fortiori

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua at the meat-market of Emmaus, where they went to buy meat for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamaliel's son: What [is the law concerning] a man who had intercourse with his sister, his father's sister and his mother's sister? Is he liable for one sacrifice for all of them, or to one [separate sacrifice] for each of them? They replied: we have heard nothing [about this], but we have heard that if one had intercourse with five menstruants in one spell of unawareness, he is liable to a sacrifice for each [act], and it seems to us that the case [you asked about] may be derived by an a fortiori conclusion (kal vehomer).

Rebbi Berekhiah said that Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Yose: “What are we dealing with? There one makes him an appendix for ten, one should say that here one should make him an appendix for three. Since there one makes him an appendix for the mention of the Divine Name, here, when one does not mention the Divine Name, a fortiori should one make him an appendix.” He answered him: “It is not a fortiori! There, since they must mention the Name, one makes him anappendix; here, since one does not recite the Name, there is no need to make him an appendix!”

Rebbi Berekhiah said that Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Yose: “What are we dealing with? There one makes him an appendix for ten, one should say that here one should make him an appendix for three. Since there one makes him an appendix for the mention of the Divine Name, here, when one does not mention the Divine Name, a fortiori should one make him an appendix.” He answered him: “It is not a fortiori! There, since they must mention the Name, one makes him anappendix; here, since one does not recite the Name, there is no need to make him an appendix!”

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which cannot be acquired within four cubits can be acquired by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which cannot be acquired within four cubits can be acquired by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

“ The administrators of charity should not publicly announce on a holiday in the way they announce on weekdays, but they collect in private, carry it in their bosom, and distribute for each quarter separately. The administrators of the charity chest should not be inquisitive in the courtyards of those who eat from the yield of the Sabbatical year. If one gave them bread it is permitted, because Jews are not suspected of giving anything other than money or eggs.” Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas: That means, at a place where people sow but do not eat. Since they are not suspected to eat, a fortiori not to feed.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Does the border wall save vegetables from melons? If the border wall does not save different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits? Does planting melon save on top of the border wall? If different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved by eight cubits? Rebbi Judan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, is that a reasoning a fortiori? It must be as follows: If different kinds of grains that are saved by 12.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits?

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Does the border wall save vegetables from melons? If the border wall does not save different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits? Does planting melon save on top of the border wall? If different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved by eight cubits? Rebbi Judan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, is that a reasoning a fortiori? It must be as follows: If different kinds of grains that are saved by 12.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits?

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Does the border wall save vegetables from melons? If the border wall does not save different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits? Does planting melon save on top of the border wall? If different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved by eight cubits? Rebbi Judan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, is that a reasoning a fortiori? It must be as follows: If different kinds of grains that are saved by 12.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits?

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Does the border wall save vegetables from melons? If the border wall does not save different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits? Does planting melon save on top of the border wall? If different kinds of grains that are saved by 10.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved by eight cubits? Rebbi Judan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said, is that a reasoning a fortiori? It must be as follows: If different kinds of grains that are saved by 12.5 cubits are not saved on top of the border wall, does this not apply a fortiori to melons that are saved only by twelve cubits?

How long does it have to be to jail? Rebbi Zeïra said, let us infer it from a vineyard. Just as you say in regard to a vineyard that there is no difference between length and separation, so here also there is no difference between length and separation. That is fine according to the opinion of Ḥizqiah; there eight and here also eight. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, with how much will it jail? If you say with eight, is there an argument a fortiori that a strip of melons among onions will jail only with twelve? But a melon strip, which you empowered among melon strips to save by a mere eight, will be jailed by eight, melon strips among onions, which you weakened to save only by twelve, certainly will be jailed only by eight. If you say that a melon strip among onions will be jailed only by twelve, then an argument a fortiori shows that a melon strip among melons should be jailed only by twelve.

How long does it have to be to jail? Rebbi Zeïra said, let us infer it from a vineyard. Just as you say in regard to a vineyard that there is no difference between length and separation, so here also there is no difference between length and separation. That is fine according to the opinion of Ḥizqiah; there eight and here also eight. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, with how much will it jail? If you say with eight, is there an argument a fortiori that a strip of melons among onions will jail only with twelve? But a melon strip, which you empowered among melon strips to save by a mere eight, will be jailed by eight, melon strips among onions, which you weakened to save only by twelve, certainly will be jailed only by eight. If you say that a melon strip among onions will be jailed only by twelve, then an argument a fortiori shows that a melon strip among melons should be jailed only by twelve.

MISHNAH: They established a comprehensive principle for the Sabbatical: Everything that is food for humans or animals or material for dye and cannot be preserved in the ground is subject to the Sabbatical and its proceeds are subject to the Sabbatical; it is subject to removal and its proceeds are subject to removal. What are these? This is the leaf of wild arum, mint, endives, leeks, purslain and milk bud. Animal feed, thistles and thorns. Dyestuffs, the wild growth of isatis and safflower. These are subject to the Sabbatical and their proceeds are subject to the Sabbatical; both they and their proceeds are subject to removal. They established another principle for the Sabbatical: Everything that is food for humans or animals or dyestuff and is preserved in the ground is subject to the Sabbatical; its proceeds are subject to the Sabbatical; it is not subject to removal nor are its proceeds subject to removal. What are these? These are the root of wild arum, the root of mint, ceterach, ḥalbiẓin, and wild nard. Kinds of dyestuffs: madder and campeachy-wood. These and their proceeds are subject to the Sabbatical; these and their proceeds are not subject to removal. Rebbi Meïr says, their proceeds have to be removed before New Year’s Day. They said to him, they do not have to be removed, a fortiori their proceeds. Pomegranate skins and its peduncles, nut shells, and pits are subject to the Sabbatical and so are their proceeds. The dyer dyes for himself; he should not dye for payment because one does not treat the produce of the Sabbatical as merchandise, nor firstlings or heaves, carcasses, torn animals, abominations, and crawling things. One may not buy vegetables to sell them on the market but he may collect and his son sells for him. If he bought for himself and has leftovers, it is permitted to sell them. If somebody bought a first-born animal for his son’s wedding or for a holiday and now does not need it, he may sell it. Catchers of wild animals, birds, or fish who accidentally caught impure species may sell them. Rebbi Jehudah says, even one who incidentally has such an opportunity may take and sell them on condition that this not be his profession, but the Sages prohibit it.

Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah deals with any harvesting-basket. “Rebbi Simeon permits by a reasoning a fortiori: Since you say it is permitted if it carries the potential obligation of three tithes, so much more if it carries only the potential obligation of two tithes.” Does the First Tithe create ṭevel for the Second? Since you say it is permitted if it carries the potential obligation of two tithes, so much more if it carries only the potential obligation of one tithe.

It is written (Deut. 25:4): “Do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” Is there only an ox in the cut and a human in the standing? May a human eat from the cut? If an ox which does not eat from the standing may eat from the cut, a human who may eat from the standing should a fortiori be able to eat from the cut. The verse says, “do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” To an ox applies “do not muzzle”; to a human “do not muzzle” does not apply. May an ox eat from the standing? If a human who does not eat from the cut may eat from the standing, an ox which may eat from the cut should a fortiori be able to eat from the standing. This means, if “do not muzzle” applies to one case, it also should apply to the other. The verse says, “do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” You may not muzzle him when he is threshing but you may muzzle him for what is standing on the ground.

It is written (Deut. 25:4): “Do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” Is there only an ox in the cut and a human in the standing? May a human eat from the cut? If an ox which does not eat from the standing may eat from the cut, a human who may eat from the standing should a fortiori be able to eat from the cut. The verse says, “do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” To an ox applies “do not muzzle”; to a human “do not muzzle” does not apply. May an ox eat from the standing? If a human who does not eat from the cut may eat from the standing, an ox which may eat from the cut should a fortiori be able to eat from the standing. This means, if “do not muzzle” applies to one case, it also should apply to the other. The verse says, “do not muzzle an ox while he is threshing.” You may not muzzle him when he is threshing but you may muzzle him for what is standing on the ground.

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, even on the Sabbath, and certainly the First. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, that it should not become an obligation. Did we not hold: “Before the Two Breads one should not bring but if somebody brought it is acceptable?” It is different here since the occasion was news, that it should not become an obligation. Did we not state: “If they were without blemish they should be sacrificed”? It is different here since the occasion was news, that it should not become an obligation.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi (Yannai) in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: They asked Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, may a person sell a Torah scroll in order to marry a wife? He said to them, yes. To study Torah? Yes. For his livelihood? He did not respond. Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: They asked Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, may a person sell a Torah scroll in order to marry a wife? He said to them, yes. To study Torah? Yes. For his livelihood they did not ask and he did not respond. According to Rebbi Jonah it is understandable: They did not ask, therefore he did not respond. According to Rebbi Yose, if they asked him, why did he not respond? When Rebbi Ḥanania came, Rebbi Phineas, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel: A person may sell to marry a wife and to study Torah, and a fortiori for his livelihood.

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one brought in half a dried fig and took out half a dried fig he is liable. What Rebbi Joḥanan said does not follow Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “If one took out half a dried fig and again took out half a dried fig during one period of oblivion, he is liable; during different periods of oblivion he is not liable. Rebbi Yose said, during one period of oblivion and one domain he is liable, during one period of oblivion and two domains or during two periods of oblivion and one domain he is not liable.” We find this difficult. If two different transorts do not combine following Rebbi Yose, a fortiori also not bringing in and taking out? Therefore what Rebbi Joḥanan said could not follow Rebbi Yose.

What is the difference between intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works or in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works? Rebbi Yose said, why intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works makes him liable for each single one? For if you tell him that this is [forbidden] work, he stops doing it and does other works. Why in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional about works makes him liable only once? For if you tell him that it is a Sabbath, he stops immediately. What if he is in error in both respects? Rav Hamnuna said, he is liable only once. Rebbi Zeˋira said to him, is that not a case a fortiori? If he is intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error about works, is he not liable for each single one? Because there was added for him the error regarding work on the Sabbath; the error about works is lost?

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: If one harvested half the volume of a dried fig on this Sabbath, intentional regarding the Sabbath and in error regarding the work, and half the volume of a dried fig on another Sabbath, in error regarding the Sabbath and intentional regarding the work; do the errors combine? Is it possible to say Sabbaths divide, Sabbaths combine? Do not trays divide and trays combine? He answered, I do not know the reason for the tray. Is this not a baraita? If he wrote one letter on a weekday and one letter on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable. Rebbi Azariah said before Rebbi Mana, explain it by intent. He said to him, is this not an argument a fortiori? Since intent neither divides nor combines, error which does not divide a fortiori does not combine.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says, one hangs the yeast-sieve,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages did not disagree that one sets up new tents on the Sabbath. Where do they disagree? About extending, for Rebbi Eliezer says one adds on a holiday but one does not add on a Sabbath, but the Sages say, one does not add on a holiday, and it is not necessary to say on a Sabbath.” Do we not deal here with an addition? Rebbi Abbin bar Cahana said, explain it about a new yeast-sieve which he turns into an implement. A fortiori.

If they were exiled from one place to another and wanted to change their ways? Would it be as Rebbi Abba said, the people of Mesha took it upon themselves not to travel on the ocean. They came, asked Rebbi, and said to him, our forefathers used not to travel by sea; what is our situation? He said to them, since your forefathers treated it as a prohibition, do not change the usage of your deceased ancestors. May a person not ask about his vow? There he asks when he made the vow, but here their ancestors made the vow. Then they should be permitted a fortiori. Rebbi Ḥanania said, it is not because of this but because of the following. Rebbi was the student of Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Jehudah said, one is forbidden to travel by sea.

For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of an olive, it is qualified. For those who eat it in volumes of an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive, it is qualified a fortiori. For those who eat it in volumes of half an olive and those who cannot eat it in volumes of half an olive? Where do we hold? If intent was qualifying, intent is disqualifying. If intent is not disqualifying then the intent should be qualifying. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the intent in qualifying, as we have stated there: “To eat half the volume of an olive and to burn half the volume of an olive is qualified since slaughter and burning do not combine.” If he slaughtered it that half of its group should be covered, Rebbi Jonah disqualifies. It is as grabbing the cover for these and those. Since these are not covered, neither are those covered. Rebbi Yose said, it is qualified. During the second cycle, Rebbi Yose retracted. Rebbi Phineas said to him, did the rabbi not teach us, it is qualified. He told him, is this fixed for you by nails?

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining \others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? Every man a sheep for the family, if they want for the house. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, every man a sheep for the family, a fortiori for the house. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not a woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

It is written and he shall bring it inside the curtain, and put the incense in the fire before the Eternal, that he should not prepare outside and bring inside, since the Sadducees are saying, he shall prepare outside and then bring inside. If one does this before flesh and blood, a fortiori before the Omnipresent. Also it says, for in a cloud I shall appear over the cover. The Sages said to them, has it not already been said, he shall put the incense in the fire before the Eternal; only inside he puts it on. If it is so, why was it said, for in a cloud I shall appear over the cover? This teaches that he has to put in smoke-creating herb. From where that he has to add smoke-creating herb? The verse says, the incense shall cover the cover over the chest,lest he die. If he failed to add smoke-creating herb or left out any of its ingredients he has committed a deadly sin. Lest he die, that is the punishment. For in a cloud I shall appear over the cover, this is the warning.

“The child.” Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari were sitting. They said, we have stated: Who is a child? Any who cannot ride on his father’s shoulder.” And can a child hear and can a child speak? They turned around and said, all your males, to include the child. Or should we say, to include the deaf-mute? So they should hear and learn, to exclude (the child) [the deaf-mute. Or should we say, so they should hear and learn, to exclude the child?] Rebbi Yose said, since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: May a deaf-mute child be liable? He said to him, come and see; the permanent dweller (in Heaven) [on earth] and the traveller in the highest Heaven? Since an adult deaf-mute is not liable, a child deaf-mute not a fortiori? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it would have been logical that a child who is no deaf-mute should be not liable. It is the decision of the verse, all your males, to include the child. I would say, but a (child) [adult] deaf-mute should be liable, not to split the practice of males. Therefore what Rebbi Yose said is necessary: since one verse excludes and one verse includes, I am including the child who will be able to come in the future, and excluding the deaf-mute who will not be able to come in the future.

Rebbi Jonathan in the name of Rebbi: If somebody eats food which is third degree impure for heave, his body is disqualified from eating heave. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked, how? Rebbi follows Rebbi Eliezer? As we have stated there, “He who eats food impure in the first degree is impure in the first degree. He who eats food impure in the second degree is impure in the second degree. He who eats food impure in the third degree is impure in the third degree.” It is everybody’s opinion, so he should stay away from heave. And similarly, if somebody eats food which is second degree impure for tithe, is his body disqualified from eating tithe? Let us hear from the following: “But the Sages forbid for tithe.” They had not heard that Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, what means “but the Sages forbid for tithe”? His body is disqualified from eating tithe. And similarly, if somebody eats food which is fourth degree impure for sancta, is his body disqualified from eating sancta? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, they made him like one eating fourth degree impure food for sancta. This implies, if somebody eats food which is fourth degree impure for sancta, his body is disqualified from eating sancta. So far in Temple sancta which were sanctified. Or also for profane food prepared in the standards of sancta? Let us hear from the following, [as we stated there]: “If somebody slaughters domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, and no blood came out from them, they are qualified and may be eaten with unclean hands, since they were not prepared by blood. Rebbi Simeon says, they were prepared by slaughter.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The Mishnah is about profane food prepared in the standards of sancta following Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If somebody eats food which is third degree impure for heave, his body is disqualified from eating heave. Is that not a Mishnah that third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta? The Mishnah is about Temple sancta which were sanctified. He tells you in addition, even for profane food prepared in the standards of sancta. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze`ira: The Mishnah says so, “loaves of sancta bread; the water in their cavities is sanctified.” Does it displease you that it comes to tell you that he makes fluid by your pronouncement like sanctified fluid? Rebbi Ze`ira said, as you are saying there, one made one pure for the ashes of the Red Cow equal to the water for the ashes of the Red Cow and to the ashes of the Red Cow, and here one made fluid by your pronouncement like sanctified fluid. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Yannai, and it is unknown whether this is in the name of Rebbi: There is a Mishnah which is both confirmation and disproof. From it confirmation: “For third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta, but not second degree impurity for heave, if it was prepared by the standards of heave.” But if it was prepared in the standards of sancta, his body is second degree impure for sancta. From it disproof: For third degree impurity is second degree impurity for sancta, but not second degree impurity for heave, if it was prepared by the standards of sancta. But if it was prepared in the standards of heave, his body is second degree impure for heave and a fortiori for sancta.

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

One marries neither the king’s widow nor his divorcee, because they were secluded to the day of their death, living in widowhood. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This teaches that David had them braided and adorned, and brought them before himself every day and told his evil inclination, you desire something which is forbidden to you; by your life, I shall make you desire what is permitted to you. The rabbis of Caesarea said, they actually were forbidden to him. If a private person’s vessel used by a private person is forbidden for the king’s use, a fortiori the king is forbidden to use the king’s vessels which were used by a private person.

HALAKHAH: But the following are strangled,” etc. From where warning for one who hits his father or his mother? Forty times he shall hit him, he may not add. Since one who is commanded to hit is commanded not to hit, one who is commanded not to hit a fortiori is commanded not to hit.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

Rebbi Simeon, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: a Jewish braider should not braid a Gentile because of “do not give on them charm.” Also a Jew should not be a Gentile’s best man because of do not contract marriage with them. Rebbi Isaac from Gufta asked before Rebbi Mana: It is forbidden to go to their wedding feasts, not a fortiori to become his best man? He told him, to put a biblical prohibition on it.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, even his fine flour becomes forbidden and another person’s is permitted. Is this following him who said, whether it was his or another person’s, it is forbidden; did he say that they do not disagree about something which is not alive and Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya comes to tell you that the baraita refers to living things? If they disagree about something which is not alive; therefore a living thing is forbidden. Then something which is not alive should be forbidden a fortiori. This is that you should not say as you say there, anything living while it cannot become forbidden for a private person it becomes forbidden for Heaven, so similarly anything which is not yours even though it cannot become forbidden for a private person it becomes forbidden for Heaven

Ahi [asked of him] a Tanna of the school of R. Hiyya, asked R. Hiyya : May one interrupt the Hallel or the Megillah [to greet a person] ? Do we argue a fortiori : If with the reading of the Shema', which is an ordinance of the Torah, one may interrupt, how much more so should it be permitted in the case of the Hallel or the Megillah, which is only a Rabbinical ordinance ! Or is it perhaps that the proclamation of a miracle is superior [to the reading of the [Shema'] ?

And may we not use the a fortiori argument ? As the womb receives [the seed] in silence and yields up [the child] with loud cries, how much more so will the grave, which receives [the body] with loud cries [of lament], yield up with loud cries ! Hence a refutation of those who assert that the resurrection of the dead is not taught in the Torah.

R. Johanan said : We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument, and the injunction to say Grace before meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning. We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument : If a meal which requires no benediction before it requires one after it, is it not right that the reading of the Torah, which does require a benediction before it, should require one after it ! And we derive the injunction to say Grace after meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning : If the reading of the Torah, which requires no benediction after it, requires one before it, is it not right that a meal, which does require a benediction after it, should require one before it !

R. Johanan said : We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument, and the injunction to say Grace before meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning. We derive the injunction to utter a benediction after reading the Torah from the Grace after meals by a fortiori argument : If a meal which requires no benediction before it requires one after it, is it not right that the reading of the Torah, which does require a benediction before it, should require one after it ! And we derive the injunction to say Grace after meals from the benediction over the reading of the Torah by a similar method of reasoning : If the reading of the Torah, which requires no benediction after it, requires one before it, is it not right that a meal, which does require a benediction after it, should require one before it !

It is quoted in objection: "What I have permitted thee in one place I have forbidden thee in another, [and this is an argument a fortiori which cannot be refuted"] — does this not refer to the Tefillin? It is quite right if thou sayest that the above Baraita emanates from Bet Hillel; for then I have permitted thee elsewhere [to enter] a regular privy [with Tefillin], but here I forbid thee [to enter] a chance privy ! On the other hand, if thou sayest that it emanates from Bet Shammai, they do not permit it in either case !

If this be so, that which is mentioned in the sequel, viz. "This is an argument a fortiori which cannot be refuted" — what means it cannot be refuted? It is a natural proceeding!

If so, why does it mention "[This is an argument a fortiori] which cannot be refuted "? [What has just been said] is an excellent refutation !

But this is what he means to say : This question [of carrying Tefillin in a regular privy but not a chance one] thou mayest argue with a reason; but thou must not argue it by means of a fortiori deduction, for if thou usest this method of argument, it is an argument which cannot be refuted.

responded to him?" he replied "No," "And if thou hadst responded to him, what would they have done to thee?" He answered, "They would have cut off my head with the sword." He said to him, "May we not use the a fortiori argument : If thou standing before a human king, who is here to-day and to-morrow in the grave, actest thus, how much more so I who was standing before the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, Who lives and endures for all eternity?"

Rab Nahman b. Isaac replied : We draw an a fortiori conclusion from the Tefillah : If of the Tefillah where [the Habdalah] was originally instituted they say : He who pronounced the "Division" in the Tefillah must do so again over the cup of wine, how much more so must one who says the Habdalah over the cup of wine, where it was not originally instituted, [say it in the Tefillah] !

This is no difficulty ; for we can use a fortiori reasoning — if he is to bless God when he is satisfied, how much more so when he is hungry ! We find this in connection with

That is no difficulty ; because it can be derived by a fortiori reasoning — if he says a benediction when satisfied, how much more so when hungry ! According to him

Our Rabbis have taught : Whence do we derive the Grace after meals from the Torah? As it is said, "And thou shalt eat and be satisfied and bless" (Deut. viii. 10) — this refers to the benediction "Who feedest"; "the Lord thy God" (ibid.)— to the benediction of Zimmun; "for the land" (ibid.) — to the benediction of "the land" ; "the good" (ibid.) — to "Who. . . rebuildest Jerusalem," for so it states "That goodly hill-country and Lebanon" (ibid. iii. 25); "which He hath given thee" (ibid. viii. 10) — to "Who art kind and dealest kindly." I have here only the Grace after meals ; whence do we derive the Grace before meals ? Thou canst reason by a fortiori argument — if a man should bless God when satisfied, how much more so when he is hungry !

I have here only the benediction for meals ; whence is the benediction over Torah derived? R. Ishmael said : By a fortiori reasoning — for temporal life one says a benediction ; how much more so for the life of the world to come! R. Hiyya b. Nahmani, the disciple of R. Ishmael, says in the name of R. Ishmael : [This reasoning] is unnecessary ; for it states, "For the good land which He hath given thee" (Deut. viii. 10) and elsewhere it is stated, "And I will give thee the tables of stone, and the law and the commandments," etc. (Exod. xxiv, 12).

A man should not behave with levity towards the Eastern Gate [of the Temple], since it is directed towards the Holy of Holies. Nor may one enter the Temple Mount with his staff, his sandal, his wallet, and with the dust upon his feet ; nor may he use it as a short cut, and to expectorate [on the Temple Mount is forbidden] a fortiori. At the conclusion of every benediction in the Sanctuary they used to say

And to expectorate on the Temple Mount is forbidden a fortiori. Rab Bebai said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi : Whoever expectorates on the Temple Mount in this time is as though he expectorates into the pupil of his eye; as it is said, "And Mine eyes and My heart shall be there perpetually" (I Kings ix. 3).

He replied : The Tanna derives it from the shoe, and thou sayest [it should be derived] from the short cut — how can that be? For there is a teaching : A man must not enter the Temple Mount with his staff in his hand, his shoe upon his foot, and his money tied up in his cloth or in his money-bag thrown over his shoulder, nor may he make it a short cut ; and [the prohibition of] expectoration is derived a fortiori from the shoe — as in the case of a shoe which is not in itself contemptible the Torah declares, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet" (Exod. iii. 5), must not expectoration, which is in itself contemptible, be all the more forbidden !

R. Jose b. Judah says : [This reasoning] is unnecessary ; for it is stated, "For none might enter within the king's gate clothed with sackcloth" (Esther iv. 2) — and is there not here an a fortiori deduction : If it is thus with sackcloth which is not a disgusting thing in the presence of human beings, must not expectoration, which is disgusting in the presence of the supreme King of kings, be all the more prohibited !

R. Judah, the chief of orators in every place, began with the honour of the Torah and expounded : "Now Moses used to take the tent and pitch it without the camp" (Exod. xxxiii. 7). Can we not use here an a fortiori argument : If of the Ark of God, which was never more than twelve Mil distant, the Torah declares, "Everyone that sought the Lord went out unto the tent of meeting, which was without the camp" (ibid.), how much more so, the disciples of the wise who go from city to city and from province to province to study Torah!

R. Nehemiah began [to speak] in honour of the hospitality and expounded : What means that which is written, "And Saul said unto the Kenites, Go, depart, get you down from among the Amalekites, lest I destroy you with them ; for ye showed kindness to all the children of Israel, when they came up out of Egypt" (I Sam. 15:6)? Can we not use here an a fortiori argument : If Jethro, who only befriended Moses for his own honour, is treated with so much consideration, how much more so one who entertains a disciple of the wise in his house, giving him to eat and drink, and allowing him to enjoy his possessions!

R. Jose began [to speak] in honour of the hospitality and expounded : "Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for he is thy brother; thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, because thou wast a stranger in his land" (Deut. xxiii. 8). Can we not use here an a fortiori argument? If the Egyptians are not to be abhorred, who only befriended the Israelites for their own needs — as it is said, "And if thou knowest any able men among them, then make them rulers over my cattle" (Gen. xlvii. 6) — how much more so, one who entertains a disciple of the wise in his house, giving him to eat and drink, and allowing him to enjoy his possessions!

R. Eliezer, the son of R. Jose of Galilee, began [to speak] in honour of the hospitality and expounded : "And the Lord blessed Obed-Edom and all his house...because of the Ark of God" (II Sam. vi. llf.). Can we not use here an a fortiori argument? If the Ark which neither ate nor drank, but which Obed-Edom swept and besprinkled, brought him a blessing, how much more so one who entertains a disciple of the wise, giving him to eat and drink, and allowing him to enjoy his possessions !

They answered him: Any a fortiori argument which begins with a stringency and concludes with a leniency is not a valid argument.

And this is what R. Elazar said: What is the implication of the text, “It has been told to you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires of you: Only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?” (Micah 6:8): ‘To do justly’ means [to act in accordance with] justice; ‘to love mercy’ refers to acts of loving kindness’, ‘and to walk humbly with your God’ refers to attending to funerals and providing a bride with a dowry for her wedding. Now can we not make an a fortiori deduction: If in matters which are normally performed publicly the Torah says ‘to walk humbly’, how much more so in matters that are normally done privately?

“And the land shall mourn, every family apart; the family of the house of David apart, and their wives apart” (Zechariah 12:12). They said: Is there not an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument? If in the future when they will be engaged in mourning and the evil inclination will have no power over them, the Torah nevertheless says, men separately and women separately, how much more so now when they are engaged in rejoicing and the evil inclination has sway over them.

and cast it into the Deep so that it should subside?” No one said a word. David said, “Whoever knows the answer and does not speak, may he be suffocated”. Ahitophel adduced an a fortiori argument to himself: “If, for the purpose of establishing harmony between man and wife, the Torah said, Let My name that was written in sanctity be blotted out by the water,how much more so may it be done in order to establish peace in the world!” He [Ahitophel] said to him, “It is permitted!”

It has also been taught: Priests at their [Temple] service, Levites on their platform, Israelites at their station — all stop their service in order to come and hear the reading of the Megillah. From this the members of the house of Rabbi relied that they were to stop the study of Torah in order to come and hear the reading of the Megillah. They argued a fortiori from the case of the [Temple] service. If the Temple service, which is so important, may be abandoned, how much more the study of the Torah?

It has been taught: R. Elazar HaKappar says: The synagogues and study houses in Babylon will in time to come be planted in Eretz Israel, as it says, “For as Tabor among the mountains and as Carmel by the sea came” (Jeremiah 46:18-19). Now can we not draw an a fortiori inference from here: Seeing that Carmel and Tabor which came only on a single occasion to learn the Torah were set in Eretz Israel, how much more so with the synagogues and study houses of learning where the Torah is read and spread throughout the land.

And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

R. Abohu said that R. Eliezer said, As to the disciples of the wise, the flame of Gehenna has no power over them. For this is shewn by an a fortiori argument drawn from the salamander. And what is the salamander? It is a creature of fire. He that anoints himself with its blood, flame has no power over him. How much more the disciples of the wise, whose whole body is fire, as it is written, "Is not my word like as fire, saith the LORD?" (Jer. xxiii. 29) Resh Lakish said, The flame of Gehenna has no power over the transgressors of Israel. How much less over the altar of gold! As in the case of the altar of gold, upon which is only about the thickness of a denarius of gold, for ever so many years the flame has had no power over it, how much less can it have power over the transgressors of Israel, who are full of the commandments as a pomegranate is full of seeds, as it is written, "Thy temples are like a piece of a pomegranate" (Cant. iv. 3). Read not, "thy temples" but, the vain fellows that are in thee.

Bar Pada said It stands to reason, a fortiori, since a priest who successfully takes away priesthood from his fellow keeps his priesthood, a priest who is unsuccessful remains a priest. Ravina argues, if so, false witnesses can never be punished

R' Yochanan says A fortiori, if the one that intentionally acted is not exiled then the one that did not act [i.e. he spoke], even though he did it intentionally, should not be exiled.

GEMARA: We learned [in a beraisa], Beribi says, If the witnesses didn't succeed in having their victim killed they are executed if they did succeed in having him killed they aren't executed. His father asked him, My son isn't this a fortiori? [which would imply the opposite ruling]

He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori. We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.

Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [punishment for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets punished for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be punished] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori.

Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [punishment for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets punished for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be punished] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori.

We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".

We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]? The Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".

Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [the scriptural warning for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets a scriptural warning for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be scripturally warned] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a scriptural warning from a fortiori.

Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [the scriptural warning for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets a scriptural warning for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be scripturally warned] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a scriptural warning from a fortiori.

Achitofel reasoned to himself with a fortiori. He said to himself, If in regards to making peace between a man and his wife the Torah says, "My name that was written with holiness should be erased in water", then [in order to make peace] for the entire world is it not even more so? [Achitofel] said to [Dovid], It is permissible. [Dovid] wrote [God's] name on a shard and threw it into the deeps. [The water] calmed and remained in its place.

GEMARA: What is the reason [that he doesn't go to exile if the high priest dies before he gets there]? Abaye says it's a fortiori, And just as someone who was already in exile goes out [with the death the high priest], then now, someone who never went to exile should certainly not be exiled. But maybe the one was exiled got an atonement, and the one who wasn't exiled didn't [get his atonement]? Is exile the thing that grants atonement? The death of the high priest is what grants atonement.

And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?