permission
293 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.
MISHNAH: If a potter put his pots in a private courtyard without permission and an animal of the owner broke them, [the owner] is not liable; if [the animal] was hurt, the owner of the pots is liable. But if he puts them there with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable.
MISHNAH: If a potter put his pots in a private courtyard without permission and an animal of the owner broke them, [the owner] is not liable; if [the animal] was hurt, the owner of the pots is liable. But if he puts them there with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable.
HALAKHAH: “If a potter put his pots,” etc. If he put his pots in a private courtyard without permission and a bull came from another place and broke them, he is not liable. If it was hurt by them, he is not liable. This implies that ‘horn’ is not liable in a courtyard which belongs to neither party.
MISHNAH: If somebody put his produce in a private courtyard without permission and an animal of the owner ate them, [the owner] is not liable; if [the animal] was hurt, the owner of the produce is liable. But if he puts them there with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable.
MISHNAH: If somebody put his produce in a private courtyard without permission and an animal of the owner ate them, [the owner] is not liable; if [the animal] was hurt, the owner of the produce is liable. But if he puts them there with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody put his produce in a private courtyard,” etc. If he put his produce in a private courtyard without permission and a bull came from another place and ate them, he is not liable. If it was hurt by them, he is not liable. This implies that the ‘tooth’ is not liable in a courtyard which belongs to neither party.
MISHNAH: If somebody put his bull in a private courtyard without permission and the owner’s bull gored it or his dog bit it, [the owner] is not liable; if it gored the owner’s bull, he is liable. If it fell into his cistern and caused it to stink, he is liable. If his father or son were inside, he pays weregilt. But if he put it in by permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable; Rebbi says, in all these cases, only if he agreed to watch.
MISHNAH: If somebody put his bull in a private courtyard without permission and the owner’s bull gored it or his dog bit it, [the owner] is not liable; if it gored the owner’s bull, he is liable. If it fell into his cistern and caused it to stink, he is liable. If his father or son were inside, he pays weregilt. But if he put it in by permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable; Rebbi says, in all these cases, only if he agreed to watch.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody put a bull in a private courtyard,” etc. “If somebody put a bull in a private courtyard without permission, and a bull came from another place. If it gored, hit, bit, walloped, or kicked, he pays full damages, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, for ‘tooth’ and ‘foot’ he is liable; for goring, or hitting, or biting, or walloping, or kicking, or pushing, a tame [bull] pays half the damages, a notorious full damages from storage.”
Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi. Rav Ze‘ira said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Jeremiah said, everybody agrees that in a house, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and I shall watch it.” Everybody agrees that on a field, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and you watch it.” Where do they disagree? In a courtyard. Rebbi says, a courtyard is like a field, but the Sages say, a courtyard is like a house. There, we have stated: If somebody assembles sheaves in another person’s field without permission.” [R. Isaac said,] sheaves on a field are like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.
MISHNAH: If somebody stacks his sheaves on another person’s field without permission and the field’s owner’s animals ate them, he is not liable. If it was damaged by it, the owner of the stack is liable. But if he stacked his sheaves with permission, the field’s owner is liable.
MISHNAH: If somebody stacks his sheaves on another person’s field without permission and the field’s owner’s animals ate them, he is not liable. If it was damaged by it, the owner of the stack is liable. But if he stacked his sheaves with permission, the field’s owner is liable.
HALAKHAH: If somebody stacks his sheaves on another person’s field without permission.” R. Isaac said, are sheaves on a field like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.
HALAKHAH: “If a spark is coming from under a hammer,” etc. “Rebbi Jehudah stated: In case of a Ḥanukkah light he is not liable because he acted with permission. But the Sages say, in any case he is liable, as, e. g., those who build huts in front of their stores on Tabernacles because it is permitted; but if somebody else is hurt by them, he is liable.”
It was stated: “She reached out with her hand,” but not the court marshal’s wife. Another Tanna stated, “she reached out with her hand,” including the court marshal’s wife. He who said, “she reached out with her hand,” but not the court marshal’s wife, if he whipped with permission. He who said, “she reached out with her hand,” including the court marshal’s wife, if he whipped without permission. It was stated: Not the wife of two men.
It was stated: “She reached out with her hand,” but not the court marshal’s wife. Another Tanna stated, “she reached out with her hand,” including the court marshal’s wife. He who said, “she reached out with her hand,” but not the court marshal’s wife, if he whipped with permission. He who said, “she reached out with her hand,” including the court marshal’s wife, if he whipped without permission. It was stated: Not the wife of two men.
“One who robbed a beam and built it into a large building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, he has to pay its worth to support the penitents. If he went into another person’s ruined building and rebuilt it without permission, one estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged. If he rebuilt it with permission, one estimates for him and his hand is advantaged. If he wanted to take his wood and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of the settlement in the Land of Israel. Rav Naḥman bar Isaac asked: If somebody temporarily entered another person’s ruin to put down his bundle, when he wanted to take it up again does one not listen to him? When he heard what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa had said, because of the settlement in the Land of Israel, he said: That is a statement. But if he built at a place unfit for building, or planted trees at a place unfit for planting, Rav said one estimates for him but one tricks him to permit entry both in summer and in winter. One said to him: Was that not already stated: “One estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged?”
“One who robbed a beam and built it into a large building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, he has to pay its worth to support the penitents. If he went into another person’s ruined building and rebuilt it without permission, one estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged. If he rebuilt it with permission, one estimates for him and his hand is advantaged. If he wanted to take his wood and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of the settlement in the Land of Israel. Rav Naḥman bar Isaac asked: If somebody temporarily entered another person’s ruin to put down his bundle, when he wanted to take it up again does one not listen to him? When he heard what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa had said, because of the settlement in the Land of Israel, he said: That is a statement. But if he built at a place unfit for building, or planted trees at a place unfit for planting, Rav said one estimates for him but one tricks him to permit entry both in summer and in winter. One said to him: Was that not already stated: “One estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged?”
If his vessels were switched at the artisan’s he may use them while he goes out and searches for his own. At a mourner’s house or at a wedding, he may not use them while he goes out and searches for his own. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥanan said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya explained this only as in the case of one Bar Qora where everybody who takes from him takes by permission and everybody who puts something up there does so with permission.
If his vessels were switched at the artisan’s he may use them while he goes out and searches for his own. At a mourner’s house or at a wedding, he may not use them while he goes out and searches for his own. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥanan said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya explained this only as in the case of one Bar Qora where everybody who takes from him takes by permission and everybody who puts something up there does so with permission.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”
“If a caravan was attacked by soldiers and one of its members managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if they gave him permission, he saved for himself. If donkey-drivers were attacked by robbers and one of theirs managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if he stipulated with them in court, he saved for himself. If toll collectors forgave to partners, they forgave equally [for all]; but if they indicated, we forgave to Mr. X, what they forgave, they forgave him.”
HALAKHAH: “If the ground floor and the upper floor,” etc. But if the owner of the ground floor wants to build and the owner of the upper floor does not, may he tell him: seal it? Let us hear from the following: “If his collapsed building was next to another’s collapsed building, and he rebuilt without permission, he computes his actual expenses and he has to pay him all his expenses.” This implies that he cannot tell him, seal it on the side. Just as he cannot tell him, seal it on the side, so he cannot tell him, seal it on top.
HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”
HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”
HALAKHAH: “The following count for a claim of undisturbed possession,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, co-owners usually permit chickens to one another. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says otherwise: “Both of them are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raised chickens in a courtyard which is not his, it is taking in possession. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you take it, if he has permission to raise chickens there, he raises them. If he does not have permission to raise, it would be legally taking in possession.
HALAKHAH: “The following count for a claim of undisturbed possession,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, co-owners usually permit chickens to one another. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says otherwise: “Both of them are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raised chickens in a courtyard which is not his, it is taking in possession. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you take it, if he has permission to raise chickens there, he raises them. If he does not have permission to raise, it would be legally taking in possession.
HALAKHAH: “A person may not open windows,” etc. Here you say, a door opposite a door is permitted, and there you say, a door opposite a door is forbidden. Where you say it is permitted, in an alley. And where you say it is forbidden, in a condominium courtyard. But did we not state: “Just as the inhabitants of a courtyard may object to one another, so the inhabitants of an alley may object to one another”? Rebbi La said, here when permission was given, there when permission was not given. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is a difference because gardens are usually dug into. Rebbi Nasa said, are ruins not to be rebuilt?
HALAKHAH: “A person may not open windows,” etc. Here you say, a door opposite a door is permitted, and there you say, a door opposite a door is forbidden. Where you say it is permitted, in an alley. And where you say it is forbidden, in a condominium courtyard. But did we not state: “Just as the inhabitants of a courtyard may object to one another, so the inhabitants of an alley may object to one another”? Rebbi La said, here when permission was given, there when permission was not given. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is a difference because gardens are usually dug into. Rebbi Nasa said, are ruins not to be rebuilt?
HALAKHAH: “Four situations for sellers.,” etc. How is this? If the measuring vessel belonged to the seller, he has the property rights, if to the buyer, he has the property rights. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi La in the name of the Great Rebbi Jehudah, so is the Mishnah: If the measuring vessel belonged to a third person. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, Friday evenings close to sundown he is not liable since he has permission, but the Sages say, in any case he is liable. What is the reason for what Rebbi Jehudah said? “If he is hired, it is paid for by his wages.”
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the words of the Sages are, until they reach adulthood or are married. That is both a leniency and a restriction. Sometimes they are close to adulthood, sometimes far from adulthood. They asked before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, I did not hear anything from him concerning this matter except what Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: what if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since they started with permission, they started.
Are Fellows able to enter for the intercalation of the year? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel said, call seven Elders to a meeting on the upper floor, but eight entered. He asked, who is the one who entered without permission? Samuel minor stood up and said, I came up here without permission since I have a practical problem and I have to ask advice on it. Rabban Gamliel told him, you compare to Eldad and Medad; if I had said “two”, you would have been one of them. Nevertheless, they did not intercalate on that day but talked about themes in the Torah and intercalated the next day.
Are Fellows able to enter for the intercalation of the year? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel said, call seven Elders to a meeting on the upper floor, but eight entered. He asked, who is the one who entered without permission? Samuel minor stood up and said, I came up here without permission since I have a practical problem and I have to ask advice on it. Rabban Gamliel told him, you compare to Eldad and Medad; if I had said “two”, you would have been one of them. Nevertheless, they did not intercalate on that day but talked about themes in the Torah and intercalated the next day.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
Rebbi Simeon ben Ḥalfuta, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. Lambs for your clothing; the price of a field are rams. It is written “suppressings”. How is this? If the students are young, suppress before them the secrets of the Torah. If they grew and became like rams, reveal to them the secrets of the Torah. This lends support to what Rebbi Simoen ben Ioḥai stated: And these are the laws which you shall put before them. Just as this putting is not revealed to everybody so you do have permission to immerse yourself in words of the Torah only before legitimate people.
If he worked for him half a day in prohibition and half a day in permission. If he was selling profane [food] and Second Tithe together, [the buyer] has the choice of treating as profane what he chooses and as Second Tithe what he chooses. Is this the same here? Let us hear from the following. If somebody hires a worker to bring wine to a sick person; if he delivered [the employer] has to pay him, otherwise he does not have to pay him. But if he told him, wine for a sick person from place X, an apple for a sick person from place X, whether or not he delivered he has to pay him, for he pays the wages of his feet. And here, does he not pay the wages of his feet?
HALAKHAH: “If one threw a stone,” etc. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated, it found. That he should have been there at the moment he killed him. But is there permission to throw the stone into the public domain? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it if his wall was inclined.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable? What is the difference between him who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath, who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden, who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.
But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden. This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same. But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow? What about a prophet and seducer? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow, that you should listen to them. The verse says, to walk in them, in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.
The Babylonian Talmud
Rab Kahana said to them : A great man having expressed an opinion, you should not laugh at him. We base the authority for all the dicta of the Rabbis upon the prohibition, "Thou shalt not turn aside" ; but for the duty of honouring a fellow-creature the Rabbis give permission.
It has been taught : That same day, they removed the doorkeeper [of the College] and permission was granted to the disciples to enter ; for Rabban Gamaliel had issued a proclamation: "A disciple, who is not inwardly the same as outwardly, will not be allowed to enter the House of Study."
It once happened that Rabban Gamaliel and the Elders were reclining in an upper chamber in Jericho ; dates were set before them and they ate. Rabban Gamaliel gave permission to R. 'Akiba to say Grace. R. 'Akiba sat up and said one benediction which is an abstract of three. Rabban Gamaliel said to him, "'Akiba, how long wilt thou put thy head between strife!" He replied, "Our master ! Although thou sayest thus and thy colleagues say otherwise, thou hast taught us, our master, that where the individual and the many differ, the Halakah is in accord with the view of the many ! "
We can say that this is like [the discussion of] the Tannaim. For two disciples were sitting in the presence of Bar Kappara, When there were set before him cabbage, Damascene plums and poultry. Bar Kappara gave one of the disciples permission to say the benediction. He sat up and said the benediction over the poultry. His companion laughed at him, and Bar Kappara became angry, saying, "Not with him who uttered the benediction, but with him who laughed, am I angry. If thy companion is like one who has never tasted meat, wherefore dost thou laugh at him?" Then he said, "Not with him who laughed am I angry, but with him who uttered the benediction" ; and he continued, "If there is no wisdom here, is there no old age here?"
Come and hear : The attendant who was waiting upon two men should eat with them, even if they did not give him permission. If he waited upon three, he should only eat with them when they give him permission !
Come and hear : The attendant who was waiting upon two men should eat with them, even if they did not give him permission. If he waited upon three, he should only eat with them when they give him permission !
R. Joshua b. Levi said : Three things did the Angel of Death tell me : Do not take thy shirt in the morning from the hand of the attendant and put it on ; do not let thy hands be washed by him who has not washed his own; and do not stand before women when they return from being with a dead person, because I leap and go before them with my sword in my hand, and I have permission to destroy.
Abbai declared : Let not a man speak thus ; for there is a teaching of the school of R. Ishmael : [It is written,] "Only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed" (Exod. xxi. 19) ; from this [it follows] that a physician is given permission [by God] to cure.
and I say that with reference to the Temple Mount where [the wearing of] a shoe is forbidden, let one derive [the prohibition against expectoration] from a shoe; but with reference to the Synagogue where one is permitted [to wear] shoes, instead of deriving permission [to expectorate, by analogy] from a shoe, let him derive a prohibition [against expectoration, by analogy] from the short cut !
What is the reason? R. Hiyya b. Avin and R. Assi disagree on this point. One explains because there is no permission to eat it, and the other explains because it has no monetary value.
Now you should think that the one who insists on permission to eat it [in order for it to be valid] does not insist upon [its having] monetary value, and that the one who insists upon monetary value does not insist upon permission to eat it It was taught: [An etrog] of unclean terumah, is invalid. This goes well according to him who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, but according to him who explains [that it can't be used] because it has no monetary value, why not? Behold he can kindle it under his cooking!
Now you should think that the one who insists on permission to eat it [in order for it to be valid] does not insist upon [its having] monetary value, and that the one who insists upon monetary value does not insist upon permission to eat it It was taught: [An etrog] of unclean terumah, is invalid. This goes well according to him who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, but according to him who explains [that it can't be used] because it has no monetary value, why not? Behold he can kindle it under his cooking!
Now you should think that the one who insists on permission to eat it [in order for it to be valid] does not insist upon [its having] monetary value, and that the one who insists upon monetary value does not insist upon permission to eat it It was taught: [An etrog] of unclean terumah, is invalid. This goes well according to him who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, but according to him who explains [that it can't be used] because it has no monetary value, why not? Behold he can kindle it under his cooking!
Rather [with regard to] permission to eat it, all agree that it is necessary. They disagree only on the question whether monetary value [is also necessary]: One Master holds that permission to eat it is necessary but monetary value is not necessary, while the other Master holds that monetary value is also necessary. What is the practical difference between them?
Rather [with regard to] permission to eat it, all agree that it is necessary. They disagree only on the question whether monetary value [is also necessary]: One Master holds that permission to eat it is necessary but monetary value is not necessary, while the other Master holds that monetary value is also necessary. What is the practical difference between them?
The difference is ... the case of second tithe in Jerusalem according to R. Meir According to the one who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, [second tithe is valid, since] there is permission to eat it.
The difference is ... the case of second tithe in Jerusalem according to R. Meir According to the one who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, [second tithe is valid, since] there is permission to eat it.
Or of unclean terumah, it is invalid; because there is no permission to eat it.
But if he did take it, it is valid. According to him who explains, because there is no permission to eat it, this is permitted to be eaten, and according to him who explains, because it has no monetary value, this has monetary value.
But if he took it, it is valid. According to him who explains: Because there is no permission to eat it, [the ruling] is according to all. According to him who explains: Because it has no monetary value, according to whom [is the ruling]? It is according to the rabbis.
The reason then for the [permission to purchase a] lulav is that it is [the product of] the sixth year which entered the seventh, but if it were of the Sabbatical Year it would have been sacred? But why? ... Is it not just wood, and wood does not possess the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, as it has been taught: ... Leaves of reeds and leaves of the vine which have been heaped up to store them upon a field: if they were gathered for [animal] food, they possess the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, but if they were gathered for firewood, they do have not the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.
And that the whole day of waving should be prohibited. What is the reason? The Temple may be rebuilt speedily, and people would say, "Did we not eat [new grain] last year from the time that light appeared in the east? Let us now also eat it [from the same time]" and they would not know that in the previous year, when there was no Temple, once day dawned in the east it,was permitted [to eat of the new grain], but now that the Temple is rebuilt, it is only the [waving of the] omer which [begins] the permission to eat new grain.
Let it override one of the other days? Since [the permission to override Shabbat] was removed from the first day, it was transferred to the seventh.
But are those who see Him through a bright speculum so few? Did not Abaye in fact state: The world never has less than thirty-six righteous people who see the Shekhinah every day, for it is said, “Happy are they that wait lo [for Him]” (Isaiah 30:18) and the numerical value of lo is thirty-six? There is no difficulty: The latter number refers to those who may enter [the Divine Presence] with permission, the former to those who may enter without permission.
But are those who see Him through a bright speculum so few? Did not Abaye in fact state: The world never has less than thirty-six righteous people who see the Shekhinah every day, for it is said, “Happy are they that wait lo [for Him]” (Isaiah 30:18) and the numerical value of lo is thirty-six? There is no difficulty: The latter number refers to those who may enter [the Divine Presence] with permission, the former to those who may enter without permission.
R. Johanan further said: Rain is granted for the sake of an individual, means of sustenance are granted for the sake of a multitude only. That rain is granted for the sake of an individual we learn from the verse (Deut., 28.12): "The Lord will open unto thee His good treasure, the heaven, to give the rain of thy land." That means of sustenance are granted for the sake of a multitude only, we learn from the verse (Exod., 16.4): "Behold I will cause to rain bread from heaven for you." But are not means of sustenance granted also for the sake of an individual? Do we not read: "R. Jose b. Judah said, three good leaders have arisen for Israel; they are Moses, Aaron and Miriam; and three precious gifts were presented to Israel for their sake. These are, the well, the pillar of cloud and the manna. The well was given for the merits of Miriam, the pillar of cloud for the merits of Aaron, and the manna for the merits of Moses. When Miriam died the well was taken away, for it is said (Num., 20.1): 'And Miriam died there,' and immediately after it is written: 'And there was no water for the congregation.' Subsequently the well came back on account of the merits of Moses and Aaron. When Aaron died the pillar of cloud disappeared, as it is said (ibid., 21.1): 'And the Canaanite, the king of Arad, heard.' What did he hear? He heard that Aaron had died and the clouds of glory were taken away from Israel, so he thought that now permission was given to wage war against them. Therefore it is written (ibid., 20.29): 'And all the congregation saw that Aaron was dead,' [concerning which R. 'Abahu said that one should not read 'they saw,' but 'they were seen'—agreeing herein with what Resh Laḳish said, namely, that ki (כי) has four meanings: if, perhaps (lest), but, because]. Both (well and cloud) later came back on account of the merits of Moses, but when Moses died all three disappeared, as it is said (Zech., 11.8): 'And I cut off the three shepherds in one month.' But is it true that they died in one month? Did not Miriam die in Nisan, Aaron in Ab, and Moses in Adar? The meaning therefore can only be that the three precious gifts which had been given to Israel through them were taken away in one month." Now, does it not follow from the foregoing Baraita that means of sustenance are granted also for the sake of an individual?! Moses is an exception; since all his requests were for a multitude, he was himself regarded as a multitude.
R. Isaac, with the permission of his father R. Judah, delivered the following discourse: An individual who has taken upon himself a fast must recite the prayer provided for fasts. Where does he insert it? Between the benediction ending with "Redeemer" and that ending with "Healer" (of Israel). R. Isaac objected: Is an individual entitled to insert a benediction for himself? He should rather, said R. Isaac, include it in the benediction ending with the words: "Who hearest prayer." The same opinion was given also by R. Sheshet. An objection was raised to this view from the following Baraita: There is no difference between an individual and a community, except that the former recites eighteen benedictions, while the latter recites nineteen. Now what is meant by "individual" and "community"? Is "individual" to be understood literally and "community" in the sense of representative of the community? If so, the benedictions here spoken of would not be nineteen, but twenty-four! Consequently by "individual" can be meant only one who takes upon himself a fast which is known as a "private fast," while by "community" is meant an individual who takes upon himself a "public fast," and yet the Baraita reads: "except that the former recites eighteen benedictions and the latter nineteen," which proves that an individual may insert a benediction for himself! Answer: No, by "community" is no doubt meant its representative, but (as to your objection that in this case twenty-four benedictions are recited, it must be understood that) the Baraita has reference to the first three public fasts, during which the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three first and the three intermediary public fasts, except that during the former work is allowed, while during the latter it is prohibited," from which you must infer that with regard to the number of benedictions they are alike!? Answer: The author of this Baraita mentioned one difference and omitted the other. Is there anything else that he omitted, so that we may be justified in assuming that he omitted this difference? I will say this, then: The teacher of the Baraita was concerned only in pointing out a difference regarding things prohibited on fast days, but did not care to mention a difference in the number of benedictions recited. If you prefer, I may also say that the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four even during the intermediary public fasts. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three intermediary and the seven (last) public fasts except that during the latter the alarm is sounded and the shops are closed," which proves that with regard to the twenty-four benedictions both groups of fasts are alike? If, however, you should say that here, too, the author of the Baraita mentions one difference and omits the other, what will you do, then, with the explicit words of the Baraita, saying that "there is no difference between them except"? Answer: Do you mean to say that the phrase "there is no difference" is to be taken literally?
During the week in which the ninth of Ab falls one should not cut one's hair or wash (one's clothes). Said R. Naḥman, this applies only to washing for immediate wear, but it is allowed to wash the clothes in order to lay them aside (for future wear). R. Sheshet, however, said, even to wash and lay aside is also forbidden. Said R. Sheshet, you can derive it from the fact that (during the week preceding the ninth of Ab) the fullers of the house of Rab were idle. R. Hamnuna raised an objection from the following sentence of the Mishnah: On Thursday it is allowed (to wash clothes) in honor of the Sabbath. Now what is the supposed purpose of the washing to which the Mishnah here refers? Will you say that it refers to washing for immediate wear? What has washing for such purpose to do with the honoring of the Sabbath? The Mishnah can thus mean only washing for the purpose of putting aside (for a later time), and yet the reason given for its permission is that it is Thursday, when the washing is done in honor of the next Sabbath, but in the preceding days of the week it would not be allowed! You may nevertheless say that the Mishnah refers to washing for immediate wear, but has in view one who possesses only one shirt, which interpretation is in keeping with what was said by R. Asi in the name of R. Johanan, namely, that one who possesses only one shirt is allowed to wash it on the Half-festivals.
Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, the Israelites never had such joyous holidays as the fifteenth of Ab and the Day of Atonement. This is quite right so far as the Day of Atonement is concerned, which is a day of pardon and forgiveness, a day on which the second Tables were given, but why the fifteenth of Ab? Said R. Judah in the name of Samuel, the fifteenth of Ab is the day on which the (twelve) tribes were given permission to intermarry. What was the Scriptural basis for this permission? The verse (Numb., 36. 6): "This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded concerning the daughters of Zelophehad," etc., which means that 'this thing' (forbidding intermarriage) shall apply only to this generation (of Moses).
Said Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, the Israelites never had such joyous holidays as the fifteenth of Ab and the Day of Atonement. This is quite right so far as the Day of Atonement is concerned, which is a day of pardon and forgiveness, a day on which the second Tables were given, but why the fifteenth of Ab? Said R. Judah in the name of Samuel, the fifteenth of Ab is the day on which the (twelve) tribes were given permission to intermarry. What was the Scriptural basis for this permission? The verse (Numb., 36. 6): "This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded concerning the daughters of Zelophehad," etc., which means that 'this thing' (forbidding intermarriage) shall apply only to this generation (of Moses).
Rabbah b. Bar-Ḥanah said in the name of R. Johanan, the fifteenth of Ab is the day on which the tribe of Benjamin was permitted to enter the congregation of Israel (to marry the daughters of the other tribes), as it is said (Jud., 21. 1): "Now the men of Israel had sworn in Mizpah, saying: There shall not any of us give his daughter unto Benjamin to wife." How did they derive the permission? The phrase "any of us" was interpreted to imply: "but not of our descendants."
R. Matnah said, it is the day on which permission was given to bury those slain at Bettar, which accords with what R. Matnah said elsewhere, that on the day on which the slain of Bettar were given over for burial, there was introduced in Jabneh (Jamnia) the benediction, "Who is good and beneficent," good, because the corpses had not become putrid, beneficent, because they were given over for burial.
there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission.
there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission.
Why then did he retract? On account of the difficulty raised by R. Mari. For R. Mari raised the following difficulty: After the sanctification of Shiloh there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission. We have also taught: After they [the Israelites] came to Jerusalem, the altars were forbidden, and they were never permitted again, and it was the “inheritance.”
Why then did he retract? On account of the difficulty raised by R. Mari. For R. Mari raised the following difficulty: After the sanctification of Shiloh there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission. We have also taught: After they [the Israelites] came to Jerusalem, the altars were forbidden, and they were never permitted again, and it was the “inheritance.”
Judah said: Even if the purchaser takes the produce it is permitted. Judah further said: It happened once that Baitus b. Zunin made a sale of his field with the permission of R. Elazar b. Azariah, and the purchaser took the produce. They said to him: Do you cite that as a proof? It was in fact the seller who took the produce and not the purchaser.
and clearing out the stove. She took it and put it upon her foot and was burned, and her evil star was in the ascendant, and I have brought her. R. Baybi bar Abai said to him, Have ye permission to do thus? He said to him, And is it not written, "There is that is destroyed without judgment" (Prov. xiii. 23)? R. Baybi said to him, There is also the passage, "One generation goeth, and another generation cometh" (Eccles. i. 4). The Angel said, I shepherd them, till they have fulfilled the generation, and again I hand them over to Dumah. He said to him, But in the final result what hast thou done with the years? He said, If there is a mighty Rabbi, who does not fulfil his threats, I add them to him, and so there is compensation.
The one refers to that which is within, the other to that which is without. And R. Acha bar Jacob said, There is again a firmament above the heads of the living creatures, for it is written, "And over the heads of the living creatures there was the likeness of a firmament, like the colour of the terrible crystal" (Ezek. i. 22). So far thou hast permission to speak. Thenceforward thou hast not permission to speak. For thus it is written in the Book of Ben Sira, "Seek not out the things that are too hard for thee, and into the things that are hidden from thee enquire thou not. In what is permitted to thee instruct thyself; thou hast no business with secret things" (Ecclus. iii. 21, 22).
The one refers to that which is within, the other to that which is without. And R. Acha bar Jacob said, There is again a firmament above the heads of the living creatures, for it is written, "And over the heads of the living creatures there was the likeness of a firmament, like the colour of the terrible crystal" (Ezek. i. 22). So far thou hast permission to speak. Thenceforward thou hast not permission to speak. For thus it is written in the Book of Ben Sira, "Seek not out the things that are too hard for thee, and into the things that are hidden from thee enquire thou not. In what is permitted to thee instruct thyself; thou hast no business with secret things" (Ecclus. iii. 21, 22).
Acher cut the plants. It is of him that the Scripture says, "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin" (Eccles. v. 6). What was the matter referred to? He saw the Metatron, to whom is given the permission to sit to record the merits of Israel. He said, We are taught that in heaven there is no sitting down nor anger nor back nor weariness. Are there—God forbid!—two First Principles? They brought out the Metatron and gave him sixty strokes with a lash of fire. They said to him, What is the reason that, when thou sawest him, thou didst not rise up before him? He was given permission to strike out the merits of Acher. There came out a Bath-Kol and said, "'Return, O backsliding children' (Jer. iii. 14), except Acher." He said, Inasmuch as that man is excluded from yonder world, let him go and enjoy himself in this world. Acher went forth into evil courses. He went forth and met a loose woman. He solicited her. She said to him, Art not thou Elisha ben Abuyah? He pulled up a radish from the garden on the Sabbath and gave it to her. She said, He is another.
Acher cut the plants. It is of him that the Scripture says, "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin" (Eccles. v. 6). What was the matter referred to? He saw the Metatron, to whom is given the permission to sit to record the merits of Israel. He said, We are taught that in heaven there is no sitting down nor anger nor back nor weariness. Are there—God forbid!—two First Principles? They brought out the Metatron and gave him sixty strokes with a lash of fire. They said to him, What is the reason that, when thou sawest him, thou didst not rise up before him? He was given permission to strike out the merits of Acher. There came out a Bath-Kol and said, "'Return, O backsliding children' (Jer. iii. 14), except Acher." He said, Inasmuch as that man is excluded from yonder world, let him go and enjoy himself in this world. Acher went forth into evil courses. He went forth and met a loose woman. He solicited her. She said to him, Art not thou Elisha ben Abuyah? He pulled up a radish from the garden on the Sabbath and gave it to her. She said, He is another.
Menahem went out, Shammai entered in, etc. Whither did he go out? Abai said, He went out to destruction. Rabba said, He went out for the service of the king. There is also a Baraitha to this effect, that Menahem went out for the service of the king, and there went out with him eighty pairs of disciples clothed in Syrian robes. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said, Let the sabbath rest be by no means a light thing in thine eyes; for lo, the laying on of the hands is only prohibited on account of the Sabbath rest, and the great men of the nation were divided upon the matter. That is self-evident. But as this is a case of a Sabbath rest which clashes with a positive command, there was need of it. But this also is self-evident. It was to meet the objection of the person who says, In the matter of the laying on of the hands itself men are divided. We learn from this that it is in the matter of Sabbath rest that they are divided. Ramai bar Chama said, Learn hence that we require the laying on to be done with all one's strength, for if thou dost imagine that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength, how is the idea of work involved in the laying on of the hands? Some people adduce the passage, "Speak unto the sons of Israel ... and he shall lay his hand" (Lev. i. 2, 4). The sons of Israel lay on their hands, but the daughters of Israel do not lay on their hands. R. Jose and R. Ishmael say, Daughters of Israel lay on their hands by permission. R. Jose said, Abba El'azar related to me the following story: Once we had a calf belonging to the sacrifices of peace-offerings, and we brought it to the court of the women, and the women laid their hands upon it, not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women, but so as to gratify the women. And if thou dost imagine we require the laying on of the hands to be done with all one's strength, dost thou mean to say that in order to gratify women we introduced work into holy things? But do we not learn hence that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength? Nay, by all means I will grant you that we require it to be done with all one's strength. He said to them, Rest your hand upon it. If so, it was not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women that it was done. Thou mayest conclude that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hand. R. Ami says, He is establishing two things; one that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hands, and the other that it was done in order to gratify the women. Rab Papa said, Learn hence, Sides, and not the head only, are forbidden; for if thou dost imagine that sides are allowed, might they not lay hands on the sides? But no; learn hence that sides are forbidden.
The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.
The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.
The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.