infer
223 occurrences across the corpus
The Babylonian Talmud
How do we know that he does not use this method in any other part of the Torah ? For there is a teaching : Ben 'Azzai said : It is stated, "Thou shalt not suffer a sorceress to live" (Exod. xxii. 17) and it continues, "Whosoever lieth with a beast shall surely be put to death" (ibid. v. 18); [the Rabbis] connect the two laws to infer that as the one who lieth with a beast is put to death by stoning, so also is the sorceress put to death by stoning.
Mar Zotra (another version: Rab Ashe) said : Thou mayest infer that this is so from the fact that small vessels protect [the contents from contracting defilement] in the tent of the dead.
how is this? The latter verse refers to the major natural function, the former to the minor. Infer, then, that the Torah forbids [the Shema' to be read] near to urine only when it is by fecal matter ; but if it has fallen upon the ground, it is permitted [by the Torah], but the Rabbis have decreed against it. Have the Rabbis decreed against it ? When it is certain [that urine is there] ; but if there is a doubt, they do not decree against it.
Raba said to Rab Nahman : Thou shouldest not differ from Rab Judah, because R. Johanan and Samuel agree with him ; for Rab Judah said in the name of Samuel, and similarly said R. Isaac in the name of R. Johanan : We pronounce over olive-oil the benediction "... Who createst the fruit of the tree" — hence infer that although it has undergone change, it still remains essentially the same; and like-wise here [with wheaten-flour] although it has undergone change, it still remains essentially the same.
then he would have informed us of the explanation and also intimated that the Halakah is in accord with the Rabbis. But since he said mosi', what does he wish us to infer?" But Rab Zebid acted thus to exclude himself from the divergence of opinion,
From that time onwards it may contract defilement, but not retrospectively. Infer from this that since it has been divided, the defilement has passed from it. So here also, since the parties had included these men for Zimmun, it passes from them.
Rab Safra entered a privy. R. Abba came and emitted a sound at the door. Rab Safra said to him, "Let the master enter." After leaving, R. Abba said to him, "So far thou hast not brought in the demon ; but thou hast received the tradition about the demon. Have we not learnt thus in the Mishnah : There was an open fire-place there [in the Temple-court], and a splendid privy ; and this was its splendid feature : if it was found locked, it was known that somebody was in there, but if it was found open, it was known that it was vacant. Hence infer that it is not proper [to speak in a privy]!
Bar Kappara expounded : "If goods are cheap, hasten and buy them." "In a place where there is no man, be a man." Abbai said ; Infer from this that where there is a man, do not be a man.
While in another [Baraitha] it has been taught: Rabbi says: Any Sukkah which is not four amos square is invalid, while the Sages say: Even if it can contain only his head, and the greater part of his body it is kosher. Whereas of ‘his table’ there is no mention. Does a contradiction not arise between the two [Baraisas]? We must consequently infer therefrom that: One is from Bais Shammai, and one is from Bais Hillel.
What does it mean ‘there are no occupants’? If we say, actual occupants, are then occupants [it could be objected] a determining factor? Rather we must say that ‘there are no occupants' means that the Sukkah is unsuitable for occupation? How so? Because it is less than ten handbreadths high. We could therefore infer that the first opinion [in the Mishnah] holds that even if it is unsuitable for occupation it is still invalid?
We can also infer this [from the Mishnah], for like it is taught, it is similar to a wayward city [which must be destroyed].
Scripture says: "On the day," implying, even on Shabbat. But what do the rabbis do with the words "on the day"? They need it to infer from it that on the day, [the lulav is taken] but not at night. And R. Eliezer, from where does he deduce that [the lulav is to be taken] by day, and not at night? He deduces it from the conclusion of the verse, "And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God for seven days" "days" but not nights. And the Rabbis? If I learned it from that verse, I might have said that we ought to compare ‘days’ [mentioned here] with ‘days’ mentioned with regard to the Sukkah so that just as there [the expression of] ‘days’ includes nights, so here also [the expression of] ‘days’ includes nights.
Resh Laḳish was likewise of the opinion that rain is granted also for the sake of an individual, for he said, whence do we infer that rain is granted for the sake of an individual? It is written (Zech., 10.1): "Ask ye of the Lord rain in the time of the latter rain, even of the Lord that maketh lightnings; and He will give them showers of rain, to every one grass in the field." Now, from the words "He will give them," one might conclude that He gives it only when everybody needs it; Scripture therefore adds "to every one"; but if it said only "to every one," we might think that He gives it only when that one needs it for all his fields; Scripture therefore says "field" (singular); but the word "field" might still be understood to mean a whole (large) field; Scripture therefore says "grass." This finds its illustration in the following case: R. Daniel b. R. Ḳeṭina had a garden which he used to examine every day, and say: This bed needs rain, and this one does not need it. The next day it was found that rain fell upon the one, but not upon the other.
R. Isaac, with the permission of his father R. Judah, delivered the following discourse: An individual who has taken upon himself a fast must recite the prayer provided for fasts. Where does he insert it? Between the benediction ending with "Redeemer" and that ending with "Healer" (of Israel). R. Isaac objected: Is an individual entitled to insert a benediction for himself? He should rather, said R. Isaac, include it in the benediction ending with the words: "Who hearest prayer." The same opinion was given also by R. Sheshet. An objection was raised to this view from the following Baraita: There is no difference between an individual and a community, except that the former recites eighteen benedictions, while the latter recites nineteen. Now what is meant by "individual" and "community"? Is "individual" to be understood literally and "community" in the sense of representative of the community? If so, the benedictions here spoken of would not be nineteen, but twenty-four! Consequently by "individual" can be meant only one who takes upon himself a fast which is known as a "private fast," while by "community" is meant an individual who takes upon himself a "public fast," and yet the Baraita reads: "except that the former recites eighteen benedictions and the latter nineteen," which proves that an individual may insert a benediction for himself! Answer: No, by "community" is no doubt meant its representative, but (as to your objection that in this case twenty-four benedictions are recited, it must be understood that) the Baraita has reference to the first three public fasts, during which the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three first and the three intermediary public fasts, except that during the former work is allowed, while during the latter it is prohibited," from which you must infer that with regard to the number of benedictions they are alike!? Answer: The author of this Baraita mentioned one difference and omitted the other. Is there anything else that he omitted, so that we may be justified in assuming that he omitted this difference? I will say this, then: The teacher of the Baraita was concerned only in pointing out a difference regarding things prohibited on fast days, but did not care to mention a difference in the number of benedictions recited. If you prefer, I may also say that the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four even during the intermediary public fasts. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three intermediary and the seven (last) public fasts except that during the latter the alarm is sounded and the shops are closed," which proves that with regard to the twenty-four benedictions both groups of fasts are alike? If, however, you should say that here, too, the author of the Baraita mentions one difference and omits the other, what will you do, then, with the explicit words of the Baraita, saying that "there is no difference between them except"? Answer: Do you mean to say that the phrase "there is no difference" is to be taken literally?
What then is implied by “their times”? A large number of times! But [the expression ‘their’ times’] is still required to indicate that the time of one is not the same as the time of the other? If so, the verse should have just said, “their time”. Why does it say “their times”? So that you may infer from this all of them.
There is an indication of this in a precise reading of the text, as it is written, “For he said unto Judah, Let us build these cities” (II Chronicles 14:6). From this we can infer that they had already been towns beforehand; learn from this.
Or if you want, I can say that in fact it is R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, and there is an omission in our Mishnah and this is what it means: There is no difference between the fourteenth of the first Adar and the fourteenth of the second Adar except for reading the Megillah and gifts to the poor. From which we infer that in regard to mourning and fasting they are the same, but it doesn’t mention the special portions.
GEMARA. [From this we infer] that for requiring [the sheets] to be stitched with sinews and for defiling the hands they are the same.
How have you explained [the Mishnah]? As not agreeing with R. Meir. What about the end of the mishnah: There is no difference between a serving [high] priest and one whose time has passed except the bull of Yom HaKippurim and the tenth of the ephah. But we can infer that in all other matters they are the same; and so we come to the view of R. Meir, as it has been taught, If something happened to disqualify him and they appointed another priest to take his place, when the first returns to his service the second is still liable to all the obligations of the high priesthood, the words of R. Meir. R. Yose said: The first returns to his service whereas the second is not qualified to act as a high priest or as an ordinary priest.
And R. Joshua said: I have heard that sacrifices may be brought even though there is no Temple; that the most holy foods may be eaten, even though there are no curtains; and that foods of lesser sanctity and second tithe may be eaten even though there is no wall, because the first holiness was conferred on Jerusalem both for the time being and for all time. We infer from this that R. Eliezer holds that it was not [at first] sanctified for all time.
Rava said: Daniel also made a mistake in this calculation, as it is written, "In the first year of his reign, I Daniel meditated in the books [etc.]" (Daniel 9:2). From his use of the words "I meditated," we can infer that he [at first] made a mistake.
Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.
If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to eat it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? [Rather, it must also mean to bring it.] So then let's say that it is exclusively coming to teach us this. If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to bring it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? Infer from this both rulings.