cases
512 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
“By money.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, from another person to his master, therefore not from his master to another person. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even from his master to another person. What brings this? From his master to himself. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Here you have money that your field shall be unencumbered.” He answered, it is unencumbered. “That it be ownerless”? He answered, it is not ownerless. What is the difference between the cases? Here he advantaged a thinking person, there he did not advantage any thinking person. Think of it, if he was deaf-mute? He said to him, “a man.” Think of it, if he was underage? He said to him, one usually grows up. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Even with a contract through others, not by himself. Does not his master deliver a document to others that his slave regain his freedom? Here also, his master gives money to others that his field become ownerless.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
MISHNAH: “Be preliminarily married to me by this cup of wine,” but it turned out to be honey; “of honey” but it turned out to be wine; “by this silver denar,” but it turned out to be of gold, “gold denar” but it turned out to be of silver; “on condition that I be poor”, but he turned out to be rich; “rich” but he turned out to be poor; she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Simeon said, if he tricked her by understatement she is preliminarily married. “On condition that I be a Cohen,” and he turned out to be a Levite; “a Levite” and he turned out to be a Cohen; “a Gibeonite” and he turned out to be a bastard, “a bastard” and he turned out to be a Gibeonite; “a villager” and he turned out to be from a walled city; “from a walled city” and he turned out to be from a village; “on condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far, “far” and it turned out to be close; “on condition that I have a grown-up daughter or slave-girl” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I have not” and it turned out that he did have; “on condition that I have children” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I not have children” and it turned out that he did have. Il all these cases she is not preliminarily married even if she says, I had the intention to be preliminarily married to him regardless. The same holds if she misinformed him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.
There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.
It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive, for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he came and wanted to sign. He said to him, there is no space.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
“But for Levites or Israel one adds another generation.” Does it not turn out that one is more stringent for an Israel than for a Cohen? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, in both cases the Sages demanded a fine so that everybody should cling to his tribe and family.
MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt, if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed. The same holds for a son or a daughter. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas, whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold denar.
HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”
HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”
HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”
MISHNAH: If somebody put his bull in a private courtyard without permission and the owner’s bull gored it or his dog bit it, [the owner] is not liable; if it gored the owner’s bull, he is liable. If it fell into his cistern and caused it to stink, he is liable. If his father or son were inside, he pays weregilt. But if he put it in by permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable; Rebbi says, in all these cases, only if he agreed to watch.
MISHNAH: He who stole according to the testimony of two people and slaughtered or sold according to their testimony or the testimony of two others, has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. He who stole and sold on the Sabbath, stole and sold to pagan worship, stole and slaughtered on the Day of Atonement, stole from his father, slaughtered, or sold, and then his father died, stole, slaughtered, and then dedicated it to the Temple, has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. He who stole and slaughtered for medical purposes or for the dogs, he who slaughtered and it turned out torn, he who slaughtered a profane animal in the Temple courtyard, has to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Simeon frees from liability in these two cases.
MISHNAH: One does not buy wool, or milk, or lambs from shepherds, nor wood or fruits from orchard watchmen; but one may buy linen garments from women in Galilee, and calves in the Sharon. In all cases it is forbidden if they told to hide. One buys eggs and chickens everywhere.
Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rebbi Simeon, but we do not say this in all cases. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he instructed following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph gave a denar for salt. That one reneged. He said, does he not know that already a sickle is put on the thigh of that man, “He Who exacted retribution from the people of the Flood will in the future collect from him who does not keep his word”? A person paid for raw silk. He reneged. The case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi La said, it was a case of a pledge; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he had given him partial payment. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole.
MISHNAH: If one was working on figs he may not eat grapes, on grapes he may not eat figs; but he may restrain himself until he reaches the place of the good ones and eat there. In all cases they only referred to the time of finishing work, but because of returning lost property to its owner they said that workers may eat when they go from row to row, and when they return from the wine press, and a donkey while offloading.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to him, lend me,” etc. “Somebody exchanged a cow,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this contradicts Symmachos who says that in all cases of doubt one splits evenly. Rebbi La said, explain it if both of them say, I am certain. Rebbi Yose explained, if both of them say, I am certain, that is what Rebbi Joḥanan refered to when he said, this contradicts Symmachos’s words.
“A man from his mother, a man from his wife.” Is “a man from his mother” not the same as “a man from his wife”? Rebbi Isaac: he wanted to enumerate all cases and did not find them, so he formulated the rule twofold.
HALAKHAH: “Money matters are judged by three [judges],” etc. From where comes this? These shall be the laws of procedure to you, I would say that both civil cases and criminal cases are subject to the rules of verification and examination.
HALAKHAH: “Money matters are judged by three [judges],” etc. From where comes this? These shall be the laws of procedure to you, I would say that both civil cases and criminal cases are subject to the rules of verification and examination.
From where that civil cases are heard by three [judges]? The owner shall go to the judge, he added here one judge. Before the judge, these are two. Whom the judges will find guilty, these are three, the words of Rebbi Joshia. Rebbi Jonathan said, the first mention introduces the subject; one does not infer anything from introductions. But before the judge, there is one. Whom the judges will find guilty, there are two. No court may be even-numbered, so one adds another one; this makes three.
This Nabal was a descendant of Kelubai. Nabal said, nobody in Israel comes from a better family than I. That is what is written: A man from Maˋon had his business in Karmel; the man was exceedingly rich, a Kalebite, a descendant of Kelubai. David heard in the prairie that Nabal was shearing. Tell him, to life! For long life. Peace be with you, etc. Rebbi Justus from Sunem said, they formed a camp. Nabal answered David’s servants, etc. From where that in criminal trials the voting starts from the side? Samuel the Elder stated before Rebbi Aḥa: David told his men, etc. He flew at them. What means he flew at them? He made them fly with words. Now know this and consider what to do. She fell in with them, she bared her thigh and they walked by its light. She fell in with them, they all were recognizable. [David] said, was it in vain that I watched, etc.? Pissing on a wall; why does he refer to the dog pissing on a wall? Even with the dog I shall not have mercy. Abigail saw David, etc. She told him, my lord David, what did I do, what did my children do, what did my animals do? He answered her, because he insulted the kingdom of David. She asked him, are you a king? He told her, did not Samuel anoint me as king? She answered him, our Lord’s Saul‘s coin is still circulating. And I am your servant; this proves that he asked her for sex. Immediately, she brought out her stains and showed him. He said, does one investigate stains in the night? She retorted, may your ears hear what your lips say! Stains one does not investigate in the night, does one judge capital cases in the night? He answered, his sentence was already passed in daytime. She retorted, may this not be פוּקָה for you.
Rebbi Levi had a suit against a certain person about houses; they had it judged before Rebbi Eleazar. After a decision was reached he presented proof. He asked Rebbi Joḥanan, who told him, any time one brings proof he can demand a new trial. Rebbi Eumachos had a suit against a certain person about mills; they had it judged before Rebbi Eleazar. After a decision was reached he presented witnesses. He asked Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, is that still a problem for you? Any time one brings proof he can demand a new trial. Why did it need two cases? In Rebbi Levy’s case, no formal verdict had been rendered, in Rebbi Eumachos’s case, a formal verdict had been rendered.
MISHNAH: In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity, one starts with the greatest. In criminal cases, one starts from the side. Everybody is qualified to judge money matters but not everybody is qualified to judge criminal matters, but only Cohanim, Levites and Israel whose daughters may marry into the priesthood.
MISHNAH: In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity, one starts with the greatest. In criminal cases, one starts from the side. Everybody is qualified to judge money matters but not everybody is qualified to judge criminal matters, but only Cohanim, Levites and Israel whose daughters may marry into the priesthood.
HALAKHAH: “In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity,” etc. Rebbi says, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written against the greatest, that one does not argue after the greatest, only prior to the greatest. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written before the greatest, that one does not argue prior to the greatest, only after the greatest. Rav said, do not argue, even after a hundred, the words of Rebbi Phineas.
MISHNAH: How does one instill fear in witnesses in criminal cases? One brings them in and instills fear in them. Maybe you would testify by a guess, or by a rumor, or from the mouth of a witness, or you heard it from a trustworthy source, or maybe you do not know that we shall examine you by cross-examination and interrogation. You should know that criminal trials are not like civil trials. In civil trials a person pays money and is forgiven. In criminal trials, his blood and the blood of all his descendants hang in the balance, to the end of all generations. So we find when Cain slew his brother, it is said: The sounds of your brother’s bloods cry to me from the earth. It does not say your brother’s blood but your brother’s bloods, his blood and that of his descendants. Another explanation: Your brother’s bloods, the blood was splashed on trees and stones. Therefore man was created single in the world to teach that for anybody who destroys a single life it is counted as if he destroyed an entire world, and for anybody who preserves a single life it is counted as if he preserved an entire world. And because of peace among men, that nobody could say to another, my father was greater than your father. And that sectarians could not say, there are a plurality of powers in Heaven. And to proclaim the greatness of the King over kings of kings, the Holy One, praise to Him. For a man coins many coins with one die; they are one like the other. But the King over kings of kings, the Holy One, praise to Him, stamps every man with the stamp of the first man, but no one is like any other. Therefore, everybody is required to say, the world was created for me. Maybe you will say, why should we go to all this trouble? There already is written: If he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc. Maybe you will say, why should we be guilty of this man’s blood? There already is written: In destruction of evildoers is clamor.
Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony is contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent with what Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet, and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he counted from a wallet and the other says he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony: the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One said, he counted into his bosom, but the other said, he counted into his money-belt: everybody agrees that this contradicts the essence of the testimony but the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; Rav will agree that the testimony be void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, one says he killed him with a sword and the other says, he killed him with a mace. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. One says, he turned to the North and one says, he ran away to the South, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in aspects that belong after the fact, and the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can be remarried.” He did not hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to those of her companion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he said it because he had heard it from me. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and cross-examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is worthless.” What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain it as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: Justice, justice you shall pursue.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said: Rebbi Ismael stated so: You shall not divine nor cast spells. Were not divination and spellbinding included in the general class but were mentioned separately to be treated differently from the general case? In general by extirpation, the separate cases for extirpation. A statement of Rebbi Joḥanan says, it is a case of general case and detail, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, for anybody who would perform any of these abominations will be extirpated, etc. Was not his sister included in the general class? Rebbi Eleazar objected: Was it not written, the nakedness of your mother’s sister and your father’s sister you shall not uncover? He told him, it was stated separately for a reason, to judge it by touching. But is it not written: A man who would lie with an unwellwoman, who uncovered her nakedness, he touched her source, and she uncovered the source of her blood? He told him, it was stated separately for a reason, to judge it by touching. That you should not say, since one is guilty about her already by the impurity of touching, we should not treat the one who touched equal to the one who had full intercourse. Therefore, it was necessary to say it. But is it not written: A man who would sleep with his aunt uncovered his uncle’s nakedness? He told him, it was stated separately for a reason, to judge it by destruction, as Rebbi Yudan said, at all places where they will be destroyed is mentioned, they will be childless; where they shall die destroyed is mentioned, they shall bury their children.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a person having sexual relations with his mother guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Come and see: if a third person had sexual relations with her, would he not be guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? Her son not so much more? Rebbi Yose objected: is not her stepson guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman, but her son is not guilty [of adultery] with her as a married woman? As we have stated: Also with all other cases of incest and adultery the situation is the same. His mother-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his mother-in-law. His daughter-in-law as a married woman, you catch him because of his daughter-in-law. His sister as a married woman, do you catch him because of his sister? You smuggle him away from the serious crime and strike him for the easier one; this you cannot do as we have stated: A person having sexual relations with his sister is liable because of her as his sister and as a daughter of his father’s wife. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, a person having sexual relations with his sister is only liable because of her as his sister; the same is true for his daughter-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah accepts the description mentioned first. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan turned around: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah does not follow the argument of his father Rebbi Jehudah. There he is liable because of his mother, who is not his father’s wife; he is liable because of his father’s wife who is not his mother. But here we find that he is permitted his father’s wife’s daughter, who is not his sister.
HALAKHAH: “If he escaped before sentence was passed,” etc. Rebbi Joshia said, Zeˋira told me in the name of the people of Jerusalem: In three cases, if they want to forgive, they may forgive. These are: The suspect wife, the deviant son, and the Elder rebelling against the [Supreme] Court.
But when I came to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis, he agreed with me in two cases and disagreed in one. He disagreed about the rebellious Elder, lest quarrels increase in Israel.
HALAKHAH: “The intruder by stealth,” etc. Rebbi Ismael stated: This is one of three verses which in the Torah have been formulated as a simile: If he gets up and walks outside on his support. If the thief is found in the digging, if the sun shone on him, he has blood. Does the sun shine only on him? Does the sun not shine on all beings in the world? But just as sunshine is special in that it brings peace to the entire world, so in any case in which you know that you are at peace with him, whether it be day or night his killer will be killed. If sometimes he comes to steal, sometimes he comes to kill, you say that if certainly he comes to steal, his killer will be killed? Since sometimes he comes to kill, he may be killed. From here you argue about danger to life, to say that just as (foreign worship) is special in that it defiles the Land, desecrates the Name, removes the Divine Presence, and doubts are disregarded, so much more that doubts have to be disregarded in cases of danger to life.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Two which are four for liability and two which are four for no liability, or four for liability and four for no liability? Let us hear from the following: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “there are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” not because of liability? And similarly, “there are two kinds of export on the Sabbath which are four kinds,” because there is liability. Rebbi Abba said, there all are about liability, but here we come to state both liability and no liability. This implies four of liability and four of no liability. But did we not state, the doors of the Temple hall were two which are four? Can you say, liability and no liability? Should we state twelve cases of no liability? We come to state cases of no liability which correspond to cases of no liability. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, what is this “no liability” which we stated here? Permitted! Rebbi Yose said, the poor man and the rich man are one but the Sages counted them as two. Exporting or importing are two but the Sages counted them as one. Exporting on the Sabbath does not include importing; if one exports from a domain this does not include importing. If one who exports from one domain to the other, does this not include the one who imports? In addition, from what Rebbi Yasa said in the name if Rebbi Joḥanan: Somebody who imports half the size of a dried fig and exports half the size of a dried fig is liable. And from where that exporting is called work? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Moses ordered, they made a public proclamation in the camp,” etc. The people refrained from taking objects out from their houses to give them to the collectors, who also did not take out anything from them to import into the office. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa understood it from the following: “do not bring out any load from your houses on the Sabbath day, and perform no work.”
An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.
HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.
MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.
HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
Rebbi Huna said, (this means) [a baraita implies] that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? Therefore the betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked Rebbi Eleazar, should she parade before him that he may live? He said to them, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said to them, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and (became dangerously sick) [and he permitted him]? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one, here and here about a married woman. Explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance (and did not listen to him) [and did not want to marry.] Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.
HALAKHAH: “If one’s house was connected to a house of pagan worship,” etc. There is written abomination about the menstruating women, abomination about vermin, abomination about idolatry. About the menstruating woman, for anybody who would commit any of these abominations. About vermin, do not eat any abomination. About idolatry, and do not bring any abomination into your house. But I do not know for which purpose it was compared. Rebbi Aqiba says, it was compared to abomination regarding the menstruating woman. As the menstruating woman imparts impurity by load, also idolatry imparts impurity by load. Or since the menstruating woman imparts impurity through a cover stone, does idolatry impart impurity through a cover stone? Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina, but some say in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Rebbi Aqiba agrees with the Sages that idolatry does not impart impurity through a cover stone. But the rabbis say it was compared to abominations of vermin. As vermin imparts impurity by motion, so also idolatry imparts impurity by motion. Or as vermin in the size of a lentil imparts impurity does also idolatry in the size of a lentil impart impurity? Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, Rebbi Eleazar, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They were yoked to Baal Peor and ate sacrifices to the dead. As the dead in the size of an olive impart impurity so idolatry in the size of an olive imparts impurity. Or since a corpse imparts impurity once a person puts his finger tips in, could I think that idolatry imparts once a person puts his finger tips in? Tearing down, tearing down one infers from the leprous house. Since in a leprous house when he entered with his head and most of his body, so idolatry when he entered with his head and most of his body. Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that the impurity of idolatry is not consistent. For otherwise, why does one compare if for the facile [impurity] and does not compare for the strict? Rebbi Mana said, it is consistent. Why was it compared to a corpse and to vermin? To inform in both cases about the facile [impurity] attached to it. This is for a broken idol. But an entire one even in the most minute size, as Rebbi Yose hen Rebbi Abun said, Rav Ḥama bar Gorion in the name of Rav: Baal was the penis gland in the form of a bean. What is the reason? They selected the Baal of circumcision as god.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore if one annulled it it is annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There he says, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden, and here he says so? Here if he burned incense, there if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
Rav said, a pedestal is not annulled. Therefore its appurtenances are annulled. The opinions of Rav seem inconsistent. There Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rav, if the procession was using another way, and here he says so? There if he burned incense, here if he did not burn incense. And even if you are saying, in both cases if he burned incense, Rav follows his opinion since Rav said, if one casts a cup for idolatry it is immediately forbidden.
MISHNAH: A Non-Jew who was found standing next to a wine cistern, if he has a loan secured by it, [the wine] is forbidden, if he has no loan secured by it, it is permitted. If he fell into the cistern and climbed out, or measured it with a measuring rod; if he tried to hit a wasp with a stick, or was drumming on the mouth of a fermenting amphora; all these cases happened and they said, it should be sold, but Rebbi Simeon permits. If he took the amphora and threw it into the cistern; this happened and they declared it kosher..
Witnesses found guilty of plotting. Rebbi Joḥanan said, falsehood, falsehood. Witnesses found guilty of plotting and then found guilty of lying. Rebbi Joḥanan said, falsehood, falsehood. Rebbi Eleazar said, evildoer, evildoer. It is said evildoer for death penalty cases, and it is said evildoer for cases of whipping. Since for the evildoer subject to the death penalty there is no fine accompanying the death penalty, so for the evildoer subject to whipping there is no fine accompanying whipping.
Witnesses found guilty of plotting. Rebbi Joḥanan said, falsehood, falsehood. Witnesses found guilty of plotting and then found guilty of lying. Rebbi Joḥanan said, falsehood, falsehood. Rebbi Eleazar said, evildoer, evildoer. It is said evildoer for death penalty cases, and it is said evildoer for cases of whipping. Since for the evildoer subject to the death penalty there is no fine accompanying the death penalty, so for the evildoer subject to whipping there is no fine accompanying whipping.
It was stated: For the 24 hours which were stated, one suspends but one does not burn. Rebbi Ze‘ira enjoyed this [because] he found stated: “A woman who detects a stain makes impure retroactively. What does she make impure? Food, and drinks, and seats, and beds; her count is in disorder, and she makes her sex partner impure retroactively. A woman who detects blood makes impure retroactively. What does she make impure? Food, and drinks, and seats, and beds; her count is not in disorder, and she does not make her sex partner impure retroactively. Rebbi Aqiba says, she makes her sex partner impure retroactively. In both cases, one suspends but one does not burn.” There, they say: For the 24 hours which were stated, her bed is like her touch. How? Like one who sleeps with a menstruating woman who does not make impure by moving and does not make clay vessels impure. It was found stated: He makes clay vessels impure by moving. For the 24 hours which were stated, what is the status of what she touches in the public domain? Let us hear from the following: Pregnant and nursing women are pure for their husbands, as is a woman with a regular period. And all other women are pure for sexual relations but impure in their touch. That means, what she certainly touched in the public domain is impure.
“And like mixed wine.” Abba bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: As one sees a cup of mixed wine from the outside. They wanted to say, in a Tiberian cup. Rebbi Eudaimon from Sepphoris said before Rebbi Mana: As in a small phial whose walls do not cast a shadow. Samuel said, anybody who has no experience in seeing kinds of pure blood should not judge kinds of impure blood. Rav said, only if he is competent about them and their names. The words of Rebbi Joḥanan say so: I know all kinds of pure blood and of impure blood. The pure is the most red; the impure is like earth water. “If he has no experience,” therefore, if he has experience he can judge it. In addition, from what we have stated: clear but not turbid. Rebbi Ḥanina used it turbid. They said before Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Ḥanina uses it turbid, but you said, not turbid. He said to them, Rebbi Ḥanina drinks old [wine], Rebbi Joḥanan does not drink old [wine], Rebbi Ḥanina drinks oldest [wine]. Rebbi Hoshaiah said: Since Rebbi Hoshaiah’s eye is full of happenings, even turbid is not disqualified for him. Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi Ḥanina estimated with a lump of earth. Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Shammai in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Since we know that Rebbi Ḥanina is competent, do we follow his precedents? Rebbi Ḥanina was living in Sepphoris, they brought cases before him and he decided on the basis of three precedents. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish were there but he did not invite them to sit with him. They said, the old man is a Sage since his irons are sharp! Once he invited them to sit with him. They said, for what reason do you take notice of us this time? He said, so should come over me if I had not heard every single case from Rebbi in theory as many times as there are hairs on my head, and in a practical way three times; but the present case did come before Rebbi only twice. Therefore, I adjoined you with me.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman miscarries a sexless, or a hermaphrodite,” etc. In all cases in which we have stated “she shall observe for a male and a female,” it means 14 [days] impure and 26 pure; one puts on her the restrictions of both male and female. That means, for her house. But for pure food she observes the rules of a female [birth]. “If it was a sexless and a male, or a hermaphrodite and a male, she shall observe for a male and a female,” one takes into account the possibility of a male. “A sexless and a female, or a hermaphrodite and a female, she shall observe for a female exclusively,” does one not take into account the possibility of a male? This implies that if she gave birth to a male and a female, or a female and a male, she observes the rules for a female.
The Babylonian Talmud
Since [the Shekinah is] even with three, why mention ten ? With ten, the Shekinah precedes them ; with three, it waits until they are seated [to try cases].
Abbai said: This only applies when the building has no other entrance ; but should it have another entrance, we can have no objection ; further it applies only when there is no other Synagogue [in the town], but should there be another Synagogue, we can have no objection ; further it applies only to one who is not carrying a load, or is not running, or is not wearing Tefillin ; but in any of such cases, we can have no objection.
Bar Kappara used to tie them in the bed-curtain, leaving the cases of the Tefillin outside. Rab Shesha b. Rab Iddi used to place them upon a stool and spread a cloth over them.
Raba said : The Halakah is not in agreement with this teaching in all these cases, but according to the following teaching : A man should not read the Shema' opposite the excrement of human beings, nor opposite that of pigs or dogs when he has placed skins therein.
Are, however, the two cases analogous ? There [with oil], it has not another and higher value ; but here it has by being made into bread !
There is no contradiction; for Bet Shammai, being in doubt, take the stricter view in both cases. Nevertheless Bet Shammai have a doubt whether it is subject to 'Orlah; and we have a Mishnaic teaching: Where there is a doubt [whether a thing is subject to] 'Orlah — in the Land of Israel it is prohibited [to be used], in Syria it is permitted, and outside the Land one may go down and buy it,
But the two cases are not parallel; for there [in the instance of immersion], the man was not at the outset fit [to pronounce a benediction] ; but here [in the instance of the benediction] the man was fit at the outset [to say it], and since it was deferred it must remain so.
They asked: [Does he mean that] the dispute concerns only [poles that were erected] in the middle of the roof, but if such were erected on the edge of the roof all agree that it is valid, or is it possible [that he means that] the dispute concerns both cases? The question remains undecided.
R. Huna replied: A handbreadth since we find a handbreadth [prescribed as the minimum size] with regard to overshadowing in cases of uncleanliness, as we have learned: [A space of] one handbreadth square and one handbreadth high acts as a carrier of uncleanliness and as an interposition to it, but if it is less than one handbreadth high it neither conveys nor interposes.
And if he had informed us of those two, [one would have said that the validity applied to these cases only] because their skhakh is valid, but in the case of a large sukkah which is surrounded with a material which is invalid for a sukkah covering, since the skhakh itself is invalid, it does not apply [therefore it is] necessary [to mention all].
And Shmuel said about this: The same applies to a knife, a dish, a loaf of bread and money? In the latter cases he is not performing a mitzvah and, therefore, would worry over them but in the former one he is fulfilling a mitzvah and therefore he would not worry over it.
Our Rabbis have taught: The alarm for rain for the trees must be sounded in the middle of the Passover season, while the alarm for rain for cisterns, ditches, and caves must be sounded in the middle of the Tabernacles season: if there is no water for drinking purposes, the alarm is to be sounded at once. What is meant by "at once"? The first Monday, Thursday, and Monday. In all these cases the alarm is sounded only in the province concerned. If there is an epidemic of croup the alarm is sounded, provided the disease proves fatal, but if it is not fatal, the alarm is not sounded. The alarm is sounded on account of the appearance of locusts, no matter in what numbers; R. Simeon b. Eleazar said, the alarm is sounded also on account of grasshoppers.
Wild beasts, etc. Our Rabbis have taught: In cases of wild beasts the alarm must be sounded only when they appear as a visitation, but if they do not appear as a visitation, we do not sound the alarm. How are we to know whether it is the one or the other? If the wild beasts appear in the town, it is a visitation, but if only in the fields, it is not a visitation; if by day, it is a visitation, if by night it is not a visitation; if a beast saw two men together and ran after them, it is a visitation, but if on seeing them it fled, it is not a visitation; if it tore two persons but devoured only one of them, it is a visitation, but if it devoured both of them, it is not a visitation; if it climbed upon the roof and took a child out of the cradle, it is a visitation.
What is the reason [why] tefillin and mezuzahs [must be written in Hebrew]? — Because in reference to them it is written, “And they shall be”, (Deuteronomy 6:6) which implies, they shall be as they originally were. What cases are there of Aramaic which can be written in Hebrew? I grant you we find in the Torah “yegar sahaduta” (Genesis 31:47); but here [in the case of tefillin, and mezuzot] what Aramaic is there?
But is it not written, “Vayehi in the four hundred and eightieth year” (I Kings 6:1), “Vayehi when Jacob saw Rachel” (Genesis 29:1), and it is also written, “Vayehi was evening and there was morning one day” (Genesis 1:5), and there is the second day and the third, and there are many other cases?
R. Ashi replied: In all cases, vayehi sometimes has this signification and sometimes not, but “vayehi in the days of” always indicates trouble.
And the king said to the wise men. Who are the wise men? The rabbis. “Who knew the times”: that is, who knew how to intercalate years and fix new moons. He said to them: Try her for me. They said [to themselves]: What shall we do? If we tell him o put her to death, tomorrow he will become sober again and he will require her from us. Shall we tell him to let her go? She disrespected royalty. So they said to him: From the day when the Temple was destroyed and we were exiled from our land, counsel has been taken from us and we do not know how to judge capital cases. Go to Ammon and Moab who have remained in their places like wine that has settled on its lees. They spoke to him thus
Rabbah b. Shmuel said: It means that she came with reference to blood that came from the hidden parts [setarim]. She brought some blood and showed it to him. He said to her: Is blood to be shown at night? She replied: Are capital cases tried at night? He said to her:
But according to R. Ashi, who is the author of the Mishnah? It is neither the First Tanna nor R. Yose, as it has been taught: If it [the ninth of Av] falls on Monday or Thursday, three read and one [of them] says a haftarah. If on Tuesday or Wednesday, one reads and [the same] one says the haftarah. R. Yose, however, says that in all cases three read and one [of them] says the haftarah.
Rather Abaye said: There is no contradiction: Here [the reader deals] with one subject, in the other case with two; and in fact it has been taught: The reader may skip in the Torah within one subject, and in a Prophet even if he goes on to another subject’; and in both cases only so far that the translator will not have stopped [before he finds the place].
It makes sense to the one who says that “When you count” should be read, because he thus makes a difference between this Rosh Hodesh and other cases of Rosh Hodesh. But the one who says that “Command the children of Israel” should be read, what difference does he make?
He does make a difference, because on other cases of Rosh Hodesh six read in the portion of the day and one that of Rosh Hodesh, whereas in this case all read in that of Rosh Hodesh.
There is a difference, because on other cases of Rosh Hodesh six read in the portion of the day and one reads the special portion for Rosh Hodesh, whereas on this occasion three read in the portion of the day and four in that of Rosh Hodesh.
the case of a man who has to use violence, the other of one whose approaches are admitted. And, if you like, I will say that both are cases of one who has to use violence, and yet there is no difficulty. The one is the case of the wife of a priest, the other that of the wife of an ordinary Israelite.
I. (8) The rules concerning the dissolving of vows fly about in the air, and there is nothing upon which they can rest. The Halachoth concerning Sabbath, Chagigoth, and trespasses, behold, they are as mountains suspended by a hair, for lo! the Bible teaching is little and the Halachoth manifold. The legal decisions and the Temple services, the things clean and unclean, and cases of unlawful unions, have something on which they may rest, and these are the principal things of the Law.
Halachoth concerning Sabbath. But there is much in Holy Writ concerning it. Nay, but it was necessary, so as to agree with the words of R. Abba, for R. Abba said, He who digs a hole on the Sabbath, when it is only needed for the sake of the earth from it, is permitted to do so. According to whom is this teaching? According to R. Simeon, who said, A work which is not necessary for its own sake is permitted. If thou sayest, According to R. Jehudah, his teaching is that there are two cases to be distinguished, and that in the one the man does something which effects good, in the other harm. What is the meaning of the expression, as mountains suspended by a hair? It refers to the fact that
In hallowed things. What is the reason of the prohibition? R. Ela said, Because the weight of the vessel interposes. But seeing that in a later case it is on account of the interposition, the first case cannot be on account of an interposition. For we are taught in the later case, And the manner of the heave-offering is not as the manner of the hallowed things. For in the case of hallowed things one looses a knot and wipes and cleanses and afterwards ties up again, but in the case of a heave-offering he ties up and afterwards cleanses. Nay, but both the earlier and later cases are because of interposition, and it was necessary that they should be separately mentioned, for if he had taught us the first only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to the hallowed things, viz., because of the vessel's weight, which actually exists. But in the latter case, where the vessel's weight is not an element, I should say, In regard to hallowed things also there is in this case no disqualifying interposition. And if he had taught us the latter only, I should say, This is the reason for the prohibition with reference to hallowed things, because
And in the case of heave-offering, though one of his hands be unclean etc. R. Shezbi says, It is in case of contact that this teaching holds, but in case there is no contact, it does not hold. Abai replied to him, A wiped hand renders its fellow unclean, so far as to make unclean for hallowed things, but not for heave-offering. These are the words of Rab. R. Jose in the name of R. Jehudah says, This is the case so far as to disqualify, but not to render unclean. If thou sayest, No doubt this is so in cases of non-contact, then here comes in the importance of the word "wiped;" but if thou sayest, In case of contact, yes; in case of non-contact, no; then what is the importance of the "wiped" hand? It has been reported also that Resh Lakish said, The Mishnah refers only to his own hand
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
Rav Nachman said, Individual testimonies are valid by monetary cases, as the Torah says, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", which implies that only by capital cases are [individual testimonies] not valid, but by monetary cases they are valid.
Rav Nachman said, Individual testimonies are valid by monetary cases, as the Torah says, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", which implies that only by capital cases are [individual testimonies] not valid, but by monetary cases they are valid.
Rav Nachman said, Individual testimonies are valid by monetary cases, as the Torah says, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", which implies that only by capital cases are [individual testimonies] not valid, but by monetary cases they are valid.
Rav Zutra asked a question, But now let us ave him ny capital cases as well [which we are more lenient by]. So why do we learn in a Mishna, He and they are executed? It's a question.
Mishnah: These are the exiles: One who kills someone accidentally. One was rolling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; one who was pulling up a barrel and it fell on him and killed him; one who was descending a ladder and it fell on him and killed him—[in all these cases] behold he is exiled. However, if he was pulling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; or he was lowering a barrel and the rope broke and it [the barrel] fell on him and killed him;