404 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:33

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:33

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:49

Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:105

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:105

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:8

It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:10

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:10

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:23

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:23

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:26

MISHNAH: A bull which was rubbing itself against a wall which then fell on a human, [or which] intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed a Jew, stillbirth but killed a viable child, is free from prosecution.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:12

MISHNAH: If a bull intended [to hurt] another bull but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he is not liable. But if a man intended [to hurt] a neighbor but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children. How does he pay for the children? One estimates the worth of the woman before and after she gave birth. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, but the value of a woman increses after giving birth! But one estimates how much the children would have been worth and gives [the value] to the husband; if she does not have a husband, to the latter’s heirs. If she was a freedwoman or a proselyte, he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:12

MISHNAH: If a bull intended [to hurt] another bull but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he is not liable. But if a man intended [to hurt] a neighbor but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children. How does he pay for the children? One estimates the worth of the woman before and after she gave birth. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, but the value of a woman increses after giving birth! But one estimates how much the children would have been worth and gives [the value] to the husband; if she does not have a husband, to the latter’s heirs. If she was a freedwoman or a proselyte, he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 5:13

HALAKHAH: “If a bull intended,” etc. A bull which intended [to attack] another; therefore, if it intended to hit the woman is he liable? Does it make a difference whether it intended to hit the woman or intended to hit another [bull]? Then why was it stated here? Abba bar Rav Ḥana said, because he had to state the next clause: “But if a human intended [to hurt] another human but hit a woman who then had a miscarriage, he pays for the children.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 8:4

It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 8:9

MISHNAH: Loss of earnings. One considers him as if he were a watchman of pumpkins since he already compensated him for the loss of his hand or loss of his foot. Embarrassment. Everything depends on the person embarrassing and the one embarrassed. One who embarrassed a naked person, or embarrassed a blind person, or embarrassed a sleeping person is liable, but the sleeper who embarrassed is not liable. If a person fell from a roof and caused damage and embarrassed, he is liable for the damage but not liable for the embarrassment since is was said: “She reached out with her hand and grabbed him at his private parts;” one is not liable for embarrassment unless if was intended.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 9:17

It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 2:10

“Pitchers of wine and pitchers of oil he has to make public.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it was like a tripod one does not have to make it public. What means, like a tripod? For example, a corral belonging to three people. Since one does not know to whom to return it, he does not have to make it public. Rebbi Yose said, one understands from here that if a person went behind Rebbi Ḥalafta and a denar fell down from them, since one does not know to whom to return it, he does not have to make it public. Simeon bar Abba was walking behind Rebbi Eleazar; a denar fell down from him. Simeon bar Abba presented it to him. He answered, I already had given up hope about this. They said, Rebbi Eleazar only intended it for Rebbi Simeon bar Abba because he was poor.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 1:8

So far lengthwise. What about its width? Rebbi Nasa said, the wall of the courtyard is only made to save for him. They intended to say that if he wanted to make a roof, he cannot make a roof. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by his beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 3:5

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields of a proselyte were involved, with a boundary strip in between. If he cut off from one of them with the intent of taking possession also of the other but not the boundary strip in between, the one was acquired by him but not the other. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting [from] the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North by cutting off with the intent of also acquiring the one to the South, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he acquired the one to the North but not the one to the South. There, we have stated: “If it was connected to the ground and he cut off anything, he acquired.” Samuel said, he acquired only what he cut off. Rebbi Eudaimon the Emigrant said, this was said concerning the property of a proselyte. Rav Ḥisda said, Rebbi Isaac: It was reported that this was said concerning the property of a proselyte, so it should present no difficulty for Samuel.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 1:74

Rebbi Zeˋira asked before Rebbi Immi: If the person was checked and he said, that was not what I intended? He answered him, when he will be checked.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:40

HALAKHAH: “How does one check out the witnesses,” etc. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Johanan: If he had intended to appoint them as witnesses, their testimony is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 3:68

And the following. One does not listen to the witnesses unless they come together; Rebbi Nathan says, one listens to the first and when the second comes, one listens to what he has to say. Rebbi Jonathan was sitting and asking, maybe somebody is here who heard that practice follows Rebbi Nathan? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina told him, that is Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim. He said, may he come up. When he came up, he asked him, did you hear that practice follows Rebbi Nathan? He answered, I heard that Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa agrees with Rebbi Nathan. He said, do we need this? He said, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina only intended to elevate Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim because he was an important person.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 6:21

What happened in Ascalon supports him who said, Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ was president. Two students were in Ascalon. They ate together, drank together, and studied Torah together. One of them died, and nobody attended his funeral. The son of Ma`yan the publican died; the entire city stopped working to attend his funeral. The other student started crying and said woe, do the haters of Israel have no hope? It was shown to him in his dream and said, do not denigrate your Master’s children. This one did one good deed and died with it, the other one committed one sin and died with it. What sin did he commit? Far be it that he committed a sin, but once he put on his head phylacteries before his arm phylacteries. What good deed did the son of publican Ma`yan do? Far be it that he committed a good deed, but once he prepared a breakfast for the city council but they did not show up. He said, let the poor come and eat it, so it should not go to waste. Some say, he was walking in the street, having a loaf under his shoulder. It fell down and a poor person picked it up. He did not say anything in order not to embarrass him. This student saw gardens and water sources. He saw the son of Ma`yan the publican standing on the river bank trying in vain to reach the water. He also saw Miriam, Onion-leaf’s daughter, hanging on her breast nipples; but some say, the door of Hell was fixed in her ear. He asked, [why? They told him, because she fasted and made herself famous among her neighbors. Some say, she fasted one day and was dissolute two days. He asked them] for how long? They told him, when Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ comes, we shall remove it from her ear and put is in his ear. He asked them, what is his misdeed? They told him, because he made a personal vow that if he were elected president, he would kill all sorcerers. But now he was made president and he did not kill them. In fact, there are eighty women in the cave of Ascalon who hurt the world; go and tell him! He told them, he is an important personality, he will not believe me. They told him, he is very meek and will believe you. In case that he will not believe you, take out one of your eyes and put it in your hand. He took out one of his eyes and put it in his hand. They said, return it; it was even with the other. He went and told him. He wanted to perform his miracle before him, but he told him, you do not need to. I know that you are a pious person. Even though I intended so in my thoughts, I never spoke it with my mouth. It was a day of rainstorms. He took eighty select men in clean garments and took with them eighty amphoras. He told them, when I whistle once, put on your garments. When I whistle for the second time, come. When he came to the cave of Ascalon, he said אוים, אוים, open for me, I am one of yours. When he entered, one said what she said and produced bread. One said what she said and produced a dish. One said what she said and produced wine. They asked him, what can you do? He told them, when I whistle twice, I shall bring here eighty select men in dry garments for your pleasure and entertainment. They told him, we desire them. When he whistled, they put on their garments; when he whistled for the second time, they all entered together. He made them a sign for each one to grab one of them and lift her from the earth. Then they did not succeed in what they were trying to do. He told the one who brought bread, bring bread! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. Bring a dish! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. Bring wine! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. This he did to all of them. That is what we have stated: “Simeon ben Shetaḥ hanged eighty women in Ascalon, but one does not try two on the same day.” But the hour needed it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 8:13

What is a thief and what is a robber? Rebbi Hila said, if he stole in the presence of witnesses, he is a thief, in the presence of the owners he is a robber. Rebbi Ze`ura asked: but if he intended to rob in front of its owners, he is not a robber. What is a robber according to Rebbi Ze`ura? Rebbi Samuel ben Sosarta in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: only if he rob in the presence of ten people. The prototype for all these: He robbed the spear from the hand of the Egyptian and killed him with his own spear.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:22

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:22

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:22

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:22

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:23

“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:25

HALAKHAH: “If one intended to hit someone on his hips,” etc. Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a deadly stone which killed one person and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other? Ḥizqiah asked: If one threw a stone which was not deadly but which killed one person and broke another’s vessels, did the verse give the law for one but not for the other?

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:26

Rebbi Simeon says, those of the House of Rebbi state: even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable. The House of Rebbi follows Rebbi Nathan, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: If one was standing next to a group of people and said, I am intending to kill one of you. Even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:26

Rebbi Simeon says, those of the House of Rebbi state: even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable. The House of Rebbi follows Rebbi Nathan, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: If one was standing next to a group of people and said, I am intending to kill one of you. Even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 10:9

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the words of the Sages are that the sent-away ram pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Zeˋira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanina said, at the end. What is the difference between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ḥanina said, a baraita supports Rebbi Zeˋira: There is strength in the ram which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the ram, for the Day of Atonement pardons without a ram, but the ram does not atone except on the Day of Atonement. There is strength in the ram, for it pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another ram but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose ben Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:7

What is a thief and what is a robber? Rebbi Hila said, if he stole in the presence of witnesses, he is a thief, in the presence of the owners he is a robber. Rebbi Zeˋira asked: but if he intended to rob (for copulation), he is not a robber. What is a robber according to Rebbi Zeˋira? Rebbi Samuel ben Sosarta in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: only if he rob in the presence of ten people. The prototype for all these: He robbed the spear from the hand of the Egyptian, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:28

HALAKHAH: “One who prophesies in the name of foreign worship,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, everything was included in do not testify against your neighbor as a false witness. It came to judge whether by sign, or by miracle, whether about foreign worship or any other commandment. But about foreign worship, whether he intended to uproot the entire body or did not intend to uproot the entire body, by the words of Rebbi Simeon one does not prosecute him, but by the words of the Sages one stones him. For any other commandment by the words of the Sages one stones him, by the words of Rebbi Simeon he should understand his pywnṭ.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:31

Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 8:2

HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 3:32

Rebbi Yose objected to the rabbis, is it not written: your sin which you had made, the calf? They told him, this teaches that he intended to examine them in the way one examines deviant wives: he strewed it on the surface of the water.He said to them, is it not written, and also Maacah, king Asa’s mother, he removed from power? They told him, is there proof from there? Asa cut down etc. He told them, he beat the bronze serpent to pieces. Was this an object of worship? Did not Moses make it? This teaches that Israel was erring after it until Hezekias came and removed it.

Jerusalem Talmud Avodah Zarah 5:20

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose went to the wellknown Neapolis. The Samaritans came to him. He told them, I am seeing you bowing down not to this mountain but to the idols under it, as it is written, he hid them under the terebinth near Sichem. He heard their voices saying, let us get up early and gather those thorns. He understood that they intended to kill him; he got up early and left.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 3:64

If they intended to appoint Elders, from where do they appoint? From Tiberias or from the South? Rebbi Simon said, Jehudah shall go first. Rebbi Mana said to him, this refers to war. But for ordination, those who see the face of the king, sitting first in government.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:18

They then solved it from a Baraita ; for it is taught in a Baraita : The sign for the matter is the appearance of the stars. Conclude from this that the [complete] setting of the sun is intended ; and what means "It is clean" ? The day is clean.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:104

If thou wilt, I can say that here there is the danger of the overpowering force of sleep; or if thou wilt, I can say that it is intended to exclude the opinion of those who maintain that the evening prayer is voluntary; and hence we are informed that it is an obligation.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:592

It is said, "That thou mayest remember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt all the days of thy life" (Deut. xvi. 3). [Had the Scriptures stated] "the days of thy life" [it would have meant] the days only ; but "all the days of thy life" [must be intended to include] the nights.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 1:597

It is not intended that the name Jacob shall be obliterated, but that Israel will be fundamental and Jacob secondary. Similarly the Scriptures state, "Remember ye not the former things, neither consider the things of old" (Is. xliii. 18) — "Remember ye not the former things," i.e. the servitude of the kingdoms, "neither consider the things of old," i.e. the exodus from Egypt. "Behold I will do a new thing ; now shall it spring forth" (ibid. 5:19). Rab Joseph taught :

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 2:113

They answer that the fact that our Mishnah states Who reads is intended to show how extreme is the view of R. Jose, for he means to say that even post factum it is not valid; since were it R. Judah, even ab initio it would still be valid.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:145

For whom does he mention this ? If it is supposed for the Rabbis, it is surely obvious ; since if a man with a running issue who experiences emission and originally was not under the necessity of bathing is compelled by the Rabbis to have immersion, how much more so a woman who experiences the menstrual flow during intercourse and originally was under the necessity of bathing ! Must it not be for R. Judah ? But the statement is intended to apply to this case exclusively, viz. :

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:177

R. Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi, and R. Eleazar and R. Jose b. R. Hannina—one of the first pair is at variance with one of the second pair on the interpretation of the first part of this teaching. One says : The statement, "Of what does this speak? [If he wishes to study Torah] for himself; but [if he wishes to teach it] to others, forty Saot are necessary" is intended to apply only to a delicate person whose emission was voluntary, but nine Kabs suffice him when it was involuntary. The other says : Whoever [wishes to teach Torah] to others, even if he be a delicate person whose emission was involuntary, [cannot be regarded as clean] until there have been forty Saot.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 3:178

And one of the first pair is at variance with one of the second pair on the latter part of the teaching. One says : The statement, "R. Judah says that in every case forty Saot are required" is intended to apply only [to water found] in the ground, but not [to water] in vessels. The other says : It applies even [to water] in vessels.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 4:4

For whom is this teaching intended? For the Wetikin; for R. Johanan said: The Wetikin used to finish it with the sunrise.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 5:44

"Count not thy handmaid for a wicked woman" (I Sam. i. 16) — R. Eleazar said : Hence it is inferred that if a drunken person prays, it is as though he practised idolatry; for it is written here "a wicked woman," and elsewhere it is written, "Certain base fellows are gone out from the midst of thee" (Deut. xiii. 14) — as the reference in this latter passage is to idolatry, so also in the other passage idolatry is intended.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:2

GEMARA Whence is this derived ? For our Rabbis have taught: "The fruit thereof shall be holy, for giving praise [hillulim] unto the Lord" (Lev. xix. 24) — this teaches that they require a benediction before and after partaking of them. Hence said R. 'Akiba : A man is forbidden to taste anything without previously saying a benediction. But is the phrase "holy for giving praise" intended to teach that ?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:83

It is quoted in objection : R. Meir has declared : From the statement of Scripture, "Ye shall deem it an uncircumcision with its fruit" (Lev. xix. 23), do I not know that a food-bearing tree is intended ? Why, then, is there a teaching to tell us "trees for food" (ibid.)? To include a tree whose wood and fruit taste alike. And which is that? Pepper ; to teach thee that pepper is subject to 'Orlah, and to teach thee that the Land of Israel lacks nothing ; as it is said, "A land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack any thing in it" (Deut. viii. 9)!

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:126

Rab Joseph quoted in objection : "[R. Judah and R. Jose] both hold that we may stir up a Shattit on the Sabbath and drink Egyptian beer" ! If, then, thou thinkest that [the Shattit] is intended as a remedy, is it permitted to compound a remedy on the Sabbath ?

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:127

Abbai said to him : Art thou not of the opinion [that it is permitted to compound a remedy on the Sabbath] ? Lo, there is a Mishnaic teaching : All foods may be eaten as a remedy, and likewise all liquids may be drunk ! What is there for thee to say? The man intended it as a food [and therefore it may be prepared on the Sabbath] ; so here also [in the case of the Shattit] the man intended it as a food.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:127

Abbai said to him : Art thou not of the opinion [that it is permitted to compound a remedy on the Sabbath] ? Lo, there is a Mishnaic teaching : All foods may be eaten as a remedy, and likewise all liquids may be drunk ! What is there for thee to say? The man intended it as a food [and therefore it may be prepared on the Sabbath] ; so here also [in the case of the Shattit] the man intended it as a food.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:128

(Another version is : What is there for thee to say? The man intended it as a food, and it became a remedy of itself ; so here also [the Shattit] was intended as a food, and it became a remedy of itself.)

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:128

(Another version is : What is there for thee to say? The man intended it as a food, and it became a remedy of itself ; so here also [the Shattit] was intended as a food, and it became a remedy of itself.)

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:129

It was necessary to have the statements of Rab and Samuel. For from that [quotation from the Mishnah] I might have said that [only when the Shattit] is intended as a food and becomes a remedy of itself [is a benediction required] ; but here, since it was from the outset intended as a remedy, no benediction is at all required. Therefore [from Rab and Samuel's statement] we are informed that since one derives enjoyment therefrom, it is necessary to say a benediction.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 6:129

It was necessary to have the statements of Rab and Samuel. For from that [quotation from the Mishnah] I might have said that [only when the Shattit] is intended as a food and becomes a remedy of itself [is a benediction required] ; but here, since it was from the outset intended as a remedy, no benediction is at all required. Therefore [from Rab and Samuel's statement] we are informed that since one derives enjoyment therefrom, it is necessary to say a benediction.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 7:197

R. Jose b. R. Hannina said: The Sages agree with R. Eliezer that over a cup of wine intended for the Grace we do not say the benediction until water is added. What is the reason ? Rab Osha'ya answered : We require a commandment to be performed with the choicest.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 8:117

Thou mayest, however, argue that the same thing applies to one who omitted it intentionally and the statement "he forgot" is only intended to show the extreme view of Bet Shammai ; therefore he informs us.

Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 9:397

Further did R. Judah begin with the honour of the Torah and expound : "Attend and hear; this day thou art become a people unto the Lord thy God" (Deut. xxvii. 9). But was it on that day that the Torah had been given to Israel? Was that not the completion of forty years! But it is intended to teach thee that every day is the Torah endeared to them who study it as on the day that it was given on Mount Sinai.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:59

This applies only to a house which is intended to stand, [and therefore] we allow it a [share in the] courtyard; but as to this [a hovel] which is intended to be demolished, we do not allow it [a share in the] courtyard.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:59

This applies only to a house which is intended to stand, [and therefore] we allow it a [share in the] courtyard; but as to this [a hovel] which is intended to be demolished, we do not allow it [a share in the] courtyard.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:79

If [a sukkah] was more than twenty cubits high and one built in it a pillar ten handbreadths high, and [the pillar] was large enough for a valid sukkah,[in this case] Abaye intended to draw the partitions upward,

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:249

Gemara. R. Hisda stated: [Our mishnah] speaks only [of a sheet spread] because of falling [leaves], but if [it was spread] in order to beautify [the sukkah], it is valid But is not this obvious! For did we not learn in the mishnah, "because of falling [leaves]? One might have said that the law is the same even [where the sheet was intended] to beautify [the sukkah] and that the reason why it was stated, because of falling [leaves], is that he mentions what is the common practice, therefore he [R. Hisda] teaches us this.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:492

Rather Rava said: In the case of a large [mat] all agree that if made without specific purpose [it is assumed to be intended] for a covering. They only differ in the case of a small [mat]. The first Tanna holds that ordinarily a small one is for reclining upon, and R. Eliezer holds that ordinarily a small one is for a covering as well.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:496

Rather R. Papa said: With regard to a small [mat], all agree that ordinarily it is intended for reclining upon. About what do they disagree? About a large one. The first Tanna is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended for a covering, while R. Eliezer is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended also for reclining.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:496

Rather R. Papa said: With regard to a small [mat], all agree that ordinarily it is intended for reclining upon. About what do they disagree? About a large one. The first Tanna is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended for a covering, while R. Eliezer is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended also for reclining.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:496

Rather R. Papa said: With regard to a small [mat], all agree that ordinarily it is intended for reclining upon. About what do they disagree? About a large one. The first Tanna is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended for a covering, while R. Eliezer is of the opinion that ordinarily a large one is intended also for reclining.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:31

What did he build it from? Rabbah said: Of yellow and white marble. There are those who say: With yellow, blue and white marble. The building rose in tiers in order to provide a hold for the plaster. He intended at first to overlay it with gold, but the Rabbis told him, Leave it alone for it is more beautiful as it is, since it has the appearance of the waves of the sea.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:13

The proper explanation, then, is that our Mishnah is intended as a continuation of the one in the tractate Rosh ha-Shanah, where it is taught: In the feast of Tabernacles the world is judged as to whether it should have rain. In connection with this teaching he informs us here at what time we should begin to mention the Power of rain.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:195

Shall we say that R. Ḥisda's view is supported by the following Baraita: "All those bound to take an immersion, immerse as usual even on the Ninth of Ab or on the Day of Atonement"? What kind of immersion is here intended? It cannot be in warm water, for such water is drawn. The Baraita means therefore immersion in cold water and yet it permits it only to those "bound to take an immersion," while all other people are excluded! Said R. Ḥama b. R. Ḳeṭina, the Baraita has reference to the hot springs of Tiberias. If so, how will you understand the following statement that was made with relation to the above Baraita: "R. Ḥanina, the Segan of the priests, said, the house of our God is worth that one should give up for its sake one bath in a year"? If, as you say, the Baraita permits immersion in cold water, they could immerse in cold water (and would not have to give it up even once a year). Said R. Papa, R. Ḥanina refers to a place where there is no cold water (for bathing). Come and hear: "When it was said that bathing on a fast day is forbidden, it was said only with regard to the whole body, but washing the face, hands, and feet is allowed; when it was said that work on a fast day is forbidden, it was said only with regard to the day, but during the preceding night it is allowed; and when it was said that wearing shoes is forbidden, it was said only with reference to the city, but on the road it is allowed. How is it done? When one comes on the road, he puts his shoes on, but as soon as he reaches the city, he must take them off. Thou wilt find the same law applied also to an excommunicated person and to a mourner." Now, does not the last statement (that the same law applies also to mourners) cover all three points (bathing, working, and wearing shoes)? No, it refers only to the latter two.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:208

ordained thirteen fast days, but the prayers were not answered. He therefore intended to ordain more fasts, but R. 'Ami said to him, has it not been said that it is not proper to trouble the community too much? Said R. 'Abba son of R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba: R. 'Ami was thinking of his own convenience (because he did not want to fast), for thus said R. Ḥiyya b. 'Abba in the name of R. Johanan, that statement (quoted by R. 'Ami) applies only to fasts ordained on account of lack of rain, but in the case of other calamities the people must continue fasting until their prayer is answered. The same was taught in a Baraita: When it was ordained that the people should fast (twice) three days and again seven days, it had reference to drought, but in case of other kinds of calamities they must continue fasting until their prayers are answered. Should we say that this Baraita is a refutation of R. 'Ami? Answer: R. 'Ami can defend himself by replying that the matter is the subject of dispute between different Tannaim, for a Baraita states: No more than thirteen fasts should be enjoined upon the community, as it is not proper to trouble the community too much; this is the opinion of Rabbi; Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, this is not the reason, but it is because (after the thirteen fasts) the time for rainfall is passed.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:213

If all these fast days are passed and the community has not been answered, all business transactions, building, planting . . . should be limited. It was taught: By building is meant such as is undertaken for pleasure and, likewise, by planting is meant such as is intended for pleasure. What is a building for pleasure? A structure that one erects for the wedding of his son. What are plantings for pleasure? Bowers, as they are built by kings.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 2:36

The sixth he closes thus: He who answered Jonah, etc. The seventh he closes thus: He who answered David, etc. Did not Jonah live after David and Solomon? Why then is he mentioned first? Because it is intended that the last closing should be: "Blessed be He who has mercy upon the land." It was taught: It is reported in the name of Symmachos that the seventh benediction is closed with the words: "Blessed be He who lowereth the haughty."

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 3:38

In Droḳeret, a town of five hundred men, there died once three men in one day, wherefore R. Naḥman b. R. Ḥisda intended to decree a public fast. R. Naḥman b. Isaac, however, said to him: In accordance with whose view do you intend to do this? That of R. Meir, who said, if an ox that gores at long intervals (three times in three days) has to pay the full damage, all the more so one that gores at short intervals (three times in one day)? Said R. Naḥman b. R. Ḥisda to R. Naḥman b. Isaac: "Come and take a seat beside me," to which the latter replied: I hold to what is taught in a Baraita: R. Jose said: It is not the place that honors the man, but it is the man that honors the place, for thus we find that as long as the Shekinah was present on Sinai, the law was (Exod., 34. 3): "Neither let the flocks nor herds feed before that mount," but as soon as the Shekinah departed from there, the Torah prescribed (ib., 19.13): "When the ram's horn soundeth long, they shall come up to the mount." The same, we find, was the case with the tent of meeting, namely, when the tent was pitched, the order of the Torah was (Numbers, 5. 2): "They shall put out of the camp every leper, and every one that hath an issue," but as soon as the curtains were folded up (for removing the tent), those that had an issue as well as lepers were permitted to enter. "Then I shall come to your place," said Naḥman b. R. Ḥisda. R. Naḥman b. Isaac, however, replied, "It is proper that an eminent man who is the son of one less eminent, should go to one who is eminent and is the son of an eminent man, but it is not proper that a man of eminence who is the son of an eminent man should go to an eminent man who is the son of one less eminent."

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 4:39

Rab once came to Babylonia and, noticing that the people were reciting the Hallel on New Moon, intended to interrupt them, but seeing that they skipped over some portions thereof he concluded that they were following a custom of their ancestors. It was taught that individuals need not commence the recital of the Hallel on New Moon, but having commenced they may finish it.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 4:65

Our Rabbis have taught: One is not allowed to eat meat or to drink wine at any meal that is intended to be the last before the ninth of Ab; nor is it allowed to bathe after this meal. If it is not the last before the ninth of Ab, meat and wine are allowed, and one may still bathe after the meal. R. Ishmael b. R. Jose said in the name of his father, as long as one is allowed to eat (any kind of food), he is allowed also to bathe.