as it is written: This shall be for you a law statute for your generations, in all your dwellings. And why does the verse say, judges and marshals you shall appoint for yourself in all your gates, in the towns of the Land of Israel. Only that in the Land of Israel one installs judges in every town and outside the Land one appoints them by circuits.” It was stated: “Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai says, there is an obligation for every tribe to judge his own tribe, as it is written: Judges and marshals you shall appoint for yourself in all your gates which the Eternal, your God, gives you for your tribes.”
If a woman miscarried dry blood, Rebbi Eleazar says, she is impure; Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, she is pure. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: “Menstrual blood and flesh from a corpse make impure moist and dry.” He explains it that it was moist and then became dry. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: “If a woman had a miscarriage in the form of a lump, a hair, dust, or red mosquitoes, it should be soaked in water; if it dissolves she is impure.” He explains it, because of a creature. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even there you can object about dust. Is dust a creature? Rebbi Abba said, You even may mention dust. The dust from a pregnant woman exists as a creature. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: “It happened that a woman miscarried with a kind of red membranes. The case came before the Sages who sent and called the doctors who told them, she has an internal wound. Also it happened that a woman miscarried with a kind of red hairs. The case came before the Sages who sent and called the doctors who told them, she has an internal wart.” Only because of a wart and a wound. Therefore, if there is no wart or no wound, it does not apply. This disagrees with him and [his opinion] cannot be upheld.
The Babylonian Talmud
This would not apply when two men entered a ruin. But should there be two men, there would likewise be no ground for suspicion ! There would be in the case of two men of ill-repute.
There are some who apply the statement of Rab Aha b. Hannina to the following : There is a teaching : R. Simeon b. Johai said in the name of R. 'Akiba : There are times when a man reads the Shema' twice in a day, once before sunrise and once after sunrise, and thereby fulfils his obligation both for the day and night.
Should the reason [of exemption] be on account of anxiety, then it ought also to apply to one whose ship has sunk at sea ! Shouldest thou say that he likewise is exempt, why does R. Abba b. Zabda declare in the name of Rab : A mourner is under the obligation to observe all the commandments mentioned in the Torah except Tefillin, because they are called an adornment ; as it is said, "Bind thine adornment upon thee" (Ezek. xxiv. 17)?
But now, can this also apply to one who calls Sarah "Sarai"?
Does it likewise apply to one who calls Jacob "Jacob"?
To whom does this apply ? To those who work for a wage ; but should they work for their keep or their employer take his meals with them, they say the [entire] Grace after meals as ordained.
Should the reason [of exemption] be on account of anxiety, then it ought to apply also to one whose ship has sunk at sea ! Why, then, does R. Abba b. Zabda declare in the name of Rab : A mourner is under the obligation to observe all the commandments mentioned in the Torah except Tefillin, because they are called an adornment; as it is said, "Bind thine adornment upon thee" (Ezek. xxiv. 17)?
It was necessary [to have both this and the former teaching of Rab Judah in the name of Samuel] ; for if he had given us only the first teaching, [we might have argued,] To whom does this apply ? To a person who said the Tefillah alone and is repeating it alone ;
For whom does he mention this ? If it is supposed for the Rabbis, it is surely obvious ; since if a man with a running issue who experiences emission and originally was not under the necessity of bathing is compelled by the Rabbis to have immersion, how much more so a woman who experiences the menstrual flow during intercourse and originally was under the necessity of bathing ! Must it not be for R. Judah ? But the statement is intended to apply to this case exclusively, viz. :
Rab Nahman ordered a pitcher of the capacity of nine Kabs. When Rab Dimai came [from Palestine], he said : R. 'Akiba and R. Judah the locksmith declared : The teaching [that nine Kabs may be poured over a Ba'al Keri to cleanse him] is meant to apply only to a delicate person who experienced the emission involuntarily ; but for a delicate person who caused it to happen, forty Saot are necessary.
in the ante-room of R. Osha'ya, and they came and consulted Rab Assi. He said to them : The teaching [about the nine Kabs] was meant to apply only to a delicate person who caused it to happen ; but the delicate person who experienced it involuntarily was exempt therefrom altogether. Rab Joseph said ; Rab Nahman's pitcher is repaired.
R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi, and R. Eleazar and R. Jose b. R. Hannina—one of the first pair is at variance with one of the second pair on the interpretation of the first part of this teaching. One says : The statement, "Of what does this speak? [If he wishes to study Torah] for himself; but [if he wishes to teach it] to others, forty Saot are necessary" is intended to apply only to a delicate person whose emission was voluntary, but nine Kabs suffice him when it was involuntary. The other says : Whoever [wishes to teach Torah] to others, even if he be a delicate person whose emission was involuntary, [cannot be regarded as clean] until there have been forty Saot.
And one of the first pair is at variance with one of the second pair on the latter part of the teaching. One says : The statement, "R. Judah says that in every case forty Saot are required" is intended to apply only [to water found] in the ground, but not [to water] in vessels. The other says : It applies even [to water] in vessels.
Our Rabbis have taught : If a man feels the need to relieve himself, he should not say the Tefillah; and if he does, his prayer is an abomination. Rab Zebid (another version : Rab Judah) said : This teaching is meant to apply only to one who is unable to contain himself; but if he is able to contain himself, his Tefillah is valid.
It may be taken that both these teachings apply to a male, and there is no contradiction : the former referring to the major function of nature, the other to the minor.
Come and hear: For Rab Huna b. Judah said in the name of R. Isaac, in the name of R. Johanan: If one erred and omitted the afternoon Tefillah, he should say it twice in the evening, and the principle "The day having passed, the sacrifice becomes void" does not apply.
Then let him say : The Halakah is in agreement with R. 'Akiba outside the Land; for everyone who takes the lenient view within the Land, the Halakah is in accord with him outside the Land ! If he had stated that, I might have said : This applies to the tithe of trees which within the Land is a Rabbinical ordinance ; but with regard to 'Orlah, which within the Land is ordained by the Torah, I must suppose that likewise outside the Land we must apply it ! Therefore he informs us.
Mar b. Rab Ashe said : A man can comply with the requirements of the law therewith on the Passover. On what ground ? We may apply to it the term "bread of affliction" (Deut. xvi. 3).
R. Zera said to Rab Hisda, "Let the master come and teach." He replied, "[The regulations concerning] Grace after meals have I not learnt, so shall I teach !" R. Zera asked him, "How is that?" He replied, "When I visited the house of the Exilarch and said the Grace after meals, Rab Sheshet stretched his neck over me like a serpent." "But why ?" "Because I made no reference to the Covenant, the Torah or the Kingship." "And why didst thou not mention them?" "In accord with the statement of Rab Hananel in the name of Rab, viz. : If one has not referred to the Covenant, the Torah and the Kingship, he has complied with the requirements of the law — 'the Covenant' because it does not apply to women ; 'the Tordh and the Kingship' because they apply neither to women nor slaves." "And thou didst abandon all these Tannaim and Amoraim and act according to the view of Rab!"
R. Zera said to Rab Hisda, "Let the master come and teach." He replied, "[The regulations concerning] Grace after meals have I not learnt, so shall I teach !" R. Zera asked him, "How is that?" He replied, "When I visited the house of the Exilarch and said the Grace after meals, Rab Sheshet stretched his neck over me like a serpent." "But why ?" "Because I made no reference to the Covenant, the Torah or the Kingship." "And why didst thou not mention them?" "In accord with the statement of Rab Hananel in the name of Rab, viz. : If one has not referred to the Covenant, the Torah and the Kingship, he has complied with the requirements of the law — 'the Covenant' because it does not apply to women ; 'the Tordh and the Kingship' because they apply neither to women nor slaves." "And thou didst abandon all these Tannaim and Amoraim and act according to the view of Rab!"
Say rather, The law of division does not apply to it, as [it does in the case of] a courtyard. For R' Huna ruled, ‘A courtyard is divided according to the number of its doors.’ (and) R' Chisda said, ‘Four amos are given for each door and the remainder is divided equally’.
What principle does this teach us? That we apply the rule of the ‘curved wall’?
But is not this principle identical with the former one? One might have thought that we apply the rule of the ‘curved wall’ on one side only, but not on every side, therefore we were taught [that we apply it to all sides also].
But is not this principle identical with the former one? One might have thought that we apply the rule of the ‘curved wall’ on one side only, but not on every side, therefore we were taught [that we apply it to all sides also].
R. Huna stated: The dispute relates only [to poles erected] on the edge of a roof: R. Jacob holds that we apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’ while the sages hold that we do not apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’. But [if they were] in the middle of the roof, all agree that [the sukkah is] invalid. R. Nahman said: there is a dispute if [the poles are] in the middle of the roof.
R. Huna stated: The dispute relates only [to poles erected] on the edge of a roof: R. Jacob holds that we apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’ while the sages hold that we do not apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’. But [if they were] in the middle of the roof, all agree that [the sukkah is] invalid. R. Nahman said: there is a dispute if [the poles are] in the middle of the roof.
Abaye raised an objection against him: Do we then apply the rule of ‘since’? Was it not in fact taught: ‘[The rules relating to] a wall of a Sukkah are the same as those relating to a wall for Shabbat, as long as there is no gap of three handbreadths between any two reeds.
There was no need to mention this, [since it is obvious that] if we apply [the rule of ‘since’] from the less stringent to the more stringent, all the more so apply it from the more stringent to the less stringent
There was no need to mention this, [since it is obvious that] if we apply [the rule of ‘since’] from the less stringent to the more stringent, all the more so apply it from the more stringent to the less stringent
And if we had been informed of both those laws [but not of the third,] one would have assumed that from the more stringent to the less stringent [we apply the rule of ‘since’] but not from the less stringent to the more. [Therefore all the three rules were] necessary.
R. Papa answered: This is what he (Shmuel) means: If they are four [handbreadths wide] the sukkah is invalid according to all; If they are less than three, it is valid according to all. What is the reason? Since they are mere sticks. Over what do they dispute? [Planks that are] from three to four [handbreadths wide]. One master holds that since there is not in them the minimum measure of a ‘place’ we do not decree against their use, and the other master holds the opinion that since the law of lavud can no longer apply to them we do decree against their use.
But is not this obvious? — One might have said that we apply the law of lavud once, but we do not apply lavud twice [to the same wall], therefore he informed us of this.
But is not this obvious? — One might have said that we apply the law of lavud once, but we do not apply lavud twice [to the same wall], therefore he informed us of this.
Gemara. Why are all these [rulings] needed? It is necessary [to state them all]. For if he had only informed us of [the roof of] a house which had been opened, [one would have said that the validity applied to this case only] because the partitions are made for the house, but in the case of a courtyard which is surrounded by columns, where the partitions are not made for the walls are not made for the columns it does not apply.
And if he had informed us of those two, [one would have said that the validity applied to these cases only] because their skhakh is valid, but in the case of a large sukkah which is surrounded with a material which is invalid for a sukkah covering, since the skhakh itself is invalid, it does not apply [therefore it is] necessary [to mention all].
This applies only to the side, but as regards the middle, R. Aha and Ravina differ. One says: the rule of lavud applies in the middle, while the other says, the rule of lavud does not apply in the middle.
In Sura they taught these statements in the above form. In Pumbedita they taught [it as follows]: If a man placed skhakh over an exedra which has no pillars, it is invalid according to all. If it has pillars: Abaye declares it valid, while Rava declares it invalid. Abaye declares it valid, since we apply the law of lavud. Rava declares it invalid, since we do not apply the law of lavud. And the law is according to the former version.
In Sura they taught these statements in the above form. In Pumbedita they taught [it as follows]: If a man placed skhakh over an exedra which has no pillars, it is invalid according to all. If it has pillars: Abaye declares it valid, while Rava declares it invalid. Abaye declares it valid, since we apply the law of lavud. Rava declares it invalid, since we do not apply the law of lavud. And the law is according to the former version.
Abaye stated, this applies only where there are not three handbreadths of distance between one reed and another, but if there are three handbreadths between one and another, it is invalid. Rava says, even if there are three handbreadths between one and another we also do not say [that it is invalid] unless the upper reed is not a handbreadth wide but if the upper reed is a handbreadth wide, it is valid, since we apply to it the law of "beat and cast it down."
Rava said: From where do I say that if the upper reed is a handbreadth wide we apply to it the law of ‘beat and throw it down,’ and if it is not so wide we do not apply it? From what we have learned: 1) [With regard to] the roof beams of a house and of the upper story which have no plaster ceiling upon them and are in a line, [the upper ones exactly above the lower]: a) If there is uncleanness beneath one of them, all beneath that one becomes unclean.
Rava said: From where do I say that if the upper reed is a handbreadth wide we apply to it the law of ‘beat and throw it down,’ and if it is not so wide we do not apply it? From what we have learned: 1) [With regard to] the roof beams of a house and of the upper story which have no plaster ceiling upon them and are in a line, [the upper ones exactly above the lower]: a) If there is uncleanness beneath one of them, all beneath that one becomes unclean.
And on this it was taught, when do these apply? When the beams are each a handbreadth [wide] and there is [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, but if there is not [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, if there is uncleanliness under one of them, whatever is under that beam is unclean while the space between them and above them is clean. Thus it clearly follows that if there is a handbreadth we apply the law of ‘beat and throw it down’, but if there is not a handbreadth we do not apply this law. Conclude from this.
And on this it was taught, when do these apply? When the beams are each a handbreadth [wide] and there is [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, but if there is not [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, if there is uncleanliness under one of them, whatever is under that beam is unclean while the space between them and above them is clean. Thus it clearly follows that if there is a handbreadth we apply the law of ‘beat and throw it down’, but if there is not a handbreadth we do not apply this law. Conclude from this.
And on this it was taught, when do these apply? When the beams are each a handbreadth [wide] and there is [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, but if there is not [a gap] of a handbreadth between them, if there is uncleanliness under one of them, whatever is under that beam is unclean while the space between them and above them is clean. Thus it clearly follows that if there is a handbreadth we apply the law of ‘beat and throw it down’, but if there is not a handbreadth we do not apply this law. Conclude from this.
R. Kahana was sitting and he recited this statement. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana, do we then not apply the law of ‘beat and throw down’ where an object is not a handbreadth wide?
3) If one was above and the other below: Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah said, we regard the upper one as though it were lower down or the lower one as though it were higher, provided that the upper one is not more than twenty [cubits from the ground] nor the lower one less than ten [handbreadths from the ground]. From which it follows that if both of them were within twenty [cubits] we do apply the law of ‘beat and throw down’ even though none of them is a handbreadth [wide]?
He replied, solve it and say it this way: 1) Provided that the upper one is not more than twenty [cubits from the ground], but within the twenty [cubits], and the lower one is near it within less than three [handbreadths], 2) Alternatively provided that the lower one is not less than ten [cubits from the ground] but more than ten, and the upper one is near it within less than three [handbreadths], 3) But if they were three [handbreadths apart] since [the upper beam] is not a handbreadth [wide], we do not apply the law of ‘beat and throw down’.
But let them do the huppah in the Sukkah? Abaye says: [They cannot] because of seclusion. And Rava said, Because of the discomfort of the bridegroom. What practical difference is there between them? The practical difference between them is a case where people are going in and out of there. According to the one who said "because of seclusion", the restriction does not apply; according to the one who said because of discomfort to the groom, it does.
These words apply during the seven days [of Sukkot], but after the seven[-day period], he should return the beam itself. But if he connected it in plaster, and even if it is after the seven[-day period], he should also return the value [instead of the beam].
R. Yirmiyah asked: If the tip was broken off before the Festival, and the berry grew on it on the Festival, what [is the law]? Do we apply the law of "set aside" to commandments or not?
And R. Papa said: This implies that the law of "set aside" does not apply to commandments?
The question [of R. Yirmiyah] is concerning that very statement of R. Papa: Is he certain that the law of "set aside" does not apply to commandments, irrespective of whether it creates a stringency or a leniency, or perhaps he is doubtful, and therefore we apply it to create a stringency, but not to create a leniency? The question stands.