lenient

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Simeon the nazir: If he made it into a bandage it is pure. If one dipped it in oil is it not as if he made a bandage? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, logically practice should follow Rebbi Aqiba who is similar to both, but in fact it follows Rebbi Joshua who is lenient in the matter of three-by-three. Not only pure but even impure, because of Rav, since Rav said one heats with vessels, but one does not heat with pieces of vessels.

Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this [statement] by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis [problematic for you]? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.

Rebbi Yose said, look how lenient they were on the Sabbath, that even things which are not to be used on the Sabbath they permitted for use on the Sabbath. As Rebbi Eleazar said, why is a tripod impure? Because the waiter eats on it. Why is its base impure? Because the waiter stands on it. Look how stringent they were in impurity, that even things which are not used as a table they declared impure as a table.

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Practice does [not] follow Rebbi Jehudah. If it were not so what would we say? Rebbi Jehudah versus the Sages, practice should follow Rebbi Jehudah? But since Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rebbi Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. (We asked about it, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Idi say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rav Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri.) We asked about it, we would think this refers to an individual versus an individual but not an individual versus the Sages. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri even though the Sages disagree with him. Why should practice not follow Rebbi Jehudah even though the Sages disagree with him? Samuel said, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said to him, for example what we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it”? He told him, did I not say Eruvin but partitions? Cahana shares Samuel’s opinion. Therefore it was necessary to say that practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah.

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Practice does [not] follow Rebbi Jehudah. If it were not so what would we say? Rebbi Jehudah versus the Sages, practice should follow Rebbi Jehudah? But since Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rebbi Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. (We asked about it, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Idi say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rav Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri.) We asked about it, we would think this refers to an individual versus an individual but not an individual versus the Sages. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri even though the Sages disagree with him. Why should practice not follow Rebbi Jehudah even though the Sages disagree with him? Samuel said, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said to him, for example what we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it”? He told him, did I not say Eruvin but partitions? Cahana shares Samuel’s opinion. Therefore it was necessary to say that practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah.

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Practice does [not] follow Rebbi Jehudah. If it were not so what would we say? Rebbi Jehudah versus the Sages, practice should follow Rebbi Jehudah? But since Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rebbi Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. (We asked about it, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Idi say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and Rav Naḥman bar Isaac said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri.) We asked about it, we would think this refers to an individual versus an individual but not an individual versus the Sages. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri even though the Sages disagree with him. Why should practice not follow Rebbi Jehudah even though the Sages disagree with him? Samuel said, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said to him, for example what we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it”? He told him, did I not say Eruvin but partitions? Cahana shares Samuel’s opinion. Therefore it was necessary to say that practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah.

HALAKHAH: “One makes planks for wells,” etc. Since what is breached is more than what is standing he makes double columns but not simple ones, which proves by itself that it is because of access to the well. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: You are reaching here what are the limits of domains of the Sabbath, for if he did so at (one) place and then threw there four cubits in the public domain he would be liable. Rebbi Yose said, since you were lenient with him about what is breached may be more than what is standing, you are strict with him in another matter since everywhere else one makes a plank of four hand-breadths but here he makes a plank of six hand-breadths.

MISHNAH: Surveys may only be made by professionals. If one extended the place and restricted it at another, one listens to him who extends. Even a slave or a slave woman are trustworthy to say up to here is the Sabbath domain since the Sages said in these matters not to restrict but to be lenient.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rabban Gamliel said, if happened that a Sadducee,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah. If it were not so what would we say? Rebbi Jehudah versus the Sages, practice should follow Rebbi Jehudah? But since Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and following Rebbi Naḥman bar Isaac in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, and we asked about it, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Idi say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and did not Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri? We asked about it, we would think to say that this refers to an individual versus an individual but not an individual versus the Sages. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri even though the Sages disagree with him. Why should practice not follow Rebbi Jehudah even though the Sages disagree with him?

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rabban Gamliel said, if happened that a Sadducee,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Practice does not follow Rebbi Jehudah. If it were not so what would we say? Rebbi Jehudah versus the Sages, practice should follow Rebbi Jehudah? But since Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and following Rebbi Naḥman bar Isaac in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, and we asked about it, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Idi say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows the lenient opinion in Eruvin, and did not Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman say in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri? We asked about it, we would think to say that this refers to an individual versus an individual but not an individual versus the Sages. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri even though the Sages disagree with him. Why should practice not follow Rebbi Jehudah even though the Sages disagree with him?

Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Pappai in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: It happened that a woman made an eruv for her mother-in-law without her knowledge. The case came before Rebbi Ismael who wanted to forbid. Rebbi Ḥiyya told him, I heard from your father that if you can be lenient in eruvin you should be lenient.

Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Pappai in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: It happened that a woman made an eruv for her mother-in-law without her knowledge. The case came before Rebbi Ismael who wanted to forbid. Rebbi Ḥiyya told him, I heard from your father that if you can be lenient in eruvin you should be lenient.

MISHNAH: What is its measure? Food for two meals for everybody, food for weekday but not the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says for Sabbath but not for weekday. Both of them intended to be lenient. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, a loaf for a dupondius if four seah are a tetradrachma. Rebbi Simeon says, two thirds of a loaf if three are made from a qab; half of this for the leprous house, and half of this half bring impurity to a body.

As they disagreed: If it was compounded as profane, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is disqualified; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, it is qualified. What is Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought into the Sanctuary. What is Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought from the disbursement from the lodge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s parallels Samuel and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s Rebbi Joḥanan, as we have stated, “if one dedicated his property to the Temple and there were objects appropriate as public offerings.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, incense. Rebbi Hoshaia said, explain it about an artisan of the family Eutinos who took incense as his wages. And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s is like Samuel, as Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Samuel, they made the mortar a vessel to sanctify. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Ḥuna said this before Rebbi Yose: something sanctified in a vessel may be redeemed. He said to him, is that not Samuel’s? Since Samuel said, one is lenient in the case of leftovers. As they disagreed: If unblemished animals were left over, Samuel says, they are redeemed unblemished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are redeemed as disqualified sancta. Leftover he-goats, in Samuel’s opinion if elevation sacrifices are redeemed, a purification sacrifice so much more. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion? Rebbi Ze`ira said, they shall graze. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, one uses them to adorn the altar. This is difficult. May a purification sacrifice be brought as elevation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for public sacrifices are determined only by slaughter. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is a stipulation of the Court that all leftovers should be brought as elevation sacrifices.

Excess sticks that exceed the sukkah are considered part of the sukkah. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of the rabbis there: Only if it is on the entire front. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Even at a wall. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Even not at a wall. In the opinion of Rebbi Yasa it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, how could you be lenient in this if its sunshine is more than its shade?

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this {statement} by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis problematic for you? If one harvested for grasses he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support my teacher Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish, if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce.

“On the seventeenth of it Gentiles attacked the remainder of the Sopherim at the city of Khalkis and Bet-Zabdin and there was relief.” In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion it is understandable, it comes to forbid the {day} itself. What does it come to forbid for Rebbi Yose? [The day before? Is not the day itself forbidden for him?] Rebbi Yose said, all these matters neither support nor contradict either Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Yose; they only come to report the days on which miracles were done for Israel. You have to understand that this is so since we have stated: “On the New Moon of Nisan the Daily Offering was settled, one may not eulogize.” Without this is he not already forbidden because of the New Moon? “But on Sabbath and holidays one fasts before and after them. What is your reason to be lenient with these and restrictive with those? For these are words of the Torah, and words of the Torah do not need reinforcement. But those are words of the Sopherim, and words of the Sopherim need reinforcement.” That is what you were saying, as long as Megillat Ta`anit was not abolished. But since Megillat Ta`anit was abolished, all these were abolished. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Jonathan both said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Simon both said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was repeating, “it happened that in Lydda they decided on a fast-day on Ḥanukkah. They said about Rebbi Eliezer that he got a haircut, and about Rebbi Joshua that he took a {thermal} bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast because you fasted.” And you are saying, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even if you are saying that Megillat Ta`anit was abolished, Ḥanukkah and Purim were not abolished.

Ḥizqiah read it on the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth, since he was apprehensive about what Rebbi Simeon ben Yohay had stated, a person who would sell a dwelling-house in a walled city, that excludes Tiberias whose wall is the lake. Rebbi Joḥanan read it in the Kifra synagogue and said, this is the main ancient Tiberias; he was not apprehensive about what Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥay had stated. They were lenient in matters of reading it, as we have stated there: “Anything inside the walls is treated as a house of a walled city except fields. Rebbi Meïr says, even fields.” And it was stated so: “what is close to a walled place and what is seen with it has the same standing as it.”

“On the seventeenth of it Gentiles attacked the remainder of the Sopherim at the city of Khalkis and Bet-Zabdin and there was relief.” In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion it is understandable, it comes to forbid the {day} itself. What does it come to forbid for Rebbi Yose? Rebbi Yose said, all these matters neither support nor contradict either Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Yose; they only come to report the days on which miracles were done for Israel. You have to understand that this is so since we have stated: “On the New Moon of Nisan the Daily Offering was settled, one may not eulogize.” Without this is it not already forbidden to him because of the New Moon? “But on Sabbath and holidays one fasts before and after them. What do you understand to be lenient with these and restrictive with those? For these are words of the Torah, and words of the Torah do not need reinforcement. But those are words of the Sopherim, and words of the Sopherim need reinforcement.” That is what you were saying, as long as Megillat Ta`anit was not abolished. But since Megillat Ta`anit was abolished, all these were abolished. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi both said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Simon both said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Jonathan said, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was repeating, “it happened that in Lydda they decided on a fast-day on Ḥanukkah. They said about Rebbi Eliezer that he got a haircut, and about Rebbi Joshua that he took a {thermal} bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast because you fasted.” And you are saying, Megillat Ta`anit was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even if you are saying that Megillat Ta`anit was abolished, Ḥanukkah and Purim were not abolished.

“If he wrote it,” this implies that work is permitted. Should we say on the Fourteenth, in walled cities? “Studied it,” only he should not let his mind wander to other topics. “He corrected it.” It was stated: one is not explicit about its mistakes. Rebbi Isaac bar Abba from Mehasia and Rebbi Ḥananel were sitting before Rav. One said, Yehudim. And the other one said, Yehudiim, and neither of them changed his opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan was reading always “Yehudim”. Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: One verse says “book”, another verse says “letter.” How is this? They made it light for sewing. They were lenient regarding its sewing, that if he stitched two or three stitches it is qualified.

Mustachios and cutting fingernails. There are Tannaim who state, permitted on a holiday and forbidden in mourning. There are Tannaim who state, forbidden on a holiday and permitted in mourning. He who said permitted on a holiday, if there happens to be a holiday; and forbidden in mourning, if there is no holiday. He who said forbidden on a holiday, if it involves trickery; and permitted in mourning, without trickery. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: practice follows him who is lenient at both occasions. Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: practice follows him who is lenient in the rules of mourning. Rav said, the lips follow cutting fingernails in all respects. Rebbi Jeremiah said, only if they interfere. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A pair came before Rebbi about lips and cutting fingernails and Rebbi permitted it to them. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: There were two pairs, one from Amatheh and one from Yedid-Aleh, one about lips and one about cutting fingernails, and Rebbi permitted to them. As the following. The sister of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba died and he was sitting cutting his fingernails. Rebbi Eleazar visited him and he did not cover them. Rebbi Nathan bar Abba visited him and he was covering them. He said to him, you did not cover them in front of Rebbi Eleazar; but in front of me you are covering them? He answered him, do you think that you are as dear to me as Rebbi Eleazar?

Mustachios and cutting fingernails. There are Tannaim who state, permitted on a holiday and forbidden in mourning. There are Tannaim who state, forbidden on a holiday and permitted in mourning. He who said permitted on a holiday, if there happens to be a holiday; and forbidden in mourning, if there is no holiday. He who said forbidden on a holiday, if it involves trickery; and permitted in mourning, without trickery. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: practice follows him who is lenient at both occasions. Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: practice follows him who is lenient in the rules of mourning. Rav said, the lips follow cutting fingernails in all respects. Rebbi Jeremiah said, only if they interfere. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A pair came before Rebbi about lips and cutting fingernails and Rebbi permitted it to them. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: There were two pairs, one from Amatheh and one from Yedid-Aleh, one about lips and one about cutting fingernails, and Rebbi permitted to them. As the following. The sister of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba died and he was sitting cutting his fingernails. Rebbi Eleazar visited him and he did not cover them. Rebbi Nathan bar Abba visited him and he was covering them. He said to him, you did not cover them in front of Rebbi Eleazar; but in front of me you are covering them? He answered him, do you think that you are as dear to me as Rebbi Eleazar?

HALAKHAH: It was stated: It is permitted to wash women’s bath cloths on the holiday. Women’s bath cloths have the same status as men’s bath cloths. What are women’s bath cloths? The rabbis of Caesarea are saying, οθόνιον. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person who only has one garment may wash it on the holiday. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this means two, that he may give one to be washed and wear one. They asked before Rebbi Yose, what is the status of small children’s garments? He said to them, like one who only has one garment. They asked before him: We have stated, “only the relatives of the deceased may tear their clothes, take off their shoes, and accept the consolation meal.” If his strip was small and his relatives want to come to him, may half of them sit inside and half outside? He said to them, half of them should come today and half tomorrow. Rebbi Mana said, there we had thought that he was going to be lenient, but he was restrictive.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. Rebbi Jonah said this before Rebbi Yose. He said to him, do not accept that from here, they were lenient for eating heave. If a daughter of a Cohen was married to an Israel, her husband went overseas, and she received notice that he died, does she not immediately eat heave? But because of a fetus she has to wait three months.

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, she should remarry and collect her ketubah. The House of Hillel say, she should remarry but not collect her ketubah. The House of Shammai said to them, you permitted the stringent incest prohibition, should you not permit the lenient money matters? The House of Hillel said to them, we find that the brothers cannot access the inheritance on her testimony. The House of Shammai said, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai.

“A man can make his son a nazir,” and “a man can shave”. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meїr: In twenty-four matters are the House of Shammai lenient while the House of Hillel are restrictive and that is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot make his son a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, a man can make his son a nazir.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he warned her and said to her, do not be at a secluded place with man X, after he declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if she did not go to a secluded place. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa: Not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he is lenient about witnesses to the hiding. We have stated a disagreement. Some state it anonymously. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Rebbi Joshua does not disagree with what Rebbi Eliezer said, only that we have stated: “Rebbi Joshua says, only if she is the subject of talk of women carding by moonlight.” Rebbi Abba Mari asked: There, Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, everywhere where Rebbi taught a disagreement and returned to the problem later and taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous opinion. And here he says so?

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

MISHNAH: The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day; this can imply a lenient or a stringent implementation. How is that? If she made the vow Friday night, he may dissolve during the night and the next day until [the next] nightfall. If she made the vow shortly before nightfall, he dissolves until it becomes dark; for after dark he cannot dissolve.

A man can declare a nazir, and a man can shave. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meïr: In 24 matters are the House of Shammai lenient but the House of Hillel stringent, and this is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot declare his son to be a nazir but the House of Hillel say, a man can declare his son to be a nazir. It was stated about those who are nazir from the womb. Some want to say, until he grows two pubic hairs. Some want to say, until he reaches the time of vows. Everybody agrees that he can no longer declare him a nazir once he reaches the time of vows.

Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Simeon says, burning is worse than stoning, but the rabbis teach that stoning is worse than burning. Rebbi Simeon says, strangulation is worse than decapitation; but the rabbis teach that decapitation is worse than strangulation. Rebbi Simeon explained that any reference to “Cohen’s daughter” implies burning, but the rabbis teach that any reference to “preliminarily married” implies stoning. Rebbi Simeon explained: The Torah was stringent with a Cohen’s daughter and ordered that as preliminarily married she be burned, but was lenient with the definitively married one that she be stoned. The Torah was lenient with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned; it is logical that we be lenient with the definitively married one that she be decapitated. But the rabbis explain, since the Torah was stringent with the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel and ordered that she be stoned, it was lenient with her in her definitively married status to be burned. The Torah was lenient with the daughter of a Cohen in her pleliminarily married status and ordered that she be burned; it is logical that we be lenient with her in her definitively married status that she be strangled.

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Look at the expression which the Torah taught you, Moloch; anything that you make king over yourself, even a chip of wood, even a pebble. I shall extirpate him from amidst his people, to include all other foreign worship in extirpation. Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to include all other foreign worship relating to sons and daughters, as it was stated: He is guilty whether for the Moloch or any other foreign worship, whether he worshipped them with sons and daughters, or worshipped them with fathers and mothers. Rebbi Zeˋira said: if its worship did not prescribe this; but if its worship did prescribe it, he is free from prosecution. Rebbi Hila said, even if its worship did prescribe it, he is twice guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: The Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Jeremiah said, it follows that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his father Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants.

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Look at the expression which the Torah taught you, Moloch; anything that you make king over yourself, even a chip of wood, even a pebble. I shall extirpate him from amidst his people, to include all other foreign worship in extirpation. Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to include all other foreign worship relating to sons and daughters, as it was stated: He is guilty whether for the Moloch or any other foreign worship, whether he worshipped them with sons and daughters, or worshipped them with fathers and mothers. Rebbi Zeˋira said: if its worship did not prescribe this; but if its worship did prescribe it, he is free from prosecution. Rebbi Hila said, even if its worship did prescribe it, he is twice guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: The Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Jeremiah said, it follows that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his father Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants.

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Look at the expression which the Torah taught you, Moloch; anything that you make king over yourself, even a chip of wood, even a pebble. I shall extirpate him from amidst his people, to include all other foreign worship in extirpation. Rebbi Nasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to include all other foreign worship relating to sons and daughters, as it was stated: He is guilty whether for the Moloch or any other foreign worship, whether he worshipped them with sons and daughters, or worshipped them with fathers and mothers. Rebbi Zeˋira said: if its worship did not prescribe this; but if its worship did prescribe it, he is free from prosecution. Rebbi Hila said, even if its worship did prescribe it, he is twice guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: The Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Jeremiah said, it follows that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of his father Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, the Moloch was included in all other foreign worships; it is mentioned separately to be lenient in this regard that he be guilty only for his descendants.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.

How does Rebbi Yose uphold this verse, bring your sacrifices in the morning, etc? The verse speaks about Jeroboam’s kingdom. When Jeroboam became king over Israel he started seducing Israel and said to them come, let us worship pagan worship. Pagan worship is lenient. This is what is written, let us go against Jehudah, cut it down, break it up, and appoint a king in it, the man from Ṭabeal. Rebbi Abba said, we checked all of Scripture but did not find a place named Ṭabeal. But it treats its worshippers well. The Torah said, selected him from all of the tribes of Israel to be a priest for Me. Pagan worship says, he made priests from the fringes of the people. Rebbi La said, from the thorns of the people, the rubbish of the people. The Torah said, the fat of My sacrifice shall not remain until the morning; but pagan worship said, bring your sacrifices in the morning. The Torah said, it should be eaten on the day of its slaughter and the next day; but pagan worship said, on the third day your tithes. The Torah said, do not sacrifice the blood of My sacrifice on leavened matter; but pagan worship said, and burn your thanksgiving offer of leavened matter. The Torah said, if you are vowing a vow to the Eternal, your God, do not tarry to fulfill it, but pagan worship said, pledge gifts, publicize them. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, the verse only serves to mention the shame of Israel. The day of our king, the princes are sick from wine’s heat, he draws the mockers by his hand. On the day when Jeroboam became king over Israel, all of Israel came to him late in the evening and told him, come and worship pagan worship. He told them, it is late in the evening; I am drunk and not drunk. Everybody is drinking; but if you wish, go and come in the morning. That is what is written, for their heart is like an oven while they are lying in ambush; all night long their baker is sleeping. All night long their baker did not sleep. In the morning he is burning like fire of a conflagration. In the morning they came to him. He told them, I do understand what you want but I am afraid of your Synhedrion lest they kill me. They told him, we shall kill them; this is what is written, that all are glowing like an oven and eat their judges. Rebbi Levi said, they killed them, as is written, if a corpse is found. Rebbi La said, they deposed them; The day of our king, the princes are profaned from wine’s heat; the day when princes were profaned. From wine’s heat, they were addicted to wine. He draws the mockers by his hand: When he saw a serious person he placed two scoffers next to him who asked him, which generation was preferred over all generations? He told them, the generation of the Exodus. But did they not practice pagan worship? He answered them, because they were beloved they were not punished. But they told him, be quiet for the king wants to do the same. Not only that, but they made one and this one made two. He put the one up at Bethel; the other he gave to Dan.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody leaves a Gentile in charge of his store,,” etc. Following Rebbi Meïr? Did not Rebbi Meïr say, “in any case the house is impure?” Rebbi Ḥama in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If a courtyard is subdivided by a low wall, for purities it is impure, in matters of libation wine it is pure, since Rebbi Meïr is restrictive for purities but lenient for libation wine; also the rabbis are restrictive for purities but lenient for libation wine.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody leaves a Gentile in charge of his store,,” etc. Following Rebbi Meïr? Did not Rebbi Meïr say, “in any case the house is impure?” Rebbi Ḥama in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If a courtyard is subdivided by a low wall, for purities it is impure, in matters of libation wine it is pure, since Rebbi Meïr is restrictive for purities but lenient for libation wine; also the rabbis are restrictive for purities but lenient for libation wine.

R. Tabi said in the name of R. Josiah : The Halakah is in accord with the more lenient view in both instances.

It once happened that R. Judah, who had experienced emission, was walking by the river, and his disciples said to him, "Master, teach us a chapter of the Halakot of Derek Eres." He descended into the water, bathed, and then taught them. They said to him, "Hast thou not taught us. Master, that such an one may study the Halakot of Derek Eres?" He replied, "Although I am lenient by permitting others, I take a stricter view with myself."

R. Jannai said : I have heard that some take a lenient view and others a stricter view ; but whoever applies the stricter rule to himself, his days and years will be prolonged for him.

Then let him say that the Halakah is in agreement with R. 'Akiba! If he had said that the Halakah is in agreement with R. 'Akiba, I might have thought that [that is so] even in the Land of Israel ; therefore he informs us : Whoever takes a lenient view within the Land, the Halakah is in accord with him outside the Land, but not within.

Then let him say : The Halakah is in agreement with R. 'Akiba outside the Land; for everyone who takes the lenient view within the Land, the Halakah is in accord with him outside the Land ! If he had stated that, I might have said : This applies to the tithe of trees which within the Land is a Rabbinical ordinance ; but with regard to 'Orlah, which within the Land is ordained by the Torah, I must suppose that likewise outside the Land we must apply it ! Therefore he informs us.

Rabina found Mar b. Rab Ashe throwing away the berries and eating the caper-buds. He said to him : What is thy opinion — like R. 'Akiba's who takes the lenient view? Then let the master act in accord with Bet Shammai who take a still more lenient view. For there is a Mishnaic teaching : In the case of the caper-bush. Bet Shammai say : It constitutes Kila'im in a vineyard ; but Bet Hillel say : It does not. Both, however, admit that it is subject to 'Orlah.

Rabina found Mar b. Rab Ashe throwing away the berries and eating the caper-buds. He said to him : What is thy opinion — like R. 'Akiba's who takes the lenient view? Then let the master act in accord with Bet Shammai who take a still more lenient view. For there is a Mishnaic teaching : In the case of the caper-bush. Bet Shammai say : It constitutes Kila'im in a vineyard ; but Bet Hillel say : It does not. Both, however, admit that it is subject to 'Orlah.

They take a more lenient view in connection with [those who supervise] ritual purity.

Come and hear: [It has been taught:] To what distance may they go and remain clean? So long as one can see them! It is different with food-stuffs whose purity [must be supervised], because the Rabbis take a more lenient view in such a case.

Say that we give approximate figures in order to create a where this makes the law lenient?

What is his reason? If you say that it is because he is lenient, why did he not expound to them as R. Akiva who is even more lenient? Three with broken tips are common, one with an unbroken tip is uncommon.

What is his reason? If you say that it is because he is lenient, why did he not expound to them as R. Akiva who is even more lenient? Three with broken tips are common, one with an unbroken tip is uncommon.

It was reported: R. Ḥiyya b. 'Ashi said in the name of Rab, the law is in accordance with R. Jose, but Samuel said, it is in accordance with R. Meir. Did Samuel say so? Is it not stated in a Baraita: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Why is the word behon (בהון = on them) used (in the Scroll of Fasts) twice in succession? In order to indicate that the prohibition applies only to the days specified, but not to the days immediately preceding or following them—to which Samuel remarked that the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel! Answer: Originally Samuel was of the opinion that there was no authority as lenient in the matter as was R. Meir, and therefore he said that the law is in accordance with R. Meir, but when he heard of the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who is still more lenient, he said, the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Bali, too, said in the name of R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba, who had it from R. Johanan: The law is in accordance with R. Jose, whereupon R. Ḥiyya b. Abba said to Bali, I must inform you that when R. Johanan said the law is in accordance with R. Jose, he referred only to those days on which the Scroll of Fasts forbids fasting (but not mourning). Did R. Johanan say so? Did he not say, the law always follows the anonymous opinion of a Mishnah? Now, we read in an anonymous Mishnah: Although it has been decided that under certain circumstances the Megillah of Esther should be read several days before, instead of after, Purim,

It was reported: R. Ḥiyya b. 'Ashi said in the name of Rab, the law is in accordance with R. Jose, but Samuel said, it is in accordance with R. Meir. Did Samuel say so? Is it not stated in a Baraita: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Why is the word behon (בהון = on them) used (in the Scroll of Fasts) twice in succession? In order to indicate that the prohibition applies only to the days specified, but not to the days immediately preceding or following them—to which Samuel remarked that the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel! Answer: Originally Samuel was of the opinion that there was no authority as lenient in the matter as was R. Meir, and therefore he said that the law is in accordance with R. Meir, but when he heard of the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who is still more lenient, he said, the law is in accordance with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Bali, too, said in the name of R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba, who had it from R. Johanan: The law is in accordance with R. Jose, whereupon R. Ḥiyya b. Abba said to Bali, I must inform you that when R. Johanan said the law is in accordance with R. Jose, he referred only to those days on which the Scroll of Fasts forbids fasting (but not mourning). Did R. Johanan say so? Did he not say, the law always follows the anonymous opinion of a Mishnah? Now, we read in an anonymous Mishnah: Although it has been decided that under certain circumstances the Megillah of Esther should be read several days before, instead of after, Purim,

If you go by such analogy, then, just as a ministering priest must not have any blemish, so must a priest pronouncing the blessing be without blemish! No, in this respect the latter has been compared to a Nazir! But why do you choose your analogies so as to derive a lenient rule? You should rather make the analogies so that a rigorous view is obtained! Answer. The analogies are merely a suggestion of the Rabbis for the purpose of supporting their own view, hence any rule derived therefrom must be in the direction of leniency.

Said Raba, the law is in accordance with R. Meir; Raba further said, the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel. Both these statements of Raba were made for the purpose of indicating a lenient view, and both were needed; for if he had said only the law is in accordance with R. Meir, one might have understood it to mean that the prohibition is in force from the very beginning of the month to the fast day (as is actually the opinion of R. Meir), therefore he adds that the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel (who restricts it to the week of the ninth); if, on the other hand, he had said only the law is in accordance with Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, one might have understood him to mean that the prohibition extends even to the days following immediately upon the ninth (as is the opinion of Rabban Simeon), therefore he said also the law is in accordance with R. Meir (who denies this).

The villages, however, may push the reading forward to the day of gathering. Hanina said: The sages were lenient on the villages by allowing them to push the reading forward to the day of gathering, in order that they might provide food and water to their brothers in the cities.

They objected: R. Meir says that Kohelet does not defile the hands, and that about the Song of Songs there is a dispute. R. Yose says that the Song of Songs defiles the hands, and about Koheleth there is a difference of opinion. R. Shimon says that Koheleth is one of those matters in regard to which Beth Shammai were lenient and Beth Hillel stringent, but Ruth and the Song of Songs and Esther [certainly] make the hands unclean. Shmuel concurred with R. Joshua.

This is obvious! Now that in regard to the beginning of a section where the first tanna is lenient the alternative opinion is strict, is it not certain that in regard to the verses left [at the end of the section] where the first tanna is strict the alternative opinion will also be strict.

Rebbi Akiva says, The third [witness] isn't coming to make things lenient, but rather to make things more stringent upon him, and make his fate like theirs.

Rav Zutra asked a question, But now let us ave him ny capital cases as well [which we are more lenient by]. So why do we learn in a Mishna, He and they are executed? It's a question.

Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating bikorim] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, which is more lenient, that if one incurs malkus by eating the more lenient example of maiser outside of the wall, then wouldn't one certainly incur malkus for eating bikorim outside of the wall? Rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats bikorim before the verses are recited incurs malkus.

Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating bikorim] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, which is more lenient, that if one incurs malkus by eating the more lenient example of maiser outside of the wall, then wouldn't one certainly incur malkus for eating bikorim outside of the wall? Rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats bikorim before the verses are recited incurs malkus.