point
383 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.
MISHNAH: One who sells a house did not sell the shed even if it opened into it, nor the room which is in its interior, nor the roof if it has a railing ten handbreadths high. Rebbi Jehudah says, if its entry point is shaped like a door it is not sold even if its railing is not ten handbreadths high.
“Nor the roof if it has a railing ten handbreadths high.” Is a railing the last word? If it was surrounded by back walls of houses, if there were pillars and wooden superstructures on top of them? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah says, if its entry point is shaped like a door it is not sold even if its railing is not ten handbreadths high.” They said, only if it has a railing ten handbreadths high.
Rav said, Calendae are forbidden for everybody. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is forbidden only for those worshipping on them. Saturnalia are forbidden for everybody. Rebbi Joḥanan said, both Calendae and Saturnalia are forbidden only for those worshipping on them. The colleagues asked: are wives of worshippers like worshippers? Rebbi Abbahu asked: is the parade of Caesarea like worship, since it is full of Samaritans? The parade of Duqim is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira sent Rebbi Bevai that he should buy him a small web from the Saturnalia of Bet-Shean. He came to Rebbi Yose. He thought that he would instruct him following Rebbi Joshua ben Levi who permitted it. But he instructed him following Rebbi Joḥanan that it was forbidden. Rav said, Calends are eight days before the solstice, Saturnalia eight days after the solstice. Rebbi Joḥanan said, prwqṭw is the head of the turning point.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: In every situation in which the Sages said that her husband would be obligated for a sacrifice, pure food became impure; her husband would be exempt from a sacrifice, pure food remains pure; her husband would have to bring a sacrifice for a doubt, pure food is in limbo. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: If an old man and a child walk in a dining room, does the old man not enter first? But the child can come and make a fool of him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yudan: I say, it was here but the intercourse stopped it from leaving; but there, what hindered it to leave? The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Hoshaiah: “If she left [the bed] and saw blood, she is impure but all the food is pure.” The Mishnah disagrees with Bar Pedaiah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, also when they stop eating heave.” Why? Not that if she would bleed, the food should not retroactively become impure? Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana: Explain it for a woman who has no regular period. He said to him, so says my teacher Rebbi Yose: All that is described here is about a woman who has a regular period. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah rises: Up to this point [it speaks] about a woman who has a regular period; from there on about a woman who has no regular period. But even if you say that the Mishnah does not rise, and we deal only with a woman who has a regular period, where does Bar Pedaiah hold? One differs with Rebbi Jehudah.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rav: The words of those Sages who follow the method of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Joḥanan said, really the Sages. How is that? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: We shall infer the point of view of the Sages from that of Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says, she makes her sex partner impure retroactively but her count is not in disorder, so the Sages say, she makes her sex partner impure retroactively but her count is not in disorder.
The Babylonian Talmud
What is the point on which they differ?
What is the point of disagreement? The time of "hastening." R. Eleazar b. 'Azariah holds that it refers to the haste of the Egyptians; but R. 'Akiba holds that
Our Rabbis have taught : "And these words shall be" means that one must not recite [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "These words... upon thine heart" — one might suppose that the whole Parashah requires Kawwanah; therefore there is a teaching to state, "These words... [shall be upon thine heart]," that is to say, up to this point Kawwanah is required, but from this point onward it is not necessary. These are the words of R. Eliezer. [[fol. 13 b.]] R. 'Akiba said to him :
Our Rabbis have taught : "And these words shall be" means that one must not recite [the sentences of the Shema'] out of order. "These words... upon thine heart" — one might suppose that the whole Parashah requires Kawwanah; therefore there is a teaching to state, "These words... [shall be upon thine heart]," that is to say, up to this point Kawwanah is required, but from this point onward it is not necessary. These are the words of R. Eliezer. [[fol. 13 b.]] R. 'Akiba said to him :
He replied : One may interrupt, and there is nothing in that [point you raise]. Rabbah said : On those days when the individual completes the Hallel, he may interrupt between the paragraphs, but in the middle of a paragraph he may not interrupt ; and on the days when the individual does not complete the Hallel, he may interrupt even in the middle of a paragraph.
He replied : He may taste and there is nothing in that [point you raise]. There is a teaching to the same effect : A woman who tastes [her cooking] is not required to utter a benediction, and she who is undergoing a fast may taste and there is nothing in it.
It is necessary [to mention this point] ; because it might have entered thy mind that I mean we can draw an analogy from the use of the verb "to write" in the former instance, thus : As there [with reference to the woman suspected of adultery] the curses were to be written and not the words of the command, so here likewise [with the Tefillin] the words of the command were not to be written! Therefore the All-merciful wrote, "And thou shalt write them" i.e. even the words of the command.
[Raba] remained silent ; so he asked him : Hast thou heard anything on this point ? He replied : Thus said Rab Sheshet: [Kawwanah is demanded of workmen] only if they stop their work to read it.
And R. Johanan asked : What is the point of divergence between them? The question of connubial intercourse.
What is the point of divergence between them ? Rabina said : They differ whether we have fear of mice [gnawing the body] ; the former holds there is such fear, the other there is not.
GEMARA Why are the reading of the Shema' and Tefillin different [from the others] ? Because they are commands the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class. Tefillah, Mezuzah and Grace after meals, being commands the observance of which does not depend upon a certain point of time, are obligatory upon women. That the reading of the Shema' [is not obligatory upon women] is self-evident, because it is a command the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class!
GEMARA Why are the reading of the Shema' and Tefillin different [from the others] ? Because they are commands the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class. Tefillah, Mezuzah and Grace after meals, being commands the observance of which does not depend upon a certain point of time, are obligatory upon women. That the reading of the Shema' [is not obligatory upon women] is self-evident, because it is a command the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class!
GEMARA Why are the reading of the Shema' and Tefillin different [from the others] ? Because they are commands the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class. Tefillah, Mezuzah and Grace after meals, being commands the observance of which does not depend upon a certain point of time, are obligatory upon women. That the reading of the Shema' [is not obligatory upon women] is self-evident, because it is a command the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class!
But they are under the obligation of Tefillah ; [obviously] because this is prayer! [not translated] But thou mightest say that since it is written thereby, "Evening and morning and at noonday" (Ps. lv. 18), it is like a command the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time [and women are exempt]; therefore it informs us [the obligation is theirs].
And Grace after meals. This too is evident ! But thou mightest say that since it is written thereby, "When the Lord shall give you in the evening flesh to eat and in the morning bread to the full" (Exod. xvi. 8), it is like a command the observance of which depends upon a certain point of time [and women are exempt]; therefore it informs us [that it is obligatory].
Rab Adda b. Ahabah said : Women are under the obligation to recite the Sanctitication of the [Sabbath] day by the ordinance of the Torah. But why, since it is a command the observance of which is dependent upon a certain point of time, and women are exempt from all commands of this class ! Abbai answered : [The Sanctification by women] is a Rabbinical ordinance.
Rabina asked Raba : Is the recital of the Grace after meals by women an ordinance from the Torah or the Rabbis ? What is the point at issue ? It is whether they have the power of exempting others. It is quite right if thou sayest it is from the Torah ; then one who is enjoined by the Torah [to keep the observance] comes and exempts one [whose observance is likewise commanded] by the Torah. But if thou sayest it is from the Rabbis, then it is not a compulsory observance, and one who is not under the obligation [to keep the observance] cannot exempt others. How is it then ?
And shouldest thou say that in fact R. Judah even exempts a mere Ba'al Keri, and the point of variance [between him and the Rabbis] is the man with a running issue who experienced emission, to show thee the extreme view taken by the Rabbis, I then quote the latter part of the Mishnaic teaching : "A woman who during intercourse experiences the menstrual flow requires immersion."
Our Rabbis have taught : If he was standing in the Tefillah and the urine began to drip upon his knees, he should interrupt [his prayer] until it ceases and then repeat the Tefillah. To what point does he return? Rab Hisda and Rab Hamnuna [differ]. One says that he recommences from the beginning; the other says that he goes back only to the place where he stopped.
One may suppose that the following is the point of divergence :
One is of opinion that if the man has waited sufficient time to finish the remainder of the Tefillah, he should recommence from the beginning. The other is of opinion that [in any event] he should go back only to the point where he stopped.
Rab Ashe said : The phrase "If the man has waited" must be altered to "If the man has not waited"; because everybody agrees that if he waited sufficient time to finish the remainder of the Tefillah, he recommences from the beginning; but the point of divergence there [between Rab Hisda and Rab Hamnuna] is the case where the man did not wait. One is of the opinion that the man was in an uncomfortable state and unfit [to pray], and therefore his Tefillah is invalid; while the other is of opinion that the man was fit [to pray] and his Tefillah is valid.
but here the point at issue is that the earth must be so wet as to moisten something which can moisten something else.
R. Judah says: Until the fourth hour. The question was asked: Is "until" inclusive, or is it perhaps exclusive? Come and hear: R. Judah says: Until the middle of the afternoon. That is quite right if thou maintainest that this means "until" but not including — for that is the point of variance between R. Judah and the Rabbis; but if thou maintainest that [[fol. 27 a.]] it means "until" and including, then R. Judah would be in agreement
What, then, does it signify? "Until" and including. Then the difficulty in the first clause remains, viz. : What is the point of variance between R. Judah and the Rabbis? Dost thou hold the opinion that when R. Judah mentioned "The middle of the afternoon" he meant the second half? He meant the first half, and he must be understood to say : When does the first half conclude and the latter half commence? At the expiration of the eleventh hour less a quarter.
"On which point do the Rabbis differ?" "On the other days of the year." "Do they differ on the question of a Festival which occurs at the conclusion of the Sabbath?
Let, then, the instance of corn show [whether this point is material] ! But why [is a benediction required when partaking of food made from] corn ? Because there is the obligation of Hallah.
Then let the instance of the vineyard show [whether this point is material]! The argument has therefore to be reinstated, because the feature of the first case is not like that of the second and vice versa ; but the factor common to both is that each is something which is enjoyed and consequently requires a benediction. Hence everything which is enjoyed requires a benediction.
Is it not that they differed in the following point : He who said the benediction thought that for cooked vegetables and poultry it is "...By Whose word all things exist," and therefore what is best liked is to be preferred [for the benediction] ; but he who laughed thought that for cooked vegetables it is "...Who createst the fruit of the ground" and for poultry "...By Whose word all things exist," and therefore the fruit should be given precedence ?
No ; they both agreed that for cooked vegetables and poultry it is "...By Whose word all things exist" ; and here they differed on the following point : One thought that what is best liked is to be preferred [for the benediction], whereas the other thought that the cabbage should receive precedence
R. Jeremiah b. Abba said : It is like [the discussion of] the Tannaim, viz.: We take Terumah with a whole onion, though small in size, but not with half of a large onion. R. Judah says : Not so, but we take it with the half of a large onion. Do they not differ on the following point : One maintains that which is of greater value is to be preferred, while the other maintains that which is whole is to be preferred ?
Let us say [that their difference is] like that of the Tannaim ; for one taught : The Grace after meals [may be said by] two or three ; and there is another teaching : Three or four. They hold that everybody admits that "Who art kind and dealest kindly" is not ordained by the Torah. Are we, then, not to suppose that they differ on the following point : He who says, "[The Grace may be said by] two or three" holds that [the benediction of Zimmun extends] until "Who givest food unto all" ; and he who says "Three or four" holds that it extends until "We will bless"?
Then the Sages agree with the first Tanna! There is a point of difference between them, viz. : the post factum.
What is the point of difference between them ?
What is the point of difference between them? Bet Shammai hold that it is forbidden to use a table [unclean in] the second degree through fear of those who are eating Terumah;
What is the point of difference between them ? Bet Hillel hold that it is forbidden to employ as an attendant one who is an 'Am ha'ares, whereas Bet Shammai hold that such may be employed.
R. Isaac b. R. Hannina said in the name of Rab Huna: Throughout our Chapter, the Halakah is in agreement with Bet Hillel except in this point where it is in agreement with Bet Shammai. R. Osha'ya, however, teaches the reverse, that here also the Halakah is in agreement with Bet Hillel.
Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: We are here dealing with a point of time near to the setting of the sun; so if it were an adult, it is obvious that he must certainly be a gentile. But in the case of a child, one might say it is an Israelite and it is by chance that he is holding [the torch].
R. Johanan can reply to thee : It is obvious that according to R. Judah, if a man made a purchase and then a fresh purchase, he also must say a benediction [for the latter]; but the point of variance [between R. Judah and R. Meir] is where the man already possessed the article and made a fresh purchase, to show the extreme view taken by R. Meir; for even if he made a purchase, already possessing a similar article, there is no necessity for a benediction, how much more unnecessary is it if he purchased and then made a fresh purchase.
And the point was raised, [How can it be said that], The Eruv of courtyards [are placed] in a courtyard? And the Tana says: If a man placed his Eruv in a gatehouse or in an exedra (a semicircular recess), or in a balcony, it is asur and he who dwells within it cannot be a cause of prohibition?
This is what he (R. Meir) means: Bet Shammai and Beth Hillel did not dispute on this point.
The latter [mishnah] is what R. Judah said to R. Meir: ‘Why do you forbid planks? As a decree against [the possible use of] an ordinary roofing? But it is Beth Shammai only who hold this opinion while Beth Hillel do not decree [against planks]. To this R. Meir said that Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel do not dispute this point at all.
But if it is according to R. Judah, it requires proper binding be required? This Tanna [of the baraita] agrees with R. Judah on one point and disagrees with him on the other.
What is the reason? R. Hiyya b. Avin and R. Assi disagree on this point. One explains because there is no permission to eat it, and the other explains because it has no monetary value.
Scripture says “You shall dwell” “You shall dwell” in order to point an analogy (gezerah shavah). It is stated here, “You shall dwell,” and with regard to the [seven days of] preparation it is also stated, “You shall dwell,” so that just as in that case the word “days” includes also the nights, so here also “days” includes the nights.
Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The mitzvah of the lulav is for all seven days. But R. Joshua b. Levi said: The mitzvah of the lulav is for the first day only. From that point onward it is a mitzvah of the elders. And R. Yitzchak said: Every day it is a mitzvah of the elders, even the first. But have we not an established that on the first day it is a toraitic commandment? Say rather “except for the first day.” But if so, is this opinion not the same as that of R. Joshua b. Levi? — Say, “And so said R. Yitzchak.”
If so, is not the seventh day of Pesah also different in respect of the commandment to eat matzah, since the Master said, On the first night it is an obligation [to eat matzah], from that point onward it is voluntary? How now! here it is different from the first night, but not from the day whereas in the case of the Eighth Day, it is different even from the preceding day.
What is the cause of the mourning [mentioned in the last cited verse]? R. Dosa and the rabbis differ on this point. One said: Over the slaying of Messiah the son of Joseph, and the other explained, over the slaying of the Evil Inclination.
But did you not say that the earlier part of our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Judah? Is it not possible that our Tanna agrees with R. Judah on one point though he disagrees with him on another point?
But did you not say that the earlier part of our Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Judah? Is it not possible that our Tanna agrees with R. Judah on one point though he disagrees with him on another point?
What is R. 'Aḳiba's reason? It is as stated in the following Baraita: In the order of sacrifices of the sixth day the expression used is: "and its drink-offerings" (plural). Scripture, therefore, has reference to two libations, the one being the libation of water and the other that of wine. May not both be of wine? On that point R. 'Aḳiba agrees with R. Judah b. Bathyra, who says that in the quoted verse water is alluded to..
Said R. 'Asi in the name of R. Johanan, the law is in accordance with R. Judah. Said R. Zera to R. 'Asi: Did R. Johanan really say so? Did we not read (above, p. 2): On the third of Marḥeshwan we begin to pray for rain; R. Gamaliel says on the seventh thereof. Now R. Eleazar, commenting upon the statement, said, the law is in accordance with R. Gamaliel! Said R. 'Asi: Do you pit one authority (R. Eleazar) against another (R. Johanan)?! Moreover, I can say that there is no contradiction between the two, for the one refers to praying and the other to mentioning. But did not R. Johanan say, whenever one prays for rain one also mentions it? This statement refers only to the time of discontinuation. But was not reference made to both, R. Johanan saying explicitly, when one begins to mention the rain he begins to pray for it, and when he stops praying for it he stops mentioning it? Nevertheless there is no difficulty, for in the one statement he has reference to us (the Babylonians), in the other to them (the Palestinians). Why such difference? Is it because we have produce in the field? (Then there should be no difference, because) they have pilgrims! R. Johanan speaks of the time after the destruction of the Temple. Now that we have arrived at this point we can say that both statements have reference to them (Palestinians), and yet there will be no contradiction, for the one refers to the time before, and the other to that after the destruction of the Temple.
Did not the Baraita omit to mention the procession with the ark? No, this is no omission, because the Baraita meant to point out only things done privately, not such as are done in public.
Said R. 'Ashi: The same view can be deduced from the text of our Mishnah, for it reads: "In what respect are these (seven) fasts more rigorous than the (three) immediately preceding ones? In that on these (seven) fast days the alarm is sounded and the shops are closed," which shows that with respect to the twenty-four benedictions both groups of fasts are alike. If, however, you should say that here, too, the Mishnah mentions one difference and omits another, what will you do with the words of the Mishnah: "In what respect"? Answer: Do you think that the phrase "in what respect" is to be taken strictly? Did not the Mishnah omit mentioning the ark? No, this is no omission, because the Mishnah mentions it in the next chapter. Now that you have arrived at this point, you may just as well say that failing to mention the increase in the number of benedictions to twenty-four is no omission either, because the Mishnah speaks of it in the next chapter.
On the first three fast days the priests of the guard fast, but not to the end of the day, etc. The Rabbis have taught: Why was it decreed that the priests of the guard might drink wine by night, but not by day? Because the day-work might become too heavy for those in the sub-division, so that the priests of the guard would have to assist them; why was it decreed that the members of the sub-division should not drink either by day or by night? Because they are usually at work. On the basis of this law it was decreed that every priest who can trace his pedigree to his division and sub-division and knows that the members of that sub-division were appointed to the work, is not allowed to drink wine during that particular day, but if he can trace his pedigree to the chief division, but not to the sub-division, while knowing that the latter was appointed to the work, he is not allowed to drink wine during that entire week; if, however, he is unable to trace his pedigree either to the chief division or the sub-division, but knows that the latter was appointed to the work, he is not allowed to drink wine during that entire year. Rabbi says: I say that from this point of view the priest should never be allowed to drink wine, but what can I do (in favor of such an injunction) seeing that his misfortune has turned out to his benefit. Said 'Abbayi: In accordance with whose view do the priests drink wine now-a-days? According to whose opinion? Of course according to that of Rabbi!
"From the eighth thereof until the close of the festival", etc. Why does he say "from the eighth thereof", why not from the ninth thereof, since the eighth is anyhow a holiday? Because if for some reason we should have to abolish the first seven days of Nisan as holidays, mourning would still be forbidden on the eighth because it immediately precedes the days on which the date for the Feast of Weeks was legally fixed. Now that you have arrived at this point, the matter becomes clear also regarding the twenty-ninth of Adar, for if it happened that we should have to abolish the twenty-eighth of Adar as a holiday, fasting on the twenty-ninth would still be prohibited on the ground that it immediately precedes the time during which the Daily Offering was established.
Said R. Ḥelbo in the name of R. 'Ulla of Bir, who said it in the name of R. Eleazar, in the future the Holy One, blessed be He, will arrange a chorus for the righteous in Paradise. He will sit in the center and each of the righteous will be able to point to Him with his finger, as it is said (Is., 25. 9): "And it shall be said in that day: Lo, this is our God, for whom we waited, that He might save us; this is the Lord, for whom we waited, we will be glad and rejoice in His salvation."
And R. Joshua b. Levi said: A city in which there are not ten men of leisure is reckoned as a village. What does he tell us? We have already learned this: What is a large town? One in which there are ten men of leisure. If there are fewer than this, it is reckoned as a village. He had to point out that the rule applies to a city, even though [leisured] people come there from outside.
We have learned elsewhere: If any who has incurred the penalty of karet is flogged — they are exempt from karet, as it says, “Lest your brother should be dishonored in your eyes” (Deuteronomy 25:3) once he has been flogged, he is like thy brother, the words of R. Hananiah b. Gamaliel. R. Yohanan said: R. Hananiah b. Gamaliel’s colleagues disagreed with him on this point.
And both the midrash of R. Simai and the midrash on “from his issue” are necessary [to prove this point]. For if I had only R. Simai, I might have raised the above objection, and therefore it teaches us “from his issue.” And if I had only “from his issue,” I would not have known how many issues [obligate for a sacrifice]; therefore I have R. Simai.
There is a difference of Tannaim on this point, as we have learnt. R. Eliezer said: I have heard that when they were building the hekhal [in the second Temple] they made curtains for the hekhal and for the courtyard, the difference being that in the hekhal they built [the walls] outside [the curtains] and in the courtyard they built [the walls] within [the curtains].
“And Esther said, An adversary and an enemy, this wicked Haman.” R. Eleazar said: This informs us that she was pointing to Ahashverosh and an angel came and pushed her hand so as to point to Haman.
What is the point of the second quotation? — You might say that from the time of the first rising of the dawn it is not yet day, though from the time the sun begins to set it is already night and they rose early and stopped work late.Therefore come and hear: ” That in the night they may be a guard for us, and that we may work in the day.”
On what point do they disagree? The First Tanna holds that Jerusalem was not apportioned to [any of] the tribes, while R. Judah holds that it was apportioned to [certain of] the tribes;
he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak and as for a fool and a child, they are exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law. What is the difference in the nature of holocaust, that they are exempt, and in the nature of rejoicing, that they are bound? As regards the nature of holocaust we are taught by the recurrence of the word from the passage intitled "Assemble," as it is written, "Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones" (Deut. xxxi. 12), and it is written, "when all Israel is come to appear" (Deut. xxxi. 11). And that point, whence do we get it? Because it is written, "that they may hear and that they may learn" (Deut. xxxi. 12). And there is a Baraitha as follows, "That they may hear," this expression excludes him who speaks and does not hear; "and that they may learn," this expression excludes him who hears and does not speak. Is this to say, that he who cannot talk cannot learn? No; for this suggests the case of the two dumb men who were in the neighbourhood of Rabbi, viz., the sons of R. Jochanan ben Gudgodah's daughter; and the sons of R. Jochanan's sister say concerning it, that every time that Rabbi went up to the College, they went up and sat before him, and shook their heads, and moved their lips, and Rabbi asked for mercy for them, and they were examined, and it was ascertained that they were perfect in knowledge of Halachah and Siphra and Siphre and all the Talmud. Mar Zot'ra said, The reading there is, "in order that they may teach." R. Ashi said, Assuredly it is, "in order that they may teach"; for, if you imagine that it is, "in order that they may learn," then, since he who does not talk does not learn, and since he who does not hear does not learn, this sense of learn comes out of the words, "in order that they may hear," but assuredly it is here, "in order that they may teach."
Ola said that Resh Lakish said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. R. Jochanan said, When he has finished, he cannot bring again. R. Abba said, But they do not really differ. The one is the case where he keeps silence, the other where he declares his intention. This expression, When he keeps silence—explain it. Perhaps there was not time in the day to bring them. In that case they are not brought, because there was not time in the day. But perhaps he has none to eat with him. In that case they are not brought, because he has none to eat with him. No; this is not such a case; and so far as this goes, it is necessary that he should bring them. For there is time in the day, and he has people to eat with him. Inasmuch as he did not bring them at the earlier time, learn from this that he left them behind intentionally; and this also is the purport of the story, how when Rabbin came, R. Jochanan said, If a man set apart ten beasts for his Chagigah, he may bring five on the first high holiday, and may again bring five on the second high holiday. They are in appearance difficult to reconcile, but in reality not. For learn from this that the one is the case when he keeps silence, the other when he declares his intention. Learn from this that the point has been also distinctly settled. R. Shemen bar Abba said that R. Jochanan said,
Our Rabbis have taught thus, There is a story about Acher, that he was riding upon his horse on the sabbath, and R. Meir was walking behind him to learn the Law from his mouth. He said to him, Meir, turn thee backwards, for I have already measured by means of my horse's hoofs up to this point the limit of a sabbath day's journey. He said to him, Do thou also turn thyself back. He said to him, And have I not already said to thee, I have already heard from behind the curtain, "'Return, O backsliding children,' except Acher?" He forced him to enter a place of instruction. He said to a child, Repeat for me thy verse. He said to him, "There is no peace, saith the LORD, unto the wicked" (Is. xlviii. 22). He brought him into another synagogue. He said to a child, Repeat for me thy verse. He said to him, "For though thou wash thee with lye, and take thee much soap, yet thine iniquity is marked before me" (Jer. ii. 22). He brought him into another synagogue. He said
There is a canonical Mishnah, In the case of the day of Pentecost which falls upon the eve of a Sabbath, the house of Shammai say, The day for sacrificing is after the Sabbath, but the house of Hillel say, There is no day for sacrificing (Chag. 17a, i. 6). Do you not think that it means that there is no day at all for sacrificing? No; it cannot mean that a day for sacrificing is not necessary. What then does it mean? We learn from this that we are to bring the sacrifice on its own day? But how can this be? for they have discussed this point once already, for we have a canonical Mishnah, viz., The house of Shammai say, Men bring peace-offerings on a festival and do not lay their hands on them, but not burnt offerings; but the house of Hillel say, Men bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings and lay their hands on them (Chag. 17a, i. 3). I reply, No; there is no superfluity. For the passage is necessary. For, if he had let me hear only the second paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Shammai insist that men are not to sacrifice on the day of Pentecost, because it is possible to do so on the morrow, but, unless I had a distinct paragraph to the contrary, I should have said thus, They agree as regards the possibility of doing it on the morrow with the house of Hillel; and if he had let me hear only the first paragraph, I should not have doubted through hearing it only, that the house of Hillel say that men may sacrifice because it is impossible to do so on the morrow, but according to this I should have said, They agree as regards the impossibility of doing it on the morrow, with the house of Shammai. Hence the second paragraph was necessary.
R. Shimi bar Ashi deals with the matter thus. Up to this point our Rabbis disagree with R. Meir only as to the eating of the tithe, but as regards the touching of the tithe and the eating of common food they do not disagree. But suppose that both the one and the other refer to eating, and still there is no difficulty. The one has to do with eating bread, the other with eating fruits. For R. Nachman said, Every one who washes his hands for fruit is over scrupulous and affected.
He went out and speculated and found that there is a Baraitha, viz., If a man have dipped and have not credit, he is forbidden tithe, but is free for common food. R. Eliezer said, If he have dipped and gone up, he may hold himself fit for any thing that he desires. But they reply, If, while he had still one foot in the water, he considered himself fit for a smaller thing, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he had gone up, he may not any more consider himself fit. Don't you think that this means, that he may not consider himself fit for any thing at all? No; while he had still one foot in the water, although he considered himself fit for a smaller thing only, he may consider himself fit for a greater thing; if he have gone up, then, if he did not think of himself as fit for any particular thing, he may consider himself as fit, but if he did think of himself as fit for a smaller thing, he may not consider himself as fit for a greater thing. Who is the Mishnah teacher who says, While he had still one foot in the water? R. P'dath says, It is R. Jehudah, for there is a canonical Mishnah, If a collection of water is measured, and there are in it exactly forty seahs, and two men go down and dip one after the other, the first is clean, and the second is unclean. R. Jehudah said, If the feet of the first are still in contact with the water, the second also is clean (Mikvaoth, vi. 6). R. Nachman said that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement on the point among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis, but, if it is a case of passing from uncleanness to cleanness, all agree that the second also is unclean, and this is the opinion of R. P'dath. There are some who say that R. Nachman said, that Rabbah bar Abuah said, There is a disagreement as regards passing from uncleanness to cleanness, but among the weighty sayings of our Rabbis all agree that the second also is clean. And here there is a divergence from R. P'dath. Ola said,
R. Jonathan ben Amram said, A man's Sabbath clothes have been exchanged for his common clothes, and he has put them on; they are unclean. R. El'azar bar Zadok said, There was the case of two women, companions, whose clothes were exchanged at the baths, and the matter came before R. Eliezer and he pronounced them unclean. R. Oshaia objects to him, But regard it thus. It follows that if a man stretch out his hand to a basket to take a piece of wheaten bread, and there come into his hand a piece of barley bread, in this case also he is made unclean. And if thou sayest, Yes, in this case also; but yet there is a Baraitha, viz., He that guards the cask, presuming that it is wine, and it is found to be a cask of oil—it is clean so far as not to cause uncleanness. But granting that, let me point out the last words. But it is forbidden to be eaten. Wherefore R. Jeremiah said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards uncleanness, but not as regards separation. And what is the meaning of this securing in a half and half way? There is such a thing, and yet there is a Baraitha, If a man stretches out his hand into a basket, and the basket is upon his shoulder, and the scraper is inside the basket, and it is in his mind as regards the basket, but is not in his mind as regards the scraper, the basket is clean but the scraper is unclean. The basket is clean, you say. Does not the scraper make the basket unclean? No; for one vessel does not make another vessel unclean, but it may make unclean what is in the basket. Rabena said, This is the case of one who says, I have guarded it as regards its uncleanness, but not as regards its separation.
"'Refuge' was written at crossroads in order that the murderer would recognise it and turn to there [the cities]." Rav Kahana said: "What is [the meaning of] the verse: 'Prepare for yourself the road' (Deuteronomy 19:3)? Make for yourself preparations for the road." [The point is that "prepare"/"takhin" is a word that has multiple meanings. Rav Kahana is clarifying that it should be translated here as "prepare"].
So rather, what is the reason that [Rebbi Yochanon] retracted [his veiw]? Because he found [his veiw point] problematic with the case of a rapist [Ohneis] For it was taught in a barasiah An Ohneis who divorced his wife [in violation of the Torah's commandment], If he is a Yisroel [i.e. a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not receive malkus. If he is a Kohen, he receives malkus and doesn't take her back.
The Roman Missal
Gospel. St John iv. 46—53. At that time, There was a certain ruler whose son was sick at Capharnaum. He having heard that Jesus was come from Judea into Galilee, went to him, and prayed him to come down, and heal his son; for he was at the point of death. Jesus therefore said to him, Unless you see signs and wonders, you believe not. The ruler saith to him, Lord, come down before that my son die. Jesus saith to him, Go thy way, thy son liveth. The man believed the word which Jesus said to him, and went his way. And as he was going down, his servants met him, and they brought word, saying, that his son lived. He asked therefore of them the hour wherein he grew better. And they said to him, Yesterday at the seventh hour the fever left him. The father therefore knew that it was at the same hour that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house.