203 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Negaim 4:11

A bright spot the size of a split bean and there was nothing else, and then there appeared a bright spot of the size of half a split bean having two hairs, this one is declared unclean. Because they said: if the bright spot preceded the white hair he is unclean; if the white hair preceded the bright spot he is clean; and if it is doubtful he is unclean. Rabbi Joshua regards this as unsolvable.

Mishnah Negaim 7:4

One who plucks out signs of uncleanness or burns quick flesh transgresses a negative commandment. And as regards cleanness: If they were plucked out before he came to the priest, he is clean; But if after he had been certified as unclean, he remains unclean. Rabbi Akiva said: I asked Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua while they were on the way to Narbata, "What is the ruling if the plucking occurred while he was isolated?" They said to me, "We did not hear anything [about this case], but we have heard that if they were plucked before he came to the priest he is clean, and if after he had been certified as unclean he remains unclean." I began to bring them proofs: whether the man stands before the priest or whether he is isolated, he is clean unless the priest had pronounced him unclean. When does he attain cleanness [after he has been certified unclean]? Rabbi Eliezer says: after another nega arises in him and he has attained cleanness after it. But the sages says: only after another nega has spread over his whole body or after his bright spot has been reduced to less than the size of a split bean.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 3:19

There, we have stated: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain and a third party was hurt, is liable for damages.” It was also stated: “It is forbidden because of robbery.” Cahana said, only if he turned it over in order to acquire it. But if he did not turn it over in order to acquire it, about that one does not speak. But as regards damages, there is no difference whether he turned it over in order to acquire it or he did not turn it over in order to acquire it; if a third party was hurt, he is liable for damages. And here, you say so? Rebbi Abun said, there it is written (Ex. 21:34): “The one responsible for the pit shall pay,” the one responsible for the damage shall pay. But here (Deut. 14:22): “You shall give tithes,” you give tithes from your property but not from other people’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 4:13

Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Eudaimon of Haifa, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: In height even one hundred cubits. Rebbi Judan said, that is, for kilaim, but as regards the Sabbath, a symbolic fence should not be better than a beam. Rebbi Yose said, it is the same for kilaim and Sabbath. According to Rebbi Yose, what is the difference between a beam and a symbolic fence? A symbolic fence does not save from one side unless it is used to close all four sides; a beam saves in one direction. This may be compared to what Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rav Hamnuna: A symbolic fence does not save unless it seals all four sides.

Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim 7:28

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “The only difference between a flower pot without a hole and one with a hole regards preparation for impurity.” That is for Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis there are others: A flower pot with a hole sanctifies in a vineyard, one without a hole does not. He who plucks from a flower pot with a hole is guilty, from one without a hole he is free from punishment. A flower pot with a hole cannot prepare plants, one without a hole prepares. Rebbi Yose referred to it as anonymous statement, Rebbi Ḥanina quoted it in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: The Torah extended the purity of growing plants (Lev. 11:37): “If any of their cadavers falls on any sown seed apt to be sown, it is pure.”

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 1:12

“It sometimes he is insane [when he is sometimes healthy he is normal in all regards], when he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the divorce document; one must investigate following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he is of even mind; that is as Samuel [acted]. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind he may deliver the divorce document; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 1:12

“It sometimes he is insane [when he is sometimes healthy he is normal in all regards], when he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the divorce document; one must investigate following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he is of even mind; that is as Samuel [acted]. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind he may deliver the divorce document; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 1:12

“It sometimes he is insane [when he is sometimes healthy he is normal in all regards], when he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the divorce document; one must investigate following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he is of even mind; that is as Samuel [acted]. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind he may deliver the divorce document; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:62

Rebbi Zeˋira, Rebbi Eudaimon of Haifa, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: In height even one hundred cubits. Rebbi Judan said, that is, for kilaim, but as regards the Sabbath, a symbolic fence should not be better than a beam. Rebbi Yose said (in the name of Rebbi), it is the same for kilaim and Sabbath. According to Rebbi [Yose], what is the difference between a beam and a symbolic fence? A beam saves in one direction; a symbolic fence does not save from one side unless it is used to close all four sides;. This follows what Rebbi Zeˋira said in the name of Rav Hamnuna: A symbolic fence does not save unless it seals all four sides.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 8:35

It was stated: “The day of information is like the day of burial as regards tearing, and mourning, and counting Seven and Thirty; but to eat sancta it is like gathering bones, (he immerses himself and eats sancta).” About gathering bones, may he immerse himself and eat sancta? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda, explain it if he was buried after nightfall. “In both cases they immerse themselves and eat their Pesaḥ in the evening.” After burial may one eat sancta? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, both are about information. If he was informed that a relative died the day before, he immerses himself and eats sancta; if he was informed that bones were collected the day before, he immerses himself and eats sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Sukkah 1:13

Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Eudaimon of Haifa in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: In height even one hundred cubits. Rebbi Judan said, that is, for kilaim, but as regards (Peah), a symbolic fence should not be better than a beam. Rebbi Yose said, it is the same for kilaim and Sabbath. According to Rebbi Yose, what is the difference between a beam and a symbolic fence? A beam saves in one direction; a symbolic fence does not save from one side unless it is used to close all four sides;. This follows what Rebbi Ze`ira said in the name of Rav Hamnuna: A symbolic fence does not save unless it seals all four sides.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:3

“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:3

“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:25

but [as regards] R. Huna and R. Chanan b. Rabbah,can we say that they differ on [what minimum of extent constitutes] the kashrus of the Sukkah the former, holding the opinion that the kashrus of the Sukkah [depends upon its being a minimum of] four amos [square] while the latter holds that The kashrus of the Sukkah [depends, upon its capacity of] containing his head, the greater part of his body, and his table?

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:208

The tanna of ganbak regards these sukkot as possessing greater validity because they are permanent, and therefore he used the expression, "any sukkah whatsoever" to include rakbash which are not permanent.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:209

While the tanna of rakbash regards the rakbash sukkot possessing greater validity since they belong to those who are bound [by the commandment of sukkah] and therefore he used the expression, "any sukkah whatsoever" to include the ganbak sukkot which belong to those who are not bound [by the commandment of sukkah].

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 1:448

This applies only to the side, but as regards the middle, R. Aha and Ravina differ. One says: the rule of lavud applies in the middle, while the other says, the rule of lavud does not apply in the middle.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 2:175

the verse [thereby] makes man and woman equal as regards all punishable acts in the Torah? Abaye answered: Indeed Sukkah is a tradition, but [the midrash] is still necessary, Lest I would have said, since "You shall dwell" implies that you should dwell in the same manner as you ordinarily dwell; just as one's permanent home is for husband and wife, so too the Sukkah must be for husband and wife, therefore he informs us that it is not so.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:241

But behold both R. Gamaliel and R. Eliezer agree that as regards the Sabbatical Year the etrog's status is determined by the time of its blossoming, as we have learned, The etrog is like a tree in three respects, and like a vegetable in one.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:242

It is like a tree in three respects, as regards the laws of orlah, of the Fourth Year, and of the Seventh Year; and like a vegetable in one respect

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 3:245

But who mentioned the Sabbatical Year? There is something missing in the text, and so it should be read: The tithing of the etrog depends upon [the time of its] picking, and its subjection to the laws of the Sabbatical Year depends on [the time of its] blossoming. But our Rabbis voted in Usha and said that ... the etrog is dependent on the time of its picking as regards both tithing and the Sabbatical Year.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:103

the blessing. According to him who regards the day as the seventh in respect of the Sukkah, we also recite the blessing [of the Sukkah], while according to him who holds that it is regarded as the eighth in respect of both, we do not recite the blessing [of the Sukkah]. R. Yoseph said: Hold fast to the ruling of R. Yohanan, since R. Huna b. Bizna and all the greats of his generation were in a Sukkah on the eighth day which may have been the seventh, they sat there, but they did not recite the blessing.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 4:142

[But they looked silver] because their surfaces were darkened. It is well [as regards the flagon of the wine] since wine darkens, but how was that of the water darkened? Since the Master has said, if one poured the flagon of water into the bowl for wine, or that of wine into that for water, he has fulfilled his obligation, the [flagon] of water may also become darkened.

Babylonian Talmud Sukkah 5:16

R. Yirmiyah b. Abba said that the dispute concerns only the music at the Simchat Bet Hashoevah, since R. Yose b. Judah holds that even an added expression of rejoicing overrides the Shabbat, while the Rabbis hold that an added expression of rejoicing does not override [either] the Shabbat [or the Festival], but as regards the music which accompanied the sacrifices, all agree that it is [an integral part of] the worship and it overrides the Shabbat.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:43

We read in a Baraita: The Sages did not make it obligatory to mention the clouds and the winds, but if one wishes to mention them, he may do so. What is the reason? The reason is that they are never withheld. Are they not withheld? Did not R. Joseph transmit the tannaitic teaching: "The verse (Deut., 11.17): 'He will shut up the heaven,' indicates the withholding of clouds and winds; I say 'clouds and winds,' is it not possible, you may object, that it indicates only the withholding of rain? No, for Scripture adds (in the same verse): 'and there shall be no rain,' rain is thus explicitly stated; what then is implied in the preceding 'He will shut up the heaven'? No doubt the withholding of clouds and winds?" Evidently, then, this (teaching of R. Joseph) contradicts that of the preceding Baraita as regards both clouds and winds! No, there is no contradiction as regards clouds, because the Baraita refers to clouds that appear before the rain (which are not withheld), while R. Joseph refers to such as appear after the rain (which are withheld). Nor is there a contradiction as regards winds, for the one refers to common (moderate) winds (which are not withheld), the other to uncommon (strong) winds (which are withheld). But are not even strong winds needed for winnowing? Winnowing can be done with sieves.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:43

We read in a Baraita: The Sages did not make it obligatory to mention the clouds and the winds, but if one wishes to mention them, he may do so. What is the reason? The reason is that they are never withheld. Are they not withheld? Did not R. Joseph transmit the tannaitic teaching: "The verse (Deut., 11.17): 'He will shut up the heaven,' indicates the withholding of clouds and winds; I say 'clouds and winds,' is it not possible, you may object, that it indicates only the withholding of rain? No, for Scripture adds (in the same verse): 'and there shall be no rain,' rain is thus explicitly stated; what then is implied in the preceding 'He will shut up the heaven'? No doubt the withholding of clouds and winds?" Evidently, then, this (teaching of R. Joseph) contradicts that of the preceding Baraita as regards both clouds and winds! No, there is no contradiction as regards clouds, because the Baraita refers to clouds that appear before the rain (which are not withheld), while R. Joseph refers to such as appear after the rain (which are withheld). Nor is there a contradiction as regards winds, for the one refers to common (moderate) winds (which are not withheld), the other to uncommon (strong) winds (which are withheld). But are not even strong winds needed for winnowing? Winnowing can be done with sieves.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:43

We read in a Baraita: The Sages did not make it obligatory to mention the clouds and the winds, but if one wishes to mention them, he may do so. What is the reason? The reason is that they are never withheld. Are they not withheld? Did not R. Joseph transmit the tannaitic teaching: "The verse (Deut., 11.17): 'He will shut up the heaven,' indicates the withholding of clouds and winds; I say 'clouds and winds,' is it not possible, you may object, that it indicates only the withholding of rain? No, for Scripture adds (in the same verse): 'and there shall be no rain,' rain is thus explicitly stated; what then is implied in the preceding 'He will shut up the heaven'? No doubt the withholding of clouds and winds?" Evidently, then, this (teaching of R. Joseph) contradicts that of the preceding Baraita as regards both clouds and winds! No, there is no contradiction as regards clouds, because the Baraita refers to clouds that appear before the rain (which are not withheld), while R. Joseph refers to such as appear after the rain (which are withheld). Nor is there a contradiction as regards winds, for the one refers to common (moderate) winds (which are not withheld), the other to uncommon (strong) winds (which are withheld). But are not even strong winds needed for winnowing? Winnowing can be done with sieves.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 1:79

R. Papa said: The date (for the second rainfall) is of importance as regards walking through private property, for we read (Baba Ḳamma, 81a): One may walk through private property until the second rainfall. R. Naḥman b. Isaac said: It is of importance with regard to the removal of the fruits of the Sabbatical year, for we read (Shebi'it, 9.7): Until what time are we allowed to use or destroy the straw and stubble of the Sabbatical year? Until the second rainfall, as it is written (Lev., 25.7): "And for thy cattle and for the beasts that are in thy land, shall all the increase thereof be for food." This means to say that as long as the beasts find food in the field, you may feed your domestic animals from what there is in the house, but when there is nothing left in the field for the beasts, you must also stop feeding the cattle from what is in the house.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 2:41

R. 'Ashi said, in the case of intoxicated priests the Rabbis were apprehensive, because they desecrate the service, but priests with long hair do not desecrate the service, hence the Rabbis felt no apprehension. Rabina raised an objection from the following Baraita (Tosefta, Zebaḥim, 12. 17): "The following priests die a premature death, those who perform their service while drunk, and those who perform it with long (neglected) hair." As regards drunken priests it is explicitly stated (Levit., 10. 9): "Drink no wine nor strong drink, thou, nor thy sons with thee, when ye go into the tent of meeting, that ye die not." And how do we know that long hair is in the same category? It is written (Ezek., 44. 20): "Neither shall they shave their heads, nor suffer their locks to grow long," and immediately following it is written (ib., 44. 21): "Neither shall any priest drink wine, when they enter into the inner court." Priests with long hair are thus compared to priests who are drunk, and we conclude that just as drunken priests die prematurely, so also priests with long hair. Now, does it not follow from this that the reason is because long hair is a desecration of the service as well as drink? Said R. 'Ashi in reply to Rabina: (this analogy based on Ezekiel has no force, for) who knew of it prior to the time of Ezekiel? If you use such argument, retorted Rabina, you must apply it also to the statement of R. Ḥisda (Zebaḥim, 22b): This law (that an uncircumcized priest is not fit for service) we do not derive from the Torah of our teacher Moses, but from the words of Ezekiel the son of Buzi (44. 9): "No alien, uncircumcized in heart and uncircumcized in flesh, shall enter into my sanctuary." How could any one have knowledge of this law before Ezekiel? You will have to say therefore that the law in question was a tradition and Ezekiel expressed it in a verse; why not say the same in our case, namely, that the law (of long hair desecrating the service) was known by tradition and that Ezekiel expressed it in a verse? No, the burden of that tradition was only that long-haired priests die prematurely, but not that they desecrate the service.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 2:43

It is said above, "from the first day of the month of Nisan", etc.—why from the first? Why does he not say from the second day of Nisan, since the first day of Nisan is a holiday, on which mourning is anyhow forbidden? Said Raba: The first of Nisan is mentioned in order that the prohibition may include also the preceding day. But could not this be inferred from the fact that the day following is New Moon? The New Moon is of biblical origin, and biblical laws require no reënforcement, for it is stated in a Baraita: The prohibition (of fasting and mourning) on the days recorded in the Scroll of Fasts includes also, in each case, the preceding as well as the following day; as regards, however, the Sabbaths and holidays, fasting on these days is forbidden, but is permitted on the days preceding or following them. Why is such a difference made between the two? Because these (Sabbaths and holidays) are biblical laws, which need no reënforcement, while the others are soferic laws, which need reënforcement.

Babylonian Talmud Ta'anit 3:22

The Rabbis have taught: There were three men for whom the sun shone, namely Moses, Joshua, and Naḳdimon b. Gorion. The case of Naḳdimon was mentioned before; as to Joshua, it is written (Joshua, 10. 13): "And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed," etc., but whence do we know it as regards Moses? Said R. Eleazar, it is derived from the analogous use of 'āḥēl (אחל = I will begin), for it is written with reference to Moses (Deut., 2. 25): "I will begin to put the dread of thee" (upon the peoples), and it is written with reference to Joshua (Josh., 3. 7): "I will begin to magnify thee." R. Samuel b. Naḥamani said, it is derived through the analogous use of têt (תת = to give, put, deliver), for it is written (Deut., 2. 25): "I will begin to put the dread of thee," and again (Josh., 10. 12): "In the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites." R. Johanan said, it can be derived from the content of that verse (Deut., 2. 25) itself: "(the peoples) who shall hear the report of thee, shall tremble, and be in anguish because of thee;" when did it happen that they trembled and were in anguish? At the time the sun was delayed for Moses.

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 2:7

From where do we derive the rule as regards Hallel? Rabbah said: Because it is written, “From the rising of the sun until the going down” (Psalms 113:3). R. Joseph said: “This is the day which the Lord has made” (Psalms 118:24). R. Avia said:

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 3:10

A Tanna stated: This is not the case with [the public reading of] the Torah. Our Rabbis taught: As regards the Torah, one reads and one translates, as long as one does not read and two translate [together]. As regards the Prophets, one reads and two may translate, as long as two do not read and two translate. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate]. What is the reason? Since the people like it, they pay attention and hear. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate].

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 3:10

A Tanna stated: This is not the case with [the public reading of] the Torah. Our Rabbis taught: As regards the Torah, one reads and one translates, as long as one does not read and two translate [together]. As regards the Prophets, one reads and two may translate, as long as two do not read and two translate. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate]. What is the reason? Since the people like it, they pay attention and hear. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate].

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 3:10

A Tanna stated: This is not the case with [the public reading of] the Torah. Our Rabbis taught: As regards the Torah, one reads and one translates, as long as one does not read and two translate [together]. As regards the Prophets, one reads and two may translate, as long as two do not read and two translate. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate]. What is the reason? Since the people like it, they pay attention and hear. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate].

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 3:10

A Tanna stated: This is not the case with [the public reading of] the Torah. Our Rabbis taught: As regards the Torah, one reads and one translates, as long as one does not read and two translate [together]. As regards the Prophets, one reads and two may translate, as long as two do not read and two translate. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate]. What is the reason? Since the people like it, they pay attention and hear. As regards Hallel and the Megillah, even ten may read [and ten may translate].

Babylonian Talmud Megillah 4:242

It makes sense in regard to the curses in Deuteronomy you can say, “so that the year should end along with its curses.” But as regards those In Leviticus, is Shavuot a New Year? Yes; Shavuot is also a New Year, as we have learned: On Shavuot is the new year for [fruit of] the tree.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:7

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:7

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:7

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:8

There is also a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust and the rejoicing except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, and he who hears and does not speak, are exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust,

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:9

he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:9

he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:19

they are like the ox that has gored an ox, an ass, and a camel, and has been made a precedent of warning for all men. R. Papa said, If R. Hunna had heard that this is the Baraitha, viz., Who is a fool? it is he who destroys all that is given to him, he would have recalled his words. It is a question as regards his recalling of his words, whether he would have recalled his words only in the case of the man who tears his clothes, in consideration of the Baraitha which is like it, or whether he would have recalled them in the case of all three. The matter was left undecided.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:21

The Mishnah teacher said, The expression "thy males" is to exclude the one of doubtful and the one of double sex. It is all right as regards the latter. This was necessary. You might have imagined that, since he has a shred of virility, he is bound. We learn from this that his case is one sui generis. But as for the former, this was a dubious case. How was a verse necessary to remove the doubt? Abai said, Si eius ovaria externa sunt.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:23

Women and slaves who are not manumitted etc. This is all right as regards women, as we have said, but slaves—how do we get them here? R. Hunna says, The scripture says "before the LORD God" (Ex. xxiii. 17, Deut. xvi. 16). This expression can only apply to him who has but one Lord. He is excluded who has another lord. But why do I need a verse for it? Surely by every precept by which a woman is bound a slave is bound, and by every precept by which a woman is not bound a slave is not bound. The teacher learns it from the case of a woman through the double occurrence of the words "unto her." Rabena said, It is only needed for one who is half a slave and half free. This is precisely too what the teaching of the Mishnah is, women and slaves who are not manumitted. What is the meaning of the addition, who are not manumitted? If I should say that it means, who are not manumitted at all, then the words ought to be simply, slaves, but do you not think that it means, those who are not completely manumitted? and who are such? He who is half a slave and half free. Learn from this the meaning.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:26

There is a Baraitha, The uncircumcised person and the unclean person are exempt from appearing. This is all right as regards an unclean person, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing. But "the uncircumcised person," whence do we get it? Behold, this comes not from a text but from R. Akiba, who includes an uncircumcised person as unclean. For there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Akiba says, The expression "each man" (Lev. xxii. 4) is to include the uncircumcised person. Our Rabbis have taught, The unclean person is exempt from appearing, for it is written, "And thither thou shalt come: and thither ye shall bring" (Deut. xii. 5, 6). Every one who belongs to the category of coming belongs to the category of bringing, and every one who does not belong to the category of coming does not belong to the category of bringing.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:38

R. Jochanan, when he came upon this passage, wept, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his holy ones" (Job xv. 15). If He putteth not trust in His holy ones, in whom will He put trust? One day he was walking in the way. He saw a certain man, who was gathering figs. He was leaving what were ripe, and gathering what were not ripe. He said to him, Dost thou not think that those are much better? He said to him, As regards their use, they are for a journey. The one will keep and the other will not keep. He said, This is what is written, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his holy ones." Is it so? and yet there is the case of that disciple, who was in the neighbourhood of R. Alcasnadri, and died while yet young, and he said, If this one of our Rabbis had wished, he would have been alive now; or perhaps he was one of those who are referred to in the passage "he putteth no trust in his holy ones"; but no, for he was one who kicked against his teachers.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:42

R. Jochanan, when he came upon this passage, wept, "For God shall bring every work into judgment concerning every hidden thing" (Eccles. xii. 14). A slave, whose master punishes sins of error as though they were sins of presumption—is there any help for him? What is the meaning of "concerning every hidden thing"? Rab said, This means the man who kills a louse in the presence of his neighbour, so that he is disgusted at it. But Samuel said, This means the man who spits in the presence of his neighbour, so that he is disgusted. What is the meaning of "whether it be good or whether it be evil"? The men of the house of R. Jannai say, This is he that gives a coin to a poor man publicly. For this story is told of R. Jannai himself. He saw a man who gave a coin to a poor man publicly. He said to him, It had been better that thou hadst not given it to him now, for thou hast given it to him and hast put him to shame. The men of the house of R. Shila say, This is he that gives alms to a woman secretly, because he brings her into suspicion. Rabba said, This is he that sends home to his wife meat that is not bled on the eve of the sabbath. But lo, on the other hand, Rabba himself sent such home. Ah, but it was a different matter as regards the daughter of R. Chasda, for he was certain about her, as being a woman of experience.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:66

the corner of a field, and the first-fruits and the appearing before the Lord, and the conferring of kindnesses and the teaching contained in the Law. R. Jochanan said, We were of opinion that the appearing before the Lord had no superior limit but had an inferior limit, until R. Oshaia, in the name of a great teacher, came and taught that appearing before the Lord has no limit either superior or inferior. But wise men say, that the holocaust involves a meah of silver, but the Chagigah two pieces of silver. What does the appearing mean? R. Jochanan said, The presenting of oneself in the Court, but Resh Lakish said, The presenting of oneself with an offering. All the world is agreed that on the first day it means, the presenting of oneself with an offering, but men differ as regards the remainder of the days of the Feast. Every time that a man comes and brings an offering, all the world agrees that we are to receive it from him, but men differ in the case of one who comes and does not bring; for R. Jochanan considers that the presenting of oneself in the Court is sufficient, because it is not necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering; but Resh Lakish says, The presenting oneself with an offering is the meaning, for it is necessary, every time that he comes, to bring an offering. Resh Lakish put this difficulty to R. Jochanan, "None shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. He put this further difficulty to him. The passage "None shall appear before me empty" refers to coming with sacrifices. If thou sayest, With sacrifices? perhaps not, but with birds and meal-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, but the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, involves sacrifices, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, involve sacrifices. And what are these sacrifices? They are burnt-offerings. If thou sayest, Burnt-offerings? perhaps not, but peace-offerings; then here is an argument against thee. The Chagigah is assigned to a private person, and the appearing is assigned to the Most High. As the Chagigah, which is assigned to a private person, is suited to him, so must the appearing, which is assigned to the Most High, be suited to Him. And so it is fitting that thy table should not be full and the table of thy Master empty. He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast. R. Jose, in the name of R. Jehudah, put this difficulty to him, saying, Three times in the year Israel was commanded to go up to a Feast, viz., at the Feast of the Passover, and at the Feast of Weeks, and at the Feast of Tabernacles, and they must not appear by halves, inasmuch as it is said, "all thy males" (Exod. xxiii. 17; Deut. xvi. 16), and they must not appear empty, inasmuch as it is said, "none shall appear before me empty" (Exod. xxiii. 15). He said to him, Yes, but only on the first day of the Feast.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 1:82

Whence do you gather this? R. Jochanan said in the name of R. Ishmael, The same word, Restraint, is used of the seventh day of Passover, and of the eighth day of the Feast of Tabernacles. What is true of the former as regards postponement of payments, the same is true of the latter. The word is used in an unrestricted way. For if it were not used in an unrestricted way, the force of the argument drawn from it might have been broken by saying, Whereas the seventh day of Passover is not separated from those that precede it, you may say that the eighth day of the Feast of Tabernacles is separated from those that precede it. Assuredly, it is used in a wholly unrestricted sense. What does restraint really mean? That one is restrained from acts of work. But we have the passage, "Thou shalt do no work" (Deut. xvi. 8). Why then has the Merciful One written me Restraint? But learn from it that it was to give the unrestricted sense of the word. And a Baraitha brings out the same thing thus. For there is a Baraitha, "And ye shall keep it a feast unto the Lord seven days" (Lev. xxiii. 41). One might have thought from this passage that one was to go on sacrificing all seven days. No, for the teaching says "it." Thou art to sacrifice "it," and thou art not to sacrifice all seven days. If so, why have we seven stated as the number of the days of the Feast? For postponements of payments; and whence do you gather that if a man has not observed the Feast on the first high holiday of the Feast, he is to go and sacrifice during any part of its extent, even including the last high holiday? Because the teaching says, "Ye shall keep it in the seventh month" (Lev. xxiii. 41). If it had merely said, In the seventh month, one might have thought that one was to go and sacrifice the whole month. No; for the teaching says "it." Thou art to sacrifice "it" and thou art not to sacrifice further.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:47

Acher asked this question of R. Meir, after he (Acher) had gone forth into evil courses, and said to him, What is the meaning of the passage, "God hath even made the one side by side with the other?" (Eccles. vii. 14) He said to him, Every thing which the Holy One, blessed be He, created, He created with its counterpart. He created mountains, He created hills. He created seas, He created rivers. He said to him, R. Akiba thy teacher did not say so, but he explained it as meaning that He created righteous, He created sinners. He created the garden of Eden, He created Gehenna. To every individual belong two shares, one in the garden of Eden, and one in Gehenna. If a man is meritorious and righteous, he receives his own portion and also the portion of his neighbour in the garden of Eden. If he has incurred guilt, and is a wicked man, he receives his own portion and also the portion of his neighbour in Gehenna. R. Mesharshia said, What is the Scripture proof? As regards the righteous, it is written, "Therefore in their land they shall possess double;" (Is. lxi. 7) as regards the wicked it is said, "And break them with a double breach" (Jer. xvii. 18).

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:47

Acher asked this question of R. Meir, after he (Acher) had gone forth into evil courses, and said to him, What is the meaning of the passage, "God hath even made the one side by side with the other?" (Eccles. vii. 14) He said to him, Every thing which the Holy One, blessed be He, created, He created with its counterpart. He created mountains, He created hills. He created seas, He created rivers. He said to him, R. Akiba thy teacher did not say so, but he explained it as meaning that He created righteous, He created sinners. He created the garden of Eden, He created Gehenna. To every individual belong two shares, one in the garden of Eden, and one in Gehenna. If a man is meritorious and righteous, he receives his own portion and also the portion of his neighbour in the garden of Eden. If he has incurred guilt, and is a wicked man, he receives his own portion and also the portion of his neighbour in Gehenna. R. Mesharshia said, What is the Scripture proof? As regards the righteous, it is written, "Therefore in their land they shall possess double;" (Is. lxi. 7) as regards the wicked it is said, "And break them with a double breach" (Jer. xvii. 18).

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:65

Everyone who gazes into four things, it were a mercy for him, had he not come into the world at all. It is all right as regards what is above and what is beneath, and what is afterwards. This is all well and good, but before—what was, was.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:80

There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:80

There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:93

R. Shimi bar Ashi deals with the matter thus. Up to this point our Rabbis disagree with R. Meir only as to the eating of the tithe, but as regards the touching of the tithe and the eating of common food they do not disagree. But suppose that both the one and the other refer to eating, and still there is no difficulty. The one has to do with eating bread, the other with eating fruits. For R. Nachman said, Every one who washes his hands for fruit is over scrupulous and affected.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:98

He went out and speculated and found that there is a Baraitha, viz., If a man have dipped and have not credit, he is forbidden tithe, but is free for common food. R. Eliezer said, If he have dipped and gone up, he may hold himself fit for any thing that he desires. But they reply, If, while he had still one foot in the water, he considered himself fit for a smaller thing, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he had gone up, he may not any more consider himself fit. Don't you think that this means, that he may not consider himself fit for any thing at all? No; while he had still one foot in the water, although he considered himself fit for a smaller thing only, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he have gone up, then, if he did not think of himself as fit for any particular thing, he may consider himself as fit, but if he did think of himself as fit for a smaller thing, he may not consider himself as fit for a greater thing. Who is the Mishnah teacher who says, While he had still one foot in the water? R. P'dath says, It is R. Jehudah, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If a collection of water is measured, and there are in it exactly forty seahs, and two men go down and dip one after the other, the first is clean, and the second is unclean. R. Jehudah said, If the feet of the first are still in contact with the water, the second also is clean (Mikvaoth, vi. 6). R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement on the point among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis, but, if it is a case of passing from uncleanness to cleanness, all agree that the second also is unclean, and this is the opinion of R. P'dath. There are some who say that R. Nachman said, that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement as regards passing from uncleanness to cleanness, but among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis all agree that the second also is clean. And here there is a divergence from R. P'dath. Ola said,

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:99

They asked this question of R. Jochanan, According to R. Jehudah how is it as regards dipping needles and forks on the head of the first? Is there the case of draw and go down according to R. Jehudah? and is there not the case of draw and go up according to him? or perhaps there is also the case of draw and go up according to him. He said to him, This is an old story. There are, suppose, three depressions in the bed of a stream, the upper and the lower and the middle one. The upper and the lower are each of the size of twenty seahs, and the middle one of forty seahs, and a collection of stagnant rain-water stretches between them? R. Jehudah said, Meir used to say, A man may dip in the upper one. And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jehudah says,

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:105

R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:107

It is all right as regards R. El'azar son of R. Zadok. For we may observe that each woman says, My neighbour is wife of a common person, and she turns her attention from her. It is all right as regards R. Jonathan ben Amram also. For we may observe that inasmuch as a man pays great attention to his Sabbath clothes, he has taken his thoughts from the others. But as to R. Jonathan ben El'azar, we may observe that a man will pay attention to the hands of his neighbour. R. Jochanan said, It may be presumed that no man attends to what is in the hand of his neighbour? Does he not?

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:107

It is all right as regards R. El'azar son of R. Zadok. For we may observe that each woman says, My neighbour is wife of a common person, and she turns her attention from her. It is all right as regards R. Jonathan ben Amram also. For we may observe that inasmuch as a man pays great attention to his Sabbath clothes, he has taken his thoughts from the others. But as to R. Jonathan ben El'azar, we may observe that a man will pay attention to the hands of his neighbour. R. Jochanan said, It may be presumed that no man attends to what is in the hand of his neighbour? Does he not?

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 2:108

And yet there is a Baraitha, viz., Behold, a man's muleteers and his workmen are laden with clean things; although he is distant from them more than a mile, his clean things are still clean; but if he say to them, Go and I will come after you, then when they are out of his sight, his clean things become unclean. How is the inconsistency in this Baraitha to be explained? R. Isaac Naphcha said, The earlier part means, when he cleanses his muleteers and his workmen. Therefore, if so, the latter part should also refer to the same. No; for a common person is not careful as regards touching his neighbour. But, if so, this would hold good for the beginning also. Perhaps it may mean, when he comes to them by some by-way. But, if so, this would hold good for the latter part also. Nay; but the true explanation is, When he said to them, Go and I will come after you, their minds were set completely at rest.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:9

Raba said, Since the later portion of the Mishnah is on account of interposition, the former is not on account of interposition. But in the former one this is the reason. It is a precaution, in order that needles and pipes should not be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin bottle. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., The communication between religious baths must be as the pipe of a wine-skin as regards its thickness,

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:11

What real difference is there between what Raba and what R. Ela says? There is this difference between them. In the case of a basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and cleansed, according to the one who says, The prohibition is because of interposition, there is an interposition; but according to the one who says, The prohibition is for a precaution, lest haply needles and pipes should be dipped in a vessel, the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin, the answer is, there is no basket or wine-strainer the mouth of which is not of the size of the pipe of a wine-skin. And Raba has acted consistently with himself; for Raba said, In the case of a basket and wine-strainer, which are filled with vessels and dipped, all are clean; but in the case of a bath, which is divided by a basket or wine-strainer, he who seeks to cleanse there—the cleansing avails him nought, for lo, all the earth is trembling, and we require that there should be forty seahs of water in one place. And these words refer to a clean vessel, but in the case of an unclean vessel, seeing that the cleansing has gone up over the whole surface of the vessel, it has gone up also over the vessels which are in it. For there is a canonical Mishnah, viz., Vessels which are filled with vessels and are dipped, lo, these are clean, and if they are not dipped, the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin (Mikvaoth, vi. 2). How is it that it says, And if they are not dipped? This is the meaning, viz., And if it is not necessary to dip them, still the mingled waters must reach that amount of mingling which takes place by means of a communication as large as the pipe of a wine-skin. And lo, as regards the sayings of Raba and R. Ela, they are the subject of a Baraitha. For there is a Baraitha, A basket and a wine-strainer which are filled with vessels and are dipped are clean as well for hallowed things as for a heave-offering. Abba Saul says, For a heave-offering, but not for hallowed things. If so, then is not a heave-offering also invalid? No, for to whom are we speaking? Is it not to teachers? teachers who are possessed of knowledge? But if so, the same rule will apply to hallowed things also. No, for a common person sees him and goes and dips. Then in the case of heave-offering also, a common person sees him and goes and dips. We need not receive it from him. Hallowed things also we need not receive from him. He would be angry. In the case of heave-offering also he would be angry.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:22

Nay, but shall I tell you on what authority this depends? This is the teaching of R. Chănaniah ben Akbia; for he said, They have only made this restriction as regards Jordan or a ship, and in accordance with the matter that occurred. What was that? There is a Baraitha, viz., A man shall not take up the waters of sin and the ashes of sin, and carry them away over Jordan or in a ship, and he shall not stand on this side and throw them to the other side, and he shall not make them to swim upon the face of the waters, and he shall not ride upon the back of a beast nor upon the back of his comrade, but if he do, his feet must touch the ground; but he may bear them over a bridge, and he need not regard whether it be Jordan or any other river. R. Chănaniah ben Akbia says, They have only made this restriction as regards Jordan and the case when the man is in a ship, and in accordance with the matter that occurred. What was the matter that occurred? R. Jehudah said that Rab said, A matter occurred with a certain man, who was carrying the waters of sin and the ashes of sin over Jordan and in a ship, and a piece of a dead body as large as an olive was found fixed in the bottom of the ship. In the same hour they said, A man shall not bear waters of sin and ashes of sin and carry them over Jordan in a ship. This question was put by them. In the case of an unclean sandal the law is clear, but what if the case be one of a clean sandal? In the case of an open cask the law is clear, but what if the case be one of a closed cask? What also if it be the case of a man who has passed over and borne it? R. Ela said, If he has passed over and borne it, he is unclean. R. Zera said, If he has passed over and borne it, he is clean.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:22

Nay, but shall I tell you on what authority this depends? This is the teaching of R. Chănaniah ben Akbia; for he said, They have only made this restriction as regards Jordan or a ship, and in accordance with the matter that occurred. What was that? There is a Baraitha, viz., A man shall not take up the waters of sin and the ashes of sin, and carry them away over Jordan or in a ship, and he shall not stand on this side and throw them to the other side, and he shall not make them to swim upon the face of the waters, and he shall not ride upon the back of a beast nor upon the back of his comrade, but if he do, his feet must touch the ground; but he may bear them over a bridge, and he need not regard whether it be Jordan or any other river. R. Chănaniah ben Akbia says, They have only made this restriction as regards Jordan and the case when the man is in a ship, and in accordance with the matter that occurred. What was the matter that occurred? R. Jehudah said that Rab said, A matter occurred with a certain man, who was carrying the waters of sin and the ashes of sin over Jordan and in a ship, and a piece of a dead body as large as an olive was found fixed in the bottom of the ship. In the same hour they said, A man shall not bear waters of sin and ashes of sin and carry them over Jordan in a ship. This question was put by them. In the case of an unclean sandal the law is clear, but what if the case be one of a clean sandal? In the case of an open cask the law is clear, but what if the case be one of a closed cask? What also if it be the case of a man who has passed over and borne it? R. Ela said, If he has passed over and borne it, he is unclean. R. Zera said, If he has passed over and borne it, he is clean.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:26

The addition was only necessary for the rest of the meat-offering. For the teaching of the Law is, What stands in need of a vessel, the vessel includes it; what does not stand in need of a vessel, the vessel does not include it. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although a thing do not necessarily belong to a vessel, the vessel includes it. This will be all right as regards flour, but what is to be said about incense and frankincense? R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, It is as though men heaped things up upon a large piece of leather. According to the Law if it have an inside, it includes them; if it have not an inside, it does not include them. But our Rabbis went farther and ordained that although it have no inside, it includes them. And the view of R. Chanin differs from that of R. Chia bar Abba. For R. Chia bar Abba says that R. Jochanan says, This Mishnah is taught from the testimony of R. Akiba.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:27

The unclean in the fourth degree in the case of hallowed things is disqualified. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Jose said, How is it in the case of the unclean in the fourth degree that in the matter of the hallowed things he is disqualified? But this depends on a logical argument. For look you, He who has entered on the last stage of his atonement, while he is free as regards heave-offering, is disqualified as regards hallowed things. Is it not just, seeing that a man who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards heave-offering, that he should become disqualified as regards hallowed things, if unclean in the fourth degree? But we have learned from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things. And that he who is unclean in the fourth degree is so, we have learned, as above, by an a fortiori argument. Whence do we learn from the Law that he who is unclean in the third degree is disqualified as regards hallowed things? Because it is written, "And the flesh that toucheth any unclean thing shall not be eaten" (Lev. vii. 19). Are we not here treating of the touching of a thing of secondary uncleanness? And the Merciful One says, It "shall not be eaten." That which is unclean in the fourth degree is proved to be disqualified by the a fortiori argument, as we have said.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:32

Men may eat dry food with ceremonially unclean hands etc. There is a Baraitha, viz., R. Chănina ben Antigonus said, Does such a question as whether a thing be dry or wet exist as regards hallowed things? Nay, does not love for the hallowed things make men careful where they are concerned? Yea, every one will admit that it was not necessary to say this. But this is the case supposed, viz., that a man's companion put a piece of the hallowed things into his mouth, or he put it into his own mouth with a spindle or with a skewer, or attempted to eat along with these an onion or garlic taken from unconsecrated things. Our Rabbis decided that this should be the case for hallowed things; for the heave-offering our Rabbis decided that it should not be the case.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:42

We have a canonical Mishnah, viz., vessels of wine and vessels of oil which are mixed, why should they not be mixed as regards heave-offering? Those of the house of R. Chia say, Mixed as regards hallowed things. But how can there be a mixture as regards hallowed things. Those of the house of R. El'ai say, Yes, in the case of one who is in the act of purifying his untouched produce, to take out of it the libations.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:42

We have a canonical Mishnah, viz., vessels of wine and vessels of oil which are mixed, why should they not be mixed as regards heave-offering? Those of the house of R. Chia say, Mixed as regards hallowed things. But how can there be a mixture as regards hallowed things. Those of the house of R. El'ai say, Yes, in the case of one who is in the act of purifying his untouched produce, to take out of it the libations.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:42

We have a canonical Mishnah, viz., vessels of wine and vessels of oil which are mixed, why should they not be mixed as regards heave-offering? Those of the house of R. Chia say, Mixed as regards hallowed things. But how can there be a mixture as regards hallowed things. Those of the house of R. El'ai say, Yes, in the case of one who is in the act of purifying his untouched produce, to take out of it the libations.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:47

There is a Baraitha. Men are believed as regards small earthen vessels for hallowed things. Resh Lakish said, And provided that they are such as are taken in one hand; but R. Jochanan said, Even though they are such as are not taken in one hand. Resh Lakish said, They do not teach this except as regards empty vessels, but full ones not; but R. Jochanan said, Even though they be full, and even though its veil be within it; and Rabba says and R. Jochanan admits it, even in the case of drinkables which are actually unclean. And be not surprised at this; for lo, in the case of bowls full of drinkables the bowls may be unclean with an uncleanness of seven days, while the drinkables are clean.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:47

There is a Baraitha. Men are believed as regards small earthen vessels for hallowed things. Resh Lakish said, And provided that they are such as are taken in one hand; but R. Jochanan said, Even though they are such as are not taken in one hand. Resh Lakish said, They do not teach this except as regards empty vessels, but full ones not; but R. Jochanan said, Even though they be full, and even though its veil be within it; and Rabba says and R. Jochanan admits it, even in the case of drinkables which are actually unclean. And be not surprised at this; for lo, in the case of bowls full of drinkables the bowls may be unclean with an uncleanness of seven days, while the drinkables are clean.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:48

III. (6) The tax-collectors who have gone into the midst of a house, and so too the thieves who have restored the vessels, are believed, when they say, We have not touched. And in Jerusalem they are believed as regards hallowed things, and at the time of a Feast as regards heave-offering also.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:48

III. (6) The tax-collectors who have gone into the midst of a house, and so too the thieves who have restored the vessels, are believed, when they say, We have not touched. And in Jerusalem they are believed as regards hallowed things, and at the time of a Feast as regards heave-offering also.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:51

And in Jerusalem they are believed as regards hallowed things. There is a Baraitha, viz., They are believed as regards large earthen vessels for sacrifice. And why all this discussion? Because they do not make ovens in Jerusalem.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:51

And in Jerusalem they are believed as regards hallowed things. There is a Baraitha, viz., They are believed as regards large earthen vessels for sacrifice. And why all this discussion? Because they do not make ovens in Jerusalem.

Babylonian Talmud Chagigah 3:52

And at the time of a Feast as regards heave-offering also. Whence these words? R. Joshua ben Levi said, Because the Scripture says, "So all the men of Israel were gathered against the city, knit together as one man" (Jud. xx. 11). The Scripture makes them all learned and observant men.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:149

Achitofel reasoned to himself with a fortiori. He said to himself, If in regards to making peace between a man and his wife the Torah says, "My name that was written with holiness should be erased in water", then [in order to make peace] for the entire world is it not even more so? [Achitofel] said to [Dovid], It is permissible. [Dovid] wrote [God's] name on a shard and threw it into the deeps. [The water] calmed and remained in its place.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:191

But with regards to cities of refuge [going after the branches doesn't always result in a stringency], it is understandable if the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may not kill him [the murderer], so too on the trunk he may not kill him. But if the trunk is inside and the branches outside [then it won't result in a stringency to say that] just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may kill him, so too on the trunk he may kill him, Because he is inside [the boundary]!?

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:201

Rava said to him [Rav Kahana], "For you" most definitively implies for all of your needs. Rather Rava says, The dispute concerns the forty two [additional cities of refuge], that one opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds (Numbers 35, 6) "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities only] with regards to protection. And the other opinion [Rebbi Meir] holds "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities]. Just as those [the six] are for all of your needs, so too these [the forty two] are for all of your needs. But with regards to the six [primary cities], everyone agrees that [the murderers] would not pay rent.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:201

Rava said to him [Rav Kahana], "For you" most definitively implies for all of your needs. Rather Rava says, The dispute concerns the forty two [additional cities of refuge], that one opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds (Numbers 35, 6) "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities only] with regards to protection. And the other opinion [Rebbi Meir] holds "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities]. Just as those [the six] are for all of your needs, so too these [the forty two] are for all of your needs. But with regards to the six [primary cities], everyone agrees that [the murderers] would not pay rent.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:31

And why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister according to the Rabbis [Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva]? To [teach us that sacrifices are] separated [with regards to bringing a sacrifice for an inadvertent offence], as Rebbi Yochanon said that if a person did all [of these kares prohibitions] in one lapse of unawareness he is liable [to bring a chatos sacrifice] for each and every one of them.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:43

And [where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn to separate the two]? He holds like what Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah. That Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah, any place that you find two prohibitions with one kares, they are separated with regards to [bringing] a sacrifice [for an inadvertent transgression].

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:65

So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated with regards to Motzei Shem Rah, because she is already his wife. Why then was it said? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:91

But according to the one who teaches Bitlo v'lo Bitlo, then while [a way to nullify the remedial commandment] can be found regarding Shiloach Haken [i.e. sending away the mother bird, for example where he kills the mother bird], but with regards to Oneiss how can you find a case of Bitlo v'lo Bitlo?

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:240

Ullah asked him, The Tanna says "eight", and you will say that he teaches some and leaves outs some!? Rava answered, There is a separation of forbidden labors with regards to Shabbos, but there is no separation of forbidden labors with regards to Yom Tov. Ullah said, that will suffice.

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 3:240

Ullah asked him, The Tanna says "eight", and you will say that he teaches some and leaves outs some!? Rava answered, There is a separation of forbidden labors with regards to Shabbos, but there is no separation of forbidden labors with regards to Yom Tov. Ullah said, that will suffice.