191 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:36

If the public were one third sufferers from gonorrhea, one third impure, and one third pure. Rebbi Mana in the name of Ḥizqiah: The sufferers from gonorrhea and the impure form a majority against the pure and one brings in impurity. The sufferers from gonorrhea bring neither the First nor the Second. Rebbi Zeˋira said, they made the sufferer from gonorrhea like the apostate for ruling. As one says there, the apostate in matters of ruling neither adds nor subtracts, also here he neither adds nor subtracts.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 7:38

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: For ruling they went after the population of the Land of Israel; for impurity they went after a majority of those entering the Temple courtyard. Does one estimate according to all groups or does one estimate only for the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they have to estimate by themselves as long as they are outside. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, for appearance they went from Lavo-Hamat to the Brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, At that time Solomon made the pilgrimage holiday, and all of Israel with him, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:33

Ganiva said, he was continuing teaching as ruling. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra asked, if he was continuing teaching as ruling, is that what we were stating: “against the will of the Sages”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: Bar Delaya stated, they told him, either remove yourself from between us or remove the strip from between its horns. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he was shielding himself against them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it went out once and his teeth became black from the fasts and mortification. Rebbi Idi from Ḥotra said, it was his wife. And from where that his wife is called “calf”? “Had you not ploughed with my calf you would not have solved my riddle” There, they are saying, it was his neighbor. Is anybody punished for his neighbor’s behavior? Rebbi Qiris from Irma: To teach you that if anybody has the possibility to protest and he does not protest, the damage is attached to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Beitzah 2:33

Ganiva said, he was continuing teaching as ruling. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra asked, if he was continuing teaching as ruling, is that what we were stating: “against the will of the Sages”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: Bar Delaya stated, they told him, either remove yourself from between us or remove the strip from between its horns. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he was shielding himself against them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it went out once and his teeth became black from the fasts and mortification. Rebbi Idi from Ḥotra said, it was his wife. And from where that his wife is called “calf”? “Had you not ploughed with my calf you would not have solved my riddle” There, they are saying, it was his neighbor. Is anybody punished for his neighbor’s behavior? Rebbi Qiris from Irma: To teach you that if anybody has the possibility to protest and he does not protest, the damage is attached to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The entire month is qualified for reading the scroll. What is the reason? The month which for them was turned from sorrow to joy. Rebbi Ḥelbo said, but only up to the Fifteenth. As Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: and it shall not pass by, one shall not impregnate. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Samuel: and it shall not pass by, and one shall not let it pass. That is what you are saying to read the scroll. But making a dinner one makes only on the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth; and one distributes [to the poor] only on the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth. The eyes of the poor are only directed to the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth. Then these should be for reading and those for the dinner? Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rav: These days are remembered and executed. Remembered by reading. And executed by dinner. This implies that the Scroll is given to be analyzed Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is said here, words of peace and truth. And it is said there, truth buy but do not sell. It is like the truth of the Torah. This one needs ruling, that one needs ruling. This one is given to be analyzed, that one is given to be analyzed. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: The scroll which Samuel handed to David is given to be analyzed. What is the reason? Everything in writing, that is the Masora. For the hand of the Eternal, that is the Holy Spirit. To me for understanding, from here that it is given to be analyzed. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, and why do we not say, the plan of everything was in spirit with him? Rebbi Mana said, what is בָר֨וּחַ֙? by the wind of his mouth.

Jerusalem Talmud Megillah 1:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The entire month is qualified for reading the scroll. What is the reason? The month which for them was turned from sorrow to joy. Rebbi Ḥelbo said, but only up to the Fifteenth. As Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: and it shall not pass by, one shall not impregnate. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Samuel: and it shall not pass by, and one shall not let it pass. That is what you are saying to read the scroll. But making a dinner one makes only on the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth; and one distributes [to the poor] only on the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth. The eyes of the poor are only directed to the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth. Then these should be for reading and those for the dinner? Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rav: These days are remembered and executed. Remembered by reading. And executed by dinner. This implies that the Scroll is given to be analyzed Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is said here, words of peace and truth. And it is said there, truth buy but do not sell. It is like the truth of the Torah. This one needs ruling, that one needs ruling. This one is given to be analyzed, that one is given to be analyzed. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: The scroll which Samuel handed to David is given to be analyzed. What is the reason? Everything in writing, that is the Masora. For the hand of the Eternal, that is the Holy Spirit. To me for understanding, from here that it is given to be analyzed. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, and why do we not say, the plan of everything was in spirit with him? Rebbi Mana said, what is בָר֨וּחַ֙? by the wind of his mouth.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 1:54

Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Samuel: One makes no inferences from a ruling. Everybody agrees that one makes no inferences from an action. Rebbi Mana said to him, that means somebody who does not understand, but he who understands may act. He said to him, whether one understands or one does not understand, if there is a disagreement. But if there is no disagreement, whether one understands or one does not understand one acts.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:43

HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:43

HALAKHAH: “If one says, I preliminarily married off my daughter”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling. What means, one does not infer anything for another case from this ruling? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In preliminary marriage, the same holds true. “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I married her preliminarily,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry that woman.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “This one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betrothe her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I married her preliminarily, and that one says, I married her preliminarily, and one of them jumped the gun and married her definitively. But if he said, I married her preliminarily and then married her definitively, and another one comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I married her preliminarily, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 2:36

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: All poisons cause scab but the poison of a snake kills. Rebbi Ḥiyya said, one is not asked about uncovered [drinks]. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira; as master of the ruling he asked him.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8

The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8

The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:8

The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:10

Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says, [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them), even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:15

Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:27

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and all the public acted,” etc. Who stated “a majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. And Rebbi Simeon follows Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said, each single tribe is called “public”, so Rebbi Simeon says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Simeon says, one tribe does not drag all tribes. [Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes,] he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Bejamin ben Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written: A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity, as we have stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Passover] and impure the second. Rebbi Jehudah said, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in impurity or all celebrate in purity. Who is “they told him”? Following Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated: “If one of the loaves or one of the (leftovers) [orders] became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, who is “they told him”? The Sages who argue like Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:30

MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation, not the congregation of that tribe.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:31

HALAKHAH: "If the Court of one of the tribes ruled," etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is the Court's obligation. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the public's obligation. Rebbi Simeon said, it is an obligation of the Court and an obligation of the public. What is Rebbi Meïr's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, here it also refers to the Court. What is Rebbi Jehudah's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. What is Rebbi Simeon's reason? It is said here from the eyes, and it is said there from the eyes. Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, also from the eyes here refers to the Court. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to bring. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who brings? As we have stated, "one imposes and collects, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, they are brought from the Temple tax". For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to lay their hands on. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who lays their hands on? As we have stated, three from every tribe, led by the president of the Court, lay their hands on the head of the bull. "Their hands, the hands of each single one. Their hands on the head of the bull; the bull needs laying on of hands but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon said, the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders; for Rebbi Simeon says, every public purification offering whose blood is brought inside needs laying on of hands. " One objected to Rebbi Jehudah, is it not written, they presented the goats of the purification offering? Rebbi Hiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:32

Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If one of the public died, can it be brought in his stead? They answered, is it not written, those who came from captivity? Is a purification offering an elevation offering? But just as an elevation offering is not eaten, this purification offering was not eaten. Rebbi Jehudah says, they brought it for idolatry; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling. Rebbi Jeremiah (learned) [did not say] so but the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders while the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders. By whom? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, by Aaron and his sons. Rebbi Yose told him, Rebbi Ḥiyya also stated, he shall put his hands on, they shall put their hands on, to include the goats of idolatry for laying on hands but not by the Elders. Rebbi Yose (learned) [did not say] so but the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron. It is written so, “Aaron shall lean with both his hands on the living goat’s head; the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but he goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron.” What does Rebbi Jeremiah do with this? He explains it, for a common priest.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:1

MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:1

MISHNAH: If the Anointed Priest ruled for himself in error and acted in error, he brings a bull. If in error but he acted intentionally, or intentionally and he acted in error, he is not liable since the ruling of the Anointed Priest for himself is like the ruling of the Court for the public.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.” This makes the Anointed like a private person. Since the private person is not liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. Rebbi Jacob in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing compared to their prescripts. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:4

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:4

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:4

HALAKHAH: “If he ruled for himself,” etc. The Court ruled, he ruled following them, and then changed. It is obvious that for him it is the equivalent of uprooting the whole. But if he ruled first, the Court then ruled following him, and afterwards they reversed themselves. Nevertheless is it for him the equivalent of uprooting the whole, or because he ruled first, but his ruling was overturned by their ruling, for him it should not be the equivalent of uprooting the whole? If the Court ruled and he ruled following them, it is obvious that he is not liable if he ate according to the ruling of the Court. But after the Court reversed itself, he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah? “If he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.” Because he ruled for himself and acted for himself. “But if he ruled with the public and acted with the public, it is atoned for him with the public.” Because he ruled with the public and acted with the public, but “if he ruled for himself [and acted for himself], it is atoned for himself.”

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:9

HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:9

HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:66

Those of Bar Pazi and (Bar) [Rebbi] Hoshaia went and greeted the Patriarch every day. Those of Rebbi Hoshaia went in first [and left first]. Those of Bar Pazi went and became related by marriage to the patriarchate. They came and wanted to enter first. They went and asked Rebbi Immi. You shall erect the tabernacle according to its ruling. Does there exist a ruling for wood? But the log which merited to be put in the North should be put in the North, in the South should be put in the South.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:66

Those of Bar Pazi and (Bar) [Rebbi] Hoshaia went and greeted the Patriarch every day. Those of Rebbi Hoshaia went in first [and left first]. Those of Bar Pazi went and became related by marriage to the patriarchate. They came and wanted to enter first. They went and asked Rebbi Immi. You shall erect the tabernacle according to its ruling. Does there exist a ruling for wood? But the log which merited to be put in the North should be put in the North, in the South should be put in the South.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:19

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Yoshia in the name of Rav that the difference of opinion is where the walls do not reach the covering, but where the walls do reach the covering the sukkah is valid, even if it is higher than twenty amos? Whose ruling is followed? Like Rabbah's, whose reason is that:

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:19

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Yoshia in the name of Rav that the difference of opinion is where the walls do not reach the covering, but where the walls do reach the covering the sukkah is valid, even if it is higher than twenty amos? Whose ruling is followed? Like Rabbah's, whose reason is that:

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:21

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Huna in the name of Rav? That the difference of opinion is where the area of the Sukkah was only four amos square but where it was more than four amos square [both agree] that even if it is higher than twenty amos it is kosher. Whose ruling is followed? Like Rabi Zeira, Who says:

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:21

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Huna in the name of Rav? That the difference of opinion is where the area of the Sukkah was only four amos square but where it was more than four amos square [both agree] that even if it is higher than twenty amos it is kosher. Whose ruling is followed? Like Rabi Zeira, Who says:

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:23

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Chanan b. Rabbah in the name of Rav that the difference of opinion is only where [the Sukkah] can contain [only] a person's head, the greater part of his body, and his table, but where it is larger than this [both agree] that even if it is higher than twenty amos it is Kosher. Whose ruling is followed? No one's.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:23

Whose ruling is followed in the statement made by R. Chanan b. Rabbah in the name of Rav that the difference of opinion is only where [the Sukkah] can contain [only] a person's head, the greater part of his body, and his table, but where it is larger than this [both agree] that even if it is higher than twenty amos it is Kosher. Whose ruling is followed? No one's.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:34

because of ventilation; but according to the ruling who states that they differed only in the case of a small’ Sukkah, is it then customary for a queen to sit in a small Sukkah? Rabbah bar Ada answered: The ruling was necessary only in the case of a Sukkah constructed with many recesses.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:34

because of ventilation; but according to the ruling who states that they differed only in the case of a small’ Sukkah, is it then customary for a queen to sit in a small Sukkah? Rabbah bar Ada answered: The ruling was necessary only in the case of a Sukkah constructed with many recesses.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:35

Is it then customary for a queen to sit in a sukkah with many recesses? ... Rav Ashi answered: [The ruling] was necessary only in the case of the recesses in it.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:37

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: The Halachah is that [the Sukkah] must be able to contain his head, the greater part of his body, and his table. R. Abba said to him: [In] agreement with whom [is this ruling?] Like Bais Shammai? He [Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak] said to him: According to whom else? (I. E. Who else would it be?)

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:135

This ruling itself is only a rabbinic decree; we come and institute a decree lest someone transgress another thing which is only a decree?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:339

Shall we say that the [ruling of] R. Menashya b. Gada is a dispute between tannas? For it has been taught: Boughs of fig-trees on which there are figs, branches of vines on which there are grapes, or straws on which there are ears of grain, palm-branches on which there are dates, all these, if the inedible part is greater than the edible are valid [for skhakh], otherwise, they are invalid. ‘Others’ say, [they are not valid] unless the straw is more than both the ‘handle’ and the food.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:46

(Mishnah:) [A Lulav] of a worshipped tree or of a wayward city is invalid. (Gemara:) And that of a worshipped tree is invalid? But didn't Rava say, "A Lulav of idol worship should not be taken [for the Mitzvah], but if it was taken, it is valid [as opposed to the Mishnah's ruling]?"

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:167

But if he took it, it is valid. According to him who explains: Because there is no permission to eat it, [the ruling] is according to all. According to him who explains: Because it has no monetary value, according to whom [is the ruling]? It is according to the rabbis.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:167

But if he took it, it is valid. According to him who explains: Because there is no permission to eat it, [the ruling] is according to all. According to him who explains: Because it has no monetary value, according to whom [is the ruling]? It is according to the rabbis.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:175

He asked in accordance with the statement of Ulla in the name of R. Yohanan who said: If the [contents of the] lung pour out as from a ladle [the animal] is fit to be eaten, and Raba explained that this applies only when the arteries are still whole, but if the arteries are rotted [the animal is] terefah. What is the ruling here? Is it possible that in that case where the air does not affect it, it could become healthy again, but in this case where the air does affect it, it decays, or is it possible that there is no difference?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:291

R. Huna said: R. Yose used to say: A bird [offered as] a burnt-offering that was found among other fowls and [the priest] thought that it was a bird sin-offering, and ate it, he is exempt. What does he teach us by this ruling? That one who errs in connection with a mitzvah is exempt? But this is the same [as the Mishnah]?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:14

The Master said, "On the day" even if it is Shabbat. But since [the taking of the lulav] is just ordinary carrying, do we need a verse to permit ordinary carrying? Rava said: It was necessary only with regard to those things that enable the lulav, and this is in accordance with a ruling of that Tanna of whom it has been taught, The lulav and all the things that enable it override the Shabbat, the words of R. Eliezer. What is the reason of R. Eliezer?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:80

It was stated: Abaye said he law is in agreement with Rabbi. But Rava said: The law is in agreement with the sages. R. Mari the son of Shmuel’s daughter, I noticed that Rava himself did not act in accordance with his own ruling but rising early, he would go to the toilet, come out and wash his hands, put on his tefillin and recite the blessing, and when he had to go a second time he would go to the toilet, come out and wash his hands, put on his tefillin and recite the blessing again. We too act in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi and recite the blessing all seven days.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:80

It was stated: Abaye said he law is in agreement with Rabbi. But Rava said: The law is in agreement with the sages. R. Mari the son of Shmuel’s daughter, I noticed that Rava himself did not act in accordance with his own ruling but rising early, he would go to the toilet, come out and wash his hands, put on his tefillin and recite the blessing, and when he had to go a second time he would go to the toilet, come out and wash his hands, put on his tefillin and recite the blessing again. We too act in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi and recite the blessing all seven days.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:101

In Sura they acted in accordance with the ruling of Meremar. R. Shisha the son of R. Idi acted in accordance with the ruling of Abaye. And the law is in agreement with Abaye.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:101

In Sura they acted in accordance with the ruling of Meremar. R. Shisha the son of R. Idi acted in accordance with the ruling of Abaye. And the law is in agreement with Abaye.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:103

the blessing. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the Sukkah, we also recite the blessing [of the Sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the blessing [of the Sukkah]. R. Yoseph said: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yohanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the greats of his generation were in a Sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, they sat there, but they did not recite the blessing.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:105

There are those who say that all agree that one does not recite the blessing [on the Sukkah], and that they only disagree over whether one must sit [in the Sukkah] according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the seventh day in respect of the Sukkah, we must indeed sit in it, while according to the one who ruled that it is regarded as the eighth day in respect of both, we do not even sit in it. R. Yoseph said:... Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yohanan. For who is the authority of the statement? R. Judah the son of R. Shmuel b. Shilath, and he himself sat outside the Sukkah on the eighth day which might be the seventh. And the law is that we must indeed sit in the Sukkah but may not recite the blessing.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:168

You may even say that it agrees with R. Nehemiah. Say that R. Nehemiah’s ruling referred to ordinary use, but for divine use, did he really say this? Does not R. Nehemiah uphold [the lesson of the verse,] “Just offer it to your governor: Will he accept you? Will he show you favor?—said the Lord of hosts” (Malakhi 1:8).

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:154

[No,] Rav could say to you: I can state my view even according to Bet Hillel, for Bet Hillel stated their ruling only in that case, since the wine is the cause of the sanctification being recited, but not in this case, since even if there were no blessing of the season, would we not still say [the blessing of] the Sukkah?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:155

And Rabbah b. Bar Hannah could say to you: I could state my view even according to Beth Shammai, for Beth Shammai stated their ruling only in that case, since it is the day which causes the wine to be brought, but in this case, if it were not for the Sukkah, would we not still recite [the blessing of] the season?

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:18

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: This [rule stated in the Mishnah] is the ruling of R. Akiva the anonymous sage who draws the distinction between “time”, “their time” and “their times”, but according to the Sages the Megillah is to be read only on the proper day.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:22

There are those who say: Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: This rule follows the ruling of R. Akiva the anonymous authority, but the Sages held that in these days since people reckon from it, we read it only on the proper day.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 1:30

Cities which have been walled since the days of Joshua son of Nun read on the fifteenth. From where is this ruling derived? Rava said: Because Scripture says, “Therefore do the Jews of the villages that dwell in the unwalled towns, etc.” (Esther 9:19) Since the villages [are to read] on the fourteenth, the walled towns [must read] on the fifteenth.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 2:83

GEMARA. Rava said: They taught this only if he intends to return on the night of the fourteenth; but if he does not mean to return on the night of the fourteenth, he reads with the rest. Rava said: From where do I derive this ruling? As it is written, “Therefore do the Jews of the villages who dwell in the unwalled towns” (Esther 9:19). Since it is written, “the Jews of the villages” why did it need to write, “who dwell in the unwalled towns”? This teaches us that one who is a villager for one day is called a villager.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 4:67

GEMARA. According to R. Meir’s ruling, how do people live in it? [The rent they pay] would be interest!

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 4:222

Nowadays that we keep two days, on the first day we follow the ruling of the other authority, and on the next day we say, “And God tested Abraham”, and for the haftarah we read “Ephraim is a precious son to me.”

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:109

GEMARA: We learned [in a beraisa], Beribi says, If the witnesses didn't succeed in having their victim killed they are executed if they did succeed in having him killed they aren't executed. His father asked him, My son isn't this a fortiori? [which would imply the opposite ruling]

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 1:125

Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:45

And the Rabbis need that verse to teach Rebbi Yochanon's ruling, that Rabbi Yochanon said in the name of Rebbi Shimoen ben Yochai, from where do we know that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah? That the Torah says (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick and he uncovers her ervah". This teaches us that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:59

If he is a Yisroel he takes her back and doesn't receive malkus? Why? This is a case of a lo saseh sh'kadmu asseh, and [according to Rebbi Yochanon's original ruling] he should get malkus.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:110

Who is this ruling in accordance with? It's in accordance to the following Tanna, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yossi said, I might think that a person is only liable for tevel which no tithes were separated from. But if he separated terumah gedolah but did not separate maiser rishon, or he separated maiser rishon but did not separate maiser sheni, or even if maeser ani [was the only tithe unseparated], where do we know [that he is still liable for eating it]?

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:156

Rav Acha bar Yaakov teaches taught this ruling in the name Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Yochanon and accordingly found a contradiction between one statement of Rebbi Yochanon and another statement of Rebbi Yochanon. That, could Rebbi Yochanon have said that the placement of Bikorim is essential to them, but that the recitation is not essential to them? But Rav Assi had asked of Rebbi Yochanon, Bikorim, from when do they become permitted to the Kohanim? And [Rebbi Yochanon] had answered him that those which are subject to recitation [i.e. brought before Sukkos] from when he recites [the verses], and those which are not subject to recitation from when they enter the Temple.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:182

Rav Bibi says in the name of Rav Assi from where is it derived that Maaser Sheni may be redeemed even one step outside of the wall? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 14,24) "For you may not proceed to carry (שאת) it" But that is needed to teach us the ruling of Rebbi Elezar!

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:204

Rather there was only one warning. But then would he be liable [five times]? Bit it was taught in a mishna, A Nazir who was drinking wine all day is only liable once. If they said to him, "Don't drink. Don't drink.", and he drank, than he would be liable for each individual time. Rather [the ruling] was necessary where one dipped his five fingers into a cream and placed them [on his beard] simultaneously, that it constitutes as a warning for each one.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:228

Rav Pappa said, The [rulings that concern] mishnas and baraisas [are attributed to] Rav Malkio. The [rulings that concern] amorahic teachings [are attributed to] Rav Malkio. And your mnemonic would be, A mishna is a queen. What is the difference between [Rav Nachman's opinion and Rav Pappa's opinion]? The difference between them is [the ruling concerning] maidservants.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:237

What is this ruling of Rebbi Akiva? That it was taught in a baraisa, One who weeds or covers Kilayim incurs malkus. Rebbi Akiva says, also one who merely maintains [Kilayim still incurs malkus].