mentioned
848 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
And the calf whose neck was broken. There, there. Since there mentioned further describes a prohibition of usufruct, also there said here implies prohibition of usufruct.
MISHNAH: By the words of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a death sentence be imposed. If testimony is confirmed by two, why did the verse mention three? Only to compare three to two. Since three may prove that two are plotters, two also may prove that three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Simeon says, since two are executed only if both are plotters, so three are executed only if all three are plotters. And from where even a hundred? The verse says “witnesses”. Rebbi Aqiba says, the third is only mentioned to punish him harshly and to identify his judgment with that of the others. If the verse in this way punished the accessory of criminals like criminals, so much more it will reward the accessory to one who keeps the commandments as one who keeps the commandments. Since the testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person, the same holds for three if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified person. From where even for a hundred? The verse says, witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? In criminal trials, but in civil trials the testimony should be upheld by the remaining [witnesses]. Rebbi says, both in criminal and in civil trials, if they warned them. But if they did not warn them, what should two brothers do who were eye-witnesses to a murder?
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable; these are liable for it is said something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error and he told them, you are erring, or that the distinguished member of the Court was not there, or that one of them was a proselyte, or a bastard, or a Gibeonite, or a childless old man, it is not liable since it is said here “congregation” and it is said there “congregation”. Since in the congregation mentioned there, all of them were worthy of ordination, also the congregation here all have to be worthy of ordination.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “They are not liable for a positive commandment or a prohibition in the Temple,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].
“The Prince.” I could think a tribal chieftain like Naḥshon; the verse says, “if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God; and further it says, that he may learn to fear the Eternal, his God. “His God, [his God]” for an equal cut. Since “his God” mentioned there refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal] his God, so also “his God” mentioned here refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal] his God.
“The Prince.” I could think a tribal chieftain like Naḥshon; the verse says, “if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God; and further it says, that he may learn to fear the Eternal, his God. “His God, [his God]” for an equal cut. Since “his God” mentioned there refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal] his God, so also “his God” mentioned here refers to a Prince over whom there is only [the Eternal] his God.
It was stated: The Anointed Priest brings a bull, the one clothed in multiple garb does not bring a bull. This disagrees with Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? The Anointed. Why does the verse say priest? To exclude the one clothed in multiple garb. What is the rabbis’ reason? The anointed. I could think that this is the king. Why does the verse say, priest? To include the one clothed in multiple garb. Here you say, to exclude the one clothed in multiple garb. But there you say, to include the one clothed in multiple garb. Rebbi Hila said, each inference refers to its meaning. If it had said the Anointed but not priest, I would have said, he brings a bull for forgetting a topic, but for acting in error he brings a goat. Therefore it is necessary that it mention priest. But if it had mentioned priest but not the Anointed, I would have said, this refers to the king. If you would say by a bull, preceding the paragraph about the king, assuming that for forgetting a topic he brings a bull but for acting in error he brings a goat. Therefore it is necessary that it mention the Anointed and that it mention priest.
The king has precedence over the High Priest, as it is written: You shall let my son Solomon ride, etc. The High Priest over the prophet, as it is written: There, Ṣadoq the Priest and Nathan the Prophet shall anoint him as king, etc. He mentioned Ṣadoq before Nathan. Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: The prophet folds his hands and feet and sits before the High Priest. What is his reason? Listen, Joshua the High Priest, you and your friends who are sitting before you. I could think that they were common people; the verse says, because they are men of miracle, and “miracle” only means prophecy, as you say, and he gave you a sign or a miracle.
“The Hause of Shammai say, also like fenugreek water and like roast beef juice.” That makes seven. They are similar to earth water. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav, the colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr did not declare impure, only Aqabia mentioned it. Then it also should bring impurity like fenugreek water and like roast beef juice which were mentioned by the House of Shammai! These are similar to earth water. Pure blood prepares for impurity, impure blood does not prepare.
“The Hause of Shammai say, also like fenugreek water and like roast beef juice.” That makes seven. They are similar to earth water. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav, the colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr did not declare impure, only Aqabia mentioned it. Then it also should bring impurity like fenugreek water and like roast beef juice which were mentioned by the House of Shammai! These are similar to earth water. Pure blood prepares for impurity, impure blood does not prepare.
“And black, like ink-stone.” How do you check that? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: One takes the ink-stone and puts in on white leather. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, on colored leather. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: Black like a raven, black like a grape berry, black like asphalt are pure. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Black like liquid ink is pure. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Like a felt hat imported from overseas is impure. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Immi: Are all these facts to be acted upon? He answered him, yes. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, all of them, if they are lighter than the standard they are pure, darker than the standard impure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, all of them, if they are lighter than the standard they are pure, darker than the standard pure except for black. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan, as we have stated: “And black like ink-stone is impure, lighter than that is pure.” Therefore, darker than that is impure, but only black was mentioned in that connection. Therefore, all others, even if they are darker than the standards, are pure. The town of Rav Jehudah followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish but Rav Jehudah himself followed Rebbi Joḥanan. Bar Qappara stated a support for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish but one does not follow him in practice, since Rebbi Ḥanina mixed wine for Bar Qappara and asked him, if it is like that, what is its status? He answered, impure. He lightened it, then he answered, pure. He said to him, peace shall be on him who erred with his mouth but not with his eyes. They wanted to say that he who says pure, refers to when it was polished. But he who says impure , if it is not polished. Let us hear from the following: It happened that a woman from the Patriarchate had a discharge of black blood. The case came before Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi and Rebbi Isaac bar Ṭabelai; they wanted to declare her impure. Rebbi Ḥelbo told them: So says Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Black which penetrates is pure, that which polishes is impure. He said that only about black. Therefore, all others are pure even if they polish.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, this birth is like all other births mentioned in the Torah. Just as all other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this also [is counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this birth is different from all other births mentioned in the Torah. All other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this one once the face is recognized. What is the difference between them? If he came cut or stunted. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, until the appearance of either head or most of the body. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, until the face is recognized.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, this birth is like all other births mentioned in the Torah. Just as all other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this also [is counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this birth is different from all other births mentioned in the Torah. All other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this one once the face is recognized. What is the difference between them? If he came cut or stunted. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, until the appearance of either head or most of the body. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, until the face is recognized.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, this birth is like all other births mentioned in the Torah. Just as all other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this also [is counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this birth is different from all other births mentioned in the Torah. All other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this one once the face is recognized. What is the difference between them? If he came cut or stunted. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, until the appearance of either head or most of the body. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, until the face is recognized.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, this birth is like all other births mentioned in the Torah. Just as all other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this also [is counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this birth is different from all other births mentioned in the Torah. All other births mentioned in the Torah [are counted] from the appearance of either head or most of the body, this one once the face is recognized. What is the difference between them? If he came cut or stunted. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, until the appearance of either head or most of the body. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, until the face is recognized.
“What is the sole which they mentioned? Anything which looks like the sole, a sea fish. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, anything which looks like an ox tongue. Our teachers voted about this to say, only if it exhibits human traits.” Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil, and a sole. About a sole, as we just said. About oil, as we have stated: “Rebbi and his court permitted oil.” About bills of divorce, as we have stated there: “This is your bill of divorce if I die, this is your bill of divorce if [I die from this] sickness, this is your bill of divorce after my death; he did not say anything.” But our teachers said, this is a bill of divorce. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce. Rebbi Yannai shouted, you purified the women giving birth! Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: This is part of the testimony of Rebbi Onias from Hauran; as from Rebbi Ze‘ira: If this is part of the testimony of Rebbi Onias from Hauran then it was Rebbi Ḥanina who shouted, you purified the women giving birth!
“What is the placenta they mentioned? Anything looking like a thread of woof and its head is blown up like a lupine. Rabban Gamliel says, anything looking like chicken intestines and its head is blown up like a crop and it is hollow like a trumpet. No placenta is shorter than a hand-breadth.”
The Babylonian Talmud
What reply does R. Nathan make to this? He asks, Does Scripture state "one of the two middle watches"? No; the "middle watch" is explicitly mentioned.
The word berit "covenant" is mentioned in connection with salt and also with chastenings. With salt, as it is written, "Thou shalt not suffer the salt of the covenant of Thy God to be lacking" (Lev. ii. 13); and with chastenings, as it is written, "These are the words of the covenant" (Deut. xxviii. 69). As with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with salt, it is salt which sweetens meat, so with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with chastenings, they are chastenings which purge all the iniquities of man.
The word berit "covenant" is mentioned in connection with salt and also with chastenings. With salt, as it is written, "Thou shalt not suffer the salt of the covenant of Thy God to be lacking" (Lev. ii. 13); and with chastenings, as it is written, "These are the words of the covenant" (Deut. xxviii. 69). As with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with salt, it is salt which sweetens meat, so with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with chastenings, they are chastenings which purge all the iniquities of man.
The word berit "covenant" is mentioned in connection with salt and also with chastenings. With salt, as it is written, "Thou shalt not suffer the salt of the covenant of Thy God to be lacking" (Lev. ii. 13); and with chastenings, as it is written, "These are the words of the covenant" (Deut. xxviii. 69). As with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with salt, it is salt which sweetens meat, so with the "covenant" mentioned in connection with chastenings, they are chastenings which purge all the iniquities of man.
[not translated: and they are all (the verses mentioned there) written on His arm]
During the rest of the day there are many red streaks in it, but not at the afore-mentioned time.
R. Johanan also said in the name of R. Simeon b. Johai : Greater is the service of Torah than its study : as it is said, "Elisha the son of Shaphat is here, who poured water on the hands of Elijah" (II Kings iii. 11). It is not mentioned that he studied [with Elijah] but that he poured water. That teaches that its service is greater than its study.
Should the reason [of exemption] be on account of anxiety, then it ought also to apply to one whose ship has sunk at sea ! Shouldest thou say that he likewise is exempt, why does R. Abba b. Zabda declare in the name of Rab : A mourner is under the obligation to observe all the commandments mentioned in the Torah except Tefillin, because they are called an adornment ; as it is said, "Bind thine adornment upon thee" (Ezek. xxiv. 17)?
Come and hear : From the latter clause [of the quoted Baraita] "The general rule in this matter is that it depends upon the conclusion of the benediction" — what does "the general rule in this matter" intend to include? Is it not to include what we have mentioned?
No ; it is to include the instance of bread and dates. How is this to be understood ? Are we to suppose that it refers to one who ate bread and thinking that it was dates he had eaten, commences the benediction on the supposition it was dates, but concludes with the benediction for bread ? This is the same as the last-mentioned case!
MISHNAH V The exodus from Egypt must be mentioned at night. R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah said : Behold I am like one seventy years old, and I have never been worthy [to hear the reason] why the exodus from Egypt should he mentioned at night, until Ben Zoma expounded it [as follows].
MISHNAH V The exodus from Egypt must be mentioned at night. R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah said : Behold I am like one seventy years old, and I have never been worthy [to hear the reason] why the exodus from Egypt should he mentioned at night, until Ben Zoma expounded it [as follows].
GEMARA There is a teaching : Ben Zoma said to the Sages : Will the exodus from Egypt be mentioned in the days of the Messiah ? Has it not long ago been declared, "Therefore behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that they shall no more say. As the Lord liveth, that brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt ; but, as the Lord liveth, that brought up and that led the seed of the house of Israel out of the north country, and from all the countries whither I had driven them" (Jer. xxiii. 7f.)?
Did he afterwards finish the Shema' or did he not? Bar Kappara says : He did not afterwards finish it. R. Simeon b. Rabbi says : He did afterwards finish it. Bar Kappara said to R. Simeon b. Rabbi ; It is quite right according to me when I declare he did not afterwards finish it, because Rabbi used [every day] to deal with a theme in which the exodus from Egypt was mentioned; but according to thee who sayest that he did afterwards finish it, why did he [daily] deal with such a theme?
Rab washed his hands, read the Shema', put on the Tefillin and then offered his prayers. How could he act thus? For lo, there is a teaching : One who is digging a cavity for a corpse is exempt from the obligation of reading the Shema', the Tefillah, Tefillin and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah ; but when the time of reading the Shema' arrives, he ascends, washes his hands, puts on the Tefillin, reads the Shema' and offers his prayers?
Should the reason [of exemption] be on account of anxiety, then it ought to apply also to one whose ship has sunk at sea ! Why, then, does R. Abba b. Zabda declare in the name of Rab : A mourner is under the obligation to observe all the commandments mentioned in the Torah except Tefillin, because they are called an adornment; as it is said, "Bind thine adornment upon thee" (Ezek. xxiv. 17)?
MISHNAH He whose dead is lying before him [unburied] is exempt from the reading of the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah.
nor do others say Grace on his behalf or include him for Zimmun. He is likewise exempt from the reading of the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. On the Sabbath, however, he may recline at his meal, eat meat and drink wine, say Grace and arrange Zimmun, and others may say Grace on his behalf and include him for Zimmun ; and he is under the obligation of reading the Shema' and Tefillah, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says : Since he is under the obligation of these, he has obviously the obligation of them all !
nor do others say Grace on his behalf or include him for Zimmun. He is likewise exempt from the reading of the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. On the Sabbath, however, he may recline at his meal, eat meat and drink wine, say Grace and arrange Zimmun, and others may say Grace on his behalf and include him for Zimmun ; and he is under the obligation of reading the Shema' and Tefillah, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says : Since he is under the obligation of these, he has obviously the obligation of them all !
It is here at any rate taught that [the mourner, although he is not in the same room as the body,] is exempt from reading the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah ! Rab Pappa replied : [The Baraita] is to be interpreted as referring to one who turns his face from the body and eats. Rab Ashe said : Since the duty of burying rests upon him, it is to be regarded as though the body was lying before him; as it is said, "And Abraham rose up from before his dead" (Gen. xxiii. 3) and it is said "That I may bury my dead from before me" (ibid. v. 4), i.e. so long as the duty of burial rested upon him, it was as though the body was actually before him.
Who watches the body, although it is not his dead, is exempt from reading the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah ! "Who watches the body, although it is not his dead" [so stated the Baraita ; therefore it is to be inferred] if it is his dead, although he does not watch the body, [he is exempt].
It was stated above [in the Baraita] : "Who watches the body, although it is not his dead, is exempt from reading the Shema', from Tefillah, Tefillin, and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah." Should there be two [watchers], they take it in turn to watch and read. Ben Azzai says : Should they be bringing the body in a boat, they place it in one corner and they both pray in another corner !
But we are speaking of instances mentioned in our Mishnah ; and this is a Baraita !
Rab said to him : But lo, [Rab Adda] mentioned it was "by the ordinance of the Torah" ! And further, let us make all commands [of this class] obligatory upon women by Rabbinic authority !
And for what reason should he say this benediction ? If because it contains a reference to the Exodus from Egypt, he has already mentioned that in the Shema' !
If this be so, that which is mentioned in the sequel, viz. "This is an argument a fortiori which cannot be refuted" — what means it cannot be refuted? It is a natural proceeding!
What, then, does it signify? "Until" and including. Then the difficulty in the first clause remains, viz. : What is the point of variance between R. Judah and the Rabbis? Dost thou hold the opinion that when R. Judah mentioned "The middle of the afternoon" he meant the second half? He meant the first half, and he must be understood to say : When does the first half conclude and the latter half commence? At the expiration of the eleventh hour less a quarter.
[This last-mentioned] supports the teaching of R. Joshua b. Levi : It is forbidden to pass in front of those who are saying the Tefillah. But it is not so, seeing that R. Assi and R. Ammi did so pass ! It was beyond a distance of four cubits that R. Ammi and R. Assi passed.
The Halakah is in accord neither with Rab Huna nor R. Joshua b. Levi. [It is not] in accord with Rab Huna, as is here mentioned. [Nor is it] in accord with R. Joshua b. Levi who said : When the time of the afternoon Tefillah has arrived, it is forbidden to eat anything before praying the afternoon Tefillah.
R. Hillel, the son of R. Samuel b. Nahmani, said : They correspond to the eighteen times the Divine Name [JHWH] is mentioned by David in the Psalm "Ascribe unto the Lord, O ye sons of might" (Ps.xxix). Rab Joseph said : They correspond to the eighteen times the Divine Name is mentioned in the Shema'. R. Tanhum said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi : They correspond to the eighteen vertebrae in the spinal column.
R. Hillel, the son of R. Samuel b. Nahmani, said : They correspond to the eighteen times the Divine Name [JHWH] is mentioned by David in the Psalm "Ascribe unto the Lord, O ye sons of might" (Ps.xxix). Rab Joseph said : They correspond to the eighteen times the Divine Name is mentioned in the Shema'. R. Tanhum said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi : They correspond to the eighteen vertebrae in the spinal column.
To what do the seven Sabbath-benedictions correspond ? R. Halafta b. Saul said: To the seven "voices" which David mentioned concerning the waters (Ps. xxix.).
To what do the twenty-four benedictions of the fast day correspond ? R. Helbo said: To the twenty-four "cries" Solomon mentioned when he brought the Ark into the house of the Holy of Holies (I Kings viii.). In that case, one should say them every day! [No ;] when did Solomon say them ? On a day of supplication ; and so we likewise say them on a day of supplication.
It was mentioned above : "R. Tanhum declared in the name of R. Assi : If a man erred and omitted the reference to rain in the benediction of 'the Revival of the Dead,' we make him repeat it; [if he omitted] the request [for rain] in the benediction of 'the Years,' we do not make him repeat it, because he can include it in 'Who hearkenest unto prayer' ; but [if he omitted] the 'Division' in 'Thou favourest man with knowledge,' we do not make him repeat it, because he is able to say it over the cup of wine!"
MISHNAH We refer to rain in the benediction of "the Revival of the Dead" and the request [for rain] in the benediction of "the Years," and the "Division" in "Thou favourest man with knowledge." R. 'Akiba says : One should say the last mentioned as a fourth benediction by itself. R. Eliezer says : [It is to be included] in the "Thanksgiving."
He replied : Quite so, in certain circumstances it is great ; and that is what 'Ulla said : Why is "vengeance" mentioned twice in the verse? One for good, the other for evil — for good, as it is written, "He shone forth from Mount Paran" (Deut. xxxiii. 2) ; for evil, as it is written, "O Lord, Thou God, to Whom vengeance belongeth, Thou God, to Whom vengeance belongeth, shine forth" (Ps. xciv. 1).
R. 'Akiba says : One should say the last-mentioned as a fourth benediction by itself.
If he had specified wheaten-flour, I might have thought that it applies only to wheat, but barley requires no benediction at all ; therefore he mentioned it for us.
It has just been mentioned : "Rab and Samuel both say : A dish which contains one of the five species requires the benediction '...Who createst various kinds of foods'." It has likewise been reported : Rab and Samuel both say: A dish which is of the five species requires the benediction "...Who createst various kinds of foods."
"A land of Olive-trees" — R. Jose b. R. Hannina said: [This means], a land where the standard for everything is the size of the olive. The standard for everything, dost imagine? Lo, there are the others just mentioned ! Nay, [the meaning is], a land where the standard for most things is the size of the olive.
Our Rabbis have taught : Who is an 'Am ha'ares? Whoever does not read the Shema' evening and morning — these are the words of R. Eliezer; but R. Joshua says : Whoever does not lay Tefillin. Ben 'Azzai says : Whoever has no Sisit on his garment. R. Nathan says : Whoever has no Mezuzah on his door. R. Nathan b. Joseph says : Whoever has sons and does not rear them to the study of Torah. Others declare : Even if one has studied Torah and Mishnah but has not ministered to the disciples of the wise, he is an 'Am ha'ares. Rab Huna said : The Halakah is in accord with the last mentioned.
Rab Huna b. Rab Joshua said : This refers only to three, where the Divine Name is not mentioned ; but with ten, where the Name is mentioned, the matter is clear. As our Mishnah teaches : As he blesses, exactly so do they respond after him: "Blessed be the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of hosts, Who is enthroned above the Cherubim, for the food of which we have partaken."
Rab Huna b. Rab Joshua said : This refers only to three, where the Divine Name is not mentioned ; but with ten, where the Name is mentioned, the matter is clear. As our Mishnah teaches : As he blesses, exactly so do they respond after him: "Blessed be the Lord our God, the God of Israel, the God of hosts, Who is enthroned above the Cherubim, for the food of which we have partaken."
For mountains and hills... he says, "Blessed...Who hast made the Creation." Is it then to be supposed that all the other things hitherto mentioned do not belong to the work of Creation? For lo, it is written, "He maketh lightnings for the rain" (Ps. cxxxv. 7)! Abbai said : Connect them all and learn them together. Raba said : In the former instances he pronounces two benedictions : "Blessed...Whose strength fills the world and Who hast made the Creation" ; but here "...Who hast made the Creation" is applicable, but "Whose strength fills the world" is not applicable.
Rab Nahman b. Isaac objected : Therefore since the word wayyiser is not mentioned in connection with the animal it has no evil impulse, and yet we see it injuring and biting and kicking ! Nay [the double yod is to be explained] according to the statement of R. Simeon b. Pazzi who said : Woe to me because of my Creator [yoseri], and woe to me because of my impulse [yisri].
Shouldest thou argue that Boaz mentioned [the Divine Name in his salutation] of his own accord, come and hear: "The Lord is with thee, thou mighty man of valour" (Judges vi. 12). Shouldest thou argue that it was an angel that spake to Gideon, come and hear : "Despise not thy mother when she is old" (Prov. xxiii. 22).
(throughout all Seder Mo'ed when these pairs are mentioned together [some] substitute the name of R. Yonatan for that of R. Yohanan),
"A land of olive-oil" [is an allusion to the] land all of whose [minimum] standards [for mandated and forbidden things] is the bulk of an olive. How can it possibly mean all minimum measures? But aren't there those which we have just mentioned? Say rather, ‘The majority of whose [minimum] measures are the bulk of an olive....
And [all the three laws were] necessary. For if he had mentioned only [the law relating to] the alleyway one would have assumed [that there the sukkah is valid] because it had two proper walls, but that in the case of partitions of wells, which do not have not two proper walls, the sukkah is not valid.
What is the reason of R. Judah? He deduces the word ‘take’ from the word ‘take’ mentioned in connection with the bundle of hyssop. It is written there, "And you shall take a bundle of hyssop," (Exodus 12:22) and it is written here, "And you shall take you on the first day" (Leviticus 23:40). Just as there it was taken in a ‘bundle, so here also it must be taken in a bundle. And the rabbis? They do not deduce ‘take’ from ‘take’.
It has been taught: R. Hanania b. Akavya said: Scribes writing [Torah] scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot, their agents and their agents’ agents, and all who are engaged in holy work including sellers of blue [for tzitzit] are exempt from the obligation of prayer and tefillin and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah, to confirm the words of R. Yose the Galilean, for R. Yose the Galilean used to say: He who is occupied with the performance of a mitzvah is [at that time] exempt from other mitzvot
GEMARA. Waving? Who mentioned this ? It refers to there: A lulav which has a length of three handbreadths, sufficient to wave with it, is valid, and our mishnah says, And where [in the service] do they wave [the lulav]?
But who mentioned the Sabbatical Year? There is something missing in the text, and so it should be read: The tithing of the etrog depends upon [the time of its] picking, and its subjection to the laws of the Sabbatical Year depends on [the time of its] blossoming. But our Rabbis voted in Usha and said that ... the etrog is dependent on the time of its picking as regards both tithing and the Sabbatical Year.