intention
404 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: But needs profane food intention? He is informing you of more: even if he immersed himself for profane food and considers himself pure for profane food he is prohibited tithe. Did not Rebbi Eleazar say, the count for profane food is the count for tithe? Here it is for eating, there for touching. He who immerses himself without specification is pure for all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had relationship with all of them. As long as his feet are in the water, he may consider himself pure for any stage he chooses.
There, we have stated: “A staff which is full of impure fluids, when it touched the miqweh it is pure, the words of Rebbi Joshua. But the Sages are saying, only if he immerses it completely.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, where do they disagree? For easy impurity; but for severe impurity even Rebbi Joshua agrees. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they even disagree for severe impurity. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “As long as his feet are in the water, he may consider himself pure for any stage he chooses.” Explain it about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the body of one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks is pure without special intention? From the moment he intended elevated purity he (needs) [does not need] intention. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “A miqweh containing exactly 40 seah into two persons descended, [both are pure]. One after the other, the first one is pure, the second impure. Rebbi Jehudah says, if the feet of the first touched the water, the second one also is pure.” Still this is about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A woman in her period may rinse a radish in a cave and it is pure. If she lifted it in any way out of the water it is impure. And we have stated thereto: Rebbi Jehudah declares it pure in the name of Rebbi Joshua. And represents a menstruating woman not a severe impurity? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and it has no standing.
There, we have stated: “A staff which is full of impure fluids, when it touched the miqweh it is pure, the words of Rebbi Joshua. But the Sages are saying, only if he immerses it completely.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, where do they disagree? For easy impurity; but for severe impurity even Rebbi Joshua agrees. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they even disagree for severe impurity. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “As long as his feet are in the water, he may consider himself pure for any stage he chooses.” Explain it about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the body of one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks is pure without special intention? From the moment he intended elevated purity he (needs) [does not need] intention. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “A miqweh containing exactly 40 seah into two persons descended, [both are pure]. One after the other, the first one is pure, the second impure. Rebbi Jehudah says, if the feet of the first touched the water, the second one also is pure.” Still this is about one who ate impure food and drank impure drinks. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A woman in her period may rinse a radish in a cave and it is pure. If she lifted it in any way out of the water it is impure. And we have stated thereto: Rebbi Jehudah declares it pure in the name of Rebbi Joshua. And represents a menstruating woman not a severe impurity? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and it has no standing.
If they moved him from one grave to another. There are Tannaim who state, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. There are Tannaim who state, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. A case happened to Rebbi Jonah. He asked Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis, who said to him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. A case happened to Rebbi Jeremiah. He asked Rebbi Ze`ira; Rebbi Ze`ira asked Rebbi Immi. He said to him, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. He came to him; he said to him, he instructed you by a restriction. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, this you are saying within the Seven {days}. But after Seven mourning already passed. If they intended it from the start. But if there was no intent from the start to remove him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. As the following: The people of Bursa buried Gamliel from Yakontia with them. After three days they changed their mind to return him. They went and asked Rebbi Simon. Rebbi Simon said to them in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Since you had no intention to remove him, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. A case happened to Jesua the brother of Dorai. He came to ask Rebbi Abbahu who told him, from the moment the second cover plate was laid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when we asked this from Rebbi Eudaimon from Haifa who said, from the moment the first cover plate was laid. He told him, I did not hear. If you heard, go out and instruct.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.
It was stated: A mistaken ḥalîṣah is valid. What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will be permitted to you after some time. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and learning that “if he has the intention but not she, or she has the intention but not he, ḥalîṣah is always invalid unless both of them have the intention!” What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah for Rebbi Joḥanan? A case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will pay you a hundred talents. Rebbi Mana said, if this was stipulated as a condition, she has to pay. A case came before Rebbi Huna and he followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When he heard that Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed, he changed his opinion and forced a second ḥalîṣah. A case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He told him, my son, this woman does not want to be married in levirate; therefore perform ḥalîṣah and remove your candidacy from her, then she will marry you in a regular marriage. After the ḥalîṣah, he said to him: Even if Moses and Samuel came, they could not permit her. He referred to himself as “they are wise to do evil; they do not know how to do good.”
It was stated: A mistaken ḥalîṣah is valid. What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will be permitted to you after some time. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and learning that “if he has the intention but not she, or she has the intention but not he, ḥalîṣah is always invalid unless both of them have the intention!” What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah for Rebbi Joḥanan? A case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will pay you a hundred talents. Rebbi Mana said, if this was stipulated as a condition, she has to pay. A case came before Rebbi Huna and he followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When he heard that Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed, he changed his opinion and forced a second ḥalîṣah. A case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He told him, my son, this woman does not want to be married in levirate; therefore perform ḥalîṣah and remove your candidacy from her, then she will marry you in a regular marriage. After the ḥalîṣah, he said to him: Even if Moses and Samuel came, they could not permit her. He referred to himself as “they are wise to do evil; they do not know how to do good.”
It was stated: A mistaken ḥalîṣah is valid. What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will be permitted to you after some time. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and learning that “if he has the intention but not she, or she has the intention but not he, ḥalîṣah is always invalid unless both of them have the intention!” What is a mistaken ḥalîṣah for Rebbi Joḥanan? A case where one told him, perform ḥalîṣah and she will pay you a hundred talents. Rebbi Mana said, if this was stipulated as a condition, she has to pay. A case came before Rebbi Huna and he followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When he heard that Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed, he changed his opinion and forced a second ḥalîṣah. A case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He told him, my son, this woman does not want to be married in levirate; therefore perform ḥalîṣah and remove your candidacy from her, then she will marry you in a regular marriage. After the ḥalîṣah, he said to him: Even if Moses and Samuel came, they could not permit her. He referred to himself as “they are wise to do evil; they do not know how to do good.”
“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of smashed persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known.” Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of smashed people. RebbiJacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Jehudah: Standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested are movables. Rav Sheshet asked: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?
“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of smashed persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known.” Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of smashed people. RebbiJacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Jehudah: Standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested are movables. Rav Sheshet asked: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?
A predatory woman. That is one who sits and makes fun of the words of the Torah: “She said, you shall come to me … and he slept with her that night.” Rebbi Abbahu said, one could think that this was the [divine] intention. He only knew that she was doing this only to produce more tribes.
“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas; it was heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father or any person from whom he might inherit went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of broken persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known. Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of broken people. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?
“If somebody who works his wife’s property has the intention of divorcing her and goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. If somebody who works the property of prisoners heard that they prepare to return, goes and takes from the ground, he is quick and is rewarded. These are properties of prisoners: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas; it was heard that they died, and he went to work the inheritance. But property of abandoning persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of abandoning persons: In any case where his father or any person from whom he might inherit went overseas, he did not hear that they died, but he went to work the inheritance. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I heard that there is no difference between prisoners and abandoning persons. But property of broken persons one takes out of their hands. These are properties of broken persons: In any case where his father, brother, or any person from whom he might inherit, went overseas, and his whereabouts are not known. Samuel says, the prisoner is one who left involuntarily. If he had left voluntarily he would have given him instructions. The abandoning person is one who left voluntarily. You should know that he had the intention of keeping [the relative] off his property since he left voluntarily and did not give him instructions. Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Movables do not fall under the rules of broken people. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: Those date palms of Babylonia which do not need grafting, is it not reasonable that we should treat them like standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested?
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.
It was stated: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted but the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.”
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?
So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.
MISHNAH: “Be preliminarily married to me by this cup of wine,” but it turned out to be honey; “of honey” but it turned out to be wine; “by this silver denar,” but it turned out to be of gold, “gold denar” but it turned out to be of silver; “on condition that I be poor”, but he turned out to be rich; “rich” but he turned out to be poor; she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Simeon said, if he tricked her by understatement she is preliminarily married. “On condition that I be a Cohen,” and he turned out to be a Levite; “a Levite” and he turned out to be a Cohen; “a Gibeonite” and he turned out to be a bastard, “a bastard” and he turned out to be a Gibeonite; “a villager” and he turned out to be from a walled city; “from a walled city” and he turned out to be from a village; “on condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far, “far” and it turned out to be close; “on condition that I have a grown-up daughter or slave-girl” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I have not” and it turned out that he did have; “on condition that I have children” and it turned out that he had none, “on condition that I not have children” and it turned out that he did have. Il all these cases she is not preliminarily married even if she says, I had the intention to be preliminarily married to him regardless. The same holds if she misinformed him.
Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Pedaiah: Intentionally desecrated Temple property becomes profane without redemption. But did we not state: “In error,” that excludes intention? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The excluded well-being offerings become profane without redemption. But did we not state: “From the sancta,” not all sancta? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is.
Abba bar Zamina gave a denar to the food merchant and took from him at the cheapest rate of the entire year. Rav did not agree. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder had flax. The donkey drivers wanted to buy from him. He told them, it is not my intention to sell this before Purim. They said to him, sell it to us now at the price which you would sell it for at Purim. He went to ask Rebbi, who told him, it is forbidden. He went out, formulated this in a baraita, and stated the following: “If one was owing money and the other wanted to take from him on the threshing floor, when he told him, credit it to my account by the market rate and I shall provide you all twelve months; this is forbidden for it is not as if the assarion came to his hand.” Rav said, my uncle Rebbi Ḥiyya will agree that if they paid him and he immediately acquired, then it is permitted. If he paid beforehand and acquired afterwards, it is permitted; if he acquired earlier and paid afterwards, it is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: All its spoils you shall collect, etc. Rebbi Simeon said, is there not an argument de minore ad majus about this? Since properties, which have no knowledge of good or bad, but because they caused the just to dwell with the evildoers the Torah said, should be burned, if somebody has the intention of influencing his neighbor and influences him from good ways to bad ones, not so much more? Rebbi Eleazar said, the matter is demonstrated by Lot who dwelt in Sodom only because of his money but left there with his hands on his head. This is what is written: Quickly escape to there; it is enough for you that you escape with your life.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sold his wine to a Non-Jew,” etc. Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he has no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, a Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew, in case he fixed the price before that one measured, the proceeds are permitted; if that one measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal price, even if he measured before he fixed the price should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.
If one ate half the volume of an olive before he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was appointed, half the volume of an olive after he was removed from office. Since [no] obligation of a sacrifice came in between, do they combine? Let us hear from the following: Before him were three [olive sized pieces]. He ate the first but did not realize it; the second (and the third) while he was oblivious of the first. He was informed of the first but was not informed of the second. [He ate] the third while oblivious of the second. Afterwards he was informed about all of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable for the first and the second but not liable for the third. Rebbi Yose said, the second depends on his intention. If he wishes, he atones for it with the first; if he wishes, he atones for it with the third. The colleagues compare it to four half-olives. If he was intelligent, he brings one sacrifice; otherwise, he brings two sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together; one for the third and fourth together. (Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together.) If he brought for the middle ones, he is not liable for the first and the fourth. Rebbi Yose compares it to full olive sizes. If he was intelligent, he brings two sacrifices; otherwise, he brings three sacrifices. How is that? He brings one for the first and the second together, and one for the third and fourth together. If he brought for the middle ones, he is liable for the first separately and for the fourth separately.
The Babylonian Talmud
His opinion is certainly that there are three watches in the night ; but his intention is to inform us that there are watches in heaven as on earth. For there is a teaching : R. Eliezer says : There are three watches in the night, and at each watch, the Holy One, blessed be He, sits enthroned and roars like a lion ; as it is said, "The Lord doth roar from on high, and utter His voice from His holy habitation ; He doth mightily roar because of His fold " (Jer. xxv. 30). A sign for the matter [of the three earthly night-watches] is :
Nay; it teaches that he knew how to fix upon that moment in which the Holy One, blessed be He, is wrathful. This is the intention of the statement which the prophet made to Israel :
A certain Min, who lived in the neighbourhood of R. Joshua b. Levi, used to plague him with questions about [the interpretation of] the Scriptures. One day R. Joshua took a cock and placed it between the feet of his bed and watched [the comb] closely. His intention was to curse the heretic when the moment arrived [in which God was wrathful] ; but when the moment arrived, he was sleeping. On waking up he said ; Learn from this that it is not proper to act thus ; for it is written, "His tender mercies are over all His works" (Ps. cxlv. 9), and
Surely it is on the tenth that we fast ! But the intention is to tell thee that whoever eats and drinks on the ninth, the Scriptures ascribe it to him as though he fasted on the ninth and tenth.
R. Tabi also said in the name of R. Josiah : What means that which is written, "There are three things that are never satisfied... the grave, and the barren womb," etc. (Prov, xxx. 15 f.) — what is the connection between "the grave" and "the barren womb"? Its intention is to tell thee that as the womb receives and yields up, so the grave receives and yields up.
"tents" and "streams" — for it is written, "As streams stretched out, as gardens by the river-side, as tents planted by the Lord, as cedars beside the waters" (Num. xxiv. 6)? Its intention is to tell thee that as streams bring a man up from impurity to purity, so do "tents" bring a man up from the scale of guilt to the scale of merit.
If thou wilt I can say it is R. Judah's view or the Rabbis'. If thou wilt I can say it is the view of the Rabbis — because the Scriptures state, "Morning by morning" (Exod. l.c.), thus dividing the morning into two parts. If thou wilt I can say it is R. Judah's view — because one word for "morning" is superfluous, the intention being to anticipate [the time for gathering] by one hour Everybody agrees "As the sun waxed hot, it melted" means in the fourth hour. How is this proved?
It is different with guests, because it is their intention to move their position.
R. Zera said in the name of Raba b. Jeremiah : From what time may we say the benediction over the smell [of the perfume]? From the time its column of smoke ascends. R. Zera said to Raba b. Jeremiah , "But one has not yet smelt it!" He replied, "According to thy reasoning, one says the Grace before meals but has not yet eaten ! His intention is to eat, and so here likewise it is his intention to smell."
R. Zera said in the name of Raba b. Jeremiah : From what time may we say the benediction over the smell [of the perfume]? From the time its column of smoke ascends. R. Zera said to Raba b. Jeremiah , "But one has not yet smelt it!" He replied, "According to thy reasoning, one says the Grace before meals but has not yet eaten ! His intention is to eat, and so here likewise it is his intention to smell."
Rab and Samuel were sitting at a meal. Rab Shimi b. Hiyya came and hurriedly ate his food. Rab said to him, "What is thine intention — to join with us [in saying Grace with Zimmun]? We have concluded the meal. " Samuel said to him, "If they brought me mushrooms or Abba pigeons, should we not eat?"
And not even if he nullified them [completely], because his intention is nullified against other people's.
If he nullified them, yes. If he did not nullify them, no! And we learn in a baraita, on this Rabbi Yose says: Straw that he intends not to remove: this is like earth without thought to intention, and it is nullified. Earth that he intends to remove: this is like straw without thought to intention, and it is not nullified.
If he nullified them, yes. If he did not nullify them, no! And we learn in a baraita, on this Rabbi Yose says: Straw that he intends not to remove: this is like earth without thought to intention, and it is nullified. Earth that he intends to remove: this is like straw without thought to intention, and it is not nullified.
What is meant by ‘according to the rule’? R. Hisda answered: Provided that [the covering] was made [with the intention of providing] the shade for the sukkah.
What is meant by ‘according to the rule’? R. Hisda answered: provided [the covering] was made [with the intention of providing] the shade for the sukkah.
Abaye said: Whatever had different names prior to the giving of the Torah, and yet the Torah made specific mention of the general name [the intention is to exclude such of the species which] have special names. But these did not have different names before the giving of the Torah at all.
But if he cut them for food, what is the reason [for the view] of the rabbis? And if you will answer that the rabbis are of the opinion that since he changed his mind about them [to use them] for skhakh, his original intention becomes annulled, [it may be objected], does then one's intention become annulled in such a case? Have we not learned: All vessels
But if he cut them for food, what is the reason [for the view] of the rabbis? And if you will answer that the rabbis are of the opinion that since he changed his mind about them [to use them] for skhakh, his original intention becomes annulled, [it may be objected], does then one's intention become annulled in such a case? Have we not learned: All vessels
can be rendered susceptible to uncleanliness by intention, but cannot be rendered insusceptible except by an act of change, since an act can annul a [prior] act or intention, while an intention cannot annul either a [previous] act or a [previous] intention.
can be rendered susceptible to uncleanliness by intention, but cannot be rendered insusceptible except by an act of change, since an act can annul a [prior] act or intention, while an intention cannot annul either a [previous] act or a [previous] intention.
can be rendered susceptible to uncleanliness by intention, but cannot be rendered insusceptible except by an act of change, since an act can annul a [prior] act or intention, while an intention cannot annul either a [previous] act or a [previous] intention.
can be rendered susceptible to uncleanliness by intention, but cannot be rendered insusceptible except by an act of change, since an act can annul a [prior] act or intention, while an intention cannot annul either a [previous] act or a [previous] intention.
And if you will say that this refers only to vessels which are of importance but that ‘handles’ which are needed only as aids for the eating of the food, are made [susceptible to uncleanness] by intention and are also unmade by intention [it may be objected], But have we not learned: The handles of all foodstuffs that are threshed in the threshing-floor are insusceptible to ritual uncleanliness, and R. Yose declares them susceptible?
And if you will say that this refers only to vessels which are of importance but that ‘handles’ which are needed only as aids for the eating of the food, are made [susceptible to uncleanness] by intention and are also unmade by intention [it may be objected], But have we not learned: The handles of all foodstuffs that are threshed in the threshing-floor are insusceptible to ritual uncleanliness, and R. Yose declares them susceptible?
on account of those who had the power to protest [against wrongdoing] and did not protest; and on account of those who publicly declare their intention to give to charity and do not give.
R. Ashi said: This is a case where he plucked them for food, and R. Eliezer son of R. Shimon holds the same opinion as his father who said that a work which is done without intention is permitted. But do not both Abaye and Raba say that
As it was performed on weekdays, so was it was performed on Shabbat, [save that on the eve of Shabbat he would fill a non-sanctified golden barrel from the Shiloah, and place it in the chamber.] But why [bring the water in a non-sanctified vessel]? Let him bring it in a sanctified one? Zeiri said: [The author of our Mishnah] is of the opinion that no fixed amount has been prescribed for the water [of libation] and that the ministering vessels sanctify their contents even if there was no intention
If he were to bring it in a sanctified vessel it would have been rendered invalid by remaining in there overnight. Hezekiah said: Ministering vessels do not sanctify their contents where there was no intention, but [the use of a sanctified vessel was here forbidden] as a preventive measure lest it be assumed that there was intention that the contents should be sanctified.
If he were to bring it in a sanctified vessel it would have been rendered invalid by remaining in there overnight. Hezekiah said: Ministering vessels do not sanctify their contents where there was no intention, but [the use of a sanctified vessel was here forbidden] as a preventive measure lest it be assumed that there was intention that the contents should be sanctified.
R. Yannai said in the name of R. Zera: You may even say that there is a fixed amount for the water [of libation] and that ministering vessels of ministry do not sanctify their contents unless there was intention, [but the use of a sanctified vessel was nevertheless forbidden] as a preventive measure lest people will think that it was filled with the water for the purpose of using it for the washing of the hands and the feet [of the High Priest].
R. Judah said in the name of Rab: One may borrow a fast and pay it on another day. When I made this statement in the presence of Samuel, he said: Has a resolution to fast the force of a vow, so that one must perforce pay it? It is merely self-affliction that one has taken upon himself. If he feels that he can endure the affliction let him do so, but if he cannot endure it, he need not! Some relate the above in the following form: R. Judah said in the name of Rab: One may borrow a fast and pay it on another day. When I made this statement before Samuel, he said to me: This is a matter of course! Let us assume that his intention has merely the force of a vow, is not one in duty bound to pay a vow the next day or at a later time?
R. Benjamin b. Jephet also said in the name of R. Eleazar that the prohibition of washing refers only to washing for immediate wear, but washing for the purpose of putting aside is allowed. An objection was again raised from the following Baraita: It is not allowed to wash before the ninth of Ab (within the same week) even when the intention is to put the clothes aside for use after the ninth of Ab; our (Babylonian) fine laundry work is under the same rule as their (Palestinian) plain washing; linen garments are not subject to the law forbidding laundering! This, indeed, is a refutation.
“And the queen Vashti refused” (Esther 1:12). She was immodest, as the Master said above, that both of them had licentious intention. Why then would she not come? — R. Yose b. Hanina said: This teaches that leprosy broke out on her. In a Baraitha it was taught that Gabriel came and fixed a tail on her.
If one was writing it, expounding it, or correcting it, if he directed his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation. How so? If he was arranging each verse and then writing it, what does it matter if he had intention? He is reciting it by heart! Rather he writes each verse and then recites it.
as it has been taught: R. Judah says in the name of R. Elazar b. Azariah: One who recites the Shema should make it heard to his ears, as it says, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is One”—Make heard to your ear what your mouth says. R. Meir says: “Which I command you this day upon your heart” according to the words follow the intention of the heart.
Papa said to him: But maybe [the reason he repeats] is because at first he did not have proper intention, and now he has proper intention? He said to him: Is he to treat heaven like an ordinary friend? If he does not have intention, I will hit him with a hammer until he does have intention.
Papa said to him: But maybe [the reason he repeats] is because at first he did not have proper intention, and now he has proper intention? He said to him: Is he to treat heaven like an ordinary friend? If he does not have intention, I will hit him with a hammer until he does have intention.
Papa said to him: But maybe [the reason he repeats] is because at first he did not have proper intention, and now he has proper intention? He said to him: Is he to treat heaven like an ordinary friend? If he does not have intention, I will hit him with a hammer until he does have intention.
Papa said to him: But maybe [the reason he repeats] is because at first he did not have proper intention, and now he has proper intention? He said to him: Is he to treat heaven like an ordinary friend? If he does not have intention, I will hit him with a hammer until he does have intention.
And even if we adopt the view that the mere intention [to use a thing for a certain purpose] has force, this refers to a case, for instance, when one weaves a shroud for a dead body, but in this case [the bricks and beams in question] are like thread which has still to be woven into cloth, and no one says [that in such a case there is force in mere intention].
And even if we adopt the view that the mere intention [to use a thing for a certain purpose] has force, this refers to a case, for instance, when one weaves a shroud for a dead body, but in this case [the bricks and beams in question] are like thread which has still to be woven into cloth, and no one says [that in such a case there is force in mere intention].
Nahman b. Yitzchak said: If one goes in without any intention of using it as a short cut, he may afterwards use it as a short cut. And R. Helbo said in the name of R. Huna: If one enters a synagogue to pray, he may afterwards use it as a short cut, as it says, “But when, the people of the land shall come before the Lord at the appointed times, he that enters by way of the north gate to worship shall go out by way of the south gate” (Ezekiel 46:9).
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, He that washes his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And so he that dips his hands—if he does it with intention, his hands are clean; if he does it without intention, his hands are unclean. And yet there is a Baraitha, Whether he does it with intention or not, his hands are clean. R. Nachman said, There is no difficulty. The one has to do with common food,
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).
And what is your authority for saying that common food does not want intention? Because there is a canonical Mishnah, If a wave of water, which is let loose and contains forty seahs, falls upon a man or upon vessels, they are clean (Chullin 31b, i. 1). For it teaches that a man is like vessels. As vessels have no intention, so a man has no intention. But whence do you gather that he has no intention? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of a man sitting and watching when the wave shall be let loose. And vessels are like a man. As a man utters his intention, so in the case of vessels persons exercise intention for them. And when thou sayest, It is the case of a man sitting and watching, what is the good of the story, for in that case he has an intention? Thou mightest have thought, It is to set a limit. Perhaps otherwise he would have gone to dip himself in a collection of stagnant rain-water. Thus also we limit it to the first fall, on account of the second being unlawful. We learn from this that we are not to limit it. And what is your authority for saying that men do not dip in the second fall? Because there is a Baraitha, viz., Men dip in the first, but do not dip in the second, that they may not dip in the air. But we also learn it hence, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If fruits have fallen into the midst of a reservoir of water, and if one whose hands are unclean should reach out and lay hold of them, his hands are clean, and the fruits are clean. But if he did this that he might wash his hands, his hands are clean, but the fruits are unclean (Makhshirin, iv. 7).