prohibited
381 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
MISHNAH: A woman who was jailed by Gentiles, if because of money matters, she is permitted to her husband; if because of criminal matters, she is prohibited to her husband. If a city was conquered after a siege, all wives of priests in it are disqualified; but if they have witnesses, even a slave, even a slave girl, those are trustworthy; but nobody is trustworthy about himself. Rebbi Zachariah, the son of the butcher, said, by the Temple! Her hand did not leave my hand from the moment the Gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left! They said to him, nobody testifies on his own behalf.
“If because of criminal matters she is prohibited.” Rebbi Yudan the son of Rav Ḥama from Kefar Teḥumim in the name of Ḥizqiah: Only if she was sentenced to death. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if she was not sentenced to death. They said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A robber’s wife is like a robber’.
Rebbi Ḥanin stated in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Both for women about whom they said that they have ketubah as also those about whom they said they leave without ketubah, as the minor, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram, did they speak about a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses, but she takes her existing rags. But the one who leaves because of a bad reputation loses everything. Can she take her paraphernalia? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, she takes. Rebbi Hila said, she does not take. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen mention it in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: Both women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, did they speak about the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses. Rebbi Simon said, Rebbi Joḥanan: All the Mishnaiot are connected to this baraita. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yasa: About which baraita? Of Rebbi Ḥanin from Samuel? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. And Rebbi Ḥiyya formulated so: “Women who infringe upon the law lose everything.
MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “Neither the orphan girl, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram,” etc. One understands the secondarily prohibited and the she-ram. The orphan? Does an orphan not have ketubah? Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi J̣oḥanan: Explain it for an orphan who repudiated. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari, Rebbi Immi: Just as they fined her, so they fined him. In which respect? That if he preliminarily married her by [giving her] a pound of gold, he loses it all.
HALAKHAH: “Neither the orphan girl, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram,” etc. One understands the secondarily prohibited and the she-ram. The orphan? Does an orphan not have ketubah? Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi J̣oḥanan: Explain it for an orphan who repudiated. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari, Rebbi Immi: Just as they fined her, so they fined him. In which respect? That if he preliminarily married her by [giving her] a pound of gold, he loses it all.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
MISHNAH: Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively and explicit ones liberally. How is this? If one said, this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine, if his intent was for Heaven, he is forbidden, if for idolatry, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like a ban, if by a ban for Heaven, he is forbidden, if priest’s, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like tithe, if animal tithe, he is forbidden, if from grain, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden, if heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave. Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.
MISHNAH: Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively and explicit ones liberally. How is this? If one said, this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine, if his intent was for Heaven, he is forbidden, if for idolatry, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like a ban, if by a ban for Heaven, he is forbidden, if priest’s, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like tithe, if animal tithe, he is forbidden, if from grain, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden. This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden, if heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted, if indeterminate he is forbidden, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave. Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.
“But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be forbidden. “Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be permitted. Here you say permitted, but there you say forbidden. Rebbi Eleazar says, these are statements of two Tannaïm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, all is from one Tanna, following the one who said: “indeterminate bans are for the upkeep of the Temple.” But for the one who said, “indeterminate bans are for priests,” even in Galilee they would be permitted. In Galilee where they are used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say forbidden; in Judea where they are not used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say permitted.
“But the Sages say, indeterminate heave in Judea is prohibited, in Galilee permitted, since Galileans do not know of Temple heave.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be forbidden. “Indeterminate bans in Judea are permitted, in Galilee prohibited, since Galileans do not know of priest’s bans.” But if they did know it, the indeterminate would be permitted. Here you say permitted, but there you say forbidden. Rebbi Eleazar says, these are statements of two Tannaïm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, all is from one Tanna, following the one who said: “indeterminate bans are for the upkeep of the Temple.” But for the one who said, “indeterminate bans are for priests,” even in Galilee they would be permitted. In Galilee where they are used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say forbidden; in Judea where they are not used to invoke Akhan’s ban, you have to say permitted.
“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
MISHNAH: One opens about festive days and Sabbaths. In earlier times, they said that these days are permitted but the rest forbidden, until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow which was partially voided is totally voided. How is this? ‘A qônām that I shall not benefit any one of you,’ if one was permitted, all are permitted. ‘That I shall not benefit this one and this one and this one,’ if the first one becomes permitted, all are permitted; if the last one becomes permitted, he is permitted and the others are prohibited. ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one, a qorbān for that one’; each single one needs a separate opening. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine, for wine is bad for the intestines.’ If they told him, but old [wine] is good for the intestines, old [wine] was permitted; not only old wine is permitted but all wines. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste onion, for onion is bad for the heart.’ If they told him, but the rural kind is good for the heart, rural [onion] was permitted; not only rural is permitted but all onions. It happened that Rebbi Meїr permitted all onions to him.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
It was stated: “It is prohibited to buy from a Gentile who sells Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot.” But was it not stated: “It happened that a Gentile in Sidon sold phylacteries and mezuzot. The case came before the Sages who said that it was permitted to buy from him.” That one was a Gentile who reverted to his error.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.
It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, one understands from this five rules: One understands that five women can be preliminarily married simultaneously. That a woman may receive her own wedding gift and that of her companion. And one may use the spoils of robbery for a preliminary marriage. And one may preliminarily marry using produce acquired by a prohibited act. And preliminary marriage is impossible in incest situations.
Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A person who gave ten denars to another and told him, I have to get from you 100 (denars) [barrels] from that house, is permitted; from that vineyard, is prohibited. What is the difference between house and vineyard? A house is not expected to collapse, a vineyard occasionally collapses. Rebbi Yose said, you understand from this that if a person gave ten denars to another and told him, I have to get 100 barrels from you, once he used them he is required to deliver the merchandise.
A Jew may borrow from a Gentile, and a Gentile from a Jew, and a Jew can become his guarantor without any worries about interest. If a Jew appointed a Gentile as guardian or steward, it is permitted to borrow from him on interest. But if a Gentile appointed a Jew as guardian or steward, it is prohibited to borrow from him on interest. It is forbidden to borrow on interest a Gentile’s money deposited with a Jew; it is permitted to borrow on interest a Jew’s money deposited with a Gentile. This is the principle: Anything which the Jew has to warrant is forbidden, what the Gentile has to warrant is permitted.
Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.
If he deposited with him with a seal. Rebbi Ḥananiah and Rebbi Mana, one says, prohibited, and one says, permitted. Where do they disagree? For usufruct. But for drinking it is forbidden.
“And Hadrianic pottery.” Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: does practice follow Rebbi Meïr? As it was stated, “Hadrianic pottery is prohibited and its prohibition is of usufruct, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, its prohibition is not of usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: what is the status of the cloth about which we stated here? He was offended by this and told him, even for him who permits there, here it is forbidden. There, the prohibition is not visible, here the prohibition is visible. May one use it to support the legs of a couch? Rebbi Eleazar says it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan says it is forbidden.
How does he do it? He tears its heart out from the living animal for pagan worship. How does one know? Rebbi Ḥuna said, if it is torn out from the living animal it rebounds and becomes circular; after slaughter it becomes stretched. Rebbi Yose said, one can infer from this that if he slaughtered one sign, even though one says that nothing living can become prohibited, here it becomes prohibited.
How does he do it? He tears its heart out from the living animal for pagan worship. How does one know? Rebbi Ḥuna said, if it is torn out from the living animal it rebounds and becomes circular; after slaughter it becomes stretched. Rebbi Yose said, one can infer from this that if he slaughtered one sign, even though one says that nothing living can become prohibited, here it becomes prohibited.
“Gentile jugs, new ones are permitted even tarred; old are forbidden even if not tarred.” Here you say tarred are permitted and there you say tarred are prohibited. Rebbi Abbahu said, I investigated tarring of jugs; they do not use vinegar while tarring.
Rebbi Yasa went to Tyre. He saw them tarring small leather bags and Jews bought them. He asked, who permitted you? They asked Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Mani, who prohibited it.
Why did he not tell him? Because they prohibited it recently and Rebbi Ismael was young.
What is alec? Rav said, soltanit. Rebbi Joḥanan said, alec and cut-up triton follow the same rules. Rebbi Ze`ira, Cahana bar Taḥlifa, Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: Its mucus is forbidden because of admixture from prohibited fish. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: This you say at a place were water is not running. But in running water no impure fish associates with pure fish. The Sea of Genezareth is similar to running water. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only at times when the fish bites. Samuel said, ḥafitha one judges according to its shell. If it produces mucus it is permitted, otherwise forbidden.
MISHNAH: All statues are prohibited because they are worshipped once a year, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, prohibited are only those in whose hand is a rod, or a bird, or a globe. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any in whose hand is anything.
MISHNAH: All statues are prohibited because they are worshipped once a year, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, prohibited are only those in whose hand is a rod, or a bird, or a globe. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any in whose hand is anything.
HALAKHAH: “All statues are prohibited,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, because they are worshipped in the great fortification of Rome twice in a Sabbatical period. Then at a place where they are worshipped they should be forbidden, at a place where they are not worshipped they should be permitted. Rebbi Yose said, since they became forbidden at one place, their kind becomes forbidden anywhere.
“But the Sages say, prohibited are only those in whose hand is a rod, or a bird, or a globe.” A rod by which he rules the world. A bird, my hand reaches to the riches of people as to a bird’s nest. A globe, for the world is globe-shaped.
Assi said, the proceeds of libation wine in the hands of a Gentile are prohibited. The proceeds of an idol in the hand of a Gentile, Rebbi Jonathan said it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan said it is prohibited. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A Gentile who owed money to a Jew should not tell him, wait until I sell libation wine, until I sell an idol, and I shall give it to you. I am saying, maybe he exchanged.” A baraita supports Rebbi Jonathan: “A Gentile who owes money to a Jew may sell libation wine and give to him, an idol and give to him. Because of the bad impression?”
Assi said, the proceeds of libation wine in the hands of a Gentile are prohibited. The proceeds of an idol in the hand of a Gentile, Rebbi Jonathan said it is permitted, Rebbi Joḥanan said it is prohibited. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A Gentile who owed money to a Jew should not tell him, wait until I sell libation wine, until I sell an idol, and I shall give it to you. I am saying, maybe he exchanged.” A baraita supports Rebbi Jonathan: “A Gentile who owes money to a Jew may sell libation wine and give to him, an idol and give to him. Because of the bad impression?”
MISHNAH: If they sinned before being appointed; when afterwards they were appointed, they remain commoners. Rebbi Simeon says, if it became known to them before they were appointed, they are obligated; if after they were appointed they are not liable. Who is the Prince? This is the king, as it is said, if he transgressed one of the commandments of the Eternal, his God; a Prince who has none above him but the Eternal, his God. And who is the Anointed? This is one anointed with the anointing oil, not one clothed in multiple garb. The only difference between the priest anointed with the anointing oil and the one clothed in multiple garb is the bull brought for all commandments. And the only difference between an officiating High Priest and a deposed one is the bull of the Day of Atonement and the tenth of an ephah. Both are equal in the office of the day of Atonement, commanded about the virgin, and prohibited for a widow, and do not defile themselves for close relatives, and may not let their hair grow or rend their garments, and let the homicide return.
The Babylonian Talmud
R. Jonah said in the name of R. Zera: Whoever attends to his personal affairs before offering his prayers is as though he had erected an idolatrous altar. He was asked : Dost thou say "an idolatrous altar"? He answered : No, I only mean it is prohibited; and it is in accordance with the statement of Rab Iddi b. Abin
The question was raised : May a man, wearing his Tefillin, enter a regular privy for the purpose of urinating? Rabina permitted it; Rab Adda b. Mattena prohibited it. The question was put to Raba, and he replied : It is forbidden, because we are afraid that he may relieve himself otherwise while wearing them. Another version is : [We are afraid] that he may break wind while wearing them.
It has been reported : If manure is being carried past a person, Abbai said : It is permitted to read the Shema' ; Raba said : It is prohibited to read it.
But against thine own argument, I quote the first clause [of the Baraita brought in objection, viz. :] "With urine, so long as the ground is wet enough to moisten it is prohibited" ; hence if the trace of it be recognisable, it is permitted! No such deduction can be drawn. It is possible to say that [the question under consideration]
There is no contradiction; for Bet Shammai, being in doubt, take the stricter view in both cases. Nevertheless Bet Shammai have a doubt whether it is subject to 'Orlah; and we have a Mishnaic teaching: Where there is a doubt [whether a thing is subject to] 'Orlah — in the Land of Israel it is prohibited [to be used], in Syria it is permitted, and outside the Land one may go down and buy it,
GEMARA Our Rabbis have taught : Over anything whose growth is not food the earth, e.g. the flesh of cattle, beasts, birds and fish, one says "...By Whose word all things exist." Over milk, eggs and cheese, one says "...By Whose word." Over bread which has become mouldy, wine over which a film has formed, and cooked food which has gone bad, one says "...By Whose word." Over salt, brine, morils and truffles, one says "...By Whose word." That is to say that morils and truffles are not grown from the soil. There is, however, a teaching : He who vows not to eat fruits grown from the earth is forbidden to eat the fruits of the earth but is allowed morils and truffles; if he declares, "All that is grown from the earth shall be forbidden me," he is also prohibited from eating morils and truffles !
And shouldest thou say that the light which is prohibited ceases to exist whereas the other is quite a different one and came into being in the hand of the Israelite, there is the teaching : Who causes a flame to issue into the public way [on the Sabbath] has incurred guilt ; but why has he incurred guilt ? What he has taken up he has not set down, and what he has set down he has not taken up!
There is another teaching : He who wishes to exercise his natural functions, if in Judea he must not face East or West, but North or South ; but in Galilee, North and South are prohibited, East or West is permitted. R. Jose, however, permits it [in any direction], because he used to say that the prohibition only applies to one who can see [the Temple]. R. Judah says : It is prohibited while the Temple is standing ; but when the Temple is no longer standing it is permitted. R. 'Akiba prohibits it in all circumstances.
There is another teaching : He who wishes to exercise his natural functions, if in Judea he must not face East or West, but North or South ; but in Galilee, North and South are prohibited, East or West is permitted. R. Jose, however, permits it [in any direction], because he used to say that the prohibition only applies to one who can see [the Temple]. R. Judah says : It is prohibited while the Temple is standing ; but when the Temple is no longer standing it is permitted. R. 'Akiba prohibits it in all circumstances.
Rabbah had bricks set up for him facing East and West. Abbai went and put them facing North and South ; but Rabbah proceeded to put them right, exclaiming, "Who is it that is troubling me ? I agree with R. 'Akiba's view when he declared that it is prohibited in all circumstances."
Raba said : Expectoration is allowed in a Synagogue, because it is analogous to [the wearing of] a shoe — just as [the wearing of] a shoe is prohibited on the Temple Mount but is permitted in a Synagogue, so is expectoration forbidden on the Temple Mount but permitted in a Synagogue.
R. Jose b. Judah says : [This reasoning] is unnecessary ; for it is stated, "For none might enter within the king's gate clothed with sackcloth" (Esther iv. 2) — and is there not here an a fortiori deduction : If it is thus with sackcloth which is not a disgusting thing in the presence of human beings, must not expectoration, which is disgusting in the presence of the supreme King of kings, be all the more prohibited !
But, answered Raba : [The Synagogue] is analogous to his own house — as a man is concerned about anybody using his house as a short cut but is not concerned about expectoration or [the wearing of] shoes, so also with the Synagogue, as a short cut it is prohibited, but expectoration and [the wearing of] shoes are allowed.
‘Vines’ [are an allusion to] the quarter of a log of wine [which is the minimum prohibited] to a Nazirite.
If the branches were interwoven, why mention the case at all? One might have thought that it should be prohibited where it is interwoven lest he regard it as valid even where it was not interwoven, [therefore the mishnah] informs us that we don't decree against it.
How so? The last object [purchased] assumes [the sanctity] of the Sabbatical Year, but the produce itself always remains prohibited. Now since the term "purchased" is repeatedly used, it is evident that only by way of sale [does it become redeemed], but not by way of exchange.
And that the whole day of waving should be prohibited. What is the reason? The Temple may be rebuilt speedily, and people would say, "Did we not eat [new grain] last year from the time that light appeared in the east? Let us now also eat it [from the same time]" and they would not know that in the previous year, when there was no Temple, once day dawned in the east it,was permitted [to eat of the new grain], but now that the Temple is rebuilt, it is only the [waving of the] omer which [begins] the permission to eat new grain.
R. Isaac, with the permission of his father R. Judah, delivered the following discourse: An individual who has taken upon himself a fast must recite the prayer provided for fasts. Where does he insert it? Between the benediction ending with "Redeemer" and that ending with "Healer" (of Israel). R. Isaac objected: Is an individual entitled to insert a benediction for himself? He should rather, said R. Isaac, include it in the benediction ending with the words: "Who hearest prayer." The same opinion was given also by R. Sheshet. An objection was raised to this view from the following Baraita: There is no difference between an individual and a community, except that the former recites eighteen benedictions, while the latter recites nineteen. Now what is meant by "individual" and "community"? Is "individual" to be understood literally and "community" in the sense of representative of the community? If so, the benedictions here spoken of would not be nineteen, but twenty-four! Consequently by "individual" can be meant only one who takes upon himself a fast which is known as a "private fast," while by "community" is meant an individual who takes upon himself a "public fast," and yet the Baraita reads: "except that the former recites eighteen benedictions and the latter nineteen," which proves that an individual may insert a benediction for himself! Answer: No, by "community" is no doubt meant its representative, but (as to your objection that in this case twenty-four benedictions are recited, it must be understood that) the Baraita has reference to the first three public fasts, during which the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three first and the three intermediary public fasts, except that during the former work is allowed, while during the latter it is prohibited," from which you must infer that with regard to the number of benedictions they are alike!? Answer: The author of this Baraita mentioned one difference and omitted the other. Is there anything else that he omitted, so that we may be justified in assuming that he omitted this difference? I will say this, then: The teacher of the Baraita was concerned only in pointing out a difference regarding things prohibited on fast days, but did not care to mention a difference in the number of benedictions recited. If you prefer, I may also say that the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four even during the intermediary public fasts. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three intermediary and the seven (last) public fasts except that during the latter the alarm is sounded and the shops are closed," which proves that with regard to the twenty-four benedictions both groups of fasts are alike? If, however, you should say that here, too, the author of the Baraita mentions one difference and omits the other, what will you do, then, with the explicit words of the Baraita, saying that "there is no difference between them except"? Answer: Do you mean to say that the phrase "there is no difference" is to be taken literally?
R. Isaac, with the permission of his father R. Judah, delivered the following discourse: An individual who has taken upon himself a fast must recite the prayer provided for fasts. Where does he insert it? Between the benediction ending with "Redeemer" and that ending with "Healer" (of Israel). R. Isaac objected: Is an individual entitled to insert a benediction for himself? He should rather, said R. Isaac, include it in the benediction ending with the words: "Who hearest prayer." The same opinion was given also by R. Sheshet. An objection was raised to this view from the following Baraita: There is no difference between an individual and a community, except that the former recites eighteen benedictions, while the latter recites nineteen. Now what is meant by "individual" and "community"? Is "individual" to be understood literally and "community" in the sense of representative of the community? If so, the benedictions here spoken of would not be nineteen, but twenty-four! Consequently by "individual" can be meant only one who takes upon himself a fast which is known as a "private fast," while by "community" is meant an individual who takes upon himself a "public fast," and yet the Baraita reads: "except that the former recites eighteen benedictions and the latter nineteen," which proves that an individual may insert a benediction for himself! Answer: No, by "community" is no doubt meant its representative, but (as to your objection that in this case twenty-four benedictions are recited, it must be understood that) the Baraita has reference to the first three public fasts, during which the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three first and the three intermediary public fasts, except that during the former work is allowed, while during the latter it is prohibited," from which you must infer that with regard to the number of benedictions they are alike!? Answer: The author of this Baraita mentioned one difference and omitted the other. Is there anything else that he omitted, so that we may be justified in assuming that he omitted this difference? I will say this, then: The teacher of the Baraita was concerned only in pointing out a difference regarding things prohibited on fast days, but did not care to mention a difference in the number of benedictions recited. If you prefer, I may also say that the number of benedictions is not increased to twenty-four even during the intermediary public fasts. Is this true? Is it not stated in a Baraita: "There is no difference between the three intermediary and the seven (last) public fasts except that during the latter the alarm is sounded and the shops are closed," which proves that with regard to the twenty-four benedictions both groups of fasts are alike? If, however, you should say that here, too, the author of the Baraita mentions one difference and omits the other, what will you do, then, with the explicit words of the Baraita, saying that "there is no difference between them except"? Answer: Do you mean to say that the phrase "there is no difference" is to be taken literally?
"From the eighth thereof until the close of the festival", etc. Why does he say "from the eighth thereof", why not from the ninth thereof, since the eighth is anyhow a holiday? Because if for some reason we should have to abolish the first seven days of Nisan as holidays, mourning would still be forbidden on the eighth because it immediately precedes the days on which the date for the Feast of Weeks was legally fixed. Now that you have arrived at this point, the matter becomes clear also regarding the twenty-ninth of Adar, for if it happened that we should have to abolish the twenty-eighth of Adar as a holiday, fasting on the twenty-ninth would still be prohibited on the ground that it immediately precedes the time during which the Daily Offering was established.
mourning and fasting during these days is allowed. Now, which of these days is here meant? If you say that the Mishnah refers to those people who under ordinary circumstances would have to read the Megillah on the fifteenth of Adar but, as it happens, read it on the fourteenth, the question must be asked, is it true that in this event mourning and fasting are allowed on the fourteenth? Is it not written in the Scroll of Fasts that the fourteenth and fifteenth must be celebrated as Purim days, on which mourning is forbidden—, a rule on which Raba commented, saying that their listing in the Scroll was needed only for the purpose of emphasizing that whatever was prohibited on the one day should be prohibited also on the other? If, however, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth, but for given reasons are to read it on the thirteenth, you, then, face the difficulty that the thirteenth is Nicanor Day (on which fasting is likewise forbidden); if, finally, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but, as it happens, have to read it on the twelfth, you face again the difficulty that the twelfth is Trajan's Day (on which, too, fasting is forbidden). You will therefore have to say that the Mishnah refers to those that would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but happen to be compelled to read it on the eleventh, and it is thus with reference to this day that the anonymous Mishnah teaches that mourning and fasting thereon are allowed! No, the Mishnah, no doubt, refers to those who would ordinarily have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but who by reason of circumstances are permitted to read it on the twelfth, and as to your objection that the twelfth is Trajan's Day, the festive character of that day was later abolished, as is instanced by R. Naḥman who ordered a public fast on the twelfth, and when the Rabbis objected thereto, pointing out that it was Trajan's Day, he replied that Trajan's Day had been abolished, because on that day Shemaiah and Ahijah were executed. But ought not fasting on that day be prohibited on the ground that it precedes Nicanor Day? Said R. 'Ashi, if Trajan Day itself was abolished, should we declare it a holiday because it comes before Nicanor Day?
mourning and fasting during these days is allowed. Now, which of these days is here meant? If you say that the Mishnah refers to those people who under ordinary circumstances would have to read the Megillah on the fifteenth of Adar but, as it happens, read it on the fourteenth, the question must be asked, is it true that in this event mourning and fasting are allowed on the fourteenth? Is it not written in the Scroll of Fasts that the fourteenth and fifteenth must be celebrated as Purim days, on which mourning is forbidden—, a rule on which Raba commented, saying that their listing in the Scroll was needed only for the purpose of emphasizing that whatever was prohibited on the one day should be prohibited also on the other? If, however, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth, but for given reasons are to read it on the thirteenth, you, then, face the difficulty that the thirteenth is Nicanor Day (on which fasting is likewise forbidden); if, finally, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but, as it happens, have to read it on the twelfth, you face again the difficulty that the twelfth is Trajan's Day (on which, too, fasting is forbidden). You will therefore have to say that the Mishnah refers to those that would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but happen to be compelled to read it on the eleventh, and it is thus with reference to this day that the anonymous Mishnah teaches that mourning and fasting thereon are allowed! No, the Mishnah, no doubt, refers to those who would ordinarily have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but who by reason of circumstances are permitted to read it on the twelfth, and as to your objection that the twelfth is Trajan's Day, the festive character of that day was later abolished, as is instanced by R. Naḥman who ordered a public fast on the twelfth, and when the Rabbis objected thereto, pointing out that it was Trajan's Day, he replied that Trajan's Day had been abolished, because on that day Shemaiah and Ahijah were executed. But ought not fasting on that day be prohibited on the ground that it precedes Nicanor Day? Said R. 'Ashi, if Trajan Day itself was abolished, should we declare it a holiday because it comes before Nicanor Day?
mourning and fasting during these days is allowed. Now, which of these days is here meant? If you say that the Mishnah refers to those people who under ordinary circumstances would have to read the Megillah on the fifteenth of Adar but, as it happens, read it on the fourteenth, the question must be asked, is it true that in this event mourning and fasting are allowed on the fourteenth? Is it not written in the Scroll of Fasts that the fourteenth and fifteenth must be celebrated as Purim days, on which mourning is forbidden—, a rule on which Raba commented, saying that their listing in the Scroll was needed only for the purpose of emphasizing that whatever was prohibited on the one day should be prohibited also on the other? If, however, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth, but for given reasons are to read it on the thirteenth, you, then, face the difficulty that the thirteenth is Nicanor Day (on which fasting is likewise forbidden); if, finally, you say that the Mishnah refers to those who would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but, as it happens, have to read it on the twelfth, you face again the difficulty that the twelfth is Trajan's Day (on which, too, fasting is forbidden). You will therefore have to say that the Mishnah refers to those that would have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but happen to be compelled to read it on the eleventh, and it is thus with reference to this day that the anonymous Mishnah teaches that mourning and fasting thereon are allowed! No, the Mishnah, no doubt, refers to those who would ordinarily have to read the Megillah on the fourteenth but who by reason of circumstances are permitted to read it on the twelfth, and as to your objection that the twelfth is Trajan's Day, the festive character of that day was later abolished, as is instanced by R. Naḥman who ordered a public fast on the twelfth, and when the Rabbis objected thereto, pointing out that it was Trajan's Day, he replied that Trajan's Day had been abolished, because on that day Shemaiah and Ahijah were executed. But ought not fasting on that day be prohibited on the ground that it precedes Nicanor Day? Said R. 'Ashi, if Trajan Day itself was abolished, should we declare it a holiday because it comes before Nicanor Day?
One should not eat meat or drink wine. It was taught in a Baraita: But one may eat salted (pickled) meat and drink wine from his vat. How long does pickled meat retain its original (natural) taste (so that it is prohibited on the eve of the ninth of Ab)? Said R. Ḥinena b. Kahana in the name of Samuel, as long as it is within the time set for the eating of the meat of a peace offering (i. e., 60 hours). How long is wine to be considered as coming fresh from the vat? As long as it is fermenting. It was taught in a Baraita: New wine that is still fermenting does not come under the law forbidding to drink liquids left uncovered. How long does the fermentation last? Three days.
Mishnah: There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except for setting foot [on his property] and vessels which are not used for [preparing] food.
Mishnah: There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except for setting foot [on his property] and vessels which are not used for [preparing] food.
Therefore on Rosh Hodesh and the intermediate days of the festival, when there is an additional sacrifice, four read; on festivals (Yom Tov), when [in addition] work is prohibited, five read; on Yom Kippur when [in addition] there is a penalty of karet, six read; on Shabbat when there is a penalty of stoning, seven read.
Rami b. Abba was building a synagogue. There was a certain old synagogue which he wanted to tear down, and to bring the bricks and beams from it and use them for the other. He was sitting and trying to figure out the implications of what R. Hisda had said, for R. Hisda said: A man should not tear down a synagogue until he has built another [to take its place]. The reason there [that it was prohibited] was so that there should be no negligence. But what about in a case like this? He came in front of R. Papa, who forbade him; and in front of R. Huna, and he also forbade him.
Thou saidst at first, Nor the Chariot with one, and again thou saidst, But if a man do so, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. This is its meaning. Men are not to expound unlawful unions to three others, nor the work of Creation to two others, nor the Chariot to one other, but if they do, he must be a wise man, and one who has much knowledge of his own. Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three. What is the reason? Shall we say, It is on account of the passage, "each man to any that is near of kin" (Lev. xviii. 6)? "Each man" is equivalent to two, "that is near of kin" is equivalent to one; and the Merciful One said, "Ye shall not approach etc." But regard it thus; as it is written, "each man that curseth his God" (Lev. xxiv. 15), "each man that giveth of his seed unto Molech" (Lev. xx. 2), so it is with this passage also; but as these last must mean to include the strangers, who are cautioned for cursing the Lord, and for idolatry, like Israel, so that first quoted also must mean to include the strangers who are cautioned for unlawful unions, like Israel. But do we get it from the passage, "therefore shall ye keep my charge?" (Lev. xviii. 30) "Therefore shall ye keep" implies two, "my charge" one; for the Merciful One in this passage was forbidding the practice of "abominable customs" (ibid.). But as it is written, Ye therefore shall keep the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 14), "and ye shall keep the Unleavened Bread" (Exod. xii. 17), "and ye shall keep the charge of the sanctuary" (Numb. xviii. 5), so it is with this passage also. But R. Ashi said, How are we to explain, Men are not to expound unlawful unions with three? It means that they are not to expound the details of the subject with three others. What is the reason? The probability is that when two sit before their Rabbi one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, and the other inclines his ear to instruction, but if there are three, one is wholly occupied with his Rabbi, but the other two are wholly occupied with each other, and know not what their Rabbi is saying, and they go forth from his lecture to allow things that are prohibited in the matter of unlawful unions. But if this be so, the whole Law should also by parity of reason come under this rule. No, for unlawful unions are different from other subjects. For the Mishnah teacher said, As for robbery and unlawful unions, a man's soul coveteth and lusteth for them. But if it be so, robbery also should come under the rule. No, for in the case of unlawful unions, whether the temptation is visible or not visible, the man's propensity is strong, but in the case of robbery, when the temptation is visible, his propensity is strong; when it is not visible, the propensity is not strong.
Menahem went out, Shammai entered in, etc. Whither did he go out? Abai said, He went out to destruction. Rabba said, He went out for the service of the king. There is also a Baraitha to this effect, that Menahem went out for the service of the king, and there went out with him eighty pairs of disciples clothed in Syrian robes. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said, Let the sabbath rest be by no means a light thing in thine eyes; for lo, the laying on of the hands is only prohibited on account of the Sabbath rest, and the great men of the nation were divided upon the matter. That is self-evident. But as this is a case of a Sabbath rest which clashes with a positive command, there was need of it. But this also is self-evident. It was to meet the objection of the person who says, In the matter of the laying on of the hands itself men are divided. We learn from this that it is in the matter of Sabbath rest that they are divided. Ramai bar Chama said, Learn hence that we require the laying on to be done with all one's strength, for if thou dost imagine that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength, how is the idea of work involved in the laying on of the hands? Some people adduce the passage, "Speak unto the sons of Israel ... and he shall lay his hand" (Lev. i. 2, 4). The sons of Israel lay on their hands, but the daughters of Israel do not lay on their hands. R. Jose and R. Ishmael say, Daughters of Israel lay on their hands by permission. R. Jose said, Abba El'azar related to me the following story: Once we had a calf belonging to the sacrifices of peace-offerings, and we brought it to the court of the women, and the women laid their hands upon it, not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women, but so as to gratify the women. And if thou dost imagine we require the laying on of the hands to be done with all one's strength, dost thou mean to say that in order to gratify women we introduced work into holy things? But do we not learn hence that we do not require it to be done with all one's strength? Nay, by all means I will grant you that we require it to be done with all one's strength. He said to them, Rest your hand upon it. If so, it was not because the laying on of the hands belongs to women that it was done. Thou mayest conclude that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hand. R. Ami says, He is establishing two things; one that it has nothing at all to do with the nature of the laying on of the hands, and the other that it was done in order to gratify the women. Rab Papa said, Learn hence, Sides, and not the head only, are forbidden; for if thou dost imagine that sides are allowed, might they not lay hands on the sides? But no; learn hence that sides are forbidden.
A member of the house of R. Eliezer ben Jacob taught thus, Holy Writ says, "And ye shall make proclamation," "and when ye reap" (Lev. xxiii. 21, 22). What is this Feast in which thou makest proclamation and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Feast of Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? And although this has been said already by R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, nevertheless what R. Eliezer ben Jacob said was necessary. If I had only the words of R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, I should say, As on the subsequent days of the Feast of Unleavened Bread the doing of work is prohibited, so on the subsequent days of the Feast of Pentecost also the doing of work is prohibited.
A member of the house of R. Eliezer ben Jacob taught thus, Holy Writ says, "And ye shall make proclamation," "and when ye reap" (Lev. xxiii. 21, 22). What is this Feast in which thou makest proclamation and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Feast of Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? And although this has been said already by R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, nevertheless what R. Eliezer ben Jacob said was necessary. If I had only the words of R. El'azar quoting R. Oshaia, I should say, As on the subsequent days of the Feast of Unleavened Bread the doing of work is prohibited, so on the subsequent days of the Feast of Pentecost also the doing of work is prohibited.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
And Resh Lakish said, "And the feast of the harvest" (Exod. xxiii. 16),—what is this Feast on which thou feastest and reapest? Thou must reply, This is the Pentecost. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is reaping lawful on a high holiday? But dost thou not think that it means as well on the subsequent days? R. Jochanan said, But regard it thus. The Feast of Ingathering—what is this Feast in which there is an ingathering? Thou must say, This is the Feast of Tabernacles. When is it? If I am to say, On the high holiday, how is work lawful on a high holiday? But if I am to say, On one of the ordinary middle holidays, how is work lawful on one of the ordinary middle holidays? But it means the Feast which comes at the season of ingathering; and so in this case also the Feast which comes at the season of harvest. Consequently both are of opinion that on the ordinary middle holidays the doing of work is forbidden. Whence do we obtain these statements? Because our Rabbis have taught, "The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep seven days" (Exod. xxiii. 15). This teaches us that on the middle holidays it is forbidden to do work. These are the words of R. Jeshaiah. R. Jonathan says, The above proof is not necessary. I can prove it by an argument a fortiori. For if on the first and seventh days of the Feast which have not got a holiday before them and after them, the doing of work is prohibited, then on ordinary middle holidays, which have a holiday before them and after them, is it not just that the doing of work should be prohibited? But, it is replied, Let the six days of Creation bear witness against this interpretation, which have a holiday before them and after them, and yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how are the six days of Creation a parallel case? For they have no additional sacrifice as the middle holidays have. Thou mayest say in reply, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday, as it has an additional sacrifice, let the first day of the month bear testimony, for on it there is an additional sacrifice, yet the doing of work is permitted. Nay, it is rejoined, how is the first day of the month a parallel case? For it is not called a holy convocation. Thou mayest say in conclusion, In the case of an ordinary middle holiday which is called a holy convocation, seeing that it is called a holy convocation, it is only just that the doing of work should be prohibited. There is another Baraitha, "Ye shall do no servile work" (Lev. xxiii. 8), that is to say, that on an ordinary middle holiday the doing of work is forbidden. The following are the words of R. Jose the Galilaean. R. Akiba says, It was not necessary, for lo, He says, "These are the set feasts of the Lord, etc." (Lev. xxiii. 4) With reference to what is the Scripture speaking? If to the first day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; if to the seventh day, Behold, it has been already called a sabbath-day; behold, the Scripture can be speaking only of an ordinary middle holiday, to teach thee that the doing of work is forbidden thereon.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
There is another Baraitha, viz., "Six days thou shalt eat blistered cakes, and on the seventh day there shall be a prohibition of work to the Lord" (Deut. xvi. 8). As on the seventh day work is prohibited, so on the six days work is prohibited. I should have thought perhaps, as on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, so on the six days there is a prohibition from all work. But no; for the teaching says, And on the seventh day there is a prohibition, thus indicating that on the seventh day there is a prohibition from all work, and that on the six days there is not a prohibition from all work. Behold, Holy Writ has communicated it only to wise men, to tell thee which is a forbidden day and which is a lawful day, which is forbidden work and which is lawful work.
Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent.
It was taught in a baraisa as well, One who removes a scissortip full [of hair] on shabbos is liable, and how much is a scissortip full? Two [hairs]. Rebbi Eliezer says, One [hair]. And the sages agree to Rebbi Eliezer in a case where one is removing the white from the black, then even one hair would make one liable. And this would even be prohibited on the weekday, because it says (Deuteronomy 22, 5) "A man shall not wear a woman's garment"....
Rebbi Elezar says, even if one removed them with wood planes or tweezer, he would be liable: Either way, if he learns the gezirah shava [linking "destroying" to "shaving"], then he should require a razor. If he does not learn the gezirah shava, then scissors also should be prohibited.
The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], From (Deuteronomy 25,3) "many lashes", I only know [that it is prohibited for the attendant to add] many lashes. From where do I learn out also few lashes? The Torah says "do not add" If so, the why does the Torah say "many lashes"? to teach us a bout the first [extra lashes] that they are considered "many lashes"