amount
368 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
By document. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, by a contract without obligating money, but with a contract obligating money he did not acquire until he paid. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, he acquired even if he did not pay. A baraita supports Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose: “If he sold him ten fields together, when he took possession of one of them, he took possession of all of them. But if he only paid the amount for one or wrote the deed only for one of them he acquired only the one which was sold to him.” Does there exist a deed without money? If you say, we hold that he paid for all of them, did it not say: “the amount of one”? It must be one or the other.
[They asked Rebbi Eliezer,] how far does honoring father and mother go? He said to them, you are asking me? Go and ask Dama ben Netinah. Dama ben Netinah was the head of the city council. Once his mother was slapping him in front of the entire council and a slipper fell from her hand, and he handed it back to her so that she should feel no inconvenience. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said: He was a Gentile from Ascalon and the head of the city council. He never sat on the stone on which his father used to sit and when his father died, he worshipped the stone. Once the jaspis of Benjamin was lost. They inquired, who would have one of similar quality? They were informed that Dama ben Netinah did. They went to him and agreed on 100 denars. He went to the upper floor to bring it and found his father sleeping. Some say that the key to the chest was in his father’s fingers; some say his father’s foot was resting on the chest. He descended to them and told them: I could not bring it to you. They thought, maybe he wants more money, and raised the price to two hundred, then to a thousand. When his father woke up from his sleep, he went up and brought it to them. They wanted to give him according to the amount last mentioned, but he refused. He said: Do I sell my father’s honor for money? I will not have any advantage from honoring my father. What reward did the Holy One, praise to Him, give him? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: The following night, his cow gave birth to a red heifer and Israel gave him its weight in gold and took it. Rebbi Sabbatai said (Job 37:23), it is written: “Justice and much charity He will not suppress.” The Holy One, praise to Him, will not wait to give the reward for good deeds to the Gentiles.
A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.
HALAKHAH: “A bull worth a mina” etc. “A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth a mina; weakened (it) in the amount of 50 zuz; he takes the bull, for he gets only half the amount of the injury and therefore, if the bull died or was weakened, he only has that bull. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and weakened it in the amount of 50 zuz; then the second [bull] couter-attacked and injured it to the amount of three gold [denars]. The first pays half a gold denar to the second. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200. It increased in value and now is worth 400; but if it had not gored it, it would now be worth 800 zuz. If it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage. If it was weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.” Rebbi La said, so is the baraita: The agressor improved; if it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage; if it weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.
HALAKHAH: “A bull worth a mina” etc. “A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth a mina; weakened (it) in the amount of 50 zuz; he takes the bull, for he gets only half the amount of the injury and therefore, if the bull died or was weakened, he only has that bull. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and weakened it in the amount of 50 zuz; then the second [bull] couter-attacked and injured it to the amount of three gold [denars]. The first pays half a gold denar to the second. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200. It increased in value and now is worth 400; but if it had not gored it, it would now be worth 800 zuz. If it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage. If it was weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.” Rebbi La said, so is the baraita: The agressor improved; if it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage; if it weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.
HALAKHAH: “A bull worth a mina” etc. “A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth a mina; weakened (it) in the amount of 50 zuz; he takes the bull, for he gets only half the amount of the injury and therefore, if the bull died or was weakened, he only has that bull. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and weakened it in the amount of 50 zuz; then the second [bull] couter-attacked and injured it to the amount of three gold [denars]. The first pays half a gold denar to the second. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200. It increased in value and now is worth 400; but if it had not gored it, it would now be worth 800 zuz. If it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage. If it was weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.” Rebbi La said, so is the baraita: The agressor improved; if it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage; if it weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.
HALAKHAH: “A bull worth a mina” etc. “A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth a mina; weakened (it) in the amount of 50 zuz; he takes the bull, for he gets only half the amount of the injury and therefore, if the bull died or was weakened, he only has that bull. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and weakened it in the amount of 50 zuz; then the second [bull] couter-attacked and injured it to the amount of three gold [denars]. The first pays half a gold denar to the second. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200. It increased in value and now is worth 400; but if it had not gored it, it would now be worth 800 zuz. If it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage. If it was weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.” Rebbi La said, so is the baraita: The agressor improved; if it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage; if it weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.
MISHNAH: One who robbed from a proselyte, swore to him, and [the proselyte] died, has to pay the capital and the fifth to the priests and the reparation offering to the altar as it is said: “If the man has no heirs to give the reparation to, the reparation etc.” If he was bringing the money and the reparation offering when he died, the money should be given to his sons and the reparation offering shall graze until it becomes disqualified, then be sold, and the amount be given for voluntary offerings. If he had given the money to the men of the watch when he died, the heirs cannot ask it back from them since it is said: “What a man give to a Cohen shall be the latter’s.”
MISHNAH: If one recognizes his own vessels or books in the hand of another, if the theft was a known fact in town, [the other] shall swear to him how much he paid and take this amount. Otherwise he cannot be believed, for I am saying that he had sold the items to a third party and the other had bought them from there.
This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.
If a person took a documented loan and paid it back, he cannot use the document to take a second loan because it diminishes the power of the buyers. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even on the same day. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Here you say, even on the same day. But there, you say, if its date was that very day, he should return it! He answered, a person is apt to take a loan and repay it the same day, but a person is not apt to repay a loan and take it the same day. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yasa: It is the same day, the same witnesses, and the same amount. What is the meaning of “it diminishes the power of the buyers”? He answered, if the property had not been mortgaged. But some say, if the witnesses did not sign for this loan.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Simeon, but we do not say this in all cases. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he instructed following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph gave a denar for salt. That one reneged. He said, does he not know that already a sickle is put on the thigh of that man, “He Who exacted retribution from the people of the Flood will in the future collect from him who does not keep his word”? A person paid for raw silk. He reneged. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi La said, it was a case of a pledge; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he had given him partial payment. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole.
Cahana asked before Rav: If the seller is being cheated, he is cheated up to a fifth; if the buyer is being cheated, he is cheated up to a sixth! He answered him, it and the amount of cheating add up to a sixth. If he sold him what was worth five for six, can [the seller] not say, you were taken in for a denar, take your denar! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the other can say to him, it is not to my honor that people say, this one was made a laughing stock. Some say, he can say to him, it is not to my honor to wear a garment of five denars. Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Hoshaia say, what is that Tanna’s reason? “I know that my merchandise was worth only five denars, but because he needed it, I gave it to him for six. Take yours and return mine.”
A person made a Cohen impure. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who made him eat profane food. They wanted to say that one deducts the price of heave from the amount.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said, only if he heard it the next day. But on the same day notice must be taken of collecting bones. Nikomachos stated before Rebbi Zeˋira: Collecting bones has no [minimal] amount. Rebbi Mani instructed Rebbi La from Kufra to tear his garment and mourn following Rebbi Aḥa, not to pollute himself following Rebbi Yose.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testified that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath”; should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced amount without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment when one witness testified that it was paid, he does not contradict two [witnesses]; but when he testifies that it was reduced he would contradict two [witnesses.]
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
If he transported for him amphora against amphora, you fine him in his own amphora up to the amount of his wages. If he paid him his wages in land. Everywhere you are saying that land is not forbidden, here it is forbidden. If he paid him his wages in an animal. Everywhere you are saying that anything breathing is not forbidden, here it is forbidden. If he gave him anything as his wages, is everything forbidden or only up to the amount of his wages? If he worked for him for goodwill, do you impound his property in the value of his wages?
If he transported for him amphora against amphora, you fine him in his own amphora up to the amount of his wages. If he paid him his wages in land. Everywhere you are saying that land is not forbidden, here it is forbidden. If he paid him his wages in an animal. Everywhere you are saying that anything breathing is not forbidden, here it is forbidden. If he gave him anything as his wages, is everything forbidden or only up to the amount of his wages? If he worked for him for goodwill, do you impound his property in the value of his wages?
There we have stated: “The Land of Israel is pure and its ritual baths are pure.” “The land of the Samaritans is pure; its ritual baths, and its dwellings, and its paths are pure.” Its paths are pure; it is a presumption that they would not select a path unless it was pure. And its ritual baths are pure; Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose: that is, to believe them that they are not from drawn water, but not for the measure of forty; for they explain, only a spring or a cistern, a collection of water,” just as a spring cleanses in any amount, any collection of water cleanses in any amount.
There we have stated: “The Land of Israel is pure and its ritual baths are pure.” “The land of the Samaritans is pure; its ritual baths, and its dwellings, and its paths are pure.” Its paths are pure; it is a presumption that they would not select a path unless it was pure. And its ritual baths are pure; Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose: that is, to believe them that they are not from drawn water, but not for the measure of forty; for they explain, only a spring or a cistern, a collection of water,” just as a spring cleanses in any amount, any collection of water cleanses in any amount.
MISHNAH: Libation wine is forbidden and makes forbidden in the most minute amount. Wine mixed with wine or water mixed with water in the most minute amount. Wine in water or water in wine, if it gives taste. This is the principle, kind in the same kind in the most minute amount, kind in another kind if it gives taste.
MISHNAH: Libation wine is forbidden and makes forbidden in the most minute amount. Wine mixed with wine or water mixed with water in the most minute amount. Wine in water or water in wine, if it gives taste. This is the principle, kind in the same kind in the most minute amount, kind in another kind if it gives taste.
MISHNAH: Libation wine is forbidden and makes forbidden in the most minute amount. Wine mixed with wine or water mixed with water in the most minute amount. Wine in water or water in wine, if it gives taste. This is the principle, kind in the same kind in the most minute amount, kind in another kind if it gives taste.
MISHNAH: The following are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount: Libation wine, idols, heart-removed skins, and an ox which was stoned, and the calf whose neck was broken, and the birds of the sufferer from skin disease, and the nazir’s hair, and the firstborn donkey, and meat in milk, and profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. These are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount.
MISHNAH: The following are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount: Libation wine, idols, heart-removed skins, and an ox which was stoned, and the calf whose neck was broken, and the birds of the sufferer from skin disease, and the nazir’s hair, and the firstborn donkey, and meat in milk, and profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. These are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount.
HALAKHAH: “The following are forbidden and they forbid in the most minute amount,” etc. Libation wine, idols, heart-removed skins, because nothing of the taboo should cling to your hand.
But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden. This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same. But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow? What about a prophet and seducer? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow, that you should listen to them. The verse says, to walk in them, in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish went up to Bostra. Over there was a cheater. God forbid that he was a cheater, but he cheated in charity. He looked how much the community pledged, and he pledged the same amount. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish took him, made him sit with him, and recited for him this verse: The gifts of a man put him at ease, etc.
There, we have stated: How long does it have to be soaked? In lukewarm water, 24 hours.” “Jehudah ben Neqosa says, if has to be lukewarm for 24 hours”. How does one proceed? One puts it into hot ashes or adds any amount of hot water.
The Babylonian Talmud
Go and deduce it from the smallest of the vessels, concerning which it is said, ... "And you shall make for it a border of a handbreadth around" (Exodus 25:25) Just as there the height was a handbreadth so was it here also a handbreadth But why should our deduction not be made from the vessels themselves? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.
Go and deduce it from the smallest of the vessels, concerning which it is said, ... "And you shall make for it a border of a handbreadth around" (Exodus 25:25) Just as there the height was a handbreadth so was it here also a handbreadth But why should our deduction not be made from the vessels themselves? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.
that of the Bar-Yokani? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized But perhaps it means a face like that of a tziparta which is very small? R. Aha b. Jacob said: R. Huna draws an analogy between two expressions of ‘face’. It is written here, ‘[Upon the face of the ark-cover", and it is written elsewhere, "From the face of Isaac his father" (Genesis 27:30).
that of the Bar-Yokani? If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized But perhaps it means a face like that of a tziparta which is very small? R. Aha b. Jacob said: R. Huna draws an analogy between two expressions of ‘face’. It is written here, ‘[Upon the face of the ark-cover", and it is written elsewhere, "From the face of Isaac his father" (Genesis 27:30).
But why should we not learn from the ‘face’ above concerning which it is written, "As one sees the face of God, and You were pleased with me?" (Genesis 33:10). If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.
But why should we not learn from the ‘face’ above concerning which it is written, "As one sees the face of God, and You were pleased with me?" (Genesis 33:10). If you seized a large amount, you have not seized anything; but if you seized the lesser amount you have seized.
Mar Kashisha the son of R. Hisda said to R. Ashi: Do you think that a man occupies one cubit? . [The fact is that] three men occupy two cubits.. How much then does this [amount to for twenty-four men]?. Sixteen cubits; and we [really] demand here sixteen and four fifths. [Because, as has been said, R. Yohanan] gave only an approximate figure...
How many [cubits] does this[amount to]? Eighteen; while sixteen and four-fifths would be enough. That is [then] what was meant [when it was stated] that he only gave an approximate figure; and in this case it is in the direction of stringency.
R. Mesharsheya raised a difficulty: Does not ‘Your guarantor need a guarantor ? Rather Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan, This refers to where the person puts his head between his knees. Rava said: There is no set amount for sleep.
As it was performed on weekdays, so was it was performed on Shabbat, [save that on the eve of Shabbat he would fill a non-sanctified golden barrel from the Shiloah, and place it in the chamber.] But why [bring the water in a non-sanctified vessel]? Let him bring it in a sanctified one? Zeiri said: [The author of our Mishnah] is of the opinion that no fixed amount has been prescribed for the water [of libation] and that the ministering vessels sanctify their contents even if there was no intention
R. Yannai said in the name of R. Zera: You may even say that there is a fixed amount for the water [of libation] and that ministering vessels of ministry do not sanctify their contents unless there was intention, [but the use of a sanctified vessel was nevertheless forbidden] as a preventive measure lest people will think that it was filled with the water for the purpose of using it for the washing of the hands and the feet [of the High Priest].
'Ilfa and R. Johanan were greatly distressed by poverty and therefore said to one another, let us go into business and thus make true in our own lives the words (Deut., 15. 4): "Howbeit there shall be no needy among you." They then went and sat down under a ruined wall. While eating, R. Johanan overheard one angel saying to another, "Let us throw down the wall upon them and kill them, for they are going to neglect the life everlasting and busy themselves with the life of the moment." The other angel, however, replied, "Let them alone, for one of them has a great future before him." Said R. Johanan to 'Ilfa: "Did you hear anything?" 'Ilfa replied, "No." R. Johanan then said to himself, "I must be the one with the great future before him; I will therefore go back (to my studies) and make true of myself the words (Deut., 15. 11): 'For the poor shall never cease out of the land.'" Before 'Ilfa returned to the city, R. Johanan had been appointed head of the academy, and when 'Ilfa came, the people of the town said to him: "Had you remained here and devoted yourself to study, you would have been made the head." 'Ilfa thereupon climbed up to the top of the mast and said: "If any one will put to me a question regarding a Baraita handed down by R. Ḥiyya and R. 'Osha'ya and I will be unable to answer it by quoting a corroborating parallel from the Mishnah, I will throw myself from the mast into the water and drown." An old man appeared and recited to him the Baraita: If a dying man says (to the trustees of his estate), "Give to my children one sheḳel a week," and it happens that the children need a sela', the trustees may give them a sela', but if he said, "Do not give them more than a sheḳel a week," the trustees are not allowed to give them more than a sheḳel; if the father adds: "In case my children die, others shall inherit the amount in their place," they should give them only a sheḳel, no matter whether the father said, "give them a sheḳel" or "Do not give them more than a sheḳel." "The authority of this Baraita," exclaimed 'Ilfa, "is none other than R. Meir, who holds that it is a religious duty to carry out the request of the dead."
The same R. Jose had a she-ass which he used to hire out. Those who hired her would place the hire upon her back, and she would walk home. If the amount was too much or too little, the ass would not move from the spot. One day a pair of sandals was forgotten on the ass, and she refused to proceed until the shoes were taken off.
The Rabbis have taught: Twenty-four divisions were in the land of Israel and twelve in Jericho (and twelve in Jericho? That would amount to more than twenty-four! Read "twelve thereof were in Jericho"). When the turn of a division arrived, half of the division would go up to Jerusalem, while the other half would go to Jericho, in order to supply from there water and food to their brethren in Jerusalem.
Things clean. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning them. It was only necessary in order to calculate a religious bath, the size of which is not determined in Holy Writ. For there is a Baraitha, "and he shall wash his flesh in water" (Lev. xv. 5, 6 sqq.), i.e., in the waters of a religious bath all his flesh, water into which his whole body shall enter. And what amount must they reach? Cubit upon cubit to the height of three cubits, and wise men have calculated the waters of a religious bath to be forty seahs.
For common food and tithe how can washing of hands be needed? For I can adduce against this Mishnah the following, viz., The heave offering and the firstfruits involve to one who transgresses with respect to them death and compensation to the amount of one fifth part beyond the price, and it is forbidden to strangers to share in them, and these are the property of the priest and are mixed with one hundred and one things, and they are subject to the washing of hands and waiting till the going down of the sun (Bikkurim, ii. 1, and elsewhere). Lo, this is the case with heave-offering and firstfruits, but it is not the case with tithe, much less with common food. There is a difficulty when we place tithe against tithe, and there is a difficulty when we place common food against common food. It is all right in the case of tithe against tithe. It does not present a difficulty. The one opinion is that of R. Meir, and the other that of our Rabbis. For there is a canonical Mishnah, Everything which is subject to the duty of going to the water, as far as the scribes have taught, defiles hallowed things, but only disqualifies heave-offering and leaves common food and tithe unaffected. These are the words of R. Meir, but wise men consider tithe affected (Chullin 33b, i. 1, Sota 30a, ii. 4).
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.
GEMARA:Rava says, and this [that one can disqualify the whole group of witnesses] is only when they all testified בתוך כדי דיבור. Rav Acha mDifti said to Revina, let's see, how long is בתוך כדי דיבור? The amount of time that it takes for a student to greet his teacher. A hundred [witnesses] is too many [to all give testimony in this time slot]?!
A court that executes...etc.: They inquired, Is it [executing] once in seventy years that acquires then the name "killing court", or maybe that is the acceptable amount [and more than that is what gets the name]? Let [the question] stand.
How much must one eat from tevel to be liable? Rebbi Shimon says any amount, and the sages say one k'zais. Rebbi Shimon said to them [the sages], Will you not agree with me that one who eats an ant of any size is liable? They responded, That is because it is in the form that it was created. He [Rebbi Shimon] said back to them, Also a kernel of wheat is in the form that it was created.
[No,] he was just saying an answer according to their words, according to me, even flour also one is liable for, but even according to your opinion, agree to me at least that one wheat kernel is in the form that it was created. And [what would] the sages [answer to that]? A living soul is significant, but a wheat kernel is not significant. A baraisa was taught in accordance with Rebbi Yirmiya's view. Rebbi Shimon says any amount [makes one liable] to malkus. The measurement of a k'zias was only stated regarding making one obligated to bring a sacrifice.
GEMARA: (Rav Bibi asked in the name of Rebbi Yosi, Is wearing considered literally wearing or is it) even if he just took in ant out his hand from his sleeve? Rav Acha brei dRav Ikka demonstrated by inserting [his hand] and removing [it]. Rav Ashi said that even if one only waited the amount of time in which he could have undressed and redressed, he would be liable.
We only evaluate him for an amount of lashes which can be divided into three. If we evaluated him to be able to withstand forty, and flogged some of them,