position
197 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If one had been certified unclean on account of white hair, and the white hair disappeared and other white hair appeared, And so also in the case of quick flesh or a spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after he had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of quick flesh, and the quick flesh disappeared and other quick flesh appeared, And so also in the case of white hair and spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of a spreading, and the spreading disappeared and another spreading appeared, And so also in the case of white hair, Whether this occurred at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is in the same position as before.
If one had been certified unclean on account of white hair, and the white hair disappeared and other white hair appeared, And so also in the case of quick flesh or a spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after he had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of quick flesh, and the quick flesh disappeared and other quick flesh appeared, And so also in the case of white hair and spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of a spreading, and the spreading disappeared and another spreading appeared, And so also in the case of white hair, Whether this occurred at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is in the same position as before.
If one had been certified unclean on account of white hair, and the white hair disappeared and other white hair appeared, And so also in the case of quick flesh or a spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after he had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of quick flesh, and the quick flesh disappeared and other quick flesh appeared, And so also in the case of white hair and spreading, Whether this occurred in the beginning, at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is regarded as being in the same position as before. If he had been certified unclean on account of a spreading, and the spreading disappeared and another spreading appeared, And so also in the case of white hair, Whether this occurred at the end of the first week, at the end of the second week, or after the man had been released from uncleanness, he is in the same position as before.
Deposited hair: Akaviah ben Mahalalel holds it is unclean. But the sages hold it to be clean. What is "deposited hair"? If one had a bright spot with white hair in it, and the bright spot disappeared leaving the white hair in position and then it reappeared: Akaviah ben Mahalalel holds it to be unclean, But the sages hold it to be clean. Rabbi Akiva said: in this case I agree that he is clean; But what is "deposited hair"? If one had a bright spot of the size of a split bean with two hairs in it, and a part the size of a half a split bean disappeared leaving the white hair in the place of the white spot and then it reappeared. They said to him: just as they rejected the ruling of Akaviah so is there no validity in your ruling.
Any object that is susceptible to corpse uncleanness, though not susceptible to midras uncleanness, is still susceptible to negaim uncleanness. For instance: the sail of a ship, a curtain, the forehead band of a hair-net, the wrappings of scrolls, a coiled belt, the straps of a shoe or sandal that are at least as wide as a split bean, Behold these are susceptible to the uncleanness of negaim. A thick cloak on which a nega appeared: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: unless it appears on the texture and on the stuffing. A skin bottle or a shepherd's leather wallet are inspected in the position in which they are used, and a nega may effectively spread from its inner side to its outer side and from its outer side to its inner side.
If a woman aborted a tumtum or an androginos, she must sit for a male and a female. [If she gave birth] to a tumtum and a male, or to an androginos and a male, she must sit for a male and a female. [If she gave birth] to a tumtum and a female or an androginos and a female, she must sit only for a female. If the embryo came out in pieces or in a reversed position it is deemed born as soon as its greater part come out. If it came out in the normal way [it is not deemed born] until the greater part of its head came out. And what is meant by the "greater part of its head"? Once the forehead comes out.
The Jerusalem Talmud
New Section. “Rabban Gamliel says until the first sign of dawn.” The statement of Rabban Gamliel is parallel to that of Rebbi Simeon, as we have stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “Sometimes a person reads the Shema‘ [twice], once before dawn and once at dawn, and has fulfilled his obligation for day and night.” Hence Rabban Gamliel is like Rebbi Simeon for evening prayers, is he also like him in the morning? His position might be that expressed by Rebbi Zeïra the Tanna, the brother of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, and of Rav Abba bar Ḥana: He who reads with the men of the Mishmar did not fulfill his duty because they were too early.
Rebbi Yoḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai: “For example we, who are engaged in the study of Torah, we do not interrupt even for the recitation of Shema‘.” Rebbi Yoḥanan used to say about himself: “For example we, who are not engaged in the study of Torah, we do interrupt even for prayer.” This one follows his own opinion and that one follows his own opinion. Rebbi Yoḥanan follows his own opinion since Rebbi Yoḥanan says: “if only a man would pray the entire day. Why? Because prayer is never in vain!” Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai follows his own opinion since Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai said: “If I had stood at Mount Sinai at the moment that the Torah was given to Israel, I would have implored the All-Merciful that he should create two mouths for man; one for him to exert himself in Torah and the other one for his other needs.” But he changed his mind and said: “With one mouth already the world almost cannot exist because of its denunciations; if there were two how much more would there be? Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Jeremiah: The position of Rebbi Yoḥanan is identical with that of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqabiah, as we have stated: “The scribes of Torah scrolls, Tefillin, and Mezuzot, do interrupt for the recitation of Shema‘ but do not interrupt for prayer. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqabiah said: just as they interrupt for Shema‘, so they interrupt for prayer, tefillin, and all other commandments of the Torah”. Would not Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai agree that one interrupts to make a sukkah or a lulav? Does not Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai make the distinction between one who studies in order to do and one who studies in order not to do? Because he who studies in order not to do would have been better off had he not been born. And did not Rebbi Yoḥanan say, he who studies in order not to do would have been better off if the afterbirth he was in was twisted around and he never would have entered the world? The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai is that this one is repeated study and that one is repeated study and he does not push aside one study for the other study. But did we not formulate: “He is like a man reading in the Torah.” Hence, at the right time it is preferred to Torah. One is like the other. Rebbi Yudan said that Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, since he was permanently studying Torah, did not prefer Shema‘ to the study of Torah. Rebbi Abba Mari said, did we not formulate: “He who reads (Shema‘) after that did not lose, he is only like a man reading in the Torah”? Hence, at the right time it is like Mishnah. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai follows his own opinion since Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai said: He who studies the written Torah does himself good that is not so good. But the rabbis equate the study of the Bible with that of the oral law.
MISHNAH: The school of Shammai say: In the evening, everyone must bend down and recite and in the morning they should stand up since it is said (Deut. 6:7): “when you sit in your house or go on the road, when you are lying down and when you are getting up.” But the school of Hillel say: everyone should recite in the position he is in, since it says “or go on the road.” In that case, why does it say: “when you are lying down and when you are getting up;” this means the time when people go to sleep and the time when they are getting up.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: In anything that gives pain, everyone who wants to distinguish himself may do so. A scholar does and may blessing come to him. In anything that gives praise, not everyone who wants to distinguish himself may do so. A scholar does except if he has been appointed to a position of public authority.
It was stated: One may step to one side because of obstacles on the road. And when one sinks, even into a field full of saffron. Rebbi Abbahu said: It happened that Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Joshua were on the road and stepped on the side because of obstacles on the road when they saw Rebbi Yehudah ben Pappos, who was sinking, coming towards them. Rabban Gamliël said to Rebbi Joshua: Who is this one who makes an exhibition of himself? He answered: This is Yehudah ben Pappos, all whose deeds are done for Heaven’s sake. He said to him: Did we not formulate “In anything that gives praise, not everyone who wants to distinguish himself may do so. A scholar does except if he has been appointed to a position of public authority.” He answered him: Did we not also formulate, “In anything that gives pain, everyone who wants to distinguish himself may do so. A scholar does and may blessing come to him.” Rebbi Zeïra said, but only if he does not shame others.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Berekhia in the name of Rebbi Levi: Because of (Ps. 92:5) “You are always exalted, o Eternal!” Your position is always the strongest. Usually in the world, if a king of flesh and blood sits in judgment, if he dismisses, everybody acclaims him; if he sentences to execution, everybody says bad things about him since he is sweeping in his sentences. But the Holy One, praise to Him, is not so, rather: “You are always exalted, o Eternal!” Your position is always the strongest.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Berekhia in the name of Rebbi Levi: Because of (Ps. 92:5) “You are always exalted, o Eternal!” Your position is always the strongest. Usually in the world, if a king of flesh and blood sits in judgment, if he dismisses, everybody acclaims him; if he sentences to execution, everybody says bad things about him since he is sweeping in his sentences. But the Holy One, praise to Him, is not so, rather: “You are always exalted, o Eternal!” Your position is always the strongest.
If it was completely covered by straw? Let us hear from the following: “The blind who forgot makes a forgotten sheaf.” Is a blind person not like a sheaf completely covered by straw? Rebbi Jonah said, if he remembered the straw. Rebbi Jonah’s position is parallel to Rebbi Zeïra’s; just as Rebbi Zeïra said, if he remembers the upper one, so Rebbi Jonah said, if he remembered the straw.
It was stated: “Everybody who comes has to accept, even a learned ḥaver; but a rabbi who has been sitting in rabbinical court does not have to accept because he did it at the moment he joined the court.” Rebbi La said, only if he really accepted it from the first hour on. Rebbi Yose asked, if it was from the first hour, what is the difference between a ḥaver and an am ḥaäreẓ? The position of Rebbi La parallels that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish came to those of the house of Rebbi Yannai; the women saw him and removed themselves from before him. He said to them, I shall come to your house; I am an am haäreẓ with respect to purities.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ḥama, father of Rebbi Hoshaia: He takes all accumulations with it. “Rebbi Simeon said, one may even remove a leaf from a bunch in the Sabbatical year.” The position of Rebbi Simeon is inverted: We have stated there (Mishnah 2:10): “One may tear off rice in the Sabbatical year; the words of Rebbi Simeon are that one may not trim.” And here, he says so? There is a difference here, he is like one who saves from a fire.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Ḥizqiah: He harvests three bunches and permits. The position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is inverted! There, he said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If there were before him 150 amphoras which were opened, one hundred are permitted, fifty are forbidden, and the remainder will be permitted if they were opened. Rebbi Zeïra said, he said only “if they were opened;” therefore at the start it is forbidden to open them. And here, he says so? There in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, here in the name of Ḥizqiah. They say there in the name of Ḥizqiah: He opens three amphoras and permits; one follows Ḥizqiah here.
Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai: “For example we, who are engaged in the study of Torah, do not interrupt even for the recitation of the Shemaˋ.” Rebbi Joḥanan used to say about himself: “For example we, who are not engaged in the study of Torah, do interrupt even for prayer.”This one follows his own opinion and that one follows his own opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if only a man prayed the entire day. Why? Because prayer is never in vain.Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai follows his own opinion since Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai said, if I had stood at Mount Sinai at the moment that the Torah was given to Israel, I would have implored the All-Merciful that He should create two mouths for a man; one for him to exert himself in Torah, and the other one for his needs. But he changed and said, with one mouth already the world almost cannot exist because of the denunciations; if there were two how much more would there be?Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Jeremiah: The position of Rebbi Joḥanan is identical with that of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Aqiba, as we have stated: “The scribes of Torah scrolls, Tefillin, and Mezuzot, do interrupt for the recitation of Shemaˋ but do not interrupt for prayer. Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Aqiba said, just as they interrupt for Shemaˋ, so they interrupt for prayer, Tefillin, and all other commandments of the Torah.”Would not Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai agree that one interrupts to make a Sukkah or a lulav? Does not Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai make the distinction between one who studies to do and one who studies in order not to do? Because he who studies in order not to do would have been better off had he not been born. And did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, he who studies in order not to do would have been better off if the placenta he was in was twisted around and he never would have entered the world? The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai is that this one is repeated study and that one is repeated study and one does not push aside one study for the other study. But did we not state: “He who reads after that did not lose, he is like a man reading in the Torah”? Hence, at the right time it is preferred to Torah. Rebbi Yudan said that Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai, since he was enjoying studying Torah, did not prefer Shemaˋ to the study of Torah. Rebbi Abba Mari said, did we not state: “He is only like a man studying Torah.” Hence, at the right time it is like Mishnah. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai follows his own opinion since Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai said, he who studies the written Torah does himself good that is not so good. But the rabbis equate the study of the Bible with that of the oral law.
Rebbi Yasa asked: Why does Rebbi Yose say, this is not the implication? Rebbi Yasa had heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, “from the words of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ḥananiah the executive officer of the Cohanim,” and he had heard that Bar Qappara said, “original impurity is a word from the Torah, derivative impurity is of their words.” But he had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan had said, “both these and those are words of the Torah.” Therefore, he was asking: Just as it is permitted to burn what is (rabbinically) [biblically] forbidden with what is biblically impure, since one burns what is (rabbinically) [biblically] impure with what is biblically impure, so it should be permitted to burn what is (biblically) [rabbinically] forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is (biblically) [rabbinically] impure with what is biblically impure. But there must be a difference between prohibition and impurity. And Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that on the Sixteenth one burns pure and impure heave [together]. Just as you did not make a difference for us between biblical prohibition and biblical impurity since one burns what is biblically impure with what is biblically impure, so you should not make a difference for us between what is rabbinically forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is rabbinically impure with what is biblically impure. But it must be that both these and those are words of the Torah. There came Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from Tyre and said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: both these and those are words of the Torah, and I said, it is correct. There (rabbinic) [biblical] impurity with biblical impurity but here biblical disqualification with biblical impurity. Therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. The position of Rebbi Joḥanan is difficult for Rebbi Meïr; therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. Bar Qappara must argue like Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, from the words of Rebbi Eliezer and the words of Rebbi Joshua. Then the opinion of Bar Qappara is difficult for Rebbi Yose based on what Rebbi Meïr said, “from their words we learned.” Rebbi Abbin said, Rebbi Meïr is consistent since Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah. Where do we find that Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥinena said, as we have stated there: “A woman who sees a stain is out of order and worries because of flux[, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, nothing in stains implies flux].”
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah declares liable for squeezed blood.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah added it only for extirpation. There came Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Jehudah added it only for extirpation. There, they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: a baraita says so: “They said to him, is that not squeezed blood? And squeezed blood is disqualified on the altar. And also from the following, most of it was not received in a vessel, and blood not received in a vessel is disqualified on the altar.” Does Rebbi Jehudah hold that blood invalidates blood? Since he did not reply, it follows that he accepted their position. Since in the other case he does not hold so but did not respond, so here he does not hold so but did not respond. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: a baraita says so: “Not only life blood for sancta, matter appropriate for atonement, from where life blood for profane animals and squeezed blood for both sancta and profane animals? The verse says blood and all blood. When it is about life it mentions atonement, for squeezed blood it does not mention atonement.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.
There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.
It was stated: Rebbi Yose says, the family Ḥagira were professional scribes in Jerusalem, who were erasing Sabaoth since it is a profane substantive at another place, the military commanders take position at the head of the people. All Names written regarding our father Abraham are holy except one which is profane, it was when the gods made me err from my father’s house. But some are saying, this one also is holy, “for unless God, they already would have made me err.” All Names written regarding Micha are profane, even though they are written with YH, except one which is holy, all time that the House of God was at Siloh. All Names written regarding Naboth, even though they are written with EL are holy, Naboth cursed God and King. But “merciful and compassionate, patient and full of grace, King of kings, elevated, and great, and awesone, and supreme, powerful, just, straight, saintly, flawless, strong,” these are profane. The following are the names which cannot be split: Amiel, Amishadday, Ṣuriel, Ṣurishaddai, Gamliel, Pedahzur, Pedahel, may not be split These are names that may be split, Beth-El, Beth-Awen, getting angry, I shall get angry, Poti-phera, Ṣafenath-Paneaḥ.
If the paragraph was of five verses, he reads all of them. If he did not do so, the following one has to read the two last verses and three from the next paragraph. If he did not do this, does it obstruct? Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose went to visit the brother of Jehudah bar Tammuza the relative of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina in the synagogue of the neck-cloth makers. Rebbi Jeremiah was there and he stopped them. Rebbi Jonah said to Rebbi Yose, does one force? He answered him, here your teacher is stopping them. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Simeon Shara, Rebbi Ḥinena bar Andreas in the name of Rebbi Zakkai from Kabul: If he erred between one word and another one lets him repeat. Rebbi Jeremiah said to Rebbi Ze`ira, does one act like this? He told him, is that still a problem for you? Even if he erred between if and and if one makes him repeat. The people of his town told Rebbi Simeon, the teacher of Terbenth, cut the sentences which our sons are reading. He went and asked Rebbi Ḥanina, who told him, do not listen to them even if they cut off your head. He did not listen to them and they freed him from his teaching position. After some time he came down here. Rebbi Simeon ben Yosina associated with him. He asked him, what goes on in your town? He told him the affair. He asked him, why did you not listen to them? He answered, does one do this? He answered, do we not cut them in the study? He answered, but we repeat and take them together. Rebbi Ze`ira said, if this teacher had been in my time, I would have appointed him Rabbi.
It is obvious that if somebody had ḥalîṣah with a woman forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, the co-widow was freed. When he had intercourse with her? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree; they say the co-widow was not freed. Rebbi Shammai switches the [names] of this tradition. The position of Rebbi Shammai is reasonable since everywhere Rebbi Eleazar seeks support from the great Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated for women forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, if he had ḥalîṣah or intercourse with her, the co-widow was freed.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
MISHNAH: They said to him, it happened that Levites went to Zoar the town of date palms when one one them fell ill and they left him at an inn On their return they asked the women innkeeper,where is our colleague? She told them, he died and I buried him; and they let his widow remarry. They said to him, should not the wife of a Cohen be like a women innkeeper? He retorted, if she is in the position of the women innkeeper. For the women innkeeper delivered to them his stick, his back pack and the Torah scroll that had been in his hand.
HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?
MISHNAH: “When the policemen finish to speak to the people, the officers will have taken up position at the head of the people.” Behind the people one puts up people with backups armed with iron axes and they have permission to break the legs of anyone who desires to abandon his post since flight is the start of falling, as it is said: “Israel fled from before the Philistines and a great plague was among the people.” Further on it says, “the men of Israel fled from before the Philistines and slain fell on Mount Gilboa.” About what have these things be said? About a war of choice, but in a war of obligation everybody goes out, even a groom from his room and a bride from her bridal chamber. Rebbi Jehudah said, about what have these things been said? About a war of obligation, but in a war of duty everybody goes out, even a groom from his room and a bride from her bridal chamber.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “When the policemen finish to speak to the people, the officers will have taken up position at the head of the people.” Not only in front of the people, from where also behind the people? The verse says, “take up position”, “and take up position”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr used to call the end of a rope its head.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “When the policemen finish to speak to the people, the officers will have taken up position at the head of the people.” Not only in front of the people, from where also behind the people? The verse says, “take up position”, “and take up position”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr used to call the end of a rope its head.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “When the policemen finish to speak to the people, the officers will have taken up position at the head of the people.” Not only in front of the people, from where also behind the people? The verse says, “take up position”, “and take up position”. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr used to call the end of a rope its head.
HALAKHAH: There did not arise another grape bunch until Rebbi Aqiba rose. Were the other couples not also grape bunches? But these served in a position of leadership; the others did not serve in a position of leadership.
HALAKHAH: There did not arise another grape bunch until Rebbi Aqiba rose. Were the other couples not also grape bunches? But these served in a position of leadership; the others did not serve in a position of leadership.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, the ancient pious ones desired to bring a purification offering, but the Omnipresent did not let a sin happen to them; so they made a vow of nazir in order to be able to bring a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon says, they became sinners because they made a vow of nazir, for it was said: “He shall atone for himself for what he sinned about the person,” that one sinned against his own person because he barred himself from [drinking] wine. It turns out that the position of Simeon the Just parallels Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated: Simeon the Just said, I never ate the reparation offering of a nazir except once. Once a man came to me from the South, I saw that he was handsome, with beautiful eyes and good looks, and his hair in waves. I said to him, my son, what induced you to cut off that beautiful hair? He said to me: Rabbi, I was a shepherd in my village and I went to fill the water vessel with water when I saw my mirror image in the water and my instinct rushed over me and tried to remove me from the World. I said to it, wicked! You are rushing me to something which is not yours; it is upon me to sanctify you to Heaven! I embraced him, kissed him on his head and said, my son, there should be many more in Israel who fulfill the Omnipresent’s will like you. About you the verse says, “man or woman, if he clearly articulates vowing a vow of nazir, to be a nazir for the Eternal.” Rebbi Mana asked: Why following Simeon the Just, even following Rebbi Simeon? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for suet? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for blood? Simeon the Just holds that people make a vow while they are upset. Since they make the vow while they are upset, in the end, they wonder. But if he wonders, his sacrifices become similar to one of those who slaughtered profane animals in the Temple courtyard. But this one made a well thought-out dedication, when his mouth and his thoughts were in unison.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
HALAKHAH: “If a person said to two nezirim,” etc. Not only if he said to one of them, “I saw one of you becoming impure but I do not know which one of you it was,” but even if he said, “I saw one of you vowing to be a nazir but I do not know which one of you it was,” both of them have to follow the rules of nazir because of his testimony. If they do not contradict him. But if they contradict him, this does not apply. If both of them contradict, it parallels the following: “If one witness says, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, he is pure. If two witnesses say, he became impure, but he says, I did not become impure, the two are believed more than he is, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, everybody is believed about himself.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah and the Sages declare pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: Rebbi Meïr declares impure, Rebbi Jehudah declares pure. The rabbis’ words support Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Gurion said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Jehudah said this only about an old impurity, for he can say to them, I had been impure but I purified myself, and we have stated: The same holds for eating suet; the same holds for entering the Sanctuary. Should they not accept his position for impurity? Because of the impurity of a nazir, could they not say, where is the sacrifice which you brought? Then should they not accept his position for heave? So far the questions of Rebbi Ḥanina.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
MISHNAH: If somebody finds a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings. If he finds two, he takes them and their surroundings. If he finds three and between one and the next is a distance of between four and eight cubits, enough for the bier and the people who bury, that is a cemetery. He has to check on both sides for another 20 cubits. If he finds a grave at the end of 20 cubits, he has to check another 20 cubits since it is obvious that if this were a new burial ground, one would have taken him and his surroundings there.
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for the colleagues when they were slandered. They asked but were not given anything. Then they came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other. If somebody forgave a bond to another person: Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond.
HALAKHAH: “If a person appropriates a deposit,” etc. So is the Mishnah: At the time of claim in court. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Aqiba. Even though the House of Hillel disagree with him? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: It happened that there was a case and Rebbi instructed following Rebbi Aqiba. Rav Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi Aqiba’s position. There came a case before Rebbi Nasa and he instructed following Rebbi Aqiba.
There, we have stated: “If somebody find a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings.” Rav Ḥisda said, this implies that it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation, since we have stated: “he takes him and his surroundings.” And how much? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Up to three finger-breadths, the place where fluid penetrates. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, this is not reasonable; it is forbidden to remove a corpse of obligation. If you would say, it is permitted to remove him, since you are going to ruin the whole field, would it be permitted to remove him? Since it is obvious for the Tanna that it is forbidden to remove a corpse of obligation, therefore, one needs the Mishnah. Rav Ḥisda said, it follows him who said, it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation; I am saying that he was buried on a permitted path. But whould one not have to worry that maybe he was a corpse of obligation? Corpses of obligation are infrequent.
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274 days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: Everything which is “many” is 273.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A colleague of the rabbis objected to the position of Rebbi Meïr: If she miscarried the likeness of a raven and he stands on the top of a tree, can one say to him, come and give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate? Rebbi Mana told him, instead of objecting to Rebbi Meïr, object to the rabbis! Since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if his entire body is human and only his face is animal, he is not counted as a child. If his entire body is animal and only his face is human, he is counted as a child. If his entire body is human and only his face is animal, when he is standing reading the Torah one may tell him, come to be slaughtered. If his entire body is animal and only his face is human, when he is ploughing the field one may tell him, come and give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate!
The Babylonian Talmud
Shouldest thou say, "Bet Hillel also hold [that the Shema' may be read] in a reclining position!" that is so, but only when one was reclining from the first ; but in thy case, since hitherto thou has been sitting up and now thou reclinest, they will say, "We have to infer that [our teachers] agree with the opinion of Bet Shammai," and there is a fear, that the disciples seeing this, will fix the Halakah accordingly for future generations.
Rabbah b. Hinnana [the Elder] also said in the name of Rab : When one prays [the Tefillah] and has to bow, he should bow at the word "Blessed" ; and when returning to the erect position, he should do so on mentioning the Divine Name.
Samuel said to Hiyya b. Rab : O son of the Law, come and let me tell thee an excellent thing which thy father once said. Thus spake thy father : When one bows, he should do so at the word "Blessed" ; and when he returns to the erect position, he should do so on mentioning the Divine Name.
When Rab Sheshet bowed, he did so like a twig ; but when he returned to the erect position, he did so like a snake.
Rab Joseph said : One who lies on his back should not read the Shema'. Is it only he may not read [the Shema' in this position] ; but is it right for him to sleep [in this position]? For lo, R. Joshua b. Levi cursed anyone who slept lying on his back !
Rab Joseph said : One who lies on his back should not read the Shema'. Is it only he may not read [the Shema' in this position] ; but is it right for him to sleep [in this position]? For lo, R. Joshua b. Levi cursed anyone who slept lying on his back !
I quote in objection : He whose dead is lying before him should eat his meal in another room, and if he has no other room he should eat in a neighbour's house ; if such be not available, he should put up a partition and have his meal ; if he has nothing wherewith to make a partition, he should turn his face away [from the body] and eat. But he must not have his meal in a reclining position, or partake of meat or drink wine ; nor does he say Grace or arrange Zimmun,
How do we know that R. Judah does draw deductions from juxta-position in the Book of Deuteronomy? For there is a teaching: R. Eliezer says : A man may marry one outraged or seduced by his father, or one outraged or seduced by his son.
It is different with guests, because it is their intention to move their position.
They tied two cedars with a rope, bound one foot to one cedar and the other foot to the other cedar, and then released the rope. When he was decapitated each tree bounded back to its original position, and his body fell in two.
[Rab Pappa] answered : This is the position I take up : Let us derive a strict conclusion from the instance, [of the shoe] and also from the instance [of the short cut]
When Rabin came he said in the name of R. Yohanan: Both this one and that one for seven days. R. Yoseph said: Hold fast to the decision of Rabbah b. Bar Hana, since with regard to Sukkah, all the amoraim adopt the same position as he.
Raba said to Rafrem b. Papa, tell me some of the noble deeds performed by R. Huna. Said Rafrem, of his earlier days I remember nothing; as to his later years I remember that after cloudy (stormy) days he used to be taken out in a gilt carriage, in which he inspected the whole city, and wherever there was a damaged wall, he ordered it to be torn down. If the owner was in a position to build a new wall, he had to do so, if not, R. Huna would have it built at his own expense. Every Friday toward evening R. Huna would send a servant to the market who would buy up all the vegetables left over with the gardeners and throw them into the river. Why did he not rather give them to the poor? Because they would sometimes rely on these gifts and fail to provide themselves for the Sabbath. Why did he not throw it to the animals? He was of the opinion that food proper for human beings should not be given to animals. Why did he buy them at all? Because if he had not done so, it would lead the gardeners to sin in the future (by failing to provide the community with vegetables).
'Abba the Bleeder received every day a greeting from the heavenly academy while 'Abbayi received one every Friday, and Raba every year on the eve of the Day of Atonement. 'Abbayi felt discouraged on account of the greater distinction of 'Abba the Bleeder. 'Abbayi was therefore told, "Thou canst not perform deeds like those of 'Abba the Bleeder!" What were the deeds of 'Abba the Bleeder? When he performed the operation (of bleeding), he had a separate place for men and another for women. He had a garment ready in which there were numerous slits, and when a woman came, he made her put it on, so that he should not have to look upon her bare body. Outside of his office he had a place (box) where his fees were to be deposited. Whoever had money could put it in, but those who had none could come in without feeling embarrassed. When he saw a person who was in no position to pay, he would offer him some money, saying to him: "Go, strengthen thyself." One day 'Abbayi sent a pair of scholars to him to find out the truth about him. When they came to his house, he gave them to eat and to drink and laid cushions before them to sleep on.
R. Judah Nesiah (Patriarch) once ordained a fast during which he prayed for rain, but rain did not come. Said he: "What a difference between Samuel the Ramathite and Judah b. Gamaliel! [Samuel the Ramathite did not decree any fast and yet rain fell, while Judah decrees a fast and no rain comes!] Woe unto a generation that is placed in such a position! Woe unto him in whose lifetime such a thing happens!" and became very much discouraged, whereupon rain came.
R. Eleazar b. Pedat was greatly distressed by poverty. One day he was bled, and after the operation had nothing to eat. He found some garlic and swallowed it, whereupon he fainted. Some of the Rabbis went to visit him and noticed that he was weeping and laughing, and that a ray of light proceeded from his forehead. When he awoke, they asked him: "Why did you weep and laugh, and why did a ray of light proceed from your forehead?" "I saw the Shekinah," he replied, "and complained before her, saying, 'how long shall I continue to live in this poverty?' and the Shekinah replied to me: 'Would it be acceptable to thee that I should destroy the world and create it anew? Perhaps thou wilt then be born in an hour that will betoken plenty for thee.' I said, 'So much trouble for a mere perhaps?' [I further said: 'Is the time which I have already lived greater than the time I am yet to live, or the reverse?' I was told: 'The time thou hast lived is greater.' 'If so,' said I, 'I do not care to be reborn.'] I then asked: 'What wilt thou give me in the world to come?' 'Thou wilt be given,' the answer was, 'thirteen rivers flowing with balsam oil, in which thou wilt find pleasure.' Said I, 'Is that all?' [The Shekinah replied: 'What am I to give to thy fellowmen if thou takest everything?' But I said: 'Do I ask it of one who is not in a position to give?']. I was then struck on my forehead by the snapping of a thumb and was asked: 'Eleazar my son, do my arrows irritate thee?'"
R. Shmuel b. Nahmani said: This [Ramataim-Tzophim] means, a man who came from two heights (ramot) which faced (tzophot) one another. R. Hanin said: It means: a man who came from ancestors of the most exalted position (rumo). And who were they? The sons of Korah, as it says, And the sons of Korah did not die. A Tanna taught in the name of our Teacher: A special place was assigned to them in Gehinnom and they stood on it.
“And Esther called Hatach”. Rav said: Hatach is the same as Daniel. Why was he called Hatach? Because he was cut [hatkhuhu] from his elevated position. Shmuel said: Because all affairs of state were decided [nehtakim] by his voice.
Samuel came upon R. Jehudah, who was swinging upon the bolt of a door, and weeping. He said to him, Oh, clever one, why weepest thou? He said to him, Is it a small thing that is written concerning our Rabbis, "Where is he that counted, where is he that weighed, where is he that counted the towers?" (Is. xxxiii. 18) "Where is he that counted?" for they counted all the letters that are in the Books of the Law. "Where is he that weighed?" for they weighed the light and the heavy things which are in the Law. "Where is he that counted the towers?" for they taught three hundred doctrines concerning the tower which flies in the air. And R. Ami said, Three hundred questions were treated by Doeg and Ahithophel concerning the tower which flies in the air. And there is a canonical Mishnah. Three kings and four private persons have no position in the world to come (Sanhedrin, 90a, ii. 22), and we—what will there be for us? He said to him, Oh, clever one, there was uncleanness in their hearts.
"But he [i.e. you, Rava] needs this [verse] for [a case like] this baraita?!: 'He will be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—to include a day immerser (one who is impure and has immersed but needs to wait until nightfall to be pure). 'His impurity is in him' (Numbers 19:13)—to include one waiting for atonement." He said to him: "I say [that I derive my position] from 'more (od)' (Numbers 19:13)."
MISHNA: The [high priest] anointed with the anointing oil, the [high priest] appointed through the vestments, and the [high priest] who stepped down from his position all return the murderer [from exile if they die]. Rebbi Yehuda says, Even the [high priest] anointed for a war returns the murderer [if he dies].
He returns to the position that he had previously occupied etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa regarding a freed Jewish slave], (Leviticus 25,41) "And he shall return to his family and to his ancestral holdings he shall return" [this implies that] to his family he returns but that he does not return to his ancestral positions. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, He even returns to the positions of his ancestors [as the Torah says] "to his ancestral holdings" [which implies] like his ancestors.