501 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:23

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:25

Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:23

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:33

If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:33

If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:21

“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:30

MISHNAH: One gave a loan to another on a pledge and the pledge was lost. He told him, “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma”; he is not liable. “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth three šeqel;” he is liable. “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;” he is not liable. “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth five denar;” he is liable. Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge, lest one swear and the other produce the pledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:33

Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:40

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:40

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:40

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:40

The following is obvious: If the Jew holds the funnel and the Gentile pours, everybody agrees that is it forbidden. If the Gentile holds the funnel and the Jew pours, Rebbi Assi forbids and Rebbi Immi permits. If the Gentile holds the opening of the wineskin and the Jew pours, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: this is the disagreement. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yose, which disagreement? He told him, the disasgreement between Rebbi Assi and Rebbi Immi. If the Jew holds the wineskin and the Gentile pours, they wanted to say that according to everybody it is permitted. Rebbi Samuel: In itself it implies that it is forbidden. For sometimes the Jew will loosen his grip and then the entire pouring is done by the Gentile. If somebody lets down a wineskin from top to bottom this is not pouring from vessel to vessel.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:17

MISHNAH: By the words of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a death sentence be imposed. If testimony is confirmed by two, why did the verse mention three? Only to compare three to two. Since three may prove that two are plotters, two also may prove that three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Simeon says, since two are executed only if both are plotters, so three are executed only if all three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Aqiba says, the third is only mentioned to punish him harshly and to identify his judgment with that of the others. If the verse in this way punished the accessory of criminals like criminals, so much more it will reward the accessory to one who keeps the commandments as one who keeps the commandments. Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? In criminal trials, but in civil trials the testimony should be upheld by the remaining [witnesses]. Rebbi says, both in criminal and in civil trials, if they warned them. But if they did not warn them, what should two brothers do who were eye-witnesses to a murder?

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 1:23

“Whose sentence was passed,” etc. If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abun specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a single testimony and a single warning, and any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and invalid for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:30

HALAKHAH: [They were paying rent to the Levites.] It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, they were given to be distributed. Rebbi Yose said, they were given as dwellings. It turns out that Rebbi Yose holds with Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Meïr follows his own opinion as we have stated: “They were paying rent to the Levites, the words of Rebbi (Meïr) [Jehudah]. Rebbi (Jehudah) [Meïr] said, they were not paying rent to the Levites.”

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:38

If he holds that the night is divided into three watches, let him say explicitly [in the Mishnah] "until the end of the fourth hour." If, on the other hand, he holds that the night is divided into four watches, let him say explicitly "until the end of the third hour."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:38

If he holds that the night is divided into three watches, let him say explicitly [in the Mishnah] "until the end of the fourth hour." If, on the other hand, he holds that the night is divided into four watches, let him say explicitly "until the end of the third hour."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:108

If thou wilt, I can say [they differ] in their reasoning : for R. Johanan holds

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:109

that the deliverance [from Egypt] began also at night, but the complete deliverance did not take place until the morning. R. Joshua b. Levi holds that since the deliverance did not take place until the morning, [what happened in the night] is not to be considered a proper deliverance.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:110

Or if thou wilt, I can say [they differ in the interpretation of] a Scriptural passage; and they both expound the same verse, viz. "When thou liest down and when thou risest up" (Deut. vi. 7). R. Johanan holds that

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:131

R. Isaac said : Whoever reads the Shema' upon his bed is as though he holds a two-edged sword in his hand; as it is said, "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand" (Ps. cxlix. 6). How is this inferred ? Mar Zotra (another version : Rab Ashe) said : From what precedes ; for it is written, "Let the saints exult in glory, let them sing for joy upon their beds" (ibid. v. 5), and this is followed by "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand."

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:383

What is the point of disagreement? The time of "hastening." R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah holds that it refers to the haste of the Egyptians; but R. 'Akiba holds that

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:383

What is the point of disagreement? The time of "hastening." R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah holds that it refers to the haste of the Egyptians; but R. 'Akiba holds that

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:557

That is quite right according to Rab who declares that a benediction which does not contain the Divine Name is no benediction. But, according to R. Johanan who holds that a benediction which does not contain a reference to the Divine Kingship is no benediction, what is there to say?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:17

They draw no conclusion from it at all. It is possible to say that Rabbi holds that the whole Torah can be read in any language. For if thou maintainest that it may be read only in the holy tongue, what are we to make of the phrase "and these words shall be" which the All-merciful wrote?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:91

Nevertheless it presents a difficulty to Rab. [The solution is :] Rab holds the view of R. Joshua b. Karhah who says : First there must be the yoke of the kingdom of heaven, and afterwards the yoke of the commandments.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:106

GEMARA What is R. Jose's reason [for declaring that unless the Shema' is read audibly the requirements of the law have not been fulfilled]? Because it is written, "Hear O Israel," i.e. let thine ear hear what thou issuest from thy mouth. And the first Tanna ? He holds that "Hear" [means that the Shema' may be read] in any language which thou hearest.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:169

If it be R. Joshua's view, why does he mention labourers specially, since it holds good of anybody ?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:15

What is the point of divergence between them ? Rabina said : They differ whether we have fear of mice [gnawing the body] ; the former holds there is such fear, the other there is not.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:200

There is a further teaching : When one is about to enter a regular privy, he divests himself of the Tefillin at a [minimum] distance of four cubits, leaves them on the window-sill which is near the public road, and then enters. When he comes out, he walks a distance of four cubits and relays them. These are the words of Bet Shammai. Bet Hillel declare that he may hold them in his hand and enter. R. 'Akiba says : He holds them in his garment and enters.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:201

In his garment, dost thou imagine? He may sometimes forget them and they will fall ! But say that he holds them in his garment with his hand and enters, leaving them in a hole near the privy,

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:221

But this is what he means to say: They permit a regular privy where there is no splashing [of urine likely to defile the hand which holds the Tefillin], but they prohibit a chance privy where there is this likelihood.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:263

[The teacher stated above:] "He who makes his voice heard during prayer is of the small of faith." Rab Huna said : This teaching applies only to one who is able to direct his heart when whispering [the words of prayer] ; but if he is unable to do so, he is permitted [to pray aloud]. And this holds good only of one praying alone ; but with a congregation it would cause disturbance to others.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:268

But according to the first Tanna, the heart sees the nakedness [during prayer] ! He holds that when the heart sees the nakedness, it is permitted [to read the Shema'].

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:288

Abbai said : Whence do I derive my opinion ? For there is a Mishnaic teaching : If a ritually unclean person is standing under a tree and a person who is ritually clean passes by him, the latter also becomes defiled. If, however, a person ritually clean is standing under a tree and an unclean person passes by, the former remains in his state of purity; but should [the unclean person] remain standing there, then the former becomes unclean. The same law holds good with a stone which has become infected.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:312

He holds that when his heart sees his nakedness, it is permitted [to read]. But lo, his heel sees his nakedness ! He holds that when his heel sees his nakedness, it is permitted.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:312

He holds that when his heart sees his nakedness, it is permitted [to read]. But lo, his heel sees his nakedness ! He holds that when his heel sees his nakedness, it is permitted.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:167

In what do they differ ? The former holds that to say the Tefillah standing is of greater importance; the latter holds that to unite the Ge'ullah with the Tefillah is of greater importance.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:167

In what do they differ ? The former holds that to say the Tefillah standing is of greater importance; the latter holds that to unite the Ge'ullah with the Tefillah is of greater importance.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:171

GEMARA R. Judah is identical with the first Tanna's view ! There is a difference between them, viz. : an individual who lives in a place where there is no local Congregation. The first Tanna holds that he is exempt [from the additional Tefillah], but R. Judah holds that he is under the obligation.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:171

GEMARA R. Judah is identical with the first Tanna's view ! There is a difference between them, viz. : an individual who lives in a place where there is no local Congregation. The first Tanna holds that he is exempt [from the additional Tefillah], but R. Judah holds that he is under the obligation.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:76

Rab Nahman holds the same view as R. Jose ; for there is a Mishnaic teaching : R. Jose said : The grape-bud is forbidden because it is fruit ; but the Rabbis differ from him.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:130

For over bread one says : "... Who bringest forth bread from the earth." Our Rabbis have taught : What does he say ? "...Who bringest forth [hammosi'] bread from the earth." R. Nehemiah stated : It is "...Who brought forth [mosi'] bread from the earth." Raba said : Nobody disagrees about mosi that it has the meaning "brought forth" ; as it is said, "God Who brought them forth [mosiam] out of Egypt" (Num. xxiii. 22). In what do they differ? In the word hammosi'. The Rabbis hold that hammosi' means "Who brought forth," for it is written "Who brought thee forth [hammosi'] water out of the rock of flint" (Deut. viii. 15) ; and R. Nehemiah holds it means "Who bringeth forth," as it is said, "Who bringeth you out [hammosi'] from under the burden of the Egyptians" (Exod. vi. 7).

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:214

If there were several kinds of food before him, etc. 'Ulla said : The difference of opinion arises when the benediction is the same for them ; for R. Judah holds that one of the seven species is to be given preference, whereas the Rabbis hold that the kind which is best liked should be given preference. Where, however, the benediction is not the same, all agree that he should first say it over that which he likes best and then say it over the others.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:218

R. Ammi and R. Isaac Nappaha are at variance over this matter. One declares that the difference of opinion arises when the benediction is the same, for R. Judah holds that one of the seven species is to be given preference, whereas the Rabbis hold that the kind which is best liked is to be given preference. Where, however, the benediction is not the same, all agree that he says the benediction over one and then over the other. The second [Rabbi] declares that there is difference of opinion even where the benediction is not the same.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:46

Let us say [that their difference is] like that of the Tannaim ; for one taught : The Grace after meals [may be said by] two or three ; and there is another teaching : Three or four. They hold that everybody admits that "Who art kind and dealest kindly" is not ordained by the Torah. Are we, then, not to suppose that they differ on the following point : He who says, "[The Grace may be said by] two or three" holds that [the benediction of Zimmun extends] until "Who givest food unto all" ; and he who says "Three or four" holds that it extends until "We will bless"?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:46

Let us say [that their difference is] like that of the Tannaim ; for one taught : The Grace after meals [may be said by] two or three ; and there is another teaching : Three or four. They hold that everybody admits that "Who art kind and dealest kindly" is not ordained by the Torah. Are we, then, not to suppose that they differ on the following point : He who says, "[The Grace may be said by] two or three" holds that [the benediction of Zimmun extends] until "Who givest food unto all" ; and he who says "Three or four" holds that it extends until "We will bless"?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:157

R. Johanan said: The statement must be reversed. Abbai said : There is certainly no necessity to reverse it ; for here they differ in the interpretation of Scripture : R. Meir holds, "And thou shalt eat" (Deut. viii. 10) — i.e. eating; "and thou shalt be satisfied" — i.e. drinking ; and "eating" means the minimum quantity of the size of an olive. R. Judah, on the other hand, holds, "And thou shalt eat and be satisfied" — i.e. eating wherein is some satisfaction; and what is that? That is the minimum quantity of the size of an egg.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:157

R. Johanan said: The statement must be reversed. Abbai said : There is certainly no necessity to reverse it ; for here they differ in the interpretation of Scripture : R. Meir holds, "And thou shalt eat" (Deut. viii. 10) — i.e. eating; "and thou shalt be satisfied" — i.e. drinking ; and "eating" means the minimum quantity of the size of an olive. R. Judah, on the other hand, holds, "And thou shalt eat and be satisfied" — i.e. eating wherein is some satisfaction; and what is that? That is the minimum quantity of the size of an egg.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:158

But in the other case, they differ in reasoning; R. Meir holds that his return must be equal to his defilement — as his defilement is only possible by means of something of the minimum size of an egg, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an egg. R. Judah, however, holds that his return must be equal to his prohibition — as his prohibition is with something of the minimum size of an olive, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an olive.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:158

But in the other case, they differ in reasoning; R. Meir holds that his return must be equal to his defilement — as his defilement is only possible by means of something of the minimum size of an egg, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an egg. R. Judah, however, holds that his return must be equal to his prohibition — as his prohibition is with something of the minimum size of an olive, so must his return be necessitated by holy flesh of the minimum size of an olive.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:25

but [as regards] R. Huna and R. Chanan b. Rabbah,can we say that they differ on [what minimum of extent constitutes] the kashrus of the Sukkah the former, holding the opinion that the kashrus of the Sukkah [depends upon its being a minimum of] four amos [square] while the latter holds that The kashrus of the Sukkah [depends, upon its capacity of] containing his head, the greater part of his body, and his table?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:27

And the other, holding the opinion that holds the opinion that they differ [about a Sukkah whose size is] between [one capable of] containing his head, the greater part of his body and his table, and one four amos square, but if it is more than four amos square, both agree that it is kosher

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:38

Another version: R. Abba said to him: Who holds this opinion? He [Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak] said to him: ‘Beth Shammai, and do not change from it’. (I.E. to Bais Hillel)

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:39

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak objected: How do we know that Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel are disputing about a small Sukkah? Perhaps their dispute concerns a large Sukkah, as for instance, where a man sat at the entrance of the Sukkah with his table inside the house, [with]Bais Shammai holding the opinion that we prohibit it lest he be drawn after the table,while Bais Hillel holds that we do not prohibit it?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:82

R. Huna stated: The dispute relates only [to poles erected] on the edge of a roof: R. Jacob holds that we apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’ while the sages hold that we do not apply the rule of ‘draw the partition upward’. But [if they were] in the middle of the roof, all agree that [the sukkah is] invalid. R. Nahman said: there is a dispute if [the poles are] in the middle of the roof.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:87

R. Huna could answer you: They disagree about poles in the middle of the roof, and likewise also about those on the edge. And the reason why the dispute concerns the middle of the roof is in order to show you how far R. Jacob's view extends that even where the poles were in the middle of the roof he holds [the Sukkah] to be valid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:102

This is correct according to the authority who holds that the border was below, but according to the authority who holds that it was above what can one say? It is only an accessory

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:102

This is correct according to the authority who holds that the border was below, but according to the authority who holds that it was above what can one say? It is only an accessory

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:140

What principle are they arguing about?... The rabbis hold that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, while R. Shimon holds that the traditional reading is authoritative.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:143

R. Shimon holds that the traditional reading is authoritative’. The word Sukkoth is read three times, which equals six [references]. Deduct one Scriptural reference for the law itself and four remain; three walls at least of prescribed dimensions, and tradition came and diminished the [prescribed minimum of the] fourth and reduced it to a handbreadth.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:144

And if you wish you can say that they all agree that the traditional reading is authoritative but they differ on this; .one Master holds that. the skhakh needs a Scriptural reference, while the other Master holds that it does not.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:144

And if you wish you can say that they all agree that the traditional reading is authoritative but they differ on this; .one Master holds that. the skhakh needs a Scriptural reference, while the other Master holds that it does not.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:145

And if you wish you can say hat they are unanimous that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ on this principle; one Master holds that the tradition comes to diminish while the other holds that tradition comes and adds to it.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:145

And if you wish you can say hat they are unanimous that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ on this principle; one Master holds that the tradition comes to diminish while the other holds that tradition comes and adds to it.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:146

And if you wish you can say that both agree that tradition comes to diminish and that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ as to whether one uses first [references] for exegesis: one Master holds that we do expound upon first references, and the other Master holds that we do not.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:146

And if you wish you can say that both agree that tradition comes to diminish and that the traditional Scriptural text is authoritative, but they differ as to whether one uses first [references] for exegesis: one Master holds that we do expound upon first references, and the other Master holds that we do not.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:244

What does it mean ‘there are no occupants’? If we say, actual occupants, are then occupants [it could be objected] a determining factor? Rather we must say that ‘there are no occupants' means that the Sukkah is unsuitable for occupation? How so? Because it is less than ten handbreadths high. We could therefore infer that the first opinion [in the Mishnah] holds that even if it is unsuitable for occupation it is still invalid?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:246

This implies [does it not] that the first opinion holds that even if the lower one is not able to bear their weight, it is still invalid?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:290

And if you wish you may say hat if we were of the opinion that the [components of the] lulav must be tied together, [we must admit that] all agree that we do deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. But here they dispute on the following: One Master holds the opinion that it must be tied together while the other holds that it need not be tied together; and their dispute is the same as that of the following tannaim as it has been taught: A lulav, whether [its components] be tied together or not, is valid. R. Judah says: If tied together it is valid, if not, it is invalid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:290

And if you wish you may say hat if we were of the opinion that the [components of the] lulav must be tied together, [we must admit that] all agree that we do deduce the law of lulav from that of Sukkah. But here they dispute on the following: One Master holds the opinion that it must be tied together while the other holds that it need not be tied together; and their dispute is the same as that of the following tannaim as it has been taught: A lulav, whether [its components] be tied together or not, is valid. R. Judah says: If tied together it is valid, if not, it is invalid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:338

The one that said this with regard to harvesting [grain] certainly holds it with regard to harvesting grapes, since one does not desire [any stalks] lest they suck up one's wine; But the one that said this with regard to harvesting grapes, that he does not render their stalks susceptible to uncleanliness, holds that the harvesting [ears of grain] does render them susceptible since one is pleased to use [the ears] for the skhakh in order that [the grains] be not scattered.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:338

The one that said this with regard to harvesting [grain] certainly holds it with regard to harvesting grapes, since one does not desire [any stalks] lest they suck up one's wine; But the one that said this with regard to harvesting grapes, that he does not render their stalks susceptible to uncleanliness, holds that the harvesting [ears of grain] does render them susceptible since one is pleased to use [the ears] for the skhakh in order that [the grains] be not scattered.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:340

Isn't it this that they argue about: that one master holds the opinion they render the handles susceptible to uncleanliness, while the other master holds the opinion that they do not render the ‘handles’ susceptible to uncleanliness?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:340

Isn't it this that they argue about: that one master holds the opinion they render the handles susceptible to uncleanliness, while the other master holds the opinion that they do not render the ‘handles’ susceptible to uncleanliness?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:353

Rav said: The dispute is in a case of planks which are four [handbreadths wide], for R. Meir holds that this is forbidden as a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof, while R. Judah holds that there is not a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof. But in the case of planks which are less than four handbreadths wide all agree that the Sukkah is valid. Shmuel however says that the dispute concerns planks which are less than four [handbreadths wide], but if they are four [handbreadths wide], they are invalid according to all.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:353

Rav said: The dispute is in a case of planks which are four [handbreadths wide], for R. Meir holds that this is forbidden as a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof, while R. Judah holds that there is not a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roof. But in the case of planks which are less than four handbreadths wide all agree that the Sukkah is valid. Shmuel however says that the dispute concerns planks which are less than four [handbreadths wide], but if they are four [handbreadths wide], they are invalid according to all.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:355

R. Papa answered: This is what he (Shmuel) means: If they are four [handbreadths wide] the sukkah is invalid according to all; If they are less than three, it is valid according to all. What is the reason? Since they are mere sticks. Over what do they dispute? [Planks that are] from three to four [handbreadths wide]. One master holds that since there is not in them the minimum measure of a ‘place’ we do not decree against their use, and the other master holds the opinion that since the law of lavud can no longer apply to them we do decree against their use.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:355

R. Papa answered: This is what he (Shmuel) means: If they are four [handbreadths wide] the sukkah is invalid according to all; If they are less than three, it is valid according to all. What is the reason? Since they are mere sticks. Over what do they dispute? [Planks that are] from three to four [handbreadths wide]. One master holds that since there is not in them the minimum measure of a ‘place’ we do not decree against their use, and the other master holds the opinion that since the law of lavud can no longer apply to them we do decree against their use.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:379

What [then] does [the Mishnah] teach us? That R. Meir holds that there is decree lest the sukkah look like ordinary roofing, while R. Judah holds that there is no such decree? But have they not already disputed this, as we have learned: Planks may be used for skhakh, the words of R. Judah; R. Meir forbids them.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:379

What [then] does [the Mishnah] teach us? That R. Meir holds that there is decree lest the sukkah look like ordinary roofing, while R. Judah holds that there is no such decree? But have they not already disputed this, as we have learned: Planks may be used for skhakh, the words of R. Judah; R. Meir forbids them.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:384

This is correct according to Rav who says that the dispute is where the planks are four [handbreadths wide], since in such a case R. Meir holds that we decree lest one come to use ordinary roofing while R. Judah says we don't decree lest one use ordinary roofing But according to Shmuel, who says that the dispute is where the planks are not four [handbreadths wide], but that where they are four handbreadths wide all agree that it is invalid, on what principle do they dispute in the latter [Mishnah]?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:385

They dispute on [the question of] the annulment of a roof. One master holds the opinion that by this means it becomes annulled, while the other master holds the opinion that by this means it does not become annulled.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:385

They dispute on [the question of] the annulment of a roof. One master holds the opinion that by this means it becomes annulled, while the other master holds the opinion that by this means it does not become annulled.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:403

Gemara. What do they argue about? One master holds the opinion that a hanging partition renders [the Sukkah] valid, and the other Master holds the opinion that a hanging partition does not render it valid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:403

Gemara. What do they argue about? One master holds the opinion that a hanging partition renders [the Sukkah] valid, and the other Master holds the opinion that a hanging partition does not render it valid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:492

Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:492

Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:19

But does not R. Shimon also say that a Sukkah must be a permanent abode, and yet [he holds that] a temporary tent does annul a permanent tent? It is in this that they differ One Master holds that a temporary tent can come and annul a permanent tent, while the other Master holds that a temporary tent cannot annul a permanent tent.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:19

But does not R. Shimon also say that a Sukkah must be a permanent abode, and yet [he holds that] a temporary tent does annul a permanent tent? It is in this that they differ One Master holds that a temporary tent can come and annul a permanent tent, while the other Master holds that a temporary tent cannot annul a permanent tent.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:19

But does not R. Shimon also say that a Sukkah must be a permanent abode, and yet [he holds that] a temporary tent does annul a permanent tent? It is in this that they differ One Master holds that a temporary tent can come and annul a permanent tent, while the other Master holds that a temporary tent cannot annul a permanent tent.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:49

Abaye said: All agree that where it is unable to withstand a normal land breeze it is nothing; If it can withstand an unusually [strong] land breeze, all agree that it is valid. Where do they dispute? Where it can withstand a normal land breeze, but not a normal sea breeze; R. Gamaliel holds that the Sukkah must be a permanent abode, and since it cannot withstand a normal sea breeze, it is nothing, While R. Akiva is of the opinion that the sukkah must be a temporary abode, and since it can withstand a normal land breeze, it is valid.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:71

Rather R. Aha b. Jacob said that R. Meir holds that any partition which is upheld by wind is not a valid partition. There are others who say that R. Aha b. Jacob said that R. Meir holds that any partition which is not made by the hands of man is no partition.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:71

Rather R. Aha b. Jacob said that R. Meir holds that any partition which is upheld by wind is not a valid partition. There are others who say that R. Aha b. Jacob said that R. Meir holds that any partition which is not made by the hands of man is no partition.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:122

One [baraita] teaches, One may sleep casually in tefillin but not regular sleep, and another [baraita] teachers, Both casual sleep and regular sleep [are permitted] while a third baraita teaches: Neither a casual sleep nor a regular sleep [is allowed]! There is no difficulty: One refers to where he holds them in his hand, one to where they rest on his head, and one refers to where he spreads a cloth over them.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:98

No! All agree that we do not apply the law of "set aside" to commandments, but they disagree here in whether we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah. One Master holds that we do so deduce them, while the other Master holds that we do not deduce the laws of lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:98

No! All agree that we do not apply the law of "set aside" to commandments, but they disagree here in whether we deduce [the laws of] lulav from [those of] Sukkah. One Master holds that we do so deduce them, while the other Master holds that we do not deduce the laws of lulav from sukkah.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:108

Indeed it refers to a case where [he reduced them] after he bound them, but he holds that the binding is merely a designation, and a mere designation is of no consequence.